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[Courtesy of L'Asino] 

SEARCHING FOR PEACE 

If the German people want peace, they have only to 
straighten their backs. 



APPROACHES TO THE 
GREAT SETTLEMENT 




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^\<.p-' Racial & National Boundaries 

'Hipj I i hi-^- . - ^7> CENTRAL EUROPE 



MEDITERRANEAN SEA 



•./;^5??i.r^.n^^ 



X.Teutonic 



fOetman 
Dutch 
Flemish 
Scandinavian 



(French, Walloons d Spanish... 
Italian _....... 
Rumanian 



3. Slavonic 



a. Northern Slavs 



Russians 

Poles.. 

Ruthenes 

Czechs & Slovaks: 
f Slovenes 



b. Southern Slavs 1 Croats & Serbs. 
I Bulgars 



4. Letts & Lithuanians— 

(Turks.. 



5. Ural-Altaic stock 

6. Greeks 

7. Albanians 



I Magyar. 



National Boundaries.. 



Racial Boundaries.. 







!^^ 



, ^ ^ 



The object of this map is merely to present the broad outlines of racial 
distribution in Central and Eastern Europe. Any attempt to indicate 
the numerous racial minorities and scattered enclaves in Hungary and 
the Balkans would necessitate treatment on a far larger scale than 
the scope of the Round Table permits. 

Some af the racial boundaries in the Balkans are of necessity some- 
what arbitrary, in view of recent events. 

In order to help the reader's eye, the Teutonic districts have been left 
unshaded, while the Slavonic districts are shaded by sloping lines. 



From " The War and Democracy, " 
by R. W. Seton Watson and others 
Published by The Macmillan Co. 



APPROACHES TO THE 
GREAT SETTLEMENT 



By EMILY GREENE BALCH 



WITH A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOME OF THE MORE 

RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES DEALING 

WITH INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS 



INTRODUCTION BY 

NORMAN ANGELL 




PUBLISHED FOR THE 
AMERICAN UNION AGAINST MILITARISM 



NEW YORK 

B. W. HUEBSCH 

1918 



COPYEIGHT, 1918, BY 

B. W. HUEBSCH 






Ml 13 1918 



PRINTED IN V. a. A. 



©a A 



501148 



AUTHOR'S NOTE 

This brief objective account of the successive 
steps in approaching a settlement of the war begins 
with President Wilson's Peace Note of December, 
19 1 6, and closes with the various replies to the 
Pope's Note of August, 19 17. Mr. Angell's In- 
troduction refers to this same stage of proceedings. 

Although events have moved while the book has 
been passing through the press nevertheless It has 
more than mere historical Interest. To-day's events 
cannot be understood, nor the latest pronouncements 
as to peace terms intelligently weighed, without that 
background which this account aims to present. 

For Instance, the genesis of the Russian peace for- 
mula, the interpretation from different points of 
view of the phrases " no annexations " and " no in- 
demnities," the history of the attempted Stockholm 
Conference, successive pronouncements as to Alsace- 
Lorraine and the Colonies, are here set forth, sup- 
plying elements essential to an understanding of 
later phases. 

It is very difficult In war time to secure current 
material in satisfactory form. Originals are not 
accessible, and excerpts and translations (often ob- 
viously faulty) which appear in the daily press are in 
many cases the best that is to be had. The only 
way appeared to be to give these as they stand with- 
out attempted emendations. 



It was originally Intended to include the text of 
all the documents referred to, but for reasons of 
space this was found to be impracticable; it was 
therefore decided to retain only those of the Socialist 
and Labor groups, as being In general less readily 
accessible than State papers and official pronounce- 
ments. Of these last a reference list is Included 
showing where they can be found. 

All this, with Miss Angell's excellent bibliography, 
will, it Is hoped, prove of service and value to stu- 
dents of the problems involved in the great settle- 
ment, 

Emily Greene Balch. 
New York City. 
January, 191 8. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PART ONE 

PAGE 

Introduction by Norman Angell ... i 

CHAPTER 

I The German and American Peace Notes 
December, 1916. Their Antecedents 
AND the Discussion of Their Proposals 17 

II The President's Senate Address. The 

Break with Germany 35 

III The Russian Revolution: America's En- 

trance INTO THE War: Political Unrest 

in Germany 40 

IV Socialists and the War 51 

V Views of Russia and Her Allies ... 72 

VI Development of the Struggle in Ger- 
many: The Reichstag Resolution . 83 

VII Conferences . loi 

VIII The Pope's Note. Replies. Waiting on 

German Development 113 

IX The Settlement: Parties, Issues and 

Methods 125 



PART TWO 

SOCIALIST AND LABOR DOCUMENTS 

Appeal to the Socialists of the World, Issued 
BY THE Russian Council of Workers' and 
Soldiers' Delegates, May 15, 191 7 . . . .165 

Petrograd Appeal to Socialists and Labor Unions 
OF THE World 168 

Questionnaire of the Dutch-Scandinavian So- 
cialist Committee 170 

Memorandum of the German Majority Social- 
ists 172 

Memorandum of the German Minority Socialists 182 

Statement of the Austro-German Socialist 
Delegates 186 

Statement of the Hungarian Socialist Dele- 
gates 190 

Statement of the Bohemian Centralist Social- 
ist Party , 194 

Manifesto Addressed to the Dutch-Scandinavian 
Socialist Committee by MM. Vandervelde and 
DE Brouckere 196 

Italian Socialists' Proclamation 201 

Statement of the Finnish Socialist Delegation 206 

Declaration on Peace by Australian Labor So- 
cialists, June ii, 1917 208 

Joint Socialist Statement on the Refusal of 
Passports to Stockholm . 211 

Arnold Bennett on the Stockholm Conference 213 

A Proposed Program for the British National 
Council of Workmen and Soldiers . . . . 219 

British Labor Party Draft of a Program for 
London Inter- Allied Socialist Conference . 221 

The People's Council of America: Objects and 
Peace Terms 231 



Resolutions of the American Alliance for Labor 
AND Democracy 235 

National Nonpartisan League: Resolutions on 
the War 237 

Peace Terms Proposed by the Russian Council 
OF Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates for the 
Inter-Allied Conference 240 

PEACE PROGRAMS 

The " Minimum Program " of the Central Or- 
ganization FOR A Durable Peace .... 242 

Proposal from the Neutral Conference for Con- 
tinuous Mediation, Stockholm 244 

Program Prepared by the American Section of 
the International Committee of Women for 
Permanent Peace . 248 

The League of Nations Society 251 

Chamber of Commerce of the United States: 
Referendum on Peace 254 

Society to Eliminate the Economic Causes of 
War 256 

A German Petition to the Reichstag . . . .258 

Bund Neues Vaterland 259 

Manifesto of the Deutsche Friedensgesell- 

SCHAFT 260 

Statement by Dr. David Starr Jordan on the 
Terms of Peace 262 

Peace Program of the Union for Democratic 
Control 269 

Fabian Society: Proposed Articles of Settlement 276 

President Eliot's Proposal for a Peace Confer- 
ence 293 

Six Peace Programs: A Comparison of the Main 
Proposals 300 



REFERENCE LIST 
Other Sources Referred to in the Text . . . 307 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Compiled by Pauline K. Angell 

Some of the More Recent Books and Articles 

Dealing with the Problems of the 

Settlement 

I Questions of Territory and Nation- 
ality 315 

II Question of Seas and Markets . . . 341 

III Question of a League of Nations and 

Disarmament 346 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

Racial and National Boundaries in Central x 

Europe . Frontispiece J 

PACING 
PAOB 

President Wilson 18/ 

The Allies' Answer Rejoices Death .... 30/ 

The Russian Offensive 40, 

Albert Thomas 52/ 

Searching for Peace , . 60. 

Alexander Kerensky 72 

Erzberger and Helfferich 86 

Count Von Czernin 92/ 

Arthur Henderson 104 

Pope Benedict XV 114 

The Messenger 120 

Alsace-Lorraine 134 

Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George 144 

Lord Robert Cecil 156 

Philip Scheidemann 172 

Karl Liebknecht 182 

The Situation 202 

The Peace Tree 220 

Skobeleff 240/ 

J. Ramsay Macdonald 252 

To the Peace Palace 276 

A Difficult Problem 300 / 



INTRODUCTION 
By Norman Angell 

This book has a special interest for all who wish 
to help and not hinder the great international effort 
to destroy German militarism. 

One way to hinder that effort — a way in which 
many people who really want to assist are now 
actually hindering it — is to regard any preparation 
for the peace as inconsistent with the effective prose- 
cution of the war. 

The internationalist may, with no surrender of his 
creed, fully admit that American cooperation with 
the Allies is a necessary step towards an organized 
internationalism of the future. But American par- 
ticipation, and victory however complete, will fail to 
achieve the declared objects of the war, unless they 
are used to enforce the right policy. 

It is easy — and it is disastrous — to assume that 
all America needs to do is help defeat Germany; 
that German defeat will by itself cause the destruc- 
tion of German militarism. But to act on that as- 
sumption is to make it certain that the defeat of 
Germany will have no such result. The distinction 
between what is necessary, and what is enough, is 
in war-time particularly hard to establish. German 
defeat may be necessary: but it is not enough. 

Our military defeat of the German Government 

[I] 



will contribute to the future security of democracy 
if we can use it for the purpose of establishing, by 
some means, at some point, however slowly, an un- 
derstanding with the German people. But if we 
fail to use our victory for that purpose, if on the 
contrary we encourage the German people to go 
on supporting a militaristic Government, then the 
future of the world will not be for democracy but 
for that group which can militarize itself most suc- 
cessfully. 

" This I know," said Mr. Balfour recently in the 
House of Commons, " if Germany does not become 
free, Europe cannot become free." And in the 
same speech he made this further significant state- 
ment: " No one is foolish enough to suppose that 
it would be possible to impose on Germany a con- 
stitution made outside Germany." 

In order to destroy German militarism, then, 
something more than German defeat is required. 
The democratization of Germany is essential. And 
that democratization must come from within; force 
of foreign arms will not effect it. Upon the self- 
conversion of the German people from militarism, 
depends the future security of the whole world. 

If, further, it can be shown that our attitude, in 
America and in the Allied nations, is a large factor 
in the process which will result either in liberating 
the German people from the spell of militarism, or 
in attaching them more firmly to its rule — then a 
plain duty will have been set before all who wish to 
bring this war to a satisfactory conclusion. 

Our own attitude is a large factor in that process. 
But here we come upon a truth which, because it 
runs counter to our instinctive feelings, is likely to 
be taken as an attempt at paradox-mongering — a 

[2] 



thing silly enough at all times, but unpardonable in 
these. I beg the reader to believe that in what fol- 
lows I mean exactly what I say in this proposition. 

When a country goes to war, it usually proceeds to organ- 
ize the public expression of its popular opinion and feeling 
in such a way as to give the maximum of encouragement to 
the enemy, and the prolongation of his resistance to the 
utmost. 

This unconscious conspiracy in the enemy's interest has 
been particularly effective in the present war; it threatens 
to ensure the resistance of the enemy long after the period 
when, but for it, that resistance would break down ; and will 
certainly cost the Allied nations thousands of lives, and many 
conceivably cost them the victory. 

Those who make any attempt to stop this aid and com- 
fort to the enemy are regarded by the majority as traitors 
and anti-patriots, and every effort is made to keep their 
attempt from succeeding. 

There is, of course, in this unconscious conspiracy, 
no desire to aid the enemy or any knowledge that 
such aid is being given. It is set in motion by the 
need to satisfy certain " hungry emotions " ; and, as 
is the case with any emotion that has reached a high 
pitch of intensity, those who act in this manner are 
blinded to the ultimate results of their behavior. 

It Is especially important that the attention of 
Americans should be called to the workings of an 
Impulse which has wrought havoc among the moral 
and intellectual forces of the European Allies, since 
a similar phenomenon is already beginning to be 
manifest in this country. 

Let us examine, in this light, the present situation 
In our war with Germany. Is it not obvious, to be- 
gin with, that the facts which we regard as true 
about the origin and purposes of this war — that 

[3] 



it was on Germany's part an act of unprovoked and 
unjustifiable aggression; that no one threatened 
either Germany's national safety or her economic in- 
terests; that the German policy of which this war 
was the outcome was based on autocratic and dynas- 
tic ambition, and not on national welfare; that the 
Allies are fighting, not against any rights of the 
German people, but against the interests of a little 
group of ambitious men; that our aim is to make 
such tyranny impossible in the future, and to liberate 
all peoples, including the Germans — is it not clear 
that these facts have either been withheld from the 
German people or that they have been led to believe 
something of a contrary nature ? 

Suppose that what we believe to be true were so 
self-evident, even to the German people, that their 
government were obliged in effect to take this posi- 
tion: 

" The war Is not for the defense of the Father- 
land or its future; is not for the good of your 
country or for any great or noble end ; it is not even 
for your material welfare or for that of your chil- 
dren. It is from first to last for the personal ag- 
grandizement of that class whom most of you par- 
ticularly dislike, for the subjugation of the country 
to its interests and of your descendants to its rule. 
The vast suffering, the sacrifices, the death, the en- 
slavement, is all in order that Germany may con- 
tinue to be what you Socialists and Liberals have 
for generations tried to prevent it being. You shall 
die by hundreds of thousands in order that the ends 
for which you lived and worked shall be defeated." 

If that had been the situation as Germans see it, 
the German Government would not have been able 
to keep the war going a week. German mothers 

[4] 



would not still continue gladly to give their children, 
all their children; lads would not tie themselves to 
their machine guns — as our men have known them 
to do — so that when the hour of supreme tempta- 
tion came they would not fail to die at their posts. 

Those things are possible because the German 
people as a whole have been persuaded that if they 
are beaten their whole future as a people will be 
blighted, and their nation at the mercy of envious 
and resentful enemies. 

" The German people," says Lord Northcliffe, 
head of the British War Mission in America, writing 
in Current Opinion for October, 19 17, " have been 
purposely deluded into the belief that they are 
defending themselves against foes who are set upon 
crushing them out of existence." Lord Northcliffe's 
observation is confirmed by Mr. Gerard, ex-ambas- 
sador from the United States to Germany, in his 
book, " My Four Years in Germany " : " We are 
engaged in war against a people whose country was 
for so many centuries a theater of devastating wars 
that fear is bred into the very marrow of their souls, 
making them ready to submit their lives and for- 
tunes to an autocracy which for centuries has ground 
their faces, but which has promised them as the re- 
sult of the war . . . security." 

The German people as a whole — the great mass 
of the middle and upper classes, the merchants, man- 
ufacturers and traders, the University professors 
and students, the scientists, writers and journalists, 
even the majority of the Social Democratic party — 
take the view, however mistakenly, that the Govern- 
ment, notwithstanding its autocratic form, is fighting 
their battle, ensuring their security as a nation, es- 
tablishing their legitimate place and rights in the 

[5] 



world. And when the Kaiser declares, as he did 
the other day in addressing the troops on the West- 
ern front, " I need not tell you why you must hold 
on — it is that the Germany of your children may 
live," there can be no doubt that most of them be- 
lieve him. The power of the German Government 
to carry on the war, resides ultimately in the main- 
tenance of that conviction; and on its intensity de- 
pends the degree of German resistance. 

It is, plainly enough, to the interest of the Ger- 
man Government to represent the aims of the Allies 
with regard to Germany as intolerable; while on 
the other hand, it is to our interest to give to the 
German Government no grounds for such misrepre- 
sentation, no excuse for such misunderstanding. 
Indeed, it is our duty to make plain to the German 
people how near our aims are to their own desires. 

Is there anything questionable in this reasoning, 
anything indeed which is other than obviously true? 
Yet not only is its truth not realized by the general 
public of the belligerent countries (on either side), 
but any attempt to act upon it is immediately re- 
pressed and punished with extreme severity. Or- 
ganized and spontaneous efforts of private individ- 
uals and public officials alike are directed toward 
assisting In the maintenance of enemy resistance in 
the way just described. 

Take the question of the Press. The German 
Government maintains in Berlin a special Bureau 
whose duty it is to select from American, British, 
French and Italian papers just those paragraphs 
which would help persuade the German people that 
unless they hold out to the end their nationality will 
be destroyed; thus making use of assistance fur- 

[6] 



nished by the Allies for the maintenance of German 
morale.^ 

The Press of the Allied countries may be divided 
roughly into two groups: the group that favors a 
punitive and severe settlement with Germany, and 
the group that favors a milder one. It is, of course, 
the papers of the former group which the German 
Government uses for the purpose of its propaganda. 
The latter group is used by the Minority Socialists 
for the purpose of their propaganda — for the pur- 
pose of proving to the German people that the Ger- 
man Government is deceiving them in representing 
Allied intentions toward Germany as destructive. 
One might assume, in view of these facts, that the 
foreign circulation of this latter group — Socialist 
papers, or Liberal journals in favor of a moderate 
settlement — would be encouraged. In every case, 
however, it is these papers that the various Cetisor- 
ships prevent from going abroad, that they some- 
times suppress at home and always discourage. It 
is the former group, used by the enemy Govern- 
ments, that are imrriune from such prohibition or 
embarrassment. 

It is not merely a matter of official censorship, but 
of the public temper. Left to themselves, the Gov- 
ernments — who can hardly be ignorant of the serv- 
ices which these minority organs could perform, or 
of the woeful mischief that the chauvinist organs 
do — would scarcely pursue a policy which often is 

1 This was revealed in the Reichstag debate (see reports in the 
American press of Oct. 7) in which the Minister of War von Stein, 
replying to the accusation that the Government had been carrying 
on political propaganda in the army, said: "It is clear that our 
soldiers must be enlightened concerning the enemy's real intentioni 
and the consequences if lae lost." 

[7] 



quite obviously the exact contrary of the public in- 
terest. But public clamor compels them to adopt it. 

Dr. Helfferich, the German Minister, replying to 
a peace speech of the Socialist, Cohn, in the Reichs- 
tag debate of May 5, said: 

" The peace which you advocate does not mean 
bread, but hunger for our people. It does not 
mean liberty, It means slavery. That is not just 
my opinion. These are the words of our ene- 
mies. Just read their speeches and their newspa- 
pers. The Deputy Haase [of the Social Demo- 
cratic Minority] shakes his head. I know the news- 
papers which suit you deserve credit, but the others 
which do not suit you do not exist for you. I re- 
peat it, you need only look at the foreign press, and 
you will find no other peace suggested than one 
which would bring our German people slavery and 
serfdom. The other day I read in committee an 
article by the French Senator, Humbert, which 
closed with something like the following words: 
' This race of slaves dreaming of world-hegemony, 
must be made into slaves.' That Is the sort of peace 
which our enemies allow us and wish to give us. 
Such a peace can only be promoted through speeches 
such as Dr. Cohn's — a peace such as the German 
nation could not tolerate." 

Another Illustration Is afforded by an article, typi- 
cal of what may be read any day in the German 
press, in the Kolnische Zeitung of April 27. After 
quoting the kind of terms In which the British Press 
of the chauvinist school is so fond of indulging,^ the 
article goes on: 

1 This kind of thing: "The main conditions of peace are, first 
the complete dismemberment of the German Empire, its separate 
States each under the control of a governor to be nominated by the 

[8] 



" If any one amongst us believes that moderation 
or discernment exists in the ranks of our opponents, 
such a press opinion . . . should enlighten him 
thoroughly. Only a few days ago, the Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung pointed out the mis- 
take made by Social Democrats who hope to make 
an impression on the agitators in London and Paris 
by peaceful and moderate resolutions. Every one 
of our steps is watched — every wish for peace, 
every inclination to strike, every superfluous lament 
about shortness of food." 

In general it may be said: the more a paper, or 
a public man, or a proposed measure, serves the pur- 
poses of the enemy in this fashion, the greater the 
popularity of that paper, or man, or measure, at 
home.^ Few political personages have been so 
popular in England during the war as Mr. Hughes, 

Allies ... a war-indemnity charged upon the revenue ... no 
army or fleet . . . the German navy must be split up among Britain 
and her Allies . . . the German colonies divided among them . . . 
until the indemnity is paid, an army of occupation in the various 
German and Austrian States." — John Bull (two million circulation 
a week), London, Sept. i6. 

1 The Administration, following the precedent set by the Allied 
Governments in Europe, has laid down the rule that there should 
be no discussion of peace-terms. Such a "truce to controversial 
matter " is always one-sided. What it means in fact is, not that 
there shall be no discussion of peace-terms, but that there shall be no 
liberal contribution to that discussion. The Paris Economic Confer- 
ence was a discussion of peace-terms — of a most mischievous kind. 
There is plenty of discussion of peace-terms in America by the very 
persons who insist that they should not be discussed. Thus Mr. 
Roosevelt, at a meeting in Madison Square Garden, laid down 
elaborate peace-terms — "complete overthrow of Germany and the 
dissolution of Austria and Turkey," with such details as an inde- 
pendent Poland including "the whole Baltic coast" — whatever 
that may mean. There is to be no disarmament after the war. 
One doubts whether the Austro-German authorities could ask any- 
thing better for their purpose than a speech along just such lines 
from an ex-President of the United States. 

l9] 



the Australian Premier ; and the speeches which con- 
tributed to win him this popularity were those which 
subsequently the German Government is said to have 
translated and circulated in the German trenches to 
show the soldiers the kind of fate against which 
they were fighting. It was Mr. Hughes who was 
largely responsible for giving a Protectionist inter- 
pretation to the Resolutions of the Paris Economic 
Conference. The subject-matter of that Confer- 
ence had nothing whatever to do with the conduct 
of the war; it was concerned purely with after- 
the-war conditions. But nothing that the veriest 
pro-German could have devised, was so calculated 
to aid the enemy's propaganda. It enabled the 
German bureaucracy to declare that the real objects 
of England and " her dupes " — objects such as the 
destruction of German commerce — were now re- 
vealing themselves. It was not long after the 
Paris Conference that Bethmann-HoUweg, speaking 
through Alfred Zimmermann of the Foreign Office, 
said to Mr. Bayard Swope : " There can be no 
doubt as to what Germany is fighting for: it can be 
reduced to a one-word formula — Existence. . . . 
We fight for the right to live and earn our living, 
for which we must have room for commercial ex- 
pansion." Indeed, if we could imagine the Paris 
Resolutions being taken seriously, it would mean the 
riveting of militarism on Germany and the perma- 
nent conversion to it of the whole nation. 

Yet that Conference, which so played the game 
of the enemy, was imposed upon the British Gov- 
ernment by sheer force of popular opinion. 

All these manifestations were very natural and 
seemingly excusable surrenders to a deep-seated hu- 
[lo] 



man instinct. But there are circumstances when our 
salvation depends upon the control of strong natural 
instincts. It is " natural " for the thirst-maddened 
shipwrecked sailor to drink salt water. But unless 
he can control the instinct which urges him to satisfy 
his thirst, he will perish. The future salvation of 
our society depends upon a like discipline of certain 
of our instincts. 

The Governments of the Central Powers have 
realized that they can make the morale of their peo- 
ple almost impregnable if they can create a " de- 
fense psychosis." Any people, savage or civilized, 
will fight to the last against what it believes to be 
national annihilation. To continue to bolster up 
such a belief in the minds of the German people, is 
to-day the prime need of the German autocracy. 

And in that task the German and Austrian Gov- 
ernments have been greatly helped by the political 
and diplomatic strategy sometimes adopted by the 
Allied Governments. 

The Allied Governments, it is true, proclaimed at 
the beginning of the war that their major object was 
the destruction of German militarism, and the ag- 
gression and wickedness for which it stood. That 
was and remains the highest object of our arms. 
But we failed to make clear to the enemy what this 
meant. Did it mean that in the future Germany 
and Austria were to have no armies? How were 
they to protect themselves and ensure respect for 
their rights? On that point there was no declara- 
tion (there is still no declaration) . And this silence 
has enabled the enemy Governments to say to their 
peoples: " This talk of the destruction of German 
militarism really means that you are In the future 

[II] 



to be at the mercy of your enemies, and to be de- 
prived of any means of defending your Fatherland's 
rights and interests." 

It does not suffice that we have disclaimed the 
intention of destroying the German nation or of 
putting it at a disadvantage. No virile people will 
accept mere general declarations from its enemies 
as sufficient basis of its future security and rights. 
Mr. H. G. Wells — who will certainly not be ac- 
cused of pro-Germanism — wrote recently of this 
situation: 

" This is the argument that holds the German 
people stiffly united. For most men in most coun- 
tries it would be a convincing argument, strong 
enough to override considerations of right and 
wrong. I find that I myself am of this way of 
thinking, that whether England has done right or 
wrong in the past — and I have sometimes criticized 
my country very bitterly — I will not endure the 
prospect of seeing her at the foot of some victorious 
nation. Neither will any German who matters. 
Very few people would respect a German who 
would." 

Now the thing which would make it possible for 
Germans to repudiate German militarism and turn 
against the present German Government, would be 
some plan of reciprocal disarmament; or at least 
some real international organization which would 
furnish a possible, if distant, alternative to German 
military power as a means of national security. 
When Germans in the mass see in internationalism 
a means of defending German rights and interests, 
German militarism will be doomed. 

Meanwhile, it is to the interest of the German 
Government to prove to its people that we are not 

[12] 



sincere when we speak of such things as disarmament 
and arbitration. It wants to create the impression 
at home that it is wiUing to abandon militarism for 
international organization, but that when this plan 
is really offered to the Allied Governments they re- 
fuse to consider it. 

And that argument of the Central Governments 
will remain plausible if the debate is left in its pres- 
ent stage. The Central Powers have, in fact, made 
what will appear to their people a sincere offer to 
go into the questions of disarmament and arbitra- 
tion, of a new international order. Silence on our 
part will be interpreted as proof that we want to 
avoid any definite and practical discussion of the 
subject; that our previous talk was mere diplomatic 
camouflage. 

The situation must be reversed. We must show 
that we are serious in our desire for international- 
ism, on the basis of respect for the rights of all na- 
tions, small as well as great — not on the basis of 
the right of great States to override the will either 
of subject peoples or of their own peoples; and we 
must make it plain that in such a world the German 
people, like any other, would be secure. 

But there is a further reason why the German 
Government should wish at this juncture to prove 
that our talk of internationalism is insincere, and any 
attempt to realize world-arbitration impracticable. 
Its only hope of obtaining the support of its peo- 
ple to a program of annexations, is to show that 
such annexations are necessary to national security. 
While the Reichstag vote of July 19 makes it plain 
that the Government could never hope to secure 
popular sanction for annexations as part of a Pan- 
German or Industrialist policy, it might conceivably 

[13] 



do so as part of a policy of self-defense; by the 
argument that Germany has nothing to depend on 
but her own resources in men and materials, and the 
strength of her frontiers. 

The truth is that unless the problem of security, 
by means of some reasonably feasible plan of in- 
ternational organization, is on a fair way to solution 
before we come to deal with nationality and terri- 
torial readjustments, these latter will prove to be 
well-nigh insoluble. It is not alone the claims of 
the Central Powers that will make them so. Na- 
tions among the Allies are presenting claims which 
do violence to the principle of nationality. Most 
powers are moved by two great considerations: na- 
tional security and the need of economic expansion. 
These things, it is felt, must come first; and every 
nation will attempt to make sure of its own safety 
and rights by the increase of its power and territory 
— so long as a League of Nations, or other similar 
plan for preventing aggression of one nation upon 
another, is merely a vague possibility in the back- 
ground, and not a clearly-envisaged political reality. 

The Pope's note, together with the Austro-Ger- 
man reply, at least places the discussion for the time 
being on this major problem of security by interna- 
tional organization. It is to the interest of the 
United States, as of the Allies, not to let it slide from 
that plane. And for the purpose of forming a sound 
public opinion, upon which a wise diplomatic strategy 
can most securely be based, some intimate knowledge 
of the data so clearly analyzed and presented in this 
volume, is indispensable. 



[14] 



PART ONE 



APPROACHES TO THE 
GREAT SETTLEMENT 



CHAPTER I 

THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN PEACE NOTES 
OF DECEMBER, I916 

I. 

President Wilson's efforts to assist In bringing 
about a satisfactory ending of the present war date 
back to its very beginning. On Aug. 3, 19 14, six 
days after Austria had declared war on Serbia and 
the very day on which Germany invaded Belgium, he 
made a formal offer to mediate, which was formally 
declined. 

Early Peace Discussion. There followed sixteen 
months of inconclusive fighting. Then on Decem- 
ber 9, 19 1 5, the German Chancellor, von Bethmann- 
HoUweg, in a speech to the Reichstag, announced 
that Germany was ready for peace. This was un- 
derstood as an Invitation to a general preliminary 
discussion of peace terms, and it was in fact fol- 
lowed during the succeeding six months by a series of 
speeches and debates and interviews on the part of 
statesmen on both sides. 

The most significant of these were the debates in Parlia- 
ment of February 23 and May 24, 1916; the Reichstag 
debates of April 5 and 6; Sir Edward Grey's interview of 
May 15, and that of von Bethmann-Hollweg on May 22 

[17] 



in reply; the Reichstag debates of June 5 and 6, and von 
Bethmann-Hollweg's speech of November 9.^ 

The fact that an informal discussion of peace had 
been entered upon gave rise to the hope that the 
warring countries were approaching a common 
ground of agreement; and it seemed for a time as 
though this might be the case. But their mutual 
distrust was too profound,^ and in the end the dis- 
cussion came to nothing. 

During this discussion rumors of peace moves by 
the Pope and of mediation by the President of the 
United States were current in Europe, in connection, 
especially, with President Wilson's address of May 
15 before the Press Club. In this speech he said: 
" If somebody does not keep the processes of peace 
going, if somebody does not keep the passions disen- 
gaged, by what impartial judgment and suggestion 
is the world to be aided to a solution when the whole 
thing is over? " Five days later at Charlotte, N. C, 
he spoke of Americans as imagining themselves 
*" lifting some sacred emblem of counsel and of 
peace, of accommodation and righteous judgment, 
^ before the nations of the world." A few days later, 
in an address before the League to Enforce Peace, 
the so-called " Declaration of Interdependence," he 
stated, as a profession of faith, the principles upon 
which he was later to formulate a definite policy of 
international relations : 

1 These debates and interviews, except the last, for which see 
N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, may be found in Governments and Parlia- 
ments on Peace, a pamphlet published by the Nederlandsche Anti- 
Oorlog Raad, 51 Theresiastraat, The Hague. 

2 The Paris Economic Conference was held in April of that year. 
It proposed a " trade war after the war " against Germany. Brit- 
ish, French, Italian, Belgian, Servian and Russian delegates were 
present, and a program was adopted, which had, however, no bind- 
ing force upon their Governments. 

[18] 




Photo by Paul Thompson 

PRESIDENT WILSON 



First, that every people has the right to choose the sover- 
eignty under which it shall live ; 

Second, that the small States have the same right as the 
great to have their sovereignty and territorial integrity 
respected ; 

Third, that the world has the right to be free from hav- 
ing its peace disturbed by aggression and disregard of the 
rights of others.^ 

On this occasion, moreover, he foreshadowed the 
offer, made formally in his " peace note " of the fol- 
lowing December, of American participation in a 
league of nations to maintain peace. " If It should 
ever be our privilege," he said, " to suggest or Ini- 
tiate a movement for peace among the nations now 
at war, I am sure that the people of the United 
States would wish their Government to move along 
these lines " — namely, first, a settlement such as the 
belligerents may be able to agree on as regards their 
own Immediate Interests, with which we have noth- 
ing to do, and finally, " a universal association of the 
nations to maintain the Inviolate security of the high- 
way of the seas . . . and to prevent any war, begun 
either contrary to treaty covenants or without . . . 
full submission of the causes to the opinion of the 
world." 

The most propitious moment for such a move- 
ment seemed, perhaps, not yet to have arrived, and 
the President deferred further action until Decem- 
ber. 

2. 

Germany Proposes Peace Negotiations. In the 
meantime Germany made a new peace move. On 
December 9, 19 16, a year after his first suggestion 

1 For text see Independent, June 5, 1916. 

[19] 



of Germany's readiness to make peace, the Chan- 
cellor gave notice, at the reassembling of the Reichs- 
tag, of a proposal from the Central Powers to the 
Allies, to enter into peace negotiations. 

The Emperor, it was announced, " in a deep moral and 
religious sense of duty toward his nation and, beyond it, 
toward humanity," " considers that the moment has come 
for official action toward peace." It was soon afterward 
made known that this peace movement had its origin in a 
letter of the previous October, in which the Kaiser instructed 
the Chancellor to make all necessary arrangements for such 
a move without delay. In the meantime the Central Powers 
had made a successful campaign against Roumania, a fact 
which it was felt would leave no opportunity for the misin- 
terpretation of their peace offer as a confession of defeat. 

The official German peace note (December 12, 
19 1 6), addressed to the neutrals for transmission to 
the Allied governments, is quite brief. It says that 
the four Central Powers make the proposal to enter 
forthwith into peace negotiations. They firmly be- 
lieve that the propositions which they are prepared 
to bring forward for such negotiations are an ap- 
propriate basis for a lasting peace. " Their aims 
are not to shatter nor annihilate their adversaries." 
Their object is a guarantee for their nations of their 
existence, honor and free development. The note 
speaks of the war as having been forced upon the 
Central Powers, and calls attention to their military 
situation as demonstrating their invincibility. 

Germany's separate note to the Vatican, of the same date, 
is somewhat more specific in its indication of the aims 
which Germany was fightng to realize and which must be 
secured in a peace satisfactory to her. These are " the in- 
tegrity of her frontiers and the liberty of the German 
nation," and " the right which she claims freely to develop 
[20] 



her intellectual and economic energies in peaceful compe- 
tition and on an equal footing with other nations." This 
latter clause may refer to her conviction before the war — 
manifested notably in the Moroccan affair — that she was 
being systematically excluded from an equal chance at co- 
lonial expansion; or it may refer more particularly to the 
plans of the Paris Economic Conference for a trade war 
after the war against Germany, 

Allied Criticism of the German Peace Proposal. 
The German proposal was received coldly in all 
the Entente countries, both because of its failure to 
state definite terms, and becajjse of what was re- 
garded as Its insincerity. It was at once denounced 
on the latter grounds by Premier Briand in the 
French Chamber as " a crude trap," ^ Speeches In 
the parliaments of the Entente by Sonnino, Pokrov- 
sky, Henderson, Asquith, Lord Curzon, Bonar Law 
and Lloyd-George, revealed the unanimous convic- 
tion that no good results could be expected from a 
proposal which showed no sense of wrong-doing on 
Germany's part, which contained no hint of repara- 
tion for such wrong-doing, and offered no guarantee 
against Its repetition. These views were summed 
up by Lloyd-George, speaking for the first time as 
Prime Minister, on December 19: "Let me re- 
peat again — complete restitution, full reparation, 
effectual guarantees. Did the German Chancellor 

1 A view which later events were held to substantiate. " In the 
light of subsequent events it seems most probable that the German 
peace offer was ... a scheme to place the Allies in a diplomatic 
dilemma; if the Allies consented to negotiate, seeds of dissension 
might be sown among them; if the Allies brusquely rejected the 
offer, the German government in continuing the war would then 
stand justified in the eyes of the German people and might resort 
to extreme measures, ruthless submarine warfare, for instance." — 
Edward M. Salt and Thomas Parker Moon in the Political Science 
Quarterly Record of Political Events, Sept., 1917 (Supplement). 

[21] 



use a single phrase to indicate that he was prepared 
to concede such terms? . . . The very substance 
and style of the speech constitutes a denial of peace 
on the only terms on which peace is possible." ^ 

The first official reply to the German note from 
any Entente country came from Russia, in the shape 
of a Duma resolution unanimously passed Decem- 
ber 15. It was understood in this country that her 
allies had urged Russia to take advantage of this 
occasion to put an effectual quietus to the rumor that 
she was disposed to desert the Entente and make a 
separate peace. The Duma states that " it con- 
siders that a lasting peace will be possible only after 
a decisive victory, and after the definite renunciation 
by Germany of the aspirations which render her re- 
sponsible for the world war and for the horrors by 
which it is accompanied." 



President Wilson's '' Peace Note." It was in the 
midst of this unpromising situation that President 
Wilson's "peace note" of December 18 most un- 
expectedly appeared. Apparently the President had 
been contemplating this move for some time, waiting 
for the opportune moment; then the German peace 
note was interjected into the diplomatic situation. 

^ Lloyd-George proceeds to quote in substantiation of this state- 
ment a passage from the German note which is amazingly different 
from the version printed in this country. In neither version does 
the passage make good sense. The State Department, in response 
to a request for a copy of the original or of an ofBcial version, 
replied that they have no copy of the German note for distribution. 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in its useful 
collection of reprints and documents, has recourse only to the Neio 
York Times for its version of this and various other important 
state papers. 

[22] 



Secretary of State Lansing explained, in the note as 
sent to the AUies, that " The suggestion which I 
am instructed to make, the President has long had 
it in his mind to offer. He is somewhat embar- 
rassed to offer it at this particular time, because it 
may now seem to have been prompted by the recent 
overtures of the Central Powers. It has, in fact, 
been in no way suggested by them in its origin, and 
the President would have delayed offering it until 
those overtures had been independently answered, 
but for the fact that it also concerns the question of 
peace and may best be considered in connection with 
other proposals which have the same end in view. 
The President can only beg that his suggestion be 
considered on its own merits and as if it had been 
made in other circumstances." 

The full grounds of the President's action are of 
course not public property; but the situation was that 
Germany showed herself not ready to state her terms 
except in a peace conference, and that the Entente 
seemed likely to answer in such a way as to close the 
door on peace discussion for an indefinite period. 
This may have led him to feel that he could delay no 
longer if he was to have any hope of success.^ 

Request for a Statement of Peace Terms. The 
President's note suggested to all the belligerents the 
advisability of making avowals " of their respective 
views as to the terms upon which the war might be 

1 Further light may or may not be thrown on the President's 
decision to make his offer at this particular time, by the statement 
of Secretary Lansing, on December 2i, that the country was " draw- 
ing nearer the verge of war," and was therefore " entitled to know 
exactly what each belligerent seeks." This alarming statement, 
which created a frantic sale of war-stocks, was followed the same 
day by a reassurance from Secretary Lansing that he " did not 
intend to intimate that the Government was considering any change 
in its policy of neutrality." 

[23] 



concluded, and the arrangements which would be 
deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal 
or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future," 
such avowals, moreover, " as would make it pos- 
sible frankly to compare them." 

The President, it is carefully stated, " is not pro- 
posing peace; he is not even offering mediation. 
He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in 
order that we may learn, the neutral nations with 
the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may 
be for which all mankind longs with an increasing 
longing." 

" It may be," he points out, " that peace is nearer 
than we know; that the terms which the belligerents 
on one side and on the other would deem it neces- 
sary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some 
have feared; that an interchange of views would 
clear the way at least for conference, and make the 
permanent concord of the nations a hope of the 
immediate future. . . ." He reminds them that 
" the concrete objects " for which the war is being 
waged " have never been definitively stated," and 
that such aims as have been adduced by the belliger- 
ents, " as stated in general terms to their own people 
and to the world," are " virtually the same." 

Common Ground. This common ground of as- 
piration, " as stated in general terms," is as follows: 
" Each side desires to make the rights and privileges 
of weak peoples and small States as secure against 
aggression or denial in the future as the rights and 
privileges of the great and powerful States now at 
war. Each wishes itself to be made secure in the 
future, along vnth all other nations and peoples, 
against the recurrence of wars like this and against 
aggression or selfish interference of any kind. Each 
[24] 



would be jealous of the formation of any more rival 
leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power 
amid multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to 
consider the formation of a league of nations to 
insure peace and justice throughout the world." 

He directs their attention toward the necessity of 
immediately taking all possible steps toward this or- 
ganized peace, in words of eloquent warning which 
have already taken rank among the great utterances 
of mankind: " If the the contest must continue to 
proceed toward undefined ends by slow attrition 
until one group of belligerents or the other is ex- 
hausted; if million after million of human lives must 
continue to be offered up until on one side or the 
other there are no more to offer; if resentments 
must be kindled that can never cool, and despairs 
engendered from which there can be no recovery, 
hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free 
peoples will be rendered vain and Idle." 

Promise of American Participation in a League of 
Nations. And finally, in the great work of es- 
tablishing such a universal peace-league, he offers the 
participation of the United States. " In the meas- 
ures to be taken to secure the future peace of the 
world, the people and Government of the United 
States are as vitally and as directly interested as the 
Governments now at war. Their interest, more- 
over, in the means to be adopted to relieve the 
smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril 
of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that 
of any other people or Government. They stand 
ready, and even eager, to cooperate in the ac- 
complishment of these ends, when the war is over, 
with every Influence and resource at their com- 
mand." 

[25] 



Discussion of the Note. This note met with a 
variety of response, as was indicated by the discus- 
sions which preceded the formal replies of the bellig- 
erent Governments. In the United States, the Pres- 
ident's hearty promise of American cooperation in 
a League of Nations did not meet with unanimous 
favor. A resolution expressing approval of the 
President's note, introduced into the Senate, precipi- 
tated much adverse criticism. It ran counter to the 
feeling widely held in the Senate that it would be 
unwise for the United States to leave her traditional 
isolation and impair in any degree her independent 
power and sovereign self-direction by entering a 
mutually responsible society of nations. In the end, 
the President's note was endorsed only so far as it 
was a request for a statement of peace-terms. 

The neutral nations, to whom the note was also sent for 
their information and with a request for their support, re- 
sponded with cordiality, but in the main without assent 
beyond vague general terms, to the proposal of a League 
of Nations.^ 

Central Powers' Reply to the President. Of the 
belligerents, the Central Powers were the first to 
answer the President's note. Their replies, sent 
December 26, were all practically to the same effect. 
They did not state their peace-terms, but proposed 

1 The Scandinavian countries addressed to the belligerents a 
joint note in support of the President's request for a statement of 
peace-terms. Switzerland took the same action, and also declared 
her willingness to help " lay the foundation for a fruitful collabora- 
tion of the peoples." Spain preferred to " suspend action." Persia 
and Greece took occasion to plead their own cases. China ex- 
pressed her readiness to cooperate in the international organization 
suggested by President W^ilson. 
[26] 



" an immediate meeting of delegates of the belliger- 
ent States at a neutral place." They were " also of 
the opinion that the great work of preventing fu- 
ture wars can be begun only after the end of the 
present struggle of the nations." When the time 
for such work shall have come, they will " be ready 
with pleasure to collaborate entirely with the United 
States in this exalted task." 

Joint Reply of Allies to German Note. The Al- 
lies' reply to the President's note was postponed 
until eleven days after their reply to the German 
peace-proposal, discussion of which it had inter- 
rupted. Attention was now turned to the Allies' 
joint reply of December 30 to the German proposal. 

The reply showed resentment at what was re- 
garded as the claim of victory in the German note, 
and asserted that the military successes to which 
that note alluded represented " nothing more than 
a superficial and passing phase of the situation, and 
not the real strength of the belligerents." It ac- 
cused the Central Powers of falsely disclaiming re- 
sponsibility for the war, and argued the point at 
length. It characterized the German proposals as 
" sham offers," *' empty and insincere " — constitut- 
ing in fact " a war-manceuvre," an attempt " to jus- 
tify in advance in the eyes of the world a new series 
of crimes " including unrestricted submarine war- 
fare. The Allies "refuse to consider" such pro- 
posals. " Once again the Allies declare that no 
peace is possible so long as they have not secured 
reparation of violated rights and liberties, recogni- 
tion of the principle of nationalities, and of the free 
existence of small States; so long as they have not 
brought about a settlement calculated to end, once 
and for all, causes of long-standing menace to the 

[27] 



nations, and to afford the only effective guarantees 
for the future security of the world." 

Russian Demands. Specific terms Insisted upon 
by Russia were stated in a general order by the Czar, 
December 25, as follows: "the regaining of Con- 
stantinople and the Dardanelles, as well as the crea- 
tion of a free Poland from all three of her now 
incomplete tribal districts " — in addition to guar- 
antees against repetition of aggression by the Cen- 
tral Powers when " finally broken." 

Central Powers in Criticism of the Allies. The 
Central Powers retorted to the Allies' reply in a 
statement of their case addressed to the neutrals. 
Notes from Germany and Austria, January 11, 
19 1 7, protest against the "falsification of their 
motives " In offering peace; present their own views 
as regards responsibility for the war; and undertake 
to show that the moral pretensions of the Allies are 
hypocritical. " The sincerity which our enemies 
deny to the proposal of the four allied [Central] 
Powers can not be allowed by the world to these 
demands [of the Entente Allies] if it recalls the fate 
of the Irish people, the destruction of the freedom 
and independence of the Boer Republics, the sub- 
jection of Northern Africa by England, France and 
Italy, the suppression of foreign nationalities in 
Russia, and, finally, the oppression of Greece, which 
Is unexampled In history." The plans of the Allies, 
" according to the statements of their responsible 
statesmen, are directed, among other things, toward 
the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine and several Prus- 
sian provinces, the humiliation and diminution of 
Austria-Hungary, the disintegration of Turkey, and 
the dismemberment of Bulgaria. In view of such 
war-aims, the demand for reparation, restitution 
[28] 



and guarantees in the mouth of our enemies sounds 
strange." 

5- 

Allied Reply to President Wilson. The Allies, 
having answered the Central Powers on December 
30, turned to reply to the note of President Wilson. 
A joint official reply was transmitted from Paris on 
January 10, 19 17. It was supplemented by a Bel- 
gian note of the same date, expressing gratitude for 
America's moral support and material aid, and 
noting with pleasure America's intention of co- 
operating in post-bellum measures to guarantee the 
rights of small nations. 

The joint note expresses cordial appreciation of 
the idea of a league of nations to be formed after 
the war, with some emphasis on the necessity of 
penalties to give it force. The Allied Governments 
believe that there is no present possibility of a peace 
assuring them of reparation, restitution, and the 
guarantees to which the aggression of the Central 
Powers entitles them. Their war-aims are stated 
to be well known, having been " formulated on many 
occasions by the chiefs of their divers Govern- 
ments." These aims " will not be made known in 
detail, with all the equitable compensations and in- 
demnities for damages suffered, until the hour of 
negotiations. But the civilized world knows that 
they imply, in all necessity and in the first in- 
stance " — 

( I ) " restoration 

of Belgium, 
of Servia, 

and of Montenegro, 
and the indemnities which are due them " ; 

[29] 



(2) " evacuation of the invaded territories 

of France, 
of Russia, 
and of Roumania, 
with just reparation " ; 

(3) " restitution of provinces or territories 

wrested in the past from the Allies by 
force or against the will of their popu- 
lations"; 

(4) " hberation from foreign domination 

of Italians, 
of Slavs, 
of Roumanians, 

and of Tcheco-Slovaques " {i.e., 
Bohemians and Slovaks) ; 

(5) " enfranchisement of populations subject 

to the bloody tyranny of the Turks," 
and " expulsion from Europe of the 
Ottoman Empire, alien as it is to 
Western Civilization " ; 

(6) as to Poland, "the intentions of His 

Majesty the Emperor of Russia . . . 
have been clearly indicated in the proc- 
lamation which he has just addressed 
to his armies " {i.e., the creation of a 
" free Poland " from Russian, German 
and Austro-Hungarian territory). 
These aims also imply a " reorganization of 
Europe " founded upon 

(a) " respect of nationalities, and full security 

and liberty of economic development " 
for all nations, great and small; 

(b) "international agreements" which would 

" guarantee territorial and maritime 
frontiers against unjustified attacks." 

[30] 




[Courtesy of the New York Times Current History Magasinel 

THE ALLIES' ANSWER REJOICES DEATH 

[Dutch Cartoon] 



But, while reiterating the " wish to liberate 
Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian 
militarism," the Allies disclaim any design to com- 
pass " the extermination of the German peoples and 
their political disappearance." 

A British note amplifying the joint reply was sent (Janu- 
ary 13) by Balfour. It was a reasoned plea on behalf of 
the Allies' terms. Three conditions were stated as neces- 
sary for an enduring peace. ( i ) That existing causes of in- 
ternational unrest should as far as possible be removed or 
weakened. (2) That the aggressive aims and unscrupulous 
methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute 
among their own peoples. (3) That international law, and 
treaties for preventing or limiting hostilities, should be 
backed up by some form of international sanction " which 
would give pause to the hardiest aggressor." These con- 
ditions could only be fulfilled by the success of the Allied 
cause. 

Particular reference is made to the proposed expulsion of 
the Turks from Europe, which, it is said, " will contribute 
as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace- 
Lorraine to France, of Italia Irredenta to Italy, or any of 
the other territorial changes indicated in the Allied note." 

Italian Claims. The claims of Italy were more 
particularly specified by the Italian Minister of In- 
struction, Ruffini, in a speech on January 14. 
American public opinion would not, he was sure, 
" confound brutal lust of conquest with a justified 
claim to territories like those of the Trentino, Istria 
and Dalmatia." ^ 

1 The Italian claim to Dalmatia has been severely criticized. 
According to the census of 1910, only 2.8 per cent, of the popula- 
tion of Dalmatia were Italian-speaking. Only in Zara were there 
any considerable number, 11,768 out of 83,359. It has been esti- 
mated that it is safe to add 10 per cent, to the Austrian statistics of 
Italian population, in which case the Italian claim, so far as it 

[31] 



Japanese Claims. A Japanese appendix to the 
peace-terms of the Allies was revealed January 23, 
in a speech by Viscount Motono, Japanese Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. " The Imperial [Japanese] 
government, when they adhered to the project of 
the response to the American note, knew that the 
Allied Powers had not neglected to take into proper 
consideration the just claims which Japan would 
present at the peace negotiations. ... A most 
satisfactory understanding exists on this subject 
among all the Allies." The nature of these claims 
is suggested by another sentence in his speech, in 
which he says that the absence, in the Allies' joint 
note, of any reference to " the further disposition 
of the German colonies has justly attracted the at- 
tention of the Japanese public." That document, 
he reminds his people, " by no means contains all 
the conditions of peace." 

British Discussion of Allied Peace-terms. The 
question of what was implied in the Allies' answer 
to the President was raised in the House of Com- 
mons on February 20. Mr. Ponsonby, of the- 
Union of Democratic Control, complained that the 
reply was in direct conflict with the assertion that 
this was not a war of aggression. " We entered 
into the war most undoubtedly for the protection of 
small nationalities but we seemed to be prosecuting 
it now for the extension of large empires." He 
pointed out that territory amounting to 1,500,000 
square miles had already been added to the empire. 
The note implied the break-up of Austria-Hungary 
and the dismemberment of Turkey. As for punish- 

concerned " unredeemed " Italians, would be based on a percentage 
of 3.08. See Dominian, Leon, " The Frontiers of Language and 
Nationality in Europe" (Holt, 1917), p. 76, note. 

[32] 



ing Germany, " Our extreme demands only crushed 
the moderate party and united the whole nation to- 
gether under the most extreme party." 

Mr. Snowden " regarded the minimum conditions 
of peace as the complete restitution of Belgium and 
of the conquered territories of France, and ade- 
quate compensation." 

Mr. McNeill thought that " whilst the last thing 
this country desired was to increase our imperial 
responsibihties or acquire territory it did not follow 
that ... it might not be necessary to transfer ter- 
ritory from the enemy to ourselves or our domin- 
ions, or to our Allies." 



Germans Blame Allies for Continuance of War. 
On January 6, the German and Austrian Emperors 
issued orders announcing the Allies' refusal and 
laying upon them the blame for the continuation of 
the war. They had " dropped the mask," said the 
Kaiser, and " admitted the lust of conquest." 

The German reaction to the Allies' terms as 
stated to President Wilson, is given specifically in 
a comment on January 15, by Zimmermann, Ger- 
man Minister of Foreign Affairs: 

" There is not a German who would not rather 
die than see the accomplishment of the announced 
intention of the Entente Powers with respect to 
Germany, to see German provinces with predomi- 
nant German populations torn from the German 
Empire, and United Germany, which our fathers 
labored to achieve, torn asunder and the country 
reduced, as the Allies have plainly announced as 
their ambition, to a condition of subjection to rival 
great powers of Europe. 

[33] 



" The conditions for Austria-Hungary are even 
more difficult. Its dismemberment to satisfy the 
passion for territorial aggrandizement of Russia, 
Italy, Serbia, and Roumania, would leave the State 
not even a third-rate power, while who can say 
what would be the fate of the ' redeemed small 
nationalities ' when brought under the sway of Rus- 
sia? Bulgaria, of course, would be bitterly pun- 
ished and Turkey would practically cease to exist 
if the plans, contemplated in the Entente's answer, 
were attained." 



[34] 



CHAPTER II 

THE president's SENATE ADDRESS 
THE BREAK WITH GERMANY 

I. 

With the statement of the Allies' war alms and 
the German rejection of such terms, it seemed once 
more as though discussion had reached a dead end. 
The President' s Senate Address. The situation 
was, however, abruptly altered by President Wil- 
son's dramatic appearance on January 22 before 
the Senate and his great " peace without victory " 
address. 

He notes that in reply to his request for terms: (i) 
The Central Powers state merely their readiness for confer- 
ence. (2) The Entente Powers have stated "with suf- 
ficient definiteness to imply details " what they regard as 
"indispensable conditions of a satisfactory peace." '(3) 
The statesmen on both sides " have said, in terms that could 
not be misinterpreted," that it was " no part of the purpose 
they had in mind to crush their antagonists." (4) In every 
discussion it is taken for granted that there must hereafter 
be " some definite concert of power which will make it vir- 
tually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever over- 
whelm us again." 

His purpose is now to formulate the conditions 
upon which the Government would feel justified in 
asking the American people to approve its formal 
adherence to a League for Peace. 

[35] 



His thesis is that though the United States can 
not decide what the peace-terms are to be, it may 
decide whether or not they shall be made lasting by 
international agreement. 

What Peace America Would Help Assure. 
Further, American cooperation in guaranteeing 
peace must depend on the character of the peace 
settlement. Therefore the United States should 
state at once what kind of peace it will help to make 
permanent. 

Accordingly he named these specific conditions: 

First, it must be a " peace between equals " : 
both sides have said that it was no part of their 
purpose to crush their antagonists; ^ 

Second, it must be a peace founded on " equality 
of rights " among nations, irrespective of their size 
or strength; 

Third, it must be a peace based on the acceptance 
of the principle that Governments derive all their 
just powers from the consent of the governed: the 
acceptance of which principle would imply the in- 
violable security, henceforth, of life, of worship, 
and of industrial and, social development to all peo- 
ples who have lived hitherto under the power of 
Governments devoted to a faith and purpose hos- 
tile to their own — and, as a single further instance, 
the existence of a united, independent and autono- 
mous Poland; 

Fourth, so far as is practicable, every great peo- 

1 These assurances imply, President Wilson goes on to say, " a 
peace without victory." This phrase, especially when taken apart 
from the explanatory passage which followed it, was the subject 
of much critical comment by the belligerents and their advocates. 
It was only gradually that the speech came to be appreciated as a 
whole and in its true perspective as a piece of constructive states- 
manship. 

[36] 



pie now struggling towards a full development of 
its resources and of its powers should be assured 
— either by cession of territory or by neutralization 
of rights of way — of direct access to the sea; 

Fifth, freedom of the seas, with whatever 
changes of international law may be required to as- 
sure that freedom " in practically all circum- 
stances " ; 

Sixth, limitation of armaments, military and 
naval. 



Discussion of the Senate Address. This address 
was widely recognized as the first formulation, with- 
in the sphere of practical statesmanship, of that 
world-order which has long been pursued as an 
ideal. 

Nevertheless, in the discussion which it provoked, 
both at home and abroad, there was some tendency 
to regard it in an immediately partisan light. 

In the United States Senate, a resolution calling 
for discussion was tabled by a strictly party vote. 

The first expression of oflfilcial European opinion 
came from the Russian Foreign Office. It specifi- 
cally approved the President's position on access to 
the seas, limitation of armaments, Polish freedom 
and no crushing of the enemy. 

German Note of January 57. Germany's re- 
sponse was contained in an official note under date 
of January 31, in which she formally expressed her 
acceptance of: 

Self-government and equality of rights of all 
nations; 

Freedom of the seas and open door; 

Repudiation of competing alliances; 

[37] 



Repudiation of effort to destroy or annihilate 
enemies. 

With regard to Belgium she stated that " the Chancellor 
had declared only a few weeks previously that its annexa- 
tion had never fonned part of Germany's intentions. The 
peace to be signed with Belgium was to provide for such 
conditions in that country, with which Germany desires to 
maintain friendly neighborly relations, that Belgium should 
not be used again by Germany's enemies for the purpose of 
instigating continuous hostile intrigues. Such precaution- 
ary measures are all the more necessary as Germany's ene- 
mies have repeatedly stated, not only in speeches delivered 
by their leading men, but also in the statutes of the Eco- 
nomic Conference in Paris, that it is their intention not to 
treat Germany as an equal, even after peace has been re- 
stored, but to continue their hostile attitude, and especially 
to wage a systematic economic war against her." 

She expressed her readiness to cooperate in all 
efforts to prevent future wars. 



The Submarine Notification. The note express- 
ing this degree of agreement with the President's 
proposal was the note announcing an unrestricted 
submarine campaign. 

This decision of Germany's seemed under the cir- 
cumstances doubly a tragedy for mankind. The 
President's address, after the first difficulties of par- 
tisan misinterpretation, had evoked an Increasing 
enthusiasm among liberals throughout Europe. 
There was a growing appreciation of the signifi- 
cance of this desire to lift the world-struggle to a 
plane of conscious and unselfish effort on which con- 
structive statesmanship could achieve permanent re- 
[38] 



suits. The German note cut square across all such 
high debate. 

American attention now concentrated on the vary- 
ing phases of the situation which the threat of un- 
restricted submarine warfare had created — armed 
neutrality, the delegation of special powers to the 
President, and ultimately the declaration of war. 

While the country was still upon the brink of 
war, the President, in his inaugural address, re- 
peated in even more emphatic terms the proposi- 
tions of his address before the Senate, as " the 
things we shall stand for whether in war or in 
peace." 

President Wilson's Inaugural Address. Feeling 
that " some of the injuries done us have been intoler- 
able," nevertheless " we have still been clear that we 
wished nothing for ourselves that we were not ready 
to demand for all mankind — fair dealings, justice, 
the freedom to live and be at ease against organized 
wrong. . . . We desire neither conquest nor ad- 
vantage. We wish nothing that can be had only 
at the cost of another people. We always pro- 
fessed unselfish purpose, and we covet the oppor- 
tunity to prove that our professions are sincere." 



[39] 



CHAPTER III 

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 

AMERICA'S ENTRANCE INTO THE WAR 

POLITICAL UNREST IN GERMANY 

I. 

A NEW and powerful element of change, profoundly 
modifying every aspect of the situation, revealed 
itself in the Russian Revolution. 

The Coming of the Revolution. Milyukov gave 
warning in the Russian Duma, in his speech of 
February 28, 19 17, of the storm that was to break 
a week later. 

" When the nation finds that, in spite of all its 
sacrifices, its destinies are being endangered by a 
clique of incompetent and corrupt rulers, then the 
people become a nation of citizens; they become 
determined to take their case into their own hands. 
Gentlemen, we are approaching that point." 

"Separate Peace" Repudiated. On March 12 
the Duma met in defiance of Imperial orders. On 
the 15th the Czar abdicated. With the fall of the 
Romanoff regime, there was swept completely from 
power that pro-German element of the Russian 
bureaucracy whose activities had caused in Allied 
councils so much fear of Russian defection. One 
of the first actions of the revolutionary Government, 
under the temporary leadership of the Milyukov 
[40] 



ministry, was the definite repudiation both of a 
separate peace and of desire for conquest.^ 

Almost immediately, however, the Milyukov 
ministry was revealed as out of sympathy with the 
revolutionary masses. The middle-class liberalism 
of Milyukov's party had in fact shared the political 
and diplomatic theory of current European prac- 
tice, and was not prepared for so complete an aban- 
donment of national ambition, especially of the de- 
sire to secure Constantinople and the Dardanelles, 
as the workers' and soldiers' party demanded. 
Neither did the two parties feel alike about the sep- 
aratist movements of the Ukraine and non-Russian 
parts of the Empire. 

Socialist Terms of Peace. Milyukov resigned on 
May 1 6 and the power came into the hands of 
Kerensky and the moderate Socialists. This group, 
like that of the extreme Socialists, naturally de- 
sired peace — not a separate peace for Russia, but 
a world-peace effected by revolutionary working- 
class action in all nations. Already, within two 
weeks after the Revolution, the Petrograd Council 
of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates announced that 
" the time has come to begin a decisive struggle V 
against the imperialistic designs of all countries; the ' 
time has come for the peoples to take the settling of 
the question of war and peace into their own hands." 

In accordance with this policy, a definite program 
was formulated — the famous " Russian peace for- 
mula," which was thus stated editorially in the Bui- ^ 
letin of the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Sol- 
diers' Delegates. 

" The laboring masses of Russia stand for a ter- 

1 For the declarations of April 9 and May 19 as to foreign policy, 
see note i, p. 72-3. 

[41] 



mination of the war without any conquests, without 
imposing contributions, and with the recognition of 
the free development of nations." ^ 

For Russia this meant that " we give up the in- 
tention of conquering Constantinople, Galicia, Ar- 
menia, and are granting complete Independence to 
Poland. The other peoples of Europe should fol- 
low our example, and the causes and the very pos- 
sibility of war will be removed." 

With the imperialistic ambitions of the old re- 
gime, these spokesmen of new Russia discarded also 
the desire for a " decisive victory " over their foes 
— to whom instead they turned with the appeal to 
*' throw off the yoke of your semi-autocratic 
regime," and " unite to end the terrible butchery, 
and reestablish and strengthen international unity." 

These were the views of Russia as voiced by 
the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates. 
Meanwhile the government under the leadership of 
Kerensky, agreed upon an opportunistic foreign and 
domestic policy. 

Plan to Secure a General Peace. The hope was 
to bring pressure to bear upon the Allies and to se- 
cure a general adoption of the Russian peace-for- 
mula : and this policy was expected either to bring 
about a general and satisfactory peace, or. If the 
German military bureaucracy refused to accede to 
such terms, to provoke a revolution in Germany. 

1 This took the brief popular form of " No annexations, no in- 
demnities, free development for all nationalities." It is interesting 
to note that this coincides in substance with the " Terms of Peace 
at the Close of the Present War," as drafted by the National 
Committee of the American Socialist Party, in May, 1915. Those 
terms read: "(i) No indemnities. (2) No transfer of territory 
except upon the consent and by the vote of the people within the 
territory. (3) All countries under foreign rule to be given political 
independence if demanded by the inhabitants of such countries." 

[42] 




THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE 



But in order to be in a position to bring pressure 
upon the Allies it was necessary for Russia to fulfill 
what the AUies understood to be her obhgations. 
What may be called the Kerensky plan was to back 
up, with powerful and effective military operations, 
the request to the Allies for adherence to the Rus- 
sian peace-terms. 

From the Russian point of view, the Allies' response 
to the Russian renunciation of imperialistic conquest and 
aggrandizement, was inadequate. President Wilson's note 
to Russia,^ made public June lo, was a bitter disappointment. 
It might have been over-sanguine to expect more than a 
tardy and gradual conversion of her allies to these terms, 
but it appeared to Russian public opinion that the Re- 
public vv^as being treated with a coldness never manifested 
to the Czar. 

Meanwhile the Kerensky plan for a powerful blow at the 
Central Powers was proceeding under heavy difficulties. 
Aside from the activities of German agents with their prop- 
aganda of a separate peace, and the sincere conviction of 
many extremists that a separate peace would afford Russia 
her best opportunity to enjoy the blessings of proletarian com- 
munism, there was the huge fact of disorganization to cope 
with. Added to the chaos inherited from a corrupt and 
inefficient bureaucratic regime, was the tumult and con- 
fusion of a social and industrial revolution. Under these 
circumstances, the apparent lack of official sympathy from 
the Allied Governments for the aims, or even for the diffi- 
culties of Russia, could not but stimulate that process of 
independent thought so disastrous to the morale of an army. 
The great Russian blow, having been launched early in 
July, failed of its purpose. And with it the Kerensky plan 
was for the time at least frustrated. 

1 This and other Allied discussion of the Russian peace-terms will 
be found in Chap. V, p. 72 sq. 

[43] 



Effect of Russian Revolution on International Sit- 
uation. In renouncing imperialism and with it the 
traditional role of menace to Germany, Russia had 
weakened the position of German military bureau- 
cracy. At the same time, by appealing over the 
heads of rulers to the peoples, and especially to the 
highly organized Socialists with their international- 
ist principles, it had become an embarrassment not 
only to Germany but to its Allies. On the other 
hand, the fall of the Autocracy relieved the Allies 
of an embarrassment both political and moral, and 
— in spite of Japan, Roumania and other undemo- 
cratic Governments — gave further substantiation 
to their claim to be fighting for democracy. 

Perhaps its most momentous effect was exercised 
on American destinies. All that lay back of the de- 
cision of the President to urge the immediate entry 
of the United States into the war, will not be known 
till history gives up its secrets; but it was in 
the chronological sense at least a consequence of the 
Russian Revolution. The press may or may not 
have been right in representing that the United 
States had had to replace Russia. Undoubtedly 
the democratization of Russia made it much easier 
for America to join the Allies. 

American War-aims. On April 2, President 
Wilson appeared before a joint session of Congress 
to ask for a declaration of a state of war with Ger- 
many. He took the occasion to pay tribute to " the 
wonderful and heartening things that have been 
happening within the last few weeks in Russia." 
He stated that the United States would fight " for 
democracy," for the rights and liberties of small 

[44] 



nations, — for a " universal dominion of right by 
such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace 
and safety to all nations and make the world itself 
at last free." In subsequent addresses he repeated 
and emphasized his pledge of our national disinter- 
estedness. 

The Flag Day Speech, a bitter indictment of the 
German bureaucracy, with especial reference to the 
Mittel-Europa plan and the " intrigue for peace," 
amplifies a distinction earlier made between the 
German ruling class and the German people — with 
whom we " have no quarrel." Austria, as well as 
the German people, is stated to be a victim of the 
German rulers. " Its people now desire peace, but 
cannot have it until leave is granted from Berlin." 

News of the Russian Revolution Reaches Ger- 
many. The influence of the Russian Revolution on 
Germany was immediate, if not as profound as had 
been hoped. It provoked a violent parliamentary 
discussion of German peace terms and re-opened 
the old question of political reform. 

In the Prussian Diet, on March 14 — the day 
preceding the formal abdication of the Czar — 
occurred the first of many stormy scenes, in which 
the Socialists In particular were outspoken in their 
attacks on German militarism. One of them, 
Adolph Hoffman, declared: "We shall refuse to 
vote for the budget. Chancellor von Bethmann- 
HoUweg is merely the fig leaf of military absolut- 
ism. Militarism bears the responsibility for the 
blood-shed in Europe, and only when militarism and 
despotism are removed will the people breathe 
freely. Force of arms will not lead to a decision 
and peace. Distress, desperation, and general col- 
lapse will do it. 

[45] 



" When both enemies are equally strong, the 
threat of crushing is sheer nonsense. Germany, de- 
spite many successes, has not conquered. The Ger- 
man peace proposal, with its tone of victory, was 
bound to cause vexation and distrust. She should 
have communicated her peace terms and thereby 
have dissipated her enemies' distrust. 

" The revolution in Russia should be a warning 
to our rulers. The German submarine warfare is 
opposed to the laws of humanity and international 
law." 

On March 22 there was a similar storm, this time 
in the Reichstag. An indication of the temper of 
the times was the election of Franz Mehring, a 
member of the minority, or anti-war group of the 
Socialists, to fill Liebknecht's seat in the lower house 
of the Prussian Diet. On April 5, von Bethmann- 
Hollweg made a speech on peace-terms which was 
applauded by the Liberals, Socialists, and most of 
the Catholic Center, the Pan-Germanists and annex- 
ationists remaining silent. 

Reichstag Debates Peace-terms. A parliamen- 
tary " drive " was under way in which it seemed for 
a time that the Chancellor would be compelled to 
reveal the German peace-terms. The crisis came 
on May 15. Scheidemann, of the Majority Social- 
ists, declared: " On both sides the nations are be- 
ing put off with the promise of an imminent final 
decision [decisive victory]. It is our task to ex- 
pose this playing with the life of peoples, and we 
cry to all Governments, ' it is enough! ' " 

Speaking for the Socialists, he repeated that they stood 
for " the territorial integrity of Germany and her eco- 
nomic independence and development," and against the 
oppression of foreign peoples. " We are convinced that the 
[46] 



Central Powers will stand fast in repelling intentions of an- 
nihilation, but also that the wishes of the French, English 
and German annexationists will not be realized. Thus 
think the Socialists, and millions are with us. 

" The supporters of conquest shout for increase of power, 
increase of territory, money and raw material. That can 
only be wanted by a nationally organized gang of robbers," 
(This statement provoked a storm of indignation on the 
Riglit.) " The drawing of the Kaiser into this agitation 
has as a result that abroad the Kaiser is made responsible 
for Pan-German madness and the outbreak of war, and 
that he is continually being insulted. 

" Peace by agreement would be good fortune for Europe. 
Ninety-nine per cent, of all the peoples look with hope and 
longing to Stockholm. If France and Great Britain re- 
nounce annexation and Germany insists thereon, we shall 
have a revolution in the country." This brought " pro- 
longed shouts of indignation and cries of ' Shame ! Stand 
Down ! ' " Herr Scheidemann was called to order, but con- 
tinued. 

" It has not gone so far as that yet; the enemy does not 
renounce annexation. A peace just to all parties should be 
concluded. I am firmly convinced that no peace can be 
concluded without an alteration of frontiers, and that must 
be arranged by mutual understanding. I am bitterly opposed 
to the slaughter of another million men simply because cer- 
tain Germans desire peace that would follow conquests. 
Long live peace! Long live Europe! " 

The Chancellor was at the same time challenged 
by the Conservatives to make " a clear reply " 
which would show that Germany had not renounced 
annexations and indemnities. Dr. Roesicke, for in- 
stance, brought forward the tactical objection that 
to announce a policy of renunciation " gives our 
enemies a charter to prolong the war without risk- 
ing anything." 

The Chancellor' s Non-committal Policy. Under 

[47] 



this pressure from both sides, It was hoped, not only 
in Germany but throughout the world, that the 
Chancellor would reveal the German terms. This 
he categorically refused to do. 

" Does any one believe, in view of the state of mind of 
our western enemies, that they could be induced to conclude 
peace by a program of renunciation? 

" It comes to this. Shall I immediately give our western 
enemies an assurance which will enable them to prolong the 
war indefinitely without losses to themselves? Shall I tell 
these enemies : ' Come what may, we shall under all cir- 
cumstances be people who renounce: we shall not touch a 
hair of your head. But you want our lives — you can 
without any risks continue to try your luck? ' 

" Shall I nail down the German Empire in all directions 
by a one-sided formula which only comprises one part of the 
total peace conditions and which renounces successes worT 
by the blood of our sons and brothers and leaves all other 
matters in suspense? No. I will not pursue such a 
policy. 

" Or ought I, conversely, to set forth a program of con- 
quest. I decline to do that ... we did not go forth to 
war and we stand in battle now against almost the whole 
world, not in order to make conquests, but exclusively 
to secure our existence and to establish firmly the future 
of the nation. A program of conquest helps as little as a 
program of renunciation to win victory and the war. 

" On the contrary, I should thereby merely play the game 
of hostile rulers and make it easier for them further to de- 
lude their war-weary peoples into prolonging the war im- 
measurably." 

The Chancellor referred to the possibility of a separate 
peace with Russia, on terms which would leave in the Rus- 
sian nation " no germs of enmity." Nevertheless, Lede- 
bour, a Minority Socialist, still maintained that the Chan- 
cellor desired " annexations both in the East and in the 
West." 

[48] 



On May 17 the Reichstag was adjourned, with- 
out any definite statement of the German peace- 
terms having been secured. 

Demand for Political Reforms. The campaign 
for political reforms was equally inconclusive. 

Demands for internal reforms had long been pressed, and 
not by Socialists alone. As early as the spring of 191 6, it 
was understood in the Reichstag that the abolition of the ob- 
jectionable three-class system of voting for the Prussian Diet, 
awaited only the end of the war. This three-class system, 
which gave an inordinate representation to the landlord and 
capitalist classes, was the more disliked in contrast with the 
thoroughly democratic Reichstag suffrage. The Reichstag 
constituencies, however, badly needed redistricting, for the 
growth of cities had left their masses of voters inadequately 
represented ; but as such redistricting would have increased 
the Socialist representation and decreased that of the Junkers, 
it had been resisted by the Government. Another main 
point of attack was the position of the ministry, which, 
unlike that of Great Britain and France, is not responsible 
to the legislative body. The Bundesrath, or Upper House, 
moreover, is made up of appointees of the rulers of the sev- 
eral States of the Empire, so apportioned as to give Prussia 
effective control. These, and perhaps also the super-consti- 
tutional prerogatives of the Kaiser, are the long-standing 
objects of attack by German constitutional reformers. 

Promises and Delays. The " party-truce " 
which had been agreed upon at the beginning of the 
war, stood in the way of these domestic changes. 
Parliamentary discussion of them was, however, 
precipitated by the Chancellor himself, who, seek- 
ing perhaps to calm waters troubled by news of the 
Russian Revolution, declared before the Prussian 
Diet on March 14 that there must be reforms. 
Nevertheless he was forced by Junker opposition to 
retract this decision a few days later. Ledebour, 

[49] 



who openly advocates a German Republic, declared 
that " the Reichstag must have the right to a voice 
in the conclusion of alliances, peace treaties, and 
declarations of war. The Imperial Chancellor 
must be dismissed when the Reichstag demands it." 
On March 30 a resolution was passed by a vote of 
227 to 33, appointing a committee on Constitutional 
reform. On April 7, the day after America's dec- 
laration of war, the Kaiser published his " Easter 
note " In favor of reform and especially of reform 
of the Prussian Diet; not to take effect however 
" until the time of the homecoming of our warriors 
when they themselves are able to join in the counsel 
and the voting on the progress of the new order." 
The Reichstag adjourned without having secured 
anything more than this.^ 

1 The relation of political reform in Germany to peace has been 
made a close one by President Wilson's reply to the Pope, in which 
the possibility of peace is made to depend on the effectual democra- 
tization of the German Government. 



[50] 



CHAPTER IV 

SOCIALISTS AND THE WAR 



The Socialist view of the causes of war is one 
which must be recognized as tending to bring the 
working-people of the warring countries closer to- 
gether, by giving them a sense of their common in- 
terests; while at the same time accentuating in each 
country the line of cleavage between economic 
classes. 

Socialist View of the Causes of War. This 
" accepted Socialist view as it has gradually evolved 
from 1866, when the subject was first discussed in 
the Congress of the old International in Geneva, 
until 1907, when the International Congress at 
Stuttgart formulated the most complete and author- 
itative Socialist expression on war and militarism," 
is tersely stated by Morris Hillquit: 

" The Socialist diagnosis of the causes of mod- 
ern wars may thus be summed up in one sentence : 
The basic cause is capitalism; the contributory 
causes are imperialism, militarism, social unrest, in- 
ternational grudges, and pseudo-patriotism." 

Formerly this view might have seemed doctrin- 
aire in its aloofness from nationalistic sentiments; 
now, with the oifficial sanction of revolutionary 
Russia, it has become a matter of practical moment, 



since it may profoundly affect the ultimate peace- 
settlement. 

The problem of war has been one of the chief con- 
cerns of Socialist thought, and a definite program of 
action had been worked out, with respect both to 
preventing it so far as that might be possible, and, 
in case such efforts proved fruitless, to bringing 
about a satisfactory peace. 

Duty of Socialists in Regard to War. The latest 
International Socialist Congress held at Copen- 
hagen in 19 10, in " reiterating the oft-repeated duty 
of Socialist representatives in parliaments to com- 
bat militarism with all the means at their command 
and to refuse the means for armaments," specified, 
in terms that are in themselves a peace program, 
what it required of Socialist representatives. They 
must constantly strive toward: 

( 1 ) compulsory arbitration of all interna- 

natlonal disputes; 

(2) ultimate complete disarmament — and, 

as a first step, limitation of naval ar- 
maments and, abrogation of privateer- 
ing, by a general treaty; 

(3) abolition of secret diplomacy, and publi- 

cation of all international agreements; 

(4) guaranty of all nations against military 

attack or suppression by force. 

2. 

In general this program was pushed to the full 
extent of Socialist powers. It had, however, been 
feared for some time that the spirit of international- 
ism was waning in the most powerful and highly 
organized of all the Socialist national groups, that 

[52] 




Photo by Paul Thompson 

ALBERT THOMAS 

Leader of the Socialists in the French Chamber 
of Deputies 



of Germany. The Socialist members of the Reichs- 
tag had been drawn into the nationalistic current of 
thought. Their action in voting credits, when the 
war broke out, shattered the International for the 
time being. 

Socialist Efforts to End the War. Nevertheless 
since that time Socialists have been doing what they 
could toward carrying out the other part of their 
program, ' that of bringing about a satisfactory 
peace. Within a month or so of the beginning of 
the war, both the Swiss and American Socialist 
parties endeavored to convene a special Socialist In- 
ternational Peace Congress, but without success. 

Dutch-Scandinavian Socialists. In January, 
19 1 5, however, the Dutch and the three Scandina- 
vian Socialist parties held a conference at Copen- 
hagen. The invitation to this conference stated the 
following objects: "To influence the opinion of 
the peoples in neutral countries in such a way that it 
shall be exerted in favor of a settlement which will 
guarantee a lasting peace, and, further, to strive for 
a united effort to secure : 

( 1 ) that no changes of frontiers shall take 

place at the end of the war by which 
the right of self government by the na- 
tions shall be lessened; 

(2) the restriction of military armaments; 

(3) the establishment of a responsible Inter- 

national Arbitration Court. 

" The parliamentary groups of the Socialist par- 
ties which take part in the Conference will be asked 
to lay addresses before the governments of their 
respective countries urging that they should take 
steps to bring about the finish of the war, perhaps 

[53] 



through the joint action of all governments of neu- 
tral states." 

Troelstra, the veteran Dutch Socialist who attended, had 
been in favor, at a meeting held in Holland on January 2, of 
two additional points: 

( 1 ) Abolition of the right of capture at sea ; 

(2) The opening of all colonies to all the powers. 

As finally adopted, the manifesto was amplified by further 
demands for parliamentary control of foreign policies and 
no secret diplomacy. It also protested in regard to Bel- 
gium. 

The London Conference. In February, 19 15, 
the London Conference of Representatives of So- 
cialist and Labor parties in Great Britain, France, 
Russia,^ and Belgium, met under the presidency of 
Keir Hardie. They adopted resolutions declaring 
that inasmuch as a victory for German imperialism 
would be the destruction of liberty and democracy 
in Europe, they were inflexibly determined to fight 
till victory was achieved. They demanded for Bel- 
gium liberation and compensation, for the Polish 
problem the solution desired by the Polish people, 
and for populations annexed against their will, from 
Alsace to the Balkans, that they shall be allowed 
freely to dispose of themselves. They ascribed 
the war to " the policy of colonial dependencies and 
aggressive imperialism," and declared against de- 
fense developing into conquest. At the close of the 
war the working class, they held, must unite in the 
International to suppress secret diplomacy, end the 
interests of armament-makers, etc., and establish an 

1 An instance of the international spirit was afforded by the re- 
fusal of the delegates from one of the two Russian Socialist parties 
to vote on the ground that the Socialists of Germany and Austria 
should have been invited to participate. 

[54] 



international authority to compel peace and main- 
tain compulsory arbitration. 

British Socialist Eforts Toward Peace. The 
British Socialist Party, meeting soon after in con- 
ference, held that only " a democratic federation of 
the states of Europe will put an end to the present 
ruinous form of militarism and imperialism," and 
declared against the cry for " a fight to a finish " 
and in favor of " an immediate peace on such terms 
as will prevent the repetition of a similar war." 

The Independent Labor Party at its annual meet- 
ing at Norwich, April 5, 19 15, also declared for an 
immediate peace. Ramsay MacDonald declared 
that the war ought not to be carried further than 
the political point when the forces of democracy in 
Germany were liberated and prepared themselves 
to crush their own militarism, and thus place Euro- 
pean peace on a firm foundation. 

Vienna Conference of Socialists. The Socialists 
of Germany and Austria-Hungary at a meeting in 
Vienna the same month (April 12-13), adopted a 
resolution in favor of peace based on international 
arbitration, the right of peoples to decide their own 
destiny, democratic parliamentary control of 
treaties, and international agreement to move to- 
ward ultimate disarmament. 

This is practically identical with the program of 
the (British) Union of Democratic Control, 
adopted in the autumn of 19 14; and, with the ad- 
dition of the " open door " demand, it is identical 
with the " minimum program " of the international 
Central Organization for Durable Peace formed in 
Holland in April, 19 15. 

American Socialist Peace Program. A more ex- 
tended peace program was resolved on by the So- 

[55] 



cialist Party of America in May, 19 15. This em- 
bodies four of the five articles of the " minimum 
program," with more or less amplification. The 
chief points (re-arranged as to sequence) follow: 

I. No transfer of territory except by vote of its people: 

political independence to be given, on the demand 

of the inhabitants, to countries under foreign rule. 

II. Abolition of secret diplomacy and democratic control 

of foreign policies. 

III. " International Federation, the United States of the 

World." 

(a) An international Congress with legislative and 

administrative powers over international af- 
fairs and with permanent committees, in place 
of present secret diplomacy. 

(b) Special commissions to consider international 

disputes as they may arise, the decisions of 
such commissions to be enforced without re- 
sort to arms; each commission to go out of 
existence when the special problem that called 
it into being is solved. 

IV. Disarmament. 

(a) Universal disarmament as speedily as possible. 

(b) Abolition of manufacture of arms and munitions 

of war for private profit, and prohibition of 
exportation of arms, war equipment and sup- 
plies from one country to another. 

(c) No increase in existing armaments under any 

circumstances. 

(d) No appropriations for military or naval purposes. 
V. The " Open Door " plank is missing, but in its place 

is a demand for 

(a) International ownership and control of strate- 

gic waterways such as the Dardanelles, the 
Straits of Gibraltar, and the Suez, Panama 
and Kiel canals. 

(b) Neutralization of the seas. 

U6] 



Terms of German Socialists. These programs 
should be compared with the terms officially advo- 
cated by German Socialists as reported in the New 
York Times of August 26, 19 15. These terms 
were the outcome of a conference of members of 
the Party Committee of the Socialist Party of Ger- 
many with the Socialist members of the Reichstag 
— where the SociaHsts hold iii seats out of 397, 
being the largest single party — and are thus the 
views of responsible legislators. 

I. Annexations are opposed. 

Germany's opponents must not be permitted to ac- 
quire any German territory. — Austria and Turkey 
should not be weakened. — Annexations by Ger- 
many of foreign territory would violate the rights 
of peoples to self-government, and weaken the in- 
ternal strength and harmony of the German na- 
tion. 
II. Economic clauses. 

Tariff barriers should be removed. — " Most fa- 
vored nation " clauses should be introduced into 
peace terms with all belligerents. — Freedom of the 
seas, the abolition of the right of capture and in- 
ternationalization of straits of importance to the 
world's commerce should be secured as far as 
possible. 
III. An international court should be established, to which 
all future conflicts should be submitted. — Peace 
must be permanent and lead nations to closer rela- 
tions. 

South German Social-Democrats. Proposals of 
South German Social-Democrats were both more 
radical and more detailed. They proposed : 

I. The status quo ante, or a plebiscite in disputed terri- 
tories — in which are included by name the f ol- 

[57] 



lowing German holdings, Alsace-Lorraine, Schles- 
wig, Trentino; and on the other side, Finland and 
the Baltic provinces. Poland is also specified, but 
it is not clear what territory is meant, whethec 
Russian Poland only, or also Galicia and the Pol- 
ish parts of Prussia. 
II. For internationalization they specify the Bosphorus, 
the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal, Gibraltar, and 
the Kiel canal. 

III. No indemnities. 

IV. Confederacy of all European States; with further de- 

tails regarding international parliaments, police, 
and law courts for minor international offenses. 
Alliance of all against aggression. 
V. People's army for defense only, limitation of arma- 
ments, and, finally, demands for democracy at 
home. 



Zimmerwald Conference. In September, 19 15, 
a much more important step was registered in a So- 
cialist Conference at Zimmerwald in Switzerland at 
which representatives from both sides met.^ This 
was repeated at the Kienthal, or second Zimmer- 
wald, conference the following April.^ The men 
who braved public opinion to meet their " enemies " 
were of course members of the more radical group 

1 The Zimmerwald conference was not the first occasion at which 
delegates from both sides came together during the war. A meeting 
of Socialist women was held at Berne in April, 1915; and later 
in the same month the International Conference of Women was 
held at The Hague where English, Belgians, Germans, Austrians, 
Hungarians and neutrals met under the presidency of Jane Addams. 
The Hague meeting resulted in the formation of the International 
Committee of Women for Permanent Peace, with headquarters at 
Amsterdam. 

2 Held April 24-30; forty delegates attended, including Italians, 
Swiss, Russians, and Germans, among them the editor of Forivdrts. 

[58] 



beginning to make itself heard within the belligerent 
countries; men who, like Liebknecht, refused to for- 
sake the international point of view even in war- 
time. 

The " Zimmerwald position " is not so much in- 
ternational as regardless of political nationalism. 

" All Socialist parties are to wage revolutionary war 
against the Government of their country, to refuse all war- 
credits and war supplies, and, with the battle-cry of ' Down 
with the War ! ' to demand ' immediate peace without annex- 
ations.' " Socialists should not, however, be indifferent to 
political any more than to economic oppression. On the 
contrary they are urged to " defend themselves by class-war- 
fare against all forms of national oppression, to oppose all 
exploitation of the weaker nations, and to demand the safe- 
guarding of national minorities and the autonomy of all 
peoples upon the broadest democratic basis." They chal- 
lenge the idea that international organization on the basis of 
capitalism holds out any hope.^ 

The Zimmerwald manifesto was signed among 
others by Ledebour of the German Reichstag, the 
French Socialist Bourderon, and the Russian Lenin, 
who has been so conspicuous a figure in the Russian 
Revolution. 

Socialist Split in Germany. The highly disci- 
plined Social-Democratic Party of Germany, whose 
political watchword had been unity, finally in April, 
19 1 6, split into two groups on the war and peace 
issue. The more conservative, with the larger num- 
ber of Socialist party members in the Reichstag but 
probably fewer in the party membership, under the 
lead of Philip Scheidemann became known as the 
" Majority " or " Patriotic " Socialists. The " Mi- 

^ See Eduard Bernstein's article of August 19, reprinted in Neiv 
Europe, September 20, 1917. 

[59] 



nority " or " Independent " Socialists not only had 
hosts of supporters but for some time controlled 
Vorwdrts, with its immense circulation and prestige. 
It included men like Haase, Ledebour, and Eduard 
Bernstein.^ 

In the United States. In the United States the 
split came later, but was well marked at the Socialist 
Party Emergency Convention at St. Louis, April 7- 
14, 19 17. The American Socialists then found 
themselves forming into two distinct groups. Their 
views were expressed in a majority and minority 
report on the war; but in this case the majority were 
the radicals, and their report with its uncompromis- 
ing condemnation of America's entry into the war 
was adopted by a referendum vote of 21,639 to 
2,752. 

This action led to the resignation from the party of some 
of its most prominent members, including William English 
Walling, Graham Phelps Stokes, Charles Edward Russell, 
J. G. Ghent, John Spargo, and Upton Sinclair, mostly, it is 
interesting to notice, not of the working class. The Party 
was thus left in the hands of the radicals. 

The radical position seems to be taken by the of- 
ficial Socialist Party not only in the United States 
but in Norway, Sweden, Holland and Italy. It 
also dominates the two English Socialist Parties 
but not the English Labor Party. Among French 
Socialists the radicals are a minority, but an impor- 
tant minority controlling the Paris organization and 
about 45 per cent, of the party. 

1 See Bernstein's account of the split under date of April 30, 1916, 
in the Neiu Republic, Septenaber 23, 191 6. 



[60] 



International Socialist Bureau. With the out- 
break of the war the International Soclahst Bureau, 
established at Brussels, with the Belgian Camille 
Huysmans as Secretary, ceased for a time to func- 
tion. It was later, however, transferred to The 
Hague, where It was under the direction of the 
Dutch Socialists. In August, 191 6, the Executive 
Committee began to lay plans for a more represent- 
ative International conference of socialists than had 
yet convened. In January, 19 17, the Executive 
Committee of the Socialist party of America made 
an urgent appeal to the Bureau for such a Confer- 
ence. Danes, Norwegians and others also urged 
it. 

Invitation to Stockholm. The place finally de- 
cided on was Stockholm, and Invitations were sent, 
not only to all the Socialist parties represented in 
the International Bureau, but to all the minority 
parties formed since the war. 

The conference encountered extreme difficulties. It was 
originally scheduled for May 15, but the American dele- 
gates asked a postponement. By April 26 the Dutch dele- 
gates, including Troelstra, President of the International 
Socialist Bureau, began to arrive. The Belgian, Camille 
Huysmans, secretary of the Bureau, who as a belligerent 
could not cross German territory, went by sea as a steward 
in a freighter, and arrived May 2. Stauning, a Socialist 
member of the Cabinet of Denmark, Troelstra, Hjalmar 
Branting, the Swedish Socialist leader (whose pro- Ally sym- 
pathies are outspoken), were kept busy denouncing as lies 
the newspaper charges that the meeting was instigated by 
Germany. 

In Russia, the conference had official backing. 
As early as March 29, an editorial in the Bulletin 

[61] 



of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Dele- 
gates had proposed such a conference. " Let the 
representatives of the working classes work out the 
terms of peace. . . . We shall not trust irrespon- 
sible diplomats and rulers with the question of 
peace." 

Russian Appeal for Conference. On May 9 in 
Petrograd the Executive Committee of the Council 
of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates voted to ap- 
peal to the peoples of the world to call a peace con- 
ference. They also decided to send a delegate to 
Stockholm to confer with the Socialist delegates 
there, to send delegates to neutral and allied coun- 
tries to further the peace movement and to urge So- 
cialists in all countries to demand that their govern- 
ments give free passage to delegates. 

Gorky's paper said the Russians would go to such an in- 
ternational conference whether the British and French went 
or not and Skobeleff, Minister of Labor under Kerensky, 
said that for the sake of restoring the International and stop- 
ping the war he was willing to meet not only Scheidemann 
but " the devil and his grandmother." 

All the while there was constant newspaper talk 
of " German peace manoeuvres." The Borgbjerg, 
Grimm and Hoffman episodes raised a cloud of sus- 
picion which the ever-repeated Russian disclaimers 
of any idea of a separate peace could not easily 
allay.^ 

The " Branting Conversations." The confer- 
ence was declared opened on May 13. There was 
no regular assembly, but the representatives of bel- 
ligerent countries gave their views to members of 

1 The interpretation put upon the Stockholm Conference by the 
pro-Ally, pro-war Socialists in the United States, is given pp. 79-80. 

[62] 



the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee, particularly, 
apparently, to Branting. There was thus a very 
important exchange of ideas, and Scheidemann es- 
pecially seems to have gone home with a conviction 
that the irresponsible character of the German Gov- 
ernment and the consequent lack of confidence in it, 
was a prime obstacle to peace. Huysmans' view 
was that peace depended largely on the ability of 
" our German comrades " to force their govern- 
ment to come out clearly for no annexation. He 
explained that " when we say ' peace without indem- 
nities ' we consider it understood that Belgium must 
be reestablished and that its material losses must be 
made good. We do not look upon that as indem- 
nity." Branting said that this view was shared by 
all who participated in the conference. 

These " conversations " seemed so successful a 
beginning, that the Russian Council of Workers' 
and Soldiers' Delegates issued a formal call ^ to all 
Socialist parties and the chief labor organizations of 
the world to meet at Stockholm between June 28 and 
July 8 ; later the date was changed to August 15. 

Meanwhile the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist 
Committee issued a questionnaire ^ addressed to the 
different national Socialist groups. 

The German Socialist Majority, in their reply, 
accepted the Russian peace-formula, and explained 
the sense in which they understood it: 

German Majority Views. No annexations implies an in- 
dependent Belgium and return of colonies. 

Indemnities [evidently understood to mean war contri- 
butions] are repudiated. Reparation of damages should be 

1 This will be found on p. i68. 

2 See p. 170. 

[63] 



not by one side. International financial assistance can be 
provided where needed. 

The right of nations to dispose of themselves applies not 
only to Belgium but to Finland and the Poland of the Con- 
gress of Vienna \_sc. Russian Poland]. 

For settlement of the Serbian and Balkan questions refer- 
ence is made to the statement of the Austrian Socialists 
(given belov^r). 

Sympathy is expressed with the desire for freedom from 
domination of Ireland, Egypt, Tripoli, Morocco, India, Thi- 
bet, Corea. 

The case of Alsace-Lorraine is argued at length from 
the German point of view, concluding in favor of more free- 
dom within the German Empire. 

There is an outspoken pronouncement in favor of freedom, 
within the state, of national minorities, with specific refer- 
ence to Danish, French, and Polish speaking inhabitants of 
Germany. 

There are moderate provisions in regard to international 
arbitration, military service, methods of warfare and safe- 
guards of commerce during war. 

The memorandum comes out for the " open door," free 
trade, free travel, democratic control of treaties. 

" The main problem, however, for international Social- 
ism is to bring about peace as soon as possible." ^ 

" Minority " Memorandum. The German Mi- 
nority memorandum, which also stood for peace on 
the Russian formula, is briefer and more radical.^ 

Serbia must be reestablished as an independent self-gov- 
erning state. The idea of a republican Balkan Federation 
is favored. 

The Poles of Prussia and Austria have the same right to 
national independence as those of Russia. 

Alsace-Lorraine should decide its own destiny. 

Belgium not only should have complete political and eco- 

1 The document will be found in full, p. 172. 

2 See p. 182. 

[64] 



nomic independence but " in fulfillment of the German 
Government's promise at the beginning of the war, the Bel- 
gian nation has to be compensated for the damage caused 
by the war, especially for the economic values that have 
been taken away. Such a repayment has nothing to do with 
the various kinds of indemnities, which simply mean the 
plundering of the vanquished by the victor, and which we 
therefore reject." 

The whole colonial regime is condemned. " The posses- 
sion of any colony without its own self-administration is 
nothing but the possession of an unfree people and like slav- 
ery is incompatible with our principles." 

The importance of a common Socialist peace program 
is admitted but it means nothing unless Socialists by re- 
fusing to vote appropriations and by the sharpest measures 
force their governments to accept it and to declare them- 
selves ready to enter into a peace conference on the basis of 
this program. 

To refuse this policy would be to forfeit the right 
to be considered an organ of international Social- 
ism. 

Austrian Socialist Views. The Austrian Social- 
ists naturally are especially concerned with the very 
difficult question of nationalities. 

They assert that in many parts of Europe the intermin- 
gling of the population is such that a disentangling of na- 
tionalities by a territorial delimitation is absolutely impos- 
sible. They argue that a system of small states would not 
be advantageous and declare for autonomy of the national 
groups of Austria within the framework of the monarchy. 
These groups include the Bohemians, Poles of Galicia, Ru- 
thenians and South Slavs. 

They oppose the annexation of Belgium. 

They want Serbia to receive not only her political inde- 
pendence but access to the sea by union with Montenegro, 
and are quite ready to see the Balkan states federate. 

[65] 



They are for the independence of Finland and of the Poles 
of Russian Poland and they hope the future will bring volun- 
tary agreements between the latter and Germany and Aus- 
tria which shall permanently settle the Polish question. 

They favor free trade, the " open door," internationaliza- 
tion of water routes, and international railroads to be built 
and administered in common for lines of world importance. 
They urge the continuation of the work of The Hague, a 
reform of military international law, gradual abolition of 
standing armies in favor of popular militias for defense only, 
and nationalization of munitions industries. 

The peace treaty should contain clauses for international 
agreement on labor protection. 

A Socialist Conference should certainly be called and all 
should take part.^ 

Hungarian Socialist Views. The Hungarian 
Socialist views proved for the most part to be in 
key with those of the radical German minority. 
With regard to the Balkan question, however, they 
found a solution in far-reaching democratic reforms 
rather than in territorial readjustment. They stated 
with great emphasis the view that "the people of 
all the belligerent States are peacefully-minded and 
that their Governments in all countries are respon- 
sible for the war; and that not accidental circum- 
stances, but the constantly operating forces of na- 
tional and social oppression and exploitation led to 
the war. Imperialism, high protective tariff, op- 
pression of nationalities, the lack of democracy, the 
want of real parliamentary control even in the 
countries governed on parliamentary principles, the 
domination of the financial oligarchy in France, 
Czardom in Russia, the feudal nationalistic oli- 
garchy of Hungary, Junkers and large-scale indus- 

1 See p. i86. 

[66] 



try in Prussia-Germany (Preussen Deutschland), 
the lack of a parliamentary system of government in 
the German Empire, are in their opinion some of 
the real causes of the war. The glorious Russian 
revolution has removed one of these causes of war 
and the Hungarian Delegation expresses its belief 
that the International will do much happier work 
for peace if the various national sections, instead of 
fruitlessly debating the question of blame, come for- 
ward each in its own country, against the organized 
war-producing forces — against the nationalism of 
France, against the Junker and bureaucratic rule of 
Prussia-Germany and against the national and social 
servitude of the masses in Hungary. 

The Hungarian Delegation pledges itself to fight in this 
spirit for the complete democratization of Hungary and ex- 
presses the wish that the French comrades should now with 
their whole strength take up the fight against chauvinistic 
ideology, the German Social-Democracy the fight for equal 
suffrage and a parliamentary system of government in the 
Empire. The Delegation expresses this wish, not as assum- 
ing to meddle v^ith the internal affairs of other countries, or 
brother-parties, or associations, but because consideration of 
the condition of the world and peace possibilities convinces 
them that democracy is a demand of political international- 
ism and the prerequisite of a speedy and lasting peace.^ 

The Italian Socialists re-stated the Zimmerwald 
principles, and urged parliamentary control of for- 
eign policy.^ 

British Views. In June Mr. Julius West of the 
Fabian Society and Mr. Thompson, editor of the 
Clarion, were in Stockholm, and submitted a pre- 



1 The rest of the document will be found on p. 190. 

2 See p. 201. 



[67] 



liminary statement of the moderate British Socialist 
position. 

This favors the full constitution of an independent Bel- 
gium, the evacuation of the occupied parts of Northern 
France, and indemnification by the invader for all damage 
done during the course of the war, the constitution of a re- 
united, independent Poland, and the establishment of perfect 
equality for all nationalities in Austria-Hungary, w^hose 
democratization will be one of the principal conditions of 
a lasting peace. 

The British Socialist and Labor Parties, they stated, at- 
tach great importance both to the question of responsibility 
for the outbreak of the war, and to the organization of a 
supreme authority over all nations for the prevention of 
any future wars, for which the Fabian Society has elab- 
orated a plan.^ They further reported that the British 
Socialist and Labor Parties oppose a trade war after the 
war.^ 

British National Council of Workmen and Sol- 
diers. The radical position in England was repre- 
sented by a new organization, growing out of a 
convention held at Leeds on June 3. The meeting 
included representatives of the British Socialist 
Party, the Independent Labor Party, Trade Unions 
and other labor organizations, women's organiza- 
tions, the Union for Democratic Control, coopera- 
tive societies, the National Council for Civil Liber- 
ties, etc., and was presided over by Robert Smillie, 
president of the powerful Miners' Federation. The 
convention was understood to represent between 
four and five million constituents. It organized a 

1 This will be found in full, p. 276. For further discussion, 
see International Government: Two Reports by L. S. Woolf pre- 
pared for the Fabian Research Department, with an Introduction 
by Bernard Shaw. Brentano's, 1916. 

2 See London Times, June 2i, 1917. 

[68] 



British National Council of Workmen and Soldiers 
to work for " an immediate democratic peace." 

It passed, with two dissenting voices, a resolution favor- 
ing the Russian formula and calling upon the British govern- 
ment to announce its agreement with the declared foreign 
policy and war aims of the democratic government of Rus- 
sia. Philip Snowden, M. P., who moved the resolution, 
" contended that it was useless and absurd to accept the 
formula ' no annexation ' and at the same time to contem- 
plate the retention of 400,000 square miles of territory held 
by Germany before the war, even on the conditions laid 
down by Mr. Asquith that this was not militarism, but part 
of the fulfillment of the divine mission laid on the British 
people to relieve the oppressed wherever they might be found. 
He counseled the democracy to see that the statesmen of 
this country did not accept the formula ' no annexation ' be- 
fore obtaining from them definite statements as to what they 
meant by it. It would be a delusion and a mockery so long 
as those statesmen stood by the terms and conditions of the 
Allied Note to President Wilson. That Note must be re- 
pudiated. As understood by the Russian democracy, * no 
annexation ' did not mean there should be no change of 
territorial boundaries after the war. If a permanent peace 
was to be established there would have to be a readjustment 
of territory." 

A Radical Program. An outgrowth of this 
movement, so little known in this country, was the 
draft of a remarkable program of social reorgani- 
zation.^ 

The part of this program relating to foreign affairs is as 
follows : 

The Workers organized against war. 

(A) Communications between workers to be main- 
tained in war as in peace. 

1 Reprinted from the English Herald in the N. Y. Call of August 
18, 1917. 

[69] 



(B) Negotiations to be instituted at once to end the 

present war on the following basis : 

" The right of all people to decide their own destiny. 

" No indemnities, but each belligerent to restore the dam- 
age he has done, or to compound such reparation by con- 
cessions to be agreed by negotiation. 

" Equal access by all peoples to the trade and raw ma- 
terials of the world. 

" The government of non-European races in Africa to 
be regarded as an international trust, with no exclusive ad- 
vantages to the sovereign state; such populations not to be 
trained for war or subject to conscription or servile labor. 

" All secret treaties or treaties not ratified by the people to 
be void." 

(C) Disarmament by international agreement.^ 

Australian Socialists. From the other side of 
the world the Labor Socialists of Australia chimed 
in. The Australian Labor Conference on June 1 1 
submitted, among other things, the following terms : 

The right of small nations, including Ireland, to inde- 
pendence. 

Evacuation of invaded districts; plebiscite for disputed 
cases. 

Restoration of devastated territories by using armies and 
navies under international control, and not under mili- 
tary supervision, to do the work at the expense of the 
invaders. 

Colonies and dependencies, captured in the war — where 
an amicable arrangement is not reached by the peace 
conference — to be placed provisionally under inter- 
national control. 

Specifically they opposed annexation of the captured Ger- 
man possessions in the Pacific. 

Freedom of the seas on the lines laid down by President 
Wilson in May, 1 916. 

1. See p. 219. 

[70] 



They demanded initiation of immediate negotiations for 
an international peace conference with adequate representa- 
tion of working class organizations, inclusion of women 
delegates, and separate representation of British self-govern- 
ing dominions and Ireland. 

And as a first premise they assert " that only by an or- 
ganized system of production for use under democratic con- 
trol can a recurrence of such calamities be permanently 
avoided." ^ 

^ See p. 208 for a more complete report. For views of Bohemian, 
Belgian, and Finnish Socialists see respectively pp. 194, 196, and 206. 

For the further developments in regard to the Stockholm Con- 
ference, see pp. 79-80 and 102-110. 



[71] 



CHAPTER V 

VIEWS OF RUSSIA AND HER ALLIES 
I. 

The significance of the Russian Revolution cannot, 
of course, as yet be measured. But its immediate 
importance for the world seems to consist, not so 
much in the origination of new political ideas, as in 
putting the force of national purpose behind cer- 
tain ideas already wide-spread but hitherto without 
power to realize themselves. The Russian state- 
ment of what terms she would fight for, and what 
she would not, and her demand that the Allies re- 
state their terms, had to be taken into account. 

Debate in British Parliament. The question of 
what the British attitude should be toward the 
Russian peace-formula was raised in Parliament on 
May 1 6 by Philip Snowden. He introduced a reso- 
lution welcoming the declaration of the new demo- 
cratic Government of Russia,^ and calling on His 

1 The declaration referred to was the Proclamation of the Pro- 
visional Government of Russia, issued April 9, and brought to the 
notice of the Allied Governments in a note of May i. The 
Proclamation is as follows: 

" The Government deems it to be its right and duty to declare 
now that free Russia does not aim at the domination of other 
nations, at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occu- 
pying by force foreign territories, but that its object is to establish 
a durable peace on the rights of nations to decide their own des- 
tiny. 

[72] 




Photo by Paul Thompson 

ALEXANDER KERENSKY 
During the first of May manifestations, addressing 
the crowd on the Field of Mars, with his arm in a sling. 



Majesty's Government " to Issue a similar declara- 
tion for British democracy and to join with the 
Allies in restating the Allied terms in conformity 
with the Russian declaration." 

If Great Britain, he said, was to continue to be allied with 
Russia it must set itself in line with her policy. This debate 
was to ascertain whether the British Government regarded 
the treaties made with the old imperialistic order in 
Russia as still binding. The real motive of the Russian 
Revolution was objection to continuing the war for im- 
perialistic ambitions. He believed Russia expressed the de- 
sire of democracies in all countries. Scheidemann had de- 
clared that if France and Great Britain supported the Rus- 
sian declaration and the German Chancellor refused, " there 
would be a revolution in Germanj^" The Allied note 
of January, he declared, was imperialism naked and un- 
ashamed. 

Mr. Lees-Smith, seconding the motion, pointed out that 
with Russia abandoning the claim to Constantinople the 
next move for peace lay with Great Britain who held the 
key of the situation in her hands in the conquered German 



" The Russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its 
power abroad at the expense of other nations. Its aim is not to 
subjugate or to humiliate any one. In the name of the higher 
principles of equity it has removed the chains which weighed upon 
the Polish people. But the Russian nation will not allow its father- 
land to come out of the great struggle humiliated or weakened of 
its vital forces. These principles will constitute the basis of the 
foreign policy of the Provisional Government, which will carry 
out unflinchingly the popular will and safeguard the rights of our 
fatherland while observing the engagements entered into with our 
allies." 

This was interpreted in the light of current explanations as 
meaning " no annexations and no indemnities." It was restated 
by the coalition Provisional Government of Russia on May 19 as 
" The reestablishment of a general peace which shall not tend 
either toward dominion over other nations, the seizure of their 
national possessions, or violent usurpation of their territories — a 
peace without annexation or indemnities, and based on the right of 
nations to decide their own affairs." 

[73] 



colonies. If she insisted on their retention she could not 
ask her Allies to modify their demands. He thought a re- 
arrangement of colonial possessions could be made which 
would satisfy the special desire of South Africa and Aus- 
tralia and at the same time satisfy all the Great Powers 
concerned. 

Lord Robert Cecil, speaking on behalf of the 
Government, objected to the Idea of returning the 
German Colonies, and dwelt on the 111 treatment 
of the natives by the former masters. Moreover, 
the Government could not pledge Itself to a non- 
annexation policy In regard to Poland, Alsace- 
Lorraine, and Italia Irredenta. Referring to 
Turkish cruelty In Arabia, Armenia and Syria, he 
said: "The most imperialistic annexation would 
be of benefit to the people who suffered such crimes 
as that. . . . What about Belgium, Serbia, North- 
ern France and the destruction of peaceful merchant 
ships? Was there to be no reparation? " 

2. 

President Wilson's Note to Russia. It was 
hoped In Russia that President Wilson's note to 
Petrograd would mark substantial progress toward 
the adoption of the Russian terms by the AUIes. 
This note, however, cabled on May 26 and made 
public on June 10, seemed clearly to range him, not 
perhaps against the Russian peace formula as such, 
but apparently against the Russian point of view. 

Those in authority In Germany, he says, " in desperate 
desire to escape the inevitable ultimate defeat " are using 
German Socialists ("groups and parties among their own 
subjects to whom they have never been just or fair or 
even tolerant") to promote propaganda in Europe and 

[74] 



America. This could hardly be agreeable to a Russia which 
was sponsoring the Stockholm Conference and which had 
every opportunity to know the facts of the case. 

The Governments of " Mittel Europa " had been linked 
together, the note maintains, in a net of intrigue directed 
against the peace and liberty of the world. The meshes of 
this intrigue must be broken and adequate measures taken 
to prevent its ever being repaired. The war issued from 
the status quo ante — "the power of the Imperial German 
Government within the empire and its widespread domina- 
tion and influence outside that empire." The German Gov- 
ernment is making use of cat's-paws to secure the restoration 
of the status quo ante. That status must be so altered as 
to prevent any such hideous thing happening again. " The 
day has come to conquer or submit," 

America seeks no material profit or aggrandizement. She 
is fighting for general liberation. The ruling classes in Ger- 
many have of late begun to profess a like liberality and 
justice of purpose, but only for the sake of preserving their 
own power in Germany and " their private projects of power 
from Berlin to Bagdad and beyond." 

" The free peoples must draw together in some common 
covenant combining their force to secure international peace 
and justice." 

Perhaps the most significant passage in the Presi- 
dent's note is this reshaping of the Russian terms: 
" No people must be forced under sovereignty under 
which it does not wish to live. No territory must 
change hands except for the purpose of securing 
those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. 
No indemnities must be insisted on except those that 
constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No 
readjustments of power must be made except such 
as will tend to secure the future peace of the world 
and the future welfare and happiness of its peo- 
ples." 

[75] 



It was meanwhile becoming increasingly clear that Rus- 
sia rejected the offer of a separate peace, made by von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg on May 15, and repeated by the Austrian 
Emperor on May 31. On June 16, Grimm was expelled, 
for trying to effect a separate peace, by a vote of 640 to 121 
in the General Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Dele- 
gates of All Russia. And after the collapse of the great 
military effort of the summer, the conviction in Russia be- 
came profound that, as Minister Tseretelli declared before 
the Moscow Congress, " If the sad necessity ever comes to 
conclude a separate peace, it will be concluded over the 
corpse of the Revolution." 



Great Britain to Russia. Both Great Britain and 
France replied on June 1 1 to the Russian note of 
May first, forwarding the Proclamation of April 9. 
The British Government heartily concurred in the 
sentiment of Free Russia as expressed in that Pro- 
clamation. They heartily rejoice that free Russia 
has announced her Intention of liberating Poland, 
" not only Russian Poland but that within the domi- 
nation of the Germanic Empires." They heartily 
join In " acceptance and approval of the principles 
laid down by President Wilson In his historic mes- 
sage to the American Congress." They " believe 
that broadly speaking the agreements which they 
have from time to time made with their Allies are 
conformable to these standards," but If desired 
they are quite ready to " examine, and, If need be, 
to revise, these agreements." 

French Reply. The French Government, like- 
wise, was glad to feel Itself " In full community of 
Ideas " with the Russian Government and people. 
'* For herself she Intends that her faithful and loyal 
provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which were 
[76] 



snatched from her In the past by violence, shall be 
liberated and shall return to her." The promise 
to reconsider war-alms is less specific than the Brit- 
ish, but the French Government Is willing to " ex- 
amine and settle " the conditions on which a final 
settlement may be hoped for. 

Allied Interpretation of Russia's Peace Terms. 
The nature of the Allied interpretation of the 
Russian peace-formula thus assented to, is revealed 
more fully In contemporary speeches. The French 
Premier, Ribot, as has been caustically said,^ " in a 
tactful speech on May 22 contrived to accept the 
Russian formula of ' peace without annexation or 
indemnities ' and in the same breath to demand the 
restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the 
payment of indemnities to France, Belgium, Serbia, 
Montenegro and curiously enough to Roumania," 
and on June 11" declared that France could not 
consent to a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine regarding 
the future of those provinces." Lloyd George, 
speaking at Dundee on June 30, also " found Presi- 
dent Wilson's formula elastic enough to include the 
wresting of Mesopotamia and Palestine from Tur- 
key." And " Italy explained that President Wil- 
son's principles would permit her to annex Trentino, 
Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia and the Albanian port of 
Avlona ; Rumania to annex Transylvania, . . . Ser- 
bia to annex Bosnia Herzegovina, and the Entente 
powers to partition the Ottoman Empire among 
themselves." ^ 

Russian Comment on President Wilson's Note. 
To President Wilson's Note to Russia, the official 



1 Salt and Moon, loc. cit. 

2 Ibid. 



[77] 



' bulletin of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' 
Delegates replied on June 15: "Mr. Wilson is 
mistaken if he thinks that such ideas can find recep- 
tion in the hearts of a revolutionary people. The 
Russian revolutionary democracy knows very well 
that the road to the passionately awaited universal 
peace lies only through a united struggle of the 
laboring classes with the imperialists of the world. 
It is quite easy to understand what feelings will be 
called forth by the strange pretense of describing 
the ever-growing spirit of brotherhood and peace in 
the international Socialist, as also a German intrigue. 
The French and English notes will undoubtedly not 

( call forth enthusiasm among the revolutionary de- 
mocracy." ^ 

A still more pointed retort was made at the same time 
in the organ of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Dele- 

.„ gates, which after quoting two English newspapers to the 
effect that the declaration of the Provisional Government and 
the pronouncements of the Revolutionary leaders show that 
the Russian peace formula coincides with British and French 
war aims, said : 

" You are deceiving yourselves, gentlemen, or, rather you 
are vainly striving to delude your fellow-countrymen con- 
cerning the real policy of the Russian Revolution. The 

f" Revolution will not sacrifice a single soldier to help you re- 
pair ' historic injustices ' committed against you. What 

1 The Congress of Delegates from the Front affirmed on May 30 
"/ the principle of " Peace without annexation or indemnities, on the 
basis of the right of all nations to dispose of themselves." The 
N- Congress of Peasants declared, June 8, that " the peasants aspire 
to an equitable peace without humiliating annexation or indemnity 
and with the right of each nation to dispose of itself. International 
relations and treaties should be submitted to the control of the 
peoples interested. Disputes should be settled by an international 
tribunal, and not by force. The Congress approves the union of 
workers, and appeals to the peasants of all countries to force their 
Governments to renounce annexations and indemnities." 

[78] 



about the historic injustices committed by yourselves and 
your violent oppression of Ireland, India, Egypt, and innu- 
merable peoples inhabiting all the continents of the world? 
If you are so anxious for ' justice ' that you are prepared in 
its name to send millions of people to the grave, then, gen- 
tlemen, begin with yourselves," 

Labor and Socialist Objection to Stockholm Con- 
ference. It was not solely among these opposed 
to radical policies in general that the Stockholm 
Conference plan was questioned. 

President Wilson had not been without labor and 
Socialist support in his attitude toward it.^ France 

1 William English Walling, Charles Edward Russell and other 
American Socialists issued a statement from Washington, D. C, 
May 8, opposing the Stockholm Conference. " Why," they ask, 
" does the Kaiser encourage a conference that will be controlled 
not by his friend, Scheidemann, but by the German minority, which 
is fearlessly anti-Kaiser and even republican in home affairs? 
For the very simple reason that the two factions are in substantial 
accord on foreign affairs and have an identical peace program, 
namely, ' no annexation, no indemnities,' this being the plausible 
but deceptive title which the Kaiser has chosen for his next effort 
to impose a German peace on mankind. Now what will the Kaiser 
mean if he labels his new program 'no annexations, no indemni- 
ties'? Of course his chief aim will be to bring about either a 
separate peace or a civil war in Russia and paralyze any anti- 
German tendencies in Holland or Scandinavia. But the new 
formula must be made to mean something. What would it mean? 
A return to the conditions existing before the war, it is evident, 
would mean that all Europe would be helpless when confronted by 
the new Central Empire Germany has established. The German 
Socialists, like the Kaiser, even demand that the peace treaty shall 
restore the previous economic conditions, forbidding all defensive 
economic union on the part of other nations. Germany's colonies 
would also be restored, and England's self-governed colonies would 
everywhere be threatened except in Canada. Russia would be in 
Germany's military and economic power, and Japan, though such 
a course may be far from her present aims, would then be mightily 
tempted." 

Mr. Gompers also cabled Tcheidse early in May protesting 
against the " pro-Kaiser Socialist interpretation " of the no-annexa- 
tion formula, " namely that all the oppressed non-German peoples 
shall be compelled to remain under the domination of Prussia and 

[79] 



sent M. Albert Thomas; Great Britain, Mr. Hen- 
derson; Belgium, M. Vandervelde, to dispel the dis- 
trust of the Russian Socialists and to uphold joint 
action between Russia and her Allies.^ These three 
gentlemen wrote to the Council of Workers' and 
Soldiers' Delegates, expressing surprise that they 
had called an international conference to consider 
peace before the conclusion of the negotiations be- 
tween the Russian and the British, French and Bel- 
gian delegations. 

To this came the reply that the Revolution was 
not only against Czardom but against the war, the 
blame for which falls upon international imperial- 
ism. 

The Revolution showed the way out — a union of the 
working classes everywhere to defeat attempts, on the part of 
Imperialism, to prolong the war in the interests of the 
wealthy and to prevent peace on the Russian terms. 

" The [Stockholm] conference can be the turning point 
. . . only if the members of the conference are imbued with 
these ideas. The idea of the necessity of a previous agree- 
ment among socialists of the Allied countries is futile, for the 
conference can succeed only if the Socialists consider them- 
selves representatives not of the two belligerent parties but 
of a single movement of the working classes toward the com- 
mon aim of a general peace." 

Meaning of " no annexations, no indemnities." 
The Russian reply also contained a very important 
explanation of what was meant by the " no annexa- 
tions, no indemnities " formula. 

her lackeys, Austria and Turkey." He disclaimed " all punitive 
and improper indemnities " and urged that only by compelling the 
abdication of the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs can the German 
people bring the war to an early end. 

See also, Villehardouin, " Stockholm, a French View " in New 
Europe, Sept. 15, 1917. For the opposite view see Arnold Bennett's 
article, p. 213. 

[80] 



" Having recognized the right of the nations to dispose 
of their destiny, the members of the conference will come to 
an understanding without difficulty regarding the future of 
Alsace-Lorraine and other regions. Moreover, the work- 
ing classes, relieved of the mutual distrust with which the Im- 
perialists have envenomed them, will agree regarding the 
means of granting compensation and the amount of such 
compensation to the country devastated by war, like Bel- 
gium, Poland, Galicia, and Serbia. But it goes without say- 
ing that such compensation must have nothing in common 
with the contribution which is imposed on the conquered 
country." 

James Duncan, labor member of the American 
Mission to Russia, was quoted In a dispatch of July 
2 as saying that the Minister of Labor, Skobeleff, 
had made It clear to him *' that Russian democracy 
means nothing by this phrase which we cannot 
heartily subscribe to. . . . Before this phrase was 
defined, It seemed to me that Germany was to emerge 
from the war with Impunity and without making 
reparation for the damage she had done. But the 
Russian deputies do not mean this at all. They be- 
lieve that Germany should be compelled to restore 
and make full reparation for Belgium, and they are 
not opposed to the principle of Indemnities. The 
word ' contribution ' refers exclusively to a kind of 
war-levy forced by Germany upon Brussels. There 
Is no Important difference between the alms of the 
Russian democracy and our own. We both agree 
upon the conditions upon which peace can be de- 
termined." 

Vandervelde, writing In he Temps (May 28), 
said: " Soclahsts of every country accept this 
[Russian] formula so far as It shuts out annexations 
against the will of their populations, and penalties 

[8i] 



Imposed by the victor on, the vanquished. But we 
loudly claimed for Belgium complete reparation for 
damage caused, and we proclaim that the liberation 
of territories like the Trentino and Alsace-Lorraine 
are no annexations but dis annexations." ^ 

When Vandervelde addressed the General Con- 
gress of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates of All 
Russia, Tcheidse replied: "You know our plat- 
form, which must be the basis of Peace. The sooner 
the war will be con-eluded, the sooner will the suffer- 
ings of Belgium end. Comrade Vandervelde, I ask 
you to remember and to tell your Belgian Comrades, 
that the liberation is not in a continuation of the 
war; not in the crushing of the Central Powers do 
the Russian Socialists see the freeing of Belgium, the 
freeing of the world from militarism and from the 
possibility of future wars, but in an immediate con- 
clusion of the war on the only just and practical 
basis — the Socialists' terms of peace." ^ 

1 Cf. p. 196. 

2 N. Y. Call, August 20. 



[82] 



CHAPTER VI 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRUGGLE IN GERMANY 
THE REICHSTAG RESOLUTION 



Herr Scheidemann, the leader of the Socialist 
Majority in the Reichstag, apparently carried home 
with him from Stockholm a new sense of how Ger- 
many was regarded abroad, and of the degree to 
which the character of the German government 
stood in the way of peace. 

Lloyd-George's Glasgow Speech. The lesson 
was emphasized by Mr. Lloyd-George in his Glas- 
gow speech of June 29, in which he dwelt signifi- 
cantly on this point. 

" No one wishes to dictate to the German people the form 
of government under which they choose to live. That is a 
matter entirely for themselves, but it is right we should say 
we could enter into negotiations with a free government in 
Germany with a different attitude of mind . . . with more 
confidence than we could with a government whom we knew 
to be dominated by the aggressive and arrogant spirit of 
Prussian militarism. And the Allied governments would, 
in my judgment, be acting wisely if they drew the distinc- 
tion in their general attitude in a discussion of the terms of 
peace. The fatal error committed by Prussia in 1870 — the 
error which undoubtedly proves her bad faith at that time 
— was that when she entered the war she was fighting 
against a restless military empire, dominated largely by mili- 

[83] 



tary ideals, with military traditions behind them. When 
that empire fell it would have been wisdom of Germany to 
recognize the change immediately. Democratic France was 
a more sure guarantee for the case of Germany than the 
fortress of Metz, or the walled ramparts of Strasburg. If 
Prussia had taken that view, history would have taken a 
different course. It would have acted on the generous spirit 
of the great people who dwell in France, it would have re- 
acted on the spirit and policy of Germany herself. Europe 
would have reaped a harvest of peace and good-will among 
men instead of garnering, as she does now, a whirlwind of 
hate, rage and human savagery. I trust the Allied Govern- 
ments will take that as an element in their whole discussion 
of the terms and prospects of peace." 

All this — the contagious spirit of Russian lib- 
erty, the enlightenment gained at Stockholm, the en- 
couraging implications of the Glasgow speech — 
served to strengthen those in Germany who vrere 
striving for democratization. The Russian offen- 
sive of July, putting an end to the hopes of a sepa- 
rate Russian peace, and the knowledge of the vigor 
with which the United States was entering the war, 
also had the same effect.^ 

New German Demand for Reform and Peace. 
The internal struggle in Germany centered around 
the effort to secure a Chancellor and Ministry rep- 
resentative of the Reichstag. On the last day of 
June, the same day as Lloyd-George's Glasgow 
speech, a call, signed by well-known and conservative 
leaders, by Rohrbach, Delbriick, von Harnack, 

1 The internal political considerations behind von Bethmann- 
Hollweg's attitude at the time of his non-committal speech of May 
15, and when he resigned, a month later, the office of Chancellor, 
which he had held since July, 1909, are interestingly analyzed in 
an article, " Germany at the Cross-Roads," in Nenv Europe of July 
26, and in the New York Times' Current History for August, 1917. 

[84] 



Troeltsch, demanded that the Government should 
proceed with reform of the Prussian Diet suffrage. 

The Government was wiUing to favor certain re- 
forms, but not what was demanded. Meanwhile it 
was intended to call the Reichstag together July 5 
for three days, or less, solely to vote certain appro- 
priations. " The Majority Socialist press began to 
hint openly that they were not inclined to vote the 
credits on this occasion, unless they received from 
the Chancellor a public endorsement of their peace 
formula, ' without annexations and indemnities,' and 
also the assurance of immediate political reform." 
The Liberals were expected also to be ready to force 
through a form of parliamentary government (re- 
sponsibility of the ministry to parliament) . 

It became known that at a joint session on July 6 
of the main Committee of the Reichstag (which is 
practically equivalent to the Reichstag In secret ses- 
sion), Erzberger, a Bavarian Catholic and a pow- 
erful leader of the Catholic Center party, was de- 
serting the Pan-Germans, advocating peace without 
annexation or indemnities, and criticizing the sub- 
marine policy and the diplomacy that brought the 
United States into the war. It appeared also that 
he had the support of his party and very probably of 
a majority of the House. 

Reichstag Resolution of July 75. The Reichstag, 
when it met, refused to vote the credits till the politi- 
cal situation cleared. On July 13, with the support 
of a " bloc " including such incongruous elements as 
the Socialists, the Catholic Center and the " Lib- 
erals," the following peace resolution was Intro- 
duced : 

" As on August 4, 19 14, so on the threshold of the fourth 
year of the war, the German people stand upon the assurance 

' [85] 



of the speech from the throne — * We are driven by no lust 
of conquest.' 

" Germany took up arms in defense of its liberty and 
independence and for the integrity of its territories. The 
Reichstag labors for peace and a mutual understanding and 
lasting reconciliation among the nations. Forced acquisi- 
tions of territory and political, economic and financial usur- 
pations ^ are incompatible with such a peace. 

" The Reichstag rejects all plans aiming at an economic 
blockade and the stirring up of enmity among the peoples 
after the war. The freedom of the seas must be assured. 
Only an economic peace can prepare the ground for the 
friendly association of the peoples. 

" The Reichstag will energetically promote the creation of 
international judicial organizations. So long, however, as 
the enemy Governments do not accept such a peace, so long 
as they threaten Germany and her allies with conquest and 
violation, the German people will stand together as one 
man, hold out unshaken, and fight until the rights of Ger- 
many and its allies to life and development are secured. 
The German nation united is unconquerable. 

" The Reichstag knows that in this announcement it is at 
one with the men who are defending the Fatherland ; in the 
heroic struggles they are sure of the undying thanks of the 
whole people." 



Fall of von Bethmann-Hollweg. The Chancel- 
lor was believed to have advocated an open declara- 
tion for " no annexation, no indemnities," as well as 
steps toward Parliamentary government. But in 
spite of the supposed support of the Kaiser, and 
owing apparently to the opposition of the Crown 
Prince, who together with Hindenburg and Luden- 

1 In the version current in England this word is translated " vio- 
lations." The German original is not accessible. 



[86] 




Photograph by Underwood and Underwood 

MATTHIAS ERZBERGER (Left) and KARL 
HELFFERICH (Right) 



dorff had been called into council by the Emperor 
on July 14, the Chancellor fell. 

Both the person and the manner of appointment 
of von Bethmann-HoUweg's successor, Dr. Mich- 
aelis, meant that the military party were strong 
enough to flout the Reichstag and its aspirations. 
The concession of appointing members of parliament 
to ministerial positions was also so handled as to be 
insignificant. All this of course tended to make the 
Resolution little more than a pious wish, until the 
Reichstag could make its will prevail in the conduct 
of affairs. 

Michaelis' Speech. The new Chancellor's speech 
on July 19 was very disappointing to those who 
hoped for a decided forward step toward peace. 

" Germany," he said, " did not desire the war in order to 
make violent conquests, and therefore will not continue the 
war a day longer merely for the sake of such conquests, if it 
could obtain an honorable peace." But, " no parley is pos- 
sible with the enemy demanding the cession of German soil." 

" We must by means of understanding and in a spirit of 
give and take [the German words were Verstdndigung and 
Ausgleich] guarantee conditions of the existence of the Em- 
pire upon the continent and overseas." 

There must be no economic war after the war — "we 
must, as expressed in your resolution, prevent the nations 
from being plunged into further enmity through economic 
blockade and provide a safeguard that the league in arms of 
our opponents does not develop into an economic offensive 
alliance against us." 

Instead of frankly adopting the Reichstag Resolu- 
tion, as was hoped, all that he did was to refer to 
it again at this point, thus : " These aims may be 
attained within the limits of your resolution, as I 
interpret it." This phrase was much commented on 

■ [87] 



and caused grave dissatisfaction to the German sup- 
porters of the Resolution. 

" If our enemies abandon their lust for conquest and aims 
of subjugation and wish to enter into negotiations, we shall 
listen honestly and readily to what they have to say to us." 
We have stretched out our hands once and cannot ourselves 
offer peace again. 

" The Germans wish to conclude peace as combatants who 
have successfully accomplished their purpose [i. e. self-de- 
fense] and proved themselves invincible." ^ 

" What we long to attain is a new and splendid Germany, 
not a Germany which wishes, as our enemies believe, to ter- 
rorize the world with her armed might; no, the morally 
purified, God-fearing, loyal, peaceful and mighty Germany 
which we all love. For this Germany we shall fight and 
endure. For this Germany, we and our brothers out there 
will bleed and die. For this Germany we shall fight our 
way through, despite all force." 

After the Chancellor's speech, the Peace Resolu- 
tion, introduced six days before, was passed, 212 to 
126 (17 abstaining).^ In moving the Resolution, 
Deputy Fehrenbach, of the Center, said, among 
other things : " This Resolution should be consid- 
ered merely as an honest expression of the readiness 
of an overwhelming majority of the German people 
for a peace of reconciliation without annexation and 
compensation. One must despair of humanity, if 
the people in enemy countries did not recognize the 
note of honesty in this Resolution. If the enemy 

1 It has been remarked that the claim not to be conquerable marks 
a certain advance over the claim to be conquerors. 

2 The London Times of August 4 gives the vote as follows: 
" The 126 votes given against the resolution were those of 43 
German-Conservatives, 13 members of the German Party, one 
Extreme Conservative, five Centre, 42 National Liberals and 22 
Minority Socialists." 

[88] 



should scorn again this manifestation for peace, 
then, of course, the slaughter must continue until the 
Entente group tire of sacrificing their nations." 

" Majority " Views. Scheidemann, of the Ma- 
jority Socialists, said: " We oppose the submarine 
war, as we regard it as doing more harm than good. 
We, no more than our enemies, are able to bring 
the war to a conclusion by military means, though in 
spite of three years of war we stand unbroken, far in 
the enemies' land, and in defense are invincible. 

" The resolution under discussion represents what 
has long been the common view of the people. I 
wish other people would understand that we are not 
aiming at the acquisition of foreign property, and 
that we are ready for a righteous peace, secured by 
international legal guarantees. If the enemy is un- 
willing to accept such a peace we shall continue to 
fight. If a similar resolution were brought forward 
in the House of Commons and answered by the 
British Prime Minister in this same way, then the 
peace negotiations could begin to-morrow. The 
Chancellor's remarks regarding democracy did not 
satisfy me. He must free us from the three-class 
franchise. Prussian electoral reform must come 
this autumn. We demand the deliverance of the 
Press from the censorship and the liberation of po- 
litical offenders, and we vote for the War Credit in 
the spirit of the Resolution." 

" Minority " Views. Haase, of the Minority 
Socialists, stated as an " urgent preliminary condi- 
tion of peace " that it was " necessary to effect the 
complete democratization of the Constitution and 
Administration of the Empire and its several states, 
and this must end in the creation of a social Re- 
public." 

[89] 



Other remarks by Haase, setting forth the point of view 
of the Minority Socialists, are given in the London Times 
of July 27, as taken from an " obviously censored " account 
in the Frankfurter Zeitung : " Our monarchical institutions 
have not stood the test and must be set aside. . . . The peo- 
ple has awakened from its war-intoxication . . . The origin 
of the war is really quite different from the superficial ac- 
count of it which was given by the new Imperial Chancellor, 
and it is quite impossible for anybody to wipe away the policy 
of conquest which has been pursued for years. The Russian 
Council of Workmen and Soldiers will not let itself be de- 
ceived by the Reichstag Resolution. All [German] attempts 
hitherto to reach peace have been mistaken, and the memoran- 
dum of the Socialist Majority at Stockholm was not calcu- 
lated to promote peace: it has been rejected everywhere. 
The majority in the Reichstag, including the Majority So- 
cialists, cannot put themselves into the way of thinking of 
foreign countries, and so they meet with nothing but fail- 
ures. Our [Minority Socialist] way alone leads to the goal, 
because we represent the joint interests of the international 
proletariat. We reject the War Credits because we have 
no confidence in the Government." 

Czernin, Esterhazy and Tisza expressed the ac- 
quiescence of Austria-Hungary in the German Chan- 
cellor's statement. 

3- 

The Michaelis speech brought a crop of rejoin- 
ders. 

Lloyd-George, in a speech on Belgian Independ- 
ence Day (July 21), saw in Michaelis' words "a 
sham independence for Belgium, a sham democracy 
for Germany, a sham peace for Europe." It is the 
speech of a man waiting on the military issue, and, 
if Germany is victorious, means " annexation all 
around and autocracy more firmly." He saw in the 
[90] 



phrases about making safe the frontiers a threat of 
annexation to secure strategic boundaries. He re- 
peated the gist of his Glasgow speech of June 29. 
" What manner of government the Germans choose 
to rule over them is entirely a matter for the Ger- 
man people themselves, but as to what manner of 
government we can trust to make peace, that is our 
business. Democracy is in itself a guarantee of 
peace, but if it cannot be got in Germany, then we 
must secure other guarantees as a substitute." 

German Discontent with Michaelis' Speech. The 
Berliner Morten Post is quoted in the London 
Times of July 27, as saying: " How stands the 
German Government towards Belgium? What is 
the meaning of the Chancellor's words about Ger- 
many's frontiers, which must be for all time assured? 
One must concede that precisely here, as formerly 
in Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's speeches, many 
constructions are possible and the English Prime 
Minister can appeal to the contradictory construc- 
tions of this sentence to be found in the German 
Press. The advocates among us of far-reaching 
frontier rectifications, like the majority which sup- 
ported the peace resolution, have approved the 
speech In the Reichstag. How should a foreigner 
be able to form a clear conception of the views of 
the Imperial Government? The English Prime 
Minister, therefore, demands a clear word about 
Belgium, reestablished fully in its former Inde- 
pendence. We believe that is what the Reichstag 
Majority desired to say in its declaration, on the 
basis of which the Chancellor took his stand. 
Against this certainly stands the Interpretation for- 
merly frequently given in Irresponsible quarters to 
the Idea of frontier security, and therefore the 

I [91] 



passage in which the securing of frontiers was spoken 
of was perhaps unhappily worded. It appears to 
us that we should be a good bit nearer to peace, if 
for once there were clearness in regard to the Bel- 
gian question." 

Professor Lammasch was more pungent in his comment. 
" The German Chancellor," he wrote, " by his conditional 
' as I interpret it ' withered the Reichstag's peace resolution 
before it could come to fruit." Delbriick too in his Preus- 
sische Jahrbuch attacked Michaelis. " Why," Delbriick 
asked, " if he really accepts the Reichstag Resolution as the 
basis of his policy does he not answer Asquith's challenge as 
to Germany's readiness to evacuate and restore Belgium? 
The truth is," says Professor Delbriick, " that Dr. Mich- 
aelis does not enjoy the confidence of the Reichstag . . . 
Neither the German nation nor the world knows what the 
Chancellor's policy is. The Reichstag's Resolution would 
have had a different effect if it was not believed abroad that 
the Reichstag is powerless and that the Chancellor is double- 
tongued." 

Czernin, on the contrary, in an interview on July 
28, thought the speech, taken, as it should be, in con- 
junction with the Resolution, entirely clear. It was 
a solemn declaration that Germany desired no forced 
conquest. The imposition of further suffering is 
useless, since the Central Powers cannot be crushed 
and do not wish to crush. To desire an honorable 
peace " seems to me only a sign of common sense 
and morality, which revolt against the idea of pro- 
longing a war, the continuation of which is already 
absurd." 

A touch of humor was added to the discussion by 

Sir Edward Carson's rejoinder, making it a first 

condition of treating with the Germans, that they 

shall withdraw their troops behind the Rhine. This 

[92] 




Photo by Press Illustrating Service 

COUNT VON CZERNIN 

Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary 



was received in Germany as a claim for the most 
excessive annexations of pure German territory. 
The New Statesman (London) , of July 28, explained 
it as mere insular ignorance of the map of Europe : 

" Sir Edward Carson was educated at Trinity College, 
Dublin, of which learned institution he has now indeed been 
Parliamentary representative for some seventeen years. 
Doubtless he early acquired that disdain for geography which 
most universities inculcate. There ought, however, to be a 
limit to the published and advertised ignorance of statesmen, 
and Sir Edward Carson passed it when he advised the Ger- 
man armies to retire behind the Rhine, as a preliminary to 
negotiations for peace. If he was not under the impression 
that the Rhine constituted the German frontier, what im- 
pression was he under? Did he imagine that the United 
States as one of the belligerents would agree, by way of exem- 
plifying the great principle for which we are fighting, to the 
forcible transfer of the Rhine province and the Bavarian 
Palatinate from a defeated Germany to a victorious France? 
Perhaps he was making one of his grim jokes. But we have 
enough of grim jokes at the moment." 



4- 

British Discussion of Reichstag Resolution. If 
the Chancellor's speech brought disappointment to 
those desiring peace, the passage of the Reichstag 
Resolution brought cheer. In the British Parlia- 
ment the evening of July 26 was devoted to debate 
on a resolution ^ brought in by Ramsay MacDonald, 

1 The resolution itself covered three points : 

(i) That "this country has stood throughout" for principles em- 
bodied in the Reichstag statement that, " putting aside the thought 
of acquisition of territory by force, the Reichstag is striving for a 
peace of understanding and lasting reconciliation of nations, that 
with such a peace political, economic and financial usurpation are 
incompatible and that the Reichstag repudiates all plans which 

[93] 



in support of the Reichstag Resolution. MacDon- 
ald, Trevelyan, Snowden, Ponsonby, Outhwaite, 
Lees-Smith, Buxton, spoke in favor, Asquith, Bonar 
Law and two labor members against it. The reso- 
lution was lost by a vote of 148 to 21, but it brought 
out some interesting indications of changing opin- 
ion.^ 

Asquith laid stress on the powerlessness of the Reichstag 
and belittled the importance of the Resolution. He was glad 
a conference of the Allies to consider peace terms was to be 
held in the early autumn in Paris, "I understand at the 
invitation of the Russian Government." With Russia no 
longer an autocracy, and the accession of America, to suppose 
that the Allies will fight for imperialist and annexationist 
aims is a nightmare. This means the Allies do not aim at 
" selfish schemes of territorial aggrandizement," it means 
they do not aim at " the destruction or even at the per- 
manent mutilation and crippling of the German and Austrian 
peoples." But neither will they be satisfied with the pre- 
carious status quo ante bellum, leaving countries like Bel- 
gium, Serbia, Greece, at the mercy of dynastic intrigue under 
menace of military coercion. 

The best hope of peace, he said, is open avowal 
and disavowal of objects sought, and " I for my part 
welcome the fullest use of all the opportunities which 
present themselves for the interchange of views be- 
tween the representatives of the great democracies." 

aim at the economic isolation and tying down of nations after the 
war; " 

(2) An appeal "to the Government in conjunction with the 
Allies to restate their peace terms accordingly:" 

(3) The Allies should accept the Russian proposal that the forth- 
coming allied conference on war-aims shall comprise representa- 
tives of the peoples and not solely spokesmen of the Governments. 

1 As Asquith made the vote a test of " whether there is any halting 
in our determination or any doubt of our ability " to achieve our 
great ends, the vote was not on the merits of the question involved 
in the resolution. 

[94] 



Bonar Law asked why Germany had never stated her 
aims in any definite shape. " Ours may have gone too far, 
but at all events we had the courage to state them before the 
world." The phrase here italicized is an important admis- 
sion from Mr. Bonar Law. 

Cavendish-Bentinck, Unionist, thought a restatement of 
Allied war-aims would do good, and ascribed the move of 
opinion in Germany toward peace as largely due to Lloyd- 
George's Glasgow speech. 

Brigadier-General Page Croft, Unionist, said that it was 
the duty of Allied diplomacy to make it clear to Turkey, 
Bulgaria and Austria that we were prepared to consider the 
question of where we stood in relation to them in a different 
light. 

Mr. Snowden said that with regard to the general ques- 
tion of compensation outside of Belgium, he thought that the 
proposal which had been made by the Russians was, perhaps, 
the best way of dealing with the matter, and that was that 
a general fund to which each of the belligerents should con- 
tribute should be created, and distributed by some interna- 
tional commission in proportion to the amount of damage 
which had been ascertained, and that each of the belligerent 
nations should contribute to the fund in proportion to its as- 
certained responsibility for that damage. 

Mr. Lees-Smith asked if the principle of no annexation ap- 
plied -to the German colonies and said, " It would be a dis- 
grace if this country, which entered the war with justice on 
its lips, should come out of it with a million square miles 
added to its empire. Nothing had done so much to consoli- 
date the German people and strengthen German militarism 
as the announcement of a commercial boycott and economic 
war, and if the Government persisted in their policy it was 
heading straight for another war. No nation would ever 
submit to being subject to a commercial boycott. If it was 
desirable to establish democracy in Germany, it must depend 
largely on the terms of peace, and it must be a peace that 
M^ould show to the German people that militarism was not 
necessary for their security or legitimate rights." 

[95] 



Four days later there was another Parliamentary 
debate on war aims which led Mr. Balfour to make 
a long and much commented on speech. The gist 
of it was the impossibility of telling beforehand in 
detail what settlements could be made. He spoke, 
however, emphatically of the demand for the return 
to France of Alsace-Lorraine. His tone with re- 
spect to Germany was moderate, almost conciliatory. 
He dwelt on the importance of Germany's conver- 
sion from autocracy and militarism. 

5- 
American Discussion of Reichstag Resolution. 
The speech of Michaehs and the Reichstag Resolu- 
tion raised in the United States Senate the question 
of what the American aims specifically are. 

On July 26, Senator Borah, disclaiming the idea that this 
was any time to discuss peace, said, " I am not so sure but 
that the time has come when the American people should have 
presented to them more definitely and specifically the terms 
and conditions upon which we are fighting the war, and the 
terms and conditions upon which we would cease to fight it. 
I believe there ought to be laid before the American people 
a more specific program as to what we propose to attain, as 
to what we propose to accomplish, and as to the terms and 
conditions upon which the war, so far as America is con- 
cerned, can end and upon those terms and conditions 
only . . . 

" A few weeks ago Russia made a declaration in favor 
of peace based upon no indemnities and no annexations. It 
found no response from any one of her allies. In my hum- 
ble judgment the United States could have not taken a more 
important and effective step than to have endorsed that prop- 
osition which Russia at that time put out to the world. It 
is my opinion that if the United States had taken the bold 
stand at that time in favor of that same principle, Russia 
[96] 



would be loo per cent, in better condition as a fighting force 
to-day than she is; but the impression has gone abroad that 
certain influences prevented the United States from defining 
its position, waiting upon other powers which were direct- 
ing the course of the war." 

Resolution Proposed by the American Union 
Affainst Militarism. The American Union Against 
Militarism, on July 28, asked Senator Borah and 
Senator Stone to introduce the following resolution : 

" Whereas, The democratic government of Russia 
has declared in favor of an early general peace on a basis 
of no forcible annexations and no punitive indemnities; and 

" Whereas, The German Reichstag on July 19th by a 
vote of 214 to 116 declared in favor of a peace without 
forced acquisitions of territory and without political, eco- 
nomic and financial violations; and 

" Whereas, The Congress of the United States has made 
no declaration of the terms on which this country would be 
willing to enter into peace negotiations; therefore 

" Be It Resolved, That the Congress of the United States 
hereby declares its sympathy with democratic Russia's atti- 
tude toward the war, and its willingness to enter into peace 
negotiations with the Russian formula as a basis, recogniz- 
ing, however, that independent Belgium will be entitled to 
special restitution from Germany owing to the circumstances 
under which she was forced into the war, and recommending 
that the disposition of certain much disputed border lands 
should be determined by plebiscite under the supervision of 
an impartial international commission, on the principle of 
the right of the population to control its own destiny. 

" That the Congress of the United States welcomes 
the German Reichstag Peace Resolution as an attempt on the 
part of the German people to express their desire for a peace 
of reconciliation without annexation and without indemnity. 

" That the Congress of the United States calls 
upon the Parliaments of England, France, Italy and our 
other allies which, since the entrance into the war of the two 

[97] 



great republics, Russia and America, have given no indication 
of the terms on vi^hich they would make peace, to adopt resolu- 
tions expressing their willingness to enter into peace nego- 
tiations with the Russian formula as a basis." 

The La Follette Resolution. On the nth of 
August Senator La Follette introduced a resolution 
on the subject of peace-terms. It refers to the Rus- 
sian formula, and to various statements of both 
belligerents in general conformity to it; and, on the 
other hand, to statements bearing a contrary signifi- 
cance. It complains that the American people are 
in ignorance of the secret agreements among the 
Allies as to what each is expected to receive in the 
way of territories, indemnities or commercial privi- 
leges, and that Americans demand and have a right 
to know for what they are fighting. The resolution 
proceeds with two significant clauses, declaring — 

" That this Government will not contribute to the 
efforts of any belligerent for the purpose of pro- 
longing the war to annex new territory, either in 
Europe or outside of Europe, nor to enforce the pay- 
ment of indemnities to recover the expenses of 
the war; but the Congress does hereby declare in 
favor of the creation of a common fund, to be pro- 
vided by all the belligerent nations, to assist in the 
restoration of the portions of territory in any of the 
countries most seriously deva-stated by the war and 
for the establishment of an international commission 
to decide the allotment of the common fund "; and 

" That there should be a public restatement of 
the allied peace terms, based on a disavowal of any 
advantages, either in the way of indemnities, terri- 
torial acquisitions, commercial privileges or economic 
prerogatives by means of which one nation shall 
strengthen its power abroad at the expense of an- 
[98] 



other nation, as wholly incompatible with the es- 
tablishment of a durable peace in the world." ^ 

In response Senator King brought in a resolution pro- 
posing to commit the country to fight until " the German 
Government shall have acknowledged and expiated its 
crimes," etc. 

Both resolutions were shelved. 

6. 

Why Germans do not Rebel. While the Reichs- 
tag Resolution thus found a certain measure of sym- 
pathetic interest abroad, the hope of some radical 
change in the internal balance of power in Germany 
was constantly disappointed. As to the difiiculties 
of making a revolution in war-time, Vorwdrts said 
pointedly : " It is all very well for the Allies to talk 
of the German people rebelling against their Gov- 
ernment; but if they did, the Entente armies would 
be in Cologne in a week." 

Scheidemann reviewed this situation in a speech to Berlin 
Socialists on July 26. Speaking of Russia he said : " The 
disorderly retreat condemns the masses of Russian soldiers to 
frightful sufferings, and the Socialist Government of Russia 
lays the blame for this tremendous misfortune upon another 
Socialist body, the Maximalists. Think if such a misfortune 
were to befall the German Army and the Government were 
able to blame for it the Socialist Party in Germany! Here 
you have the key to the understanding of our attitude. If 
anything similar were to happen with us, it would mean the 
downfall of Germany, and at the same time the down- 

1 It is interesting to notice, as pointed out in the New York 
Evening Post of August 29, how closely the La Follette resolution 
foreshadows the position taken by President Wilson in his reply to 
the Pope. "The fact is," says the Post, "that President Wilson 
has adopted for his own almost all the terms of peace laid down 
in the much abused resolution " of Senator La Follette. 

[99] 



fall of the German democracy , . . Our Russian com- 
rades will now perhaps understand why we did not follow 
their advice and copy their revolution. They will now per- 
haps realize that we did not wish to prepare for the German 
people the fate which the Russian people now have to endure. 
We miist reach democracy by other paths, and we are already 
upon them. I do not doubt for a moment that we shall have 
equal sufFrage in Prussia and the Parliamentary system after 
the war. But it is a misfortune that we have not got them 
already. If the war does not soon come to a conclusion, a 
thorough-going democratization will come about even while 
it lasts. Convulsions like those in Russia we ought to and 
shall be spared, if the will universally prevails to do the 
necessary thing at the right moment. At this moment we 
are in a stage of transition." ^ 

Si^ns of German Political Advance. In a minor 
way there were definite steps to be recorded In 
the direction of democratization — the appoint- 
ment of a Reichstag committee to propose con- 
stitutional amendments, the appointment of seven 
members each from the Reichstag and the Bundesrat 
to be consulted on peace-terms, the Kaiser's mani- 
festos (of April 7 and July ii) favoring reform 
and promising that the next election for the Prus- 
sian diet shall be on the basis of equal suffrage. 
Most encouraging of all, however. Is the new tone 
among the representatives of the people. If they 
have not yet the power, they apparently have the 
will and the purpose to secure the power and use it. 

1 London Times, Aug. 31. 



[100] 



CHAPTER VII 

CONFERENCES 



Allied Balkan Conference. On July 25 an Allied 
Conference met in Paris to consider future military 
action in the Balkans. The United States was in- 
vited to participate, but refused, on the ground that 
the conference dealt with European campaign prob- 
lems. The proceedings were secret. The event, 
however, had an unofficial sequel in talk of a perma- 
nent Latin alliance, including not only France and 
Italy, but Roumania and perhaps Spain, to " co- 
operate with the Anglo-Saxon and Slavic block of 
nations." 

The Balkan Conference also led to a debate on August 
17 in the House of Commons, in which Balfour made a 
lengthy speech, partly in defense of the traditional methods of 
secret diplomacy. This was caustically commented on by 
the Manchester Guardian, which after referring to recent 
revelations, remarked : " British diplomacy persists, how- 
ever, in claiming for itself a monopoly of all power in the 
region of foreign affairs and a complete immunity from in- 
vestigation and criticism. That, of course, is not surprising. 
What does surprise is that Parliament and the nation have 
not yet been fired by a long succession of revelations of incom- 
petence to shatter a system as inefficient as it is fatal to self- 
government." {Manchester Guardian, weekly edition, 
August 25.) 



The more general Inter-Allied Conference for 
that reconsideration of war aims, which had been 
promised to Russia, has been continually postponed. 

2. 

Stockholm Again. The Socialist project of an 
international conference at Stockholm, the first phase 
of which has already been described,^ had an event- 
ful history which the broken newspaper accounts 
and the censorship make it hard to follow fully. 

The conference at Stockholm to which the Dutch- 
Scandinavian Committee invited their comrades re- 
alized itself only in the shape of informal " con- 
versations " between neutral Socialists (and espe- 
cially Branting) and representatives of both sides. 
The Russian Council of Workers' and Soldiers' 
Delegates issued an invitation to the Socialists and 
Labor Parties of the world to attend another inter- 
national conference to be held at Stockholm on or 
about August 15, which should supersede "the 
Branting conversations." 

The Question of Passports. The fact that this 
invitation had official Russian backing and that it 
was accepted by the organized Socialists of France 
(on May 28),^ of Italy (on June 6), and of Great 
Britain (on August 10), made the question of 
whether or not to issue passports to delegates an 
embarrassing one to Governments.^ The first de- 

1 See pp. 61-71, 79-80. 

2 Also by the Confederation Generale de Travail on August 21. 

3 The Belgian Labor Party declined to attend, sending this ex- 
planation to Russia: "It must be clearly understood that we do 
not refuse to meet the Germans; we refuse to be associated with 
the upholders of the imperialism of Wilhelm and Karl. We see 
no objection to concerted action with those even in the Central 
Empires who are opposing the policy of aggression and conqifest, 

[102] 



cision was that of the United States, where the De- 
partment of State refused to allow the Socialist dele- 
gates, Hillquit, Berger and Lee, to go. Curiously 
enough, however, a passport was granted to James 
Eads How, organizer and representative of the In- 
ternational Brotherhood Welfare Association, a 
union of migratory workers, or so-called " hoboes." 
Another representative of this organization at- 
tended, traveling via the Pacific. The fact that this 
extreme wing of the labor movement in America was 
the only one represented at Stockholm was thus the 
direct result of the attitude of the Government and 
of the American Federation of Labor. 

France and Great Britain. On June i the French 
Government followed the American lead and an- 
nounced that French socialists would not be allowed 
to go to or through Stockholm while the conference 
was being held. 

On June 8 the question of passports to members 
of the Independent Labor Party came up in the 
British Parliament, and Sir Robert Cecil announced 
that the Government would grant passports good 
only for Petrograd; the delegates, however, might 
confer en route — but only with friends, not with 
enemies or " aliens." 

The Sailors' and Firemen's Union unexpectedly took a 
hand and refused (June lo) to serve on any ship carrying 
the delegates, thus preventing the sailing of Ramsay Mac- 
Donald and his companions. The union took the ground 
that there should be " no peace manoeuvres until Germany 
had made the fullest restitution for the wholesale massacre of 
Allied sailors at sea." 



and who are really pursuing the same object as ourselves. We 
should not refuse even to meet the majority Socialists if, abandon- 
ing their present mistakes, they came out openly and energetically 
against their Emperors." 

[103] 



Meanwhile labor men and Socialists from the Al- 
lied countries were conferring in Russia,^ and Rus- 
sian delegates were sent out to the Allied countries 
to persuade their comrades of the wisdom of tho 
Stockholm plan. Mr. Henderson wrote from 
Petrograd advising acceptance of the invitation, and 
returned to England, accompanied by four Russian 
delegates, to urge it. After consultation with mem- 
bers of the British Labor Party,^ he decided to at- 
tend. There was some question however, at that 
date, whether the Labor Party would accept the 
invitation. 

In France the question of representation at Stock- 
holm caused a ministerial crisis early in August. 
On August 12 the Permanent Administrative Com- 
mittee of the French Socialist Party announced that 
delegates would be sent to Stockholm; on the I4tl^ 
the Government refused passports. 

The Henderson Incident. In England too there 
were ministerial difficulties over the matter. It had 
been expected that the Labor Party would decline 
the invitation, which would make it unnecessary for 
the Prime Minister to refuse a passport to his col- 
league, Mr. Henderson. 

These expectations proved to be incorrect. A 

1 See pp. 79-8a. 

2 The British Labor Party is affiliated with the International 
Socialist Bureau. It has for some years been committed to So- 
cialism by vote of its annual Congress and it is practically the 
regular socialist party of Great Britain. Its membership includes 
not only Socialist organizations like the Independent Labor Party 
(6o,ooo members), the Fabian Society (strong not in numbers, 
which it has never sought, but in influence) and the less important 
British Socialist Party (membership 20,000) : it also includes, as a 
very important part of its membership, trade unions and co- 
operative societies whose constituents are not all socialists. It has 
thirty-seven members in Parliament. 

[104] 




Photo by Paul Thompson 

ARTHUR HENDERSON 



Conference of the Labor Party was held August lo. 
Under the leadership of Henderson the conference 
of 600 delegates, casting votes proportioned to their 
constituency, voted 1,046,000 to 550,000 to accept 
the invitation. This was, however, on condition 
that the Conference be consultative, not manda- 
tory. 

Russia's Attitude Toward Stockholm. Lloyd-George 
thereupon indignantly accused Henderson of bad faith, and 
of suppressing the information that the " attitude of the 
Russian Government toward Stockholm was very different 
from what had been supposed." It was widely represented 
in the press that there has been a recent and material change 
in Russian opinion. 

These allegations brought out from Kerensky himself, un- 
der date of August 16, the following statement as to the 
Stockholm Conference: 

" I think it is of great importance, although personally I 
think it would have been of greater importance if it had taken 
place while we were advancing instead of in the present 
condition. But I am not opposed to it, no. I have insisted 
again and again that any opposition offered to it by the Allied 
Governments, any difficulties put in way of delegates, is 
simply playing into German hands." 

Meanwhile, Henderson had resigned from the 
cabinet and a few days later (August 13) it was 
announced that passports to Stockholm would be 
refused. The following day the Executive of the 
Labor Party passed a vote of confidence in Hender- 
son, appointed eight delegates to Stockholm, noting 
with regret the Government's position as to issuing 
passports and directing that representation be made 
to the Government on the subject. This position 
was sustained by a narrow margin at the adjourned 
meeting of the Labor Conference on August 21. 

[los] 



Mr. Gompers Refuses. In the United States 
Mr. Gompers had refused on August 3, on behalf 
of the American Federation of Labor, to take part 
in the Stockholm conference; and on August 6 the 
Department of State definitively refused to alter its 
position as to passports.^ 

The original refusal on the part of America ap- 
pears to have been the deciding factor in the attitude 
of the Allied Governments toward the Stockholm 
plan. 

Branting on the Refusal of Passports. Hjalmar Brant- 
ing, the Swedish Socialist leader, well known for his strong 
pro-Ally leanings, commented on the situation : " If the 
Allied governments, with the exception of Russia, should 
maintain their decisions to refuse passports, their attitude 
probably will lead to a rupture between the governments con- 
cerned and the Socialistic parties of their countries, which 
have decided to be represented at the conference. There may 
be serious consequences of such a policy — how serious it is 
impossible to foretell. . . . 

" The idea of a peace promoted by the action of the inter- 
national workers cannot be suppressed by a refusal of pass- 
ports . . . 

" The refusal of passports is certainly a great political 
blunder. This step will place the Entente countries in an 
unfavorable position, as the whole world is longing for peace. 
It shows that they fear the peace discussions, which the 
Central Powers' governments are not seeking to prevent. 

" The idea upon which the Stockholm conference is based 
will not be given up because of the opposition of govern- 
ments who believe themselves able to hold out against inter- 
national sentiment." 

This is also the position taken in a statement by delegates 
from Russia, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and by 

1 On August 17 Japan also refused passports to Socialist 
delegates. 

[106] 



the Belgian, Camille Huysmans, Secretary of the Interna- 
tional Bureau/ 

The question now was as to how far Socialist ele- 
ments would or could press the issue on their re- 
spective governments. 

3- 

London Conference of Inter-Allied Socialists. 
On August 28 and 29, the long planned second In- 
ter-Allied Socialist Conference was held in London.^ 

It had two objects, to consider the proposed Stock- 
holm meeting and to consider drafts of peace-terms 
submitted by various Socialist parties of the Allied 
countries. The Russians at first held aloof, but on 
the ground that the conference was consultative only 
they finally took part. 

On neither of the two aims did the conference 
reach any unanimity. This in Henderson's opinion, 
" rendered it inevitable that the whole question 
should be reconsidered. An international confer- 
ence with such divergent views as were manifested at 
the Inter-Allied Conference between different sec- 
tions of one nation and among the different allied 
nations would not only be harmful but it might be 
disastrous. We can have no conference at all until 

1 See p. 211. 

2 This had been arranged for at the time of the " Branting con- 
versations " at Stockholm in the spring. On receiving the Russian 
invitation to a Stockholm conference later in the summer, the plan 
was suspended. The Russians had objected to it from the first, 
" because such a conference would only mean the sanction of the 
breach artificially created by the war between such parties and 
organizations, and also because only an international conference, 
uniting in one common effort all the Socialist parties and Labor 
organizations, may lead to peace." After conference with the 
Russian delegates who came to England with Henderson, the plan 
was resumed. 

[107] 



a common ground for agreement is reached among 
the workers of the allied countries." 

Nevertheless, a declaration signed by the Belgian, 
British, French, Greek, and Italian representatives 
was published on September 2 by Humanite, the So- 
cialist organ: 

More than ever after three years of war, the Socialists be- 
lieve that the victory of German imperialism vi^ould spell the 
elimination of democracy and liberty from the world. . . . 
The Allied nations must at the same time pursue vigorously 
their military efforts and show clearly what are their peace 
conditions. The Socialists find the best guarantee of a 
stable and just peace in the principles affirmed by the Russian 
revolutionists; with certain exceptions, namely, that peace 
without contributions must not exclude just reparation for 
damages and peace without annexation must not exclude dis- 
annexation of territories conquered by force. 

The right of peoples to govern themselves can only be 
brought about by a society of nations founded upon inter- 
national law and strong enough to resist all Governments 
which might attempt to violate that law. 

The Socialists desire Belgium to be restored and indemni- 
fied for the violation of her neutrality; they want Serbia 
and Roumania reestablished in independence and economic 
life and the Polish question settled in conformity with a 
Polish plebiscite and with the complete restoration of Po- 
land in its original independence in view. They desire the 
same principles applied to all Europe, from Alsace-Lorraine 
to the Balkans, including Trieste and the Trentino, so that 
each shall be nationally reunited with the country to which its 
inhabitants desire to belong. 

The Socialists feel it an essential duty to oppose every 
effort to transform a war of right and defense into one of 
conquests which might bring about new conflicts. 

A just and durable peace is not possible, according to their 
profound conviction, until all the peoples enjoy democratic 
institutions which shall guarantee them against dynastic am- 
[108] 



bitions and the political and economic designs of hegemonies, 
castes, and ruling classes. 

The Socialists are convinced that the peoples of Germany 
and Austria cannot achieve their desired peace until they have 
discarded their present irresponsible Governments for demo- 
cratic regimes, which shall include the downfall of mili- 
tarism. 

The declaration concludes with the statement that this 
must be the last of all wars, but adds the reminder that this 
can be achieved only if the Socialists of all parties work for 
the creation of a pacific Federation of the United States of 
Europe and the World, which shall assure the liberty of 
the peoples and the unity, independence, and autonomy of the 
nations. 

Of the peace-programs prepared for consideration 
at the conference, one of the most interesting and 
important was that of the British Labor Party, which 
considered each point of the settlement in detail. 
It w^U be found on p. 221. 

. The British Socialist Party presented a statement 
setting forth that there is common responsibility for 
the war, and that reparation must be from a common 
fund contributed by all the belligerents; demanding 
the return of conquered territory, including the Ger- 
man colonies; and calling on the working people to 
intervene and end the war. 



Blackpool Trade Union Congress. Five days 
after the Inter-Allied Sociahst Conference, the 
British Trade Union Congress met at Blackpool. 
It was of the opinion " that a conference held now 
could not be successful, and that an attempt should 
be made to secure a general agreement among the 
v/orking classes of the allied nations as a fundamen- 
tal condition of the convening of such a body. The 

[109] 



congress should protest against the British Govern- 
ment's refusal of passports to delegates to Stock- 
holm, and demand that if an international confer- 
ence should be held no obstacle should be placed in 
the way of the attendance of delegates." ^ 

A delegate, John Hill, president of the Boilermakers' and 
Shipbuilders' Union, urged the delegates to agree on the 
principal object of the war. It was unnecessary, he said, to 
drag Belgium into the debate, as they were all agreed that 
there must be an evacuation of that covmtry and absolute 
independence and full reparation for it. Belgium, Poland, 
Alsace-Lorraine, and the Trentino, he said, were all assured 
of a full measure of justice in the agreed object of all the 
allied powers, which was the destruction of German militar- 
ism by the substitution of a German democracy. Asked if 
this could be accomplished by the military method, he said : 

" By this method it is estimated the nations have killed 
about 9,000,000 men who should have been the creators 
of a new world. The total killed and wounded of all coun- 
tries in the war is greater than the total white population of 
the British Empire." 

Free Masons on Peace Terms. An international 
conference, of another kind, which also occupied it- 
self with the question of peace terms was held In 
Paris on August 19 by the Masons of Italy, France, 
Belgium, Portugal, Serbia and some of the European 
neutrals. The Grand Lodges of Great Britain were 
not represented, because they refrain from all po- 
litical questions, both national and international. 

The terms favored by the Masons were stated by the 
Temps as follows : " First, the return of Alsace and Lor- 
raine to France; second, the reconstitution by reunion of the 
three fragments of Poland — Russian, Prussian and Austrian 
— into an independent nation ; third, the independence of 

1 For the earlier history of the Stockholm Conference see pp. 61-71, 
and 79-80. See also p. 213. 

[no] 



Bohemia; fourth, the liberation and unification of all nation- 
alities to-day oppressed by the political and alministrative 
organization of the Hapsburg empire in its various domin- 
ions, which declared themselves in favor of such a course by 
plebiscite." The Italian Masons urged a fuller recognition 
of Italian aspirations, but were not sustained. Thei'e was 
considerable bitterness in the Italian press over this lack of 
consideration of Italy's claims. 



The People's Council. In America too there 
were popular conferences, discussing peace. The 
constituent assembly of the People's Council for 
Democracy and Terms of Peace met in Chicago dur- 
ing the first days of September in the midst of con- 
siderable political excitement. While an Inventive 
press was telling of speeches denouncing the Presi- 
dent, the Conference was passing a resolution on 
terms of peace, ^ In effect an endorsement of Presi- 
dent Wilson's reply to the Pope, which had then just 
appeared. 

The People's Council believes that " the more 
clearly It is demonstrated In this country that the 
American people desire a peace without conquest, 
without tribute, without imperialistic aggrandize- 
ment, the sooner will the reactionary rulers of Ger- 
many be compelled to yield to the powerful and 
growing movement In Germany In favor of such a 
peace." (Report of Committee on Peace Terms.) 

They are not alone in advocating this belief, which 
is a constant thesis for Instance of the editorials of 
the New Republic. 

A Conference of the American Alliance for La- 
bor and Democracy, held under the lead of Mr. 

1 See p. 231. 

[Ill] 



Gompers at Minneapolis on September 6, proclaimed 
the loyalty of American labor and its enthusiasm 
for the war.^ 

The Non-partisan League, the expression of po- 
litical and economic democracy in the Northwest, 
meeting on September 19, occupied itself among 
other matters with the war. It urged the American 
Government to insist that the Allies should in com- 
mon with itself " make immediate public declaration 
of terms of peace ... in harmony with and sup- 
porting the new democracy of Russia." It de- 
manded " the abolition of secret diplomacy." " The 
ugly incitings of an economic system based upon ex- 
ploitation " and " rival groups of monopolists play- 
ing a deadly game for commercial supremacy " are 
accused of being contributory causes of the war. 
Other paragraphs deal with domestic problems con- 
nected with a state of war and with economic after- 
the-war reforms.^ 

1 See p. 235. 

2 For the document as a whole, see p. 237. 



[112] 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE pope's note 



On August I, Pope Benedict XV addressed a note 
(not made public In the United States till the six- 
teenth) " To the rulers of the Belligerent Peoples." 

The note begins by defining the position of the 
Pope during the war — his Impartiality, his good 
will to all — and speaks of his endeavors to " bring 
the peoples and their rulers to more moderate reso- 
lutions, to the serene deliberation " of a just and 
lasting peace, not all of which endeavors have been 
made public. 

He Invites the belligerents to agree on the follow- 
ing points : 

The Pope's Proposals, (i) " The fundamental 
point " — the substitution of moral for military 
force. The Pope proposes decrease of armaments, 
and compulsory arbitration, with sanctions or- pen- 
alties to be agreed on. 

(2) " Community of the Seas." 

(3) Mutual forgiveness as regards damages and 
payment for cost of war, except in certain special 
cases to be considered on the basis of justice. 

(4) Restitution of occupied territory, as a neces- 
sary preliminary of agreement: specifically, complete 
evacuation of Belgium with guarantee of full po- 

[113] 



lltical, military and economic independence, evacua- 
tion of French territory, and restitution of German 
colonies. 

(5) Territorial questions between Italy and Aus- 
tria, and Germany and France, to be examined in a 
conciliatory spirit, regard being had to aspirations 
of the peoples and general human welfare. So too 
of Armenia, the Balkan States, and the territories 
making part of the ancient Kingdom of Poland. 

The whole document is permeated with the sense 
of the pity, waste and horror of the war " which 
more and more appears a useless massacre." It ap- 
peals to the motive of sympathy. It emphasizes the 
responsibility of rulers, the immeasurable gain of a 
durable peace with disarmament. 



Discussion of the Papal Note. The public dis- 
cussion which followed dealt partly with the sub- 
stance of the proposals in the note, partly with its 
source, and the religious politics involved. 

The note was of course said to be correlated with 
the peace efforts of the Catholic Center In Germany 
and especially Erzberger's " peace drive," and with 
the desire for peace in Austria, supposed to be the 
land nearest the Pope's heart. Some even asserted 
the most direct collaboration between the Central 
Powers and the Vatican. There were also the sus- 
picions of certain anti-religious and non-Catholic 
groups. As for the Socialist and radical forces, they 
desired that peace should be brought about by popu- 
lar forces; they neither wished that prestige should 
accrue to the church nor that an ecclesiastically con- 
servative tone should be borne by the peace settle- 
[114] 




Copyright by Underwood and Underwood 

POPE BENEDICT XV 



ment. On the other hand, many Catholics found 
their Church loyalty running more or less counter 
to their national prepossessions and purposes. 
Care seems to have been taken not openly to mobil- 
ize the Cathohc body as such in favor of the Pope's 
proposals. 

The question was also raised as to what political motives 
might underlie the Pope's note. Attention was called to 
various Catholic utterances in this connection which seemed 
to show that " there is a Vatican diplomacy eager to take all 
the opportunities offered by the present situation in order 
to resolve in its own interest some problems in connection 
with the Temporal Papacy and the Roman Church." ^ 

Thus was cited an article by Monsignor Benigni, a mod- 
ernist churchman, in the Nuova Antologia^ in favor of the 
Pope's being represented at the Peace Conference. It may 
be remembered that the Pope was excluded from The Hague 
Congresses, through the absolute refusal of Italy to consent 
to his presence, on the ground that only States should be 
invited to participate. Again, an article by the English 
Cardinal Gasquet, in the Dublin Review, remarks upon the 
failure of international conventions, Hague and other, to 
safeguard peace and small peoples, and the failure of So- 
cialist internationalism to prevent war, and concludes that 
the only road to peace is a sacred league among Christian 
nations supported by the authority of the Pope, " the only 
authority recognized by all." 

On the Catholic side it was pointed out (in America, the 
leading Catholic journal of New York) that " radicalism 
is advancing by leaps and bounds, strengthened by the very 
passions that war arouses. The safety of constitutional gov- 
ernment is in the balance. Which way shall the scales be 
tilted? The wrong way, if the war is prolonged without 
due necessity. The truculence of labor here, the insistence 

^ For this and what follows see an article by Dr. George La Plana 
in the Forum of February, 1917. 

["5] 



of anarchists and Socialists abroad, bear with them a serious 
lesson." 

Explanations. Certain questions as to the con- 
tent of the note were met by a dispatch authorized 
by the Papal Secretary. It is denied that the appeal 
was suggested by, or is in the particular interest of, 
any one of the belligerents. Belgium is specifically 
named as the exceptional case with regard to in- 
demnities for war injury. 

Further, " the Holy Father said nothing about 
democracy and the democratization of any existing 
government, because history teaches us that a form 
of government imposed by arms does not and can 
not live, and also out of respect for the free-will 
of the people themselves, who, having the right of 
universal suffrage, may choose whatever form of 
government they please. For the rest, democracy 
will receive such an impulse from the war, that wis- 
dom must prevent it deteriorating into any excessive 
forms, such as anarchism." 

Another semi-official statement from Rome, Au- 
gust 17, says, " the Vatican considers the reproach 
of a part of the press that the Holy See has not 
condemned violations of law, such as atrocities com- 
mitted, is unjust; since Pope Benedict, faithful to his 
principle of impartiality, had in his note the inten- 
tion of acting as peacemaker, and not as judge, and 
also because he lacks the necessary powers to do so. 

" No peacemaker would have the faintest chance 
of success if he began by trying to prove which side 
is right and which is wrong. The Pontiff went as 
far as possible to make understood what his feelings 
are without risking the failure of his proposal on the 
rocks of Austro-German ill-feeling. Besides, the 

[116] 



Papal proposals were In solemn condemnation of 
those responsible for the war methods adopted and 
the barbarities committed." 

Still another explanation was given orally by the 
Pope himself when on August 22 he received sepa- 
rately the Belgian and British Ministers accredited 
to the Vatican. To their inquiry as to what he 
meant by freedom of the seas he replied that he 
Intended the same meaning as that of President 
Wilson in his message. 

On August 21, Cardinal Gasparri puzzled the newspaper 
correspondents by asserting that the five chief belligerents 
have subscribed to four fundamental principles upon which 
peace must be based. These were stated to be " The prin- 
ciple of nationalities, freedom of the seas, disavowal of war 
for conquest, and a league of nations to insure permanent 
peace." 

Right vs. Might. It Is to be noted that the Pope 
designates as the fundamental point in his Note the 
substitution of moral for material force. In Ger- 
many this seems to have met In certain quarters with 
hearty agreement. " The deciding question," says 
the Tageblatt, " is what shall be our attitude to what 
the Pope calls the basic idea for peace negotiations. 
That basic Idea is that right shall take the place of 
might and that an understanding for simultaneous 
disarmament shall be reached and an international 
court of arbitration established. We agree with 
the Pope on this basic idea without reserve." 

On the other hand Count Reventlow, the " mad 
dog of Germany," whose significance is much over- 
rated by our press, holds " that the moral law exists 
for Germans only so far as it applies to the German 
Empire and nation. The Germans cannot consent 

[117] 



to a reduction in armaments, which alone have made 
possible the existence of the Empire and the pos- 
sibility of its moral activities," He adds that Ger- 
many cannot bear its own burdens, and therefore 
cannot renounce indemnities. He also says that 
guarantees for Belgium's independence cannot be 
found. 

3. 

President Wilson's Reply to the Pope. In his 
reply to the Pope, President Wilson was generally 
considered to be the spokesman of the Allies. 

His Note of August 27 at once altered the status 
of the question of peace negotiations. On the 
side of the Allies the conviction was profound that 
the German Government could not be trusted. This 
lack of confidence, not only in Germany's pledged 
word but in her intention to deal fairly in any sense 
with foreign nations, had made them unwilling to 
take at their face value her various offers, and 
blocked the way to negotiations for a settlement. 

The President's policy pointed a way. He stated, 
as the essential objection to the " status quo ante " 
as a basis for enduring peace, the wish to free the 
world from the menace, not of the German nation, 
but of a " vast military establishment controlled by 
an irresponsible Government " upon whose word of 
honor it had been found impossible to rely. " We 
can not take the word of the present rulers of Ger- 
many as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, 
unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evi- 
dence of the will and purpose of the German people 
as the other peoples of the world would be justified 
in accepting. . . . We must await some new evi- 
dence of the purposes of the great peoples of the 

[118] 



Central Powers. God grant It may be given soon, 
and In a way to restore the confidence of all peoples 
everywhere In the faith of nations and the possibility 
of a covenanted peace." 

The Note also repudiates " punitive damages, the 
dismemberment of empires, the establishment of 
selfish and exclusive economic leagues " as " Inex- 
pedient and In the end futile, no proper basis for a 
peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring 
peace." 



This Implicit but unmistakable promise that the 
United States would be ready to enter Into peace 
negotiations with Germany when the German people 
could guarantee their Government's good faith, was 
understood to be a direct reference to the establish- 
ment of a Parliamentary Government in Germany. 
It met with almost unanimous approval In America 
from all parties. Including those who believed that 
the only hope for German democratization lay in an 
Allied victory.^ 

The question was raised whether such an outside demand 
for domestic reforms might not actually have the effect of 
hindering and delaying them by arousing chauvinistic oppo- 
sition. In this connection, as perhaps showing the growth 
of a desire in Germany to understand the outside point of 
view, Dr. Dernberg's comment in the Berlin Tageblatt is 
interesting : 

" I have no reason to break a lance for President Wilson, 
nevertheless I must remind my readers that a foreign poten- 
tate forms his judgment of a Government primarily upon 

1 Cf., as an example of Socialist approval, Max Eastman's edi- 
torial supplement to the Masses, October, 1917. Cf., too, the reso- 
lution of the Committee on Peace Terms of the People's Council 
{infra., p. 231). 

["9] 



the experience he has had of that Government's diplomacy 
Anybody who has carefully followed the course of German 
diplomacy in regard to America for a considerable time pre- 
vious to February i, 191 7, knows that President Wilson 
has right good grounds for complaint, since this German 
diplomacy was by no means unambiguous." 

The Russian embassy in Washington made a 
statement on the President's reply, August 30, char- 
acterizing it as in the Russian view " an act of high- 
est political wisdom " which " closely corresponds 
to the principles and aims of the Russian people," 
and as designed " to facilitate for the German people 
their entrance in the path of democratic revival." 

That the President's policy was not merely acceptable 
ex post facto but had long been substantially agreed on with 
England, is suggested in a very interesting London dispatch 
by Lincoln Colcord under date of August ig (eight days 
before the appearance of the Note). The President's reply, 
it was believed, would be in substance, " a set of extremely 
liberal ideas on the question of making peace which Balfour 
carried back with him from his American mission." These 
were based on " a common feeling in British and American 
liberal circles that the democracies of the world had not 
been entirely faithful to their purposes in the two important 
particulars, namely, in appealing to German liberalism with 
some joint statement of reassurance as to the aims of the 
Allies and in supporting the new Russian Republic and 
holding its full confidence on the same score." At the same 
time there was the obvious difficulty of stating concrete terms 
which would satisfy the aspirations of all the Allies without 
being open to the charge of imperialism and offending alike 
Russians and German liberals. " As a result of all this, 
it is understood that the suggestion was advanced that a 
simple statement to the effect that the allied democracies 
. . . would be willing at any time, with certain obvious 
guarantees, to discuss peace with a democratized Germany, 

[120] 




[Courtesy of the N. Y. Evening Post^ 

THE MESSENGER 



would, if put out as an official joint declaration of policy, 
have the desired effect." ^ 

This point of view was tersely expressed by Bal- 
four in the famous phrase in his speech of July 30, 
" until Germany is either powerless or free," fore- 
shadowing the position taken by President Wilson. 

Two semi-official statements in the press, Septem- 
ber 4 and 5, served to make clear the nature of the 
" guarantees " demanded by the President of the 
German people. In the first, it was denied that the 
Administration had meant that the abolition of the 
Hohenzollern dynasty and the monarchical form of 
government were necessary to meet its conditions. 
In the second, it was stated that the " governmental 
reforms necessary in Germany before the United 
States will treat with that country include radical 
electoral progress, without which it was believed that 
the desired democratization of Germany would not 
take place," and " a ministry responsible to the 
Reichstag." 



The President's reply met with a considerable 
amount of sympathy among the German Socialists. 
Scheidemann regards as " absolutely right " the idea 
that peace in order to be durable ought to be guaran- 
teed not only by the Government but by the people. 
However, he points out, war offers the worst op- 
portunity for the development of democratic institu- 
tions. Peace will give them a chance to make 
quicker progress. For at least a generation peace 
will be automatically guaranteed by exhaustion. 
During this time, democracy and Socialism will so 

1 Philadelphia Public Ledger, August 21, 1917- 

[121] 



advance that this should prove the last war among 
civilized nations. 

German Reply to the Pope. The German and 
Austrian replies to the Pope, appearing on Septem- 
ber 22, were a disappointment to those who had 
hoped for some concrete statement of terms, and at 
least a definite and complete renunciation of Bel- 
gium. They indicate, however, a certain change of 
attitude. There is no talk of victory and no asser- 
tion that the Allies provoked the war, which is now 
ascribed to " a disastrous concatenation of events." 

The " leading idea of the peace appeal, . . . that 
in the future the material power of arms must be 
superseded by the moral power of right " is greeted 
with special sympathy by the Imperial Government. 
It agrees that " the new spirit, that in the future 
should prevail in international relations, should first 
find hopeful expression " in measures toward limi- 
tation of armaments as well as community of the 
seas. The task of deciding " international differ- 
ences of opinion " by peaceful means, especially by 
arbitration, would then come up naturally. 

Much stress is laid on the advantages of economic reci- 
procity and free competition. " Germany, owing to her 
geographical situation and economic requirements has to rely 
on peaceful intercourse with her neighbors and with distant 
countries. No people therefore has more reason than the 
German people to wish that instead of universal hatred and 
battle, a conciliatory fraternal spirit should prevail between 
nations. If the nations are guided by this spirit it will be 
recognized, to their advantage, that the important thing is 
to lay more stress upon that which unites them in their rela- 
tions." The nations will then settle still undecided points 
of conflict in such a way as to create for every nation satis- 
factory conditions of existence, whereafter " a repetition of 
this world catastrophe would appear impossible." 
[122] 



In another passage the Note says that Germany has been 
seeking free development at home, and, abroad, " unhindered 
competition with nations enjoying equal rights and equal 
esteem. The free play of forces in the world, in peaceable 
wrestling with one another, would lead to the highest per- 
fection of the noblest human possessions." 

It is particularly to be noted that the reply takes occasion 
to speak of " measures which the Government has taken in 
closest contact with representatives of the German people, 
for discussing and answering the questions raised." This 
proves " how earnestly it desires, in accordance with His 
Holiness's desires and the peace resolution of the Reichstag 
on July iQj to find a practical basis for a just and lasting 
peace." (Our italics.) 

Austrian Reply to the Pope. The reply of the 
Austrian Emperor is distinguished by Its Catholic 
tone, by Its more pronounced expression of desire 
for peace and by distinctly less ambiguous statements 
m the passages referring to disarmament, freedom 
of the seas, and compulsory arbitration. Agreeing 
with the Pope, and also the German note. It regards 
these Ideas as the first to be realized, and holds that 
" It can then not be difficult to find a satisfactory 
solution of the other questions which still remain to 
be settled ... In a spirit of justice, and of a rea- 
sonable consideration of the conditions necessary to 
existence, on both sides." ^ 



At this point the development of any approach to 
peace would seem to depend on the internal evolution 

1 The note seems far more self-consistent in its tone than the 
German. In the latter, one is tempted to believe that one can 
almost detect the note of Kiihlmann, the note of the Emperor, the 
note of the Reichstag committee, the note of a Dernburg or Ballin, 

[123] 



of Germany. Those In present control of her des- 
tinies appear to be determined to secure a peace 
conference which they can enter with free hands. 
They appear to make it a sine qua non to be free to 
bargain, with all their military and territorial ad- 
vantages available as pawns with which to procure 
their own aims. Nevertheless, and in spite of the 
way in which territorial questions like Belgium and 
Alsace-Lorraine and the Colonies loom in the fore- 
ground, the prime requisite of Germany is freedom 
from economic discrimination after the war. 
Everything else would appear to be- in reality sec- 
ondary. 

This prime peace-requisite of Germany is con- 
fronted by the prime requisite of the Allies — an 
administration of German affairs which they feel 
they can trust; and as a necessary pre-condition, 
Germany's willingness to renounce the spoils of mil- 
itary aggression. 

and the dead hand of the Conservative, making the reply as a whole 
ineflfective. 



[124] 



CHAPTER IX 

THE SETTLEMENT: PARTIES, ISSUES AND METHODS 

I. 

In the nine months covered by this survey, the peace 
aims of the various belligerents, and the forces be- 
hind these aims, have shifted again and again. 
Three chief points of view seem to have been repre- 
sented in the councils of the nations. 

The Imperialists. There is first the point of view 
of the imperialists, militarists. Junkers, expansion- 
ists, annexationists — statesmen of the old predatory 
type. They are inclined to regard all alien terri- 
tory as possible and legitimate booty. Men of this 
way of thinking are most powerful, most cynical, 
and, we believe, proportionately most numerous, in 
Prussia, but no country is without them. 

The Liberals. There is secondly the point of 
view of those who may be called the Liberals — 
such men as President Wilson, Dr. Eliot, Balfour, 
Delbriick, Milyukov. They think in terms of 
States, of national commerce, of national honor. 
But beyond national States they envisage with more 
or less vigorous belief a State of States, a politically 
organized world. 

The Social-Radicals. There is thirdly the point 
of view of the social radicals who constitute a force 
not easily to be measured or appraised, but suddenly 

[125] 



made Important by the Russian Revolution. Those 
of them who are SociaHsts are strongly organized in 
all European countries as political parties in good 
standing. Before the war they were internationally 
organized, and since the spring of 19 17 the Inter- 
national has once more commenced to assert itself. 
In Germany the Socialists have been regarded as 
rather successfully " tamed." But in Russia a suffi- 
ciently " untamed " variety is now in power. In 
both Germany and Russia they desire peace, though 
with very different minds. But both favor interna- 
tionally organized working-class pressure as a 
means of bringing peace about. 

It may be roughly said that those in control in 
Germany represent the first point of view, in Eng- 
land and France the second, in revolutionary Russia 
the third. The coming in of the United States, in 
which public opinion is pretty solidly of the second 
type, enormously increased the impact of this set of 
ideas, to which President Wilson's intellect and 
eloquence give a finely tempered edge. 

Their Instruments: (i) A Military Settlement. 
The first group desire a settlement by military means 
and by military men based on strategic considera- 
tions. It is their idea, as was said to me in pre- 
revolutionary Russia, that " peace terms are not to 
be settled, do not deceive yourself as to that, by 
cabinets or parliaments or any civilians, but by gen- 
erals in the field." 

(2) Politico-Economic Pressure. The second 
group, when circumstances permit them to use their 
appropriate instruments, look rather to economic 
and political means of pressure. The blockade has 
meant more than "drives"; the Paris Conference 
on the one side, and the fear of the economic menace 
[126] 



of a Mittel-Europa organized for commercial ag- 
gression on the other, have caused more dismay 
than armies. President Wilson appears to rest the 
hopes of the Allies for an early peace in a change 
of political equilibrium in Germany. 

(3) Working-class Solidarity. And the third, 
the social-radical group, interpreting the war as due 
to causes acting on both sides — causes, such as 
colonial expansion, for which the nationalism of the 
Liberals bears a full share of responsibility — hopes 
for a peace to be achieved by neither military nor 
commercial pressure, but through the most complete 
working-class internationalism. 

All of these points of view are represented in 
each country, but it is difficult to say to what extent 
they are held by the populations, since no govern- 
ment has undertaken to find out definitely what the 
silent masses who bear the bulk of the suffering 
really want in regard to the settlement of the war. 
No one knows how many are ready to go on fight- 
ing for imperialistic ends ; how many believe that 
they must " conquer or submit," as President Wil- 
son said to Russia; how many desire a peace now 
on the Russian terms. 

Each of these groups finds it hard to understand the 
other points of view. The Junker- Jingo group honestly 
thinks, as Napoleon did, that the Liberal is a hypocrite or a 
shop-keeper and dollar-chaser. So the Liberal thinks the 
Junker a brute beast, a " mad dog." Both regard the third 
man as little better than an anarchist, to be kept as quiet as 
possible. The social-radical, also, may misread as pure hy- 
pocrisy the " bourgeois ideology " which sees the war — as 
Mr. Bonar Law put it in the parliamentary debate of July 
27 — as "a struggle between right and wrong to decide 
whether moral force or wickedness is to rule the world." 

[127] 



Or he may feel that a genuine but misguided passion of 
moral feeling, putting behind the determination to " fight 
to a finish " more driving force even than lust for power or 
wealth or glory, is perhaps the most serious obstacle in 
the way of the solution in which he sees the hope of the 
world. 

The Church and Other Forces. Suddenly upon a 
scene occupied by these three great figures — the sol- 
dier, the statesman, the revolutionary worker — the 
priest entered, the oldest International in Europe 
invited the wayward sons of men to serene delibera- 
tion.^ Here was a new peacemaker. 

These are so far the characters occupying the 
stage in this stupendous play. And behind the 
scenes? There is talk of an international gather- 
ing of bankers assembling in Switzerland. Is High 
Finance also reassembling its internationalism? 
How far are current suspicions, and cynical inter- 
pretations of events in terms of commercial juggling, 
justified? Is "Wall Street" — widely believed to 
have played an Important part in bringing the United 
States Into the war, and for Its own purposes — 
going to take part, too. In bringing war to an end 
when the time comes? If, as many believe, the fear 
of menacing social unrest spurred Italy and Russia 
Into war to stave off Internal troubles, will the same 
fear In one or another country Induce conservative 
leaders to call the war off? These questions can 
be asked but not answered. 

1 Cf., the remark of the pan-German Deutsche Zeitung: " We 
are permitted to behold the three great international powers, Rome, 
Social Democracy, and Judaism, working in complete unison to 
bring to shame the German victory for which hundreds of thou- 
sands have bled and died." 



[128] 



2. 

The Issues. But, if such are the forces, what 
are the issues? What must the settlement decide, 
what are the proposals now before the world? 

Such proposals are not generally to be found in 
their most complete or candid form in state papers 
nor in political speeches, but in the freer and more 
disinterested programs of organizations and individ- 
ual students.^ A formula that will serve as a slogan 
is however capable of great political service. 

" A Fight to a Finish" The formula that is 
above all others simple and, from a certain point of 
view, safe, is the mihtary slogan, " a fight to a 
finish." From the point of view of those who utter 
this phrase, any consideration of possible peace-set- 
tlements is likely to be regarded as seditious " peace 
talk," or at least as a withdrawal of attention from 
the one proper concern of all patriotic citizens — to 
wit, fighting. 

This feeling towards the consideration of terms 
draws strength not only from the instinct of pug- 
nacity, and from the danger to the partnership of 
stating too clearly what for instance Turkey or Bul- 
garia or Japan or Italy may hope for; it has an 
added intensity in proportion as victory is conceived 
as the vindication of the righteous and the punish- 
ment of the wicked. 

" Guarantees." The large phrases of the earlier 
statements as to war-aims were in great part 
merely decorous generalizations meant to cover the 
diverse and necessarily more or less conflicting de- 

1 Some of these are given in Part II : among the most interesting 
are those of President Jordan, the British Union of Democratic 
Control, the Executive Committee of the British Labor Party and 
the two German gpQJalist Parties. 

[129] 



sires of the partners on both sides. The spokesmen 
of the belligerents had either to set down an alarm- 
ing catalogue of aspirations, overlapping and in- 
compatible, or to substitute some reputable generali- 
zation. Of these phrases the " guarantee of na- 
tional security," or, at once more generous and more 
sonorous, " guarantee that such a war shall not re- 
cur," was most useful; for while it might suggest 
a friendly and all inclusive league of nations for mu- 
tual insurance, it might also mean " rectified " fron- 
tiers, one-sided disarmament and economic crippling 
of the enemy. 

The President's request for a statement of terms 
served to reveal the wide-reaching character of the 
purposes of the Allies; but even that program of 
dismemberment and rectification of historical losses 
was incomplete — Japan's share was not indicated, 
nor the fate of the German colonies, nor the war 
after the war. And Germany's corresponding pro- 
gram was known only by inference or rumor. 

The Russian Formula. Revolutionary Russia 
then came forward with the proposal which 
amounted to settlement on the basis of the status quo 
ante except in so far as the principle of the right of 
self-disposal for every nationality left the door open 
for readjustments. 

Demand for a Responsible Government in Ger- 
many. The Allies have not as yet definitely ac- 
cepted the Russian formula; but the President, 
speaking apparently for the Allies as well, narrowed 
the demands on Germany, in his reply to the Pope, 
to more practicable dimensions. He made a new 
and more definite interpretation of the demand 
which lay behind the talk of " crushing Prussian 
militarism," " making sure that such a catastrophe 
[130] 



should never occur again," etc., by interpreting this 
demand to mean, specifically, that the Allies must 
have adequate evidence that the faith of the Ger- 
man people is behind their government in its peace 
terms. And with this demand the President coupled 
a disavowal of the most menacing points in the ex- 
tremer program of the Allies, and thus once more 
put the question up to the Central Powers. 

They responded, in their replies to the Pope, by 
accepting certain general principles; but, as before, 
they practically refused to discuss concrete issues 
outside of a peace conference. 

Preliminary Basis of a Settlement. Nevertheless, 
the situation has been considerably simplified. And 
if the desire for a negotiated peace, stimulated from 
Rome and Petrograd, eventually becomes powerful 
enough to effect a settlement, it would appear to be 
one which it is now possible to envisage in some at 
least of its main aspects. 

Such a settlement would, doubtless, deal with only 
a part of the questions to be finally decided. The 
first agreement, on the basis of which the war would 
end, could clear up only the chief questions at issue : 
the more detailed arrangements, and some of the 
ultimate problems, would doubtless be left to a later 
Conference. This is made the more probable by 
the danger of possible detail difficulties among part- 
ners — difficulties less dangerous when all parties 
(including the enemy) are no longer under arms. 

For hater Settlement. In regard to that Society 
of Nations which has been President Wilson's espe- 
cial interest, all seem to be of one mind as to leav- 
ing to a later stage of proceedings all the details — 
all in fact except the merest general principles. In 
these almost every Government is ready to express 

T131] 



some degree of platonic Interest, hardly more. Eng- 
land, and especially unofficial England, has more 
confidence in the idea than the Continent.^ 

Disarmament, the freedom of the seas, and the 
revision and extension of international law, fall 
largely in the same category of questions that re- 
quire the temper and leisure of a later congress to 
work out, even if general bases are agreed on in 
the first act of settlement. 

With regard to the most obvious question, that of 
territorial adjustment, much of this matter too will 
probably have to be left over for settlement by con- 
ference. This seems to be the general view as re- 
gards the details of the Balkan problem. 

For Immediate Decision. On the other hand, 
certain territorial questions stand In the very front 
rank of those that must be settled before peace Is 
possible. 

Belgian Independence. The evacuation of Bel- 
gium and complete restoration of her Independence 
stand easily first among such questions. This Is 
true not only because the sympathies and the sense 
of justice of Liberals everywhere, even In the Cen- 
tral Powers, are deeply engaged on Belgium's be- 
half; not only because the Alhes have pledged their 
honor to secure her restoration; but because It has 
become the well understood symbol of defeat for 
the power of military aggression and the philosophy 
that justifies it. 

On the German side opinion has been divided. 
The Bund Neues Vaterland, led by Schiicklng, has 

1 For official statements touching on the subject see the appendix 
to Goldsmith's A League to Enforce Peace, Macmillan, 1917; and, 
more recent, A Reference Book for Speakers, League to Enforce 
Peace, 70 Fifth Ave.. N. Y. C 

[132] 



insisted that annexation would be a bad thing even 
on the grounds of Germany's own interests. The 
Socialists of both the majority and the minority 
groups oppose annexation on principle.^ 

Unfortunately recent developments seem to show 
that in Gerrriany these enlightened views have not 
yet prevailed. The idea of entering the peace con- 
ference unpledged, with Belgium as an object of 
barter by which to secure the return of the German 
colonies, or the cession of the Belgian Congo, or 
what not, is held even by many of those who realize 
that Belgium should or must be given up. Certain 
elements still apparently hope for a permanent and 
more or less complete " control." The nature of 
this control is perhaps indicated by the terms re- 
ported on September 27 " to have been outlined by 
von Kiihlmann to the Pope, as the condition on 
which Germany was willing to evacuate Belgium." 
These terms included Germany's " right to develop 
her economic enterprises freely in Belgium, espe- 
cially in Antwerp " (whatever that might turn out 
to mean) ; a guarantee on the part of Belgium that 
any such menace as that which threatened Germany 
in 19 14 would be excluded in future; and the ad- 
ministrative separation of Flanders and the Wal- 
loon district, instituted by Germany. 

To the Allies, however, any compromise on the 
subject of Belgium is inadmissible. The question 
does not stand on the same basis as that of other 
occupied territory. They do not consider it a sub- 
ject for debate or bargain. They stand pledged. 
It seems hard to make Germany realize that — 

^ For the opposition to annexation on the part of Dr. Quidde and 
Eduard Bernstein see Bourne Toivards an Enduring Peace, p. 316 
and p. 320. 

[133] 



short of securing overwhelming victory — she can- 
not get peace without meeting their views on this 
point at least. 

Evacuation of France. Next to the question of 
Belgium is that of the evacuation of the occupied 
portion of Northern France. This too is a sine qua 
non to the Allies. But here also Pan-Germanists 
have put forward proposals to hold on to certain 
districts valuable for their coal and iron, and Ger- 
many's official spokesmen prefer not to commit 
themselves. 

The Balkan Allies. Next among territorial con- 
siderations come the questions of Serbia, Montene- 
gro and Roumania. The honor of the Allies is 
pledged to their reconstitution; the details of terri- 
torial adjustment fall, however, into the vexed cate- 
gory of the Balkan problem. 



Next to the question of occupied territories — 
that is, occupied during this war — come perhaps 
certain questions of " unredeemed " or oppressed 
nationalities, questions which are in another aspect 
also territorial questions. 

Alsace-Lorraine. This case is a special and dif- 
ficult one. Perhaps on no single other point is there 
so absolute a deadlock of opposing views as in the 
French and German attitude — even in some de- 
gree in radical circles — on this point.^ 

The wrong done by Germany in the forcible an- 
nexation of 1 87 1 is unquestionable. But the his- 
torical test of justice is complicated by the fact that 
the land, originally German, was first taken by 

1 Cf. pp. 176, 183, 190, 225, 240, 263, 266. 

[134] 




[Courtesy of Le Rire] 



ALSACE LORRAINE 

A French view of a plebiscite with Alsace-Lorraine 
bound and gagged by German militarism 



France as part of the spoils of the Thirty Years' 
War. The test of language is in this case no 
test of nationality or national feeling, to which it 
bears no fixed relation.^ The creation of an inde- 
pendent buffer state has been proposed and some 
good observers believe that this is what the ma- 
jority of the inhabitants would themselves prefer 
if it could be made consistent with their trade ne- 
cessities. The obvious democratic solution would 
appear to be decision by means of a plebiscite, but 
this too has its serious practical difficulties. For 
instance, the exodus of French inhabitants and the 
artificially stimulated immigration of German set- 
tlers during the German era make the French dis- 
trust this plan as likely to be unfair, even were they 
not opposed to it on other grounds. These detail 
difficulties, however, are of the type amenable to ju- 
dicial or arbitral arrangement. It has been sug- 
gested for this, and other similar cases, that while 
the conditions of a fair consultation of the people 
are being worked out the territory might be put 
under the interim guardianship of a League of Na- 
tions. This assumes the possibility of the immedi- 
ate creation of some form of such a League. 

An important factor in the situation is the emotional in- 
tensity of the French determination to recover these " lost 
provinces." But no one as yet knows how far the official 

1 Dr. Jordan says: "It is to be noted that of over two millions 
of people in Alsace-Lorraine . . . only about one-sixth are of 
French origin or even speak a French dialect as a mother tongue. 
Yet only the humblest peasants are without knowledge of French, 
which language is spoken by preference by all the educated classes. 
. . . Bilingual the provinces are to-day and for the most part bi- 
lingual they have been for generations. Really they are trilingual, 
for the German and French dialects of their peasants diverge 
widely from the speech of Berlin or Paris. Alsace-Lorraine, A 
Study in Conquest: igi3 (p. 35 and 38). 

i[i35l 



spokesmen of France really voice the wishes of the French 
people in this matter: how many, that is to say, would wish 
to prolong the war (and for what length of time) to secure 
re-annexation without condition, rather than a plebiscite; 
or to secure a plebiscite, rather than the status quo for the 
time being — with the hope of a peaceable readjustment in 
the course of time when passions have cooled,^ 

The Polish Question. Poland, unlike Belgium, 
will have no voice at the Peace Conference, unlike 
Alsace-Lorraine no representative. Yet the war 
has definitively reopened the question of Polish inde- 
pendence, once thought eliminated from practical 
politics. Both sides have made large promises and 
President Wilson in his Senate address went out of 
his way to champion the cause of Poland. This was 
the only territorial question with which he dealt 
specifically.^ 

The practical arrangements for an independent 
and united Poland are, however, not without com- 
plexity. Poland, at her height, was a conquering 
kingdom, and held many non-Polish territories — 
as, for Instance, Lithuania — which might or might 
not be willing now to cast In their fortunes with her. 
Must not the new Poland have an outlet to the sea ? 

^ " It is easy to gather the arguments of public men and journal- 
ists, but not at all easy to obtain a clear idea of the feelings of the 
populace, since it is to the supposed interest of all sides to the 
controversy to misrepresent them, though often it is done in good 
faith. There is little doubt in my mind that the French peasant, 
whether living in Alsace-Lorraine or in any other part of France, 
has less political pride and more profound desire for permanent 
peace than the upper classes. He is more interested in the coal 
that keeps his family warm and the quality of the bread on which 
they have to live than he is in boundaries." — Norman Hapgood, 
in the New York Evening Post, Oct. 6. 

2 " I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a 
single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there 
should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland." 

[136] 



And what of the northwestern districts of Germany, 
where a strip of old German inhabitancy is inter- 
leaved between Polish populations? Some solution 
of these problems will have to be found at the peace 
settlement. 

The question of oppressed nationalities, like every 
question of settlement, has been deeply affected by 
the Russian change of base. If revolutionary Rus- 
sia persists, and is true to her principles, Poland, 
Finland, the Ukraine and other provinces may be 
either independent or freely federated in a new Rus- 
sian state. But, apart from Poland, the peace set- 
tlement will probably not deal with them, so far as 
now appears. 

Italian Aspirations. Italy regards the " unre- 
deemed " Italians of the territory to the north of the 
Adriatic as standing in the front rank of " oppressed 
nationalities." But in addition to plans for their re- 
union with Italy, " national aspirations " of a very 
ambitious and far reaching character have been put 
forward. These included the proposal to make the 
Adriatic " an Italian lake " by securing possession 
— in addition to Trieste — of Istria, the main Dal- 
matian islands, the important Albanian port of Va- 
lona (Avlona) and other entirely un-Italian terri- 
tory along the mainland.^ In the Near East these 
aspirations sought not only a share of the islands 
including Rhodes but opportunity for exploitation 
and expansion in Asia Minor. 

1 A map published in London by Dr. Zupanic, on behalf of the 
Jugoslav Committee, which purports to show what the Allies had 
promised to Italy, indicates a cession not only of Trieste, of all 
Istria, and of territory back as far as Laibach itself, but also, in 
addition to the islands, of a considerable slice of Dalmatian main- 
land including the cities of Zara and Spalato, together with 4000 
square kilometers of Albanian territory about Valona. 

[137] 



Such Jingo war-aims, involving subjugation of 
entirely alien populations, have been opposed in 
the Italian parliament and press and on June 30 
Signor Barzillai, speaking in the Chamber, inter- 
preted certain declarations by the Foreign Minister 
as a modification of Italy's war program, " bringing 
it more into line with the democratic principles of 
the Entente as emphasized and clarified by the Rus- 
sian Revolution and by the adherence of America." ^ 
Baron Sonnino apparently did not dissent from this 
interpretation of his views. 

The entrance of Greece into the Alliance made 
imperative some adjustment of conflicting ambitions 
of Italy and Greece and this was apparently effected 
at the Balkan Conference in Paris, July 26. 

Italy is also supposed to have an understanding 
with Serbia in accordance with which Serbia would 
receive " a little window on the sea." 

Roumania. The re-constitution of Roumania 
within her old boundaries has already been referred 
to. But, like Italy, she has not been able to bring 
within her " redeemed " territory all who belong 
with her on the basis of common language. But 
while there is no question of the reactionary and 
oppressive policies of Hungary toward her Rou- 
manian subjects, the populations of the Hungarian 
districts where Roumanians dwell — Transylvania, 
the Bukovina and the Banat — are so racially inter- 
mingled, that Roumanian annexations would create 
new difficulties and — in view of Roumanian abuse 
of her Jewish population — probably new oppres- 
sions. It is therefore the less to be regretted if her 

1 See J. C. Powell, " Democratic Forces in Italy," The New 
Europe, August 9, 1917, p. 106. See also " Italy and the Corfu 
Pact," in The Neiv Statesman, Oct. 13 and 20, 191 7. 

[138] 



military debacle has, on the received principles of 
statecraft, lessened the likelihood of her claims of 
annexation being allowed wide scope. 

'^ Disme^nberment " of Austria-Hungary . The 
Allies' January statement of terms to President 
Wilson required specifically the liberation of Ital- 
ians, Slavs, Roumanians, and Czecho-Slovaks. 
Such " liberations " would be almost entirely at the 
expense of Austria-Hungary, and the passage was 
taken to indicate a deliberate intention to " dismem- 
ber " the Dual Monarchy. ^ 

This policy is advocated by the distinguished Bohemian 
scholar and patriot, Professor Masarj^k, who is quoted in a 
dispatch of May second to the New York Evening Post, 
as saying: "The dismemberment of Austria-Hungary is 
just as essential to permanent peace in Europe as the de- 
struction of military Prussianism. Bohemia, with the Slo- 
vaks, should become a separate independent state. The 
Italian elements in the monarchy should go to Italy, the Rou- 
manian elements to Roumania, the Ruthenians to Russia, the 
Poles to Poland, and the South Slavs to Servia. There 
would remain the German-Austrians and the Magyars in 
separate states. This is the only possible way of crushing 
out the Mittel-Europa idea. If Poland and Bohemia are 
free, ' Central Europe ' cannot exist." 

Reform Without Dismemberment. This is one 
point of view. On the other side are those who 
hope for effective reform from within, breaking 
down, not only the German-Polish domination in 
Austria and the Magyar domination in Hungary, 
but Austria's reactionary clericalism and the corrupt 
and corrupting landed oligarchy of Hungary which 
clothe themselves in nationalistic forms. 

President Wilson, in his reply to the Pope, spe- 

1 The realization of the expressed intention of the Allies would 
mulct Austria-Hungary of 54 per cent, of her territory. 

[139] 



cifically disclaimed the "dismemberment of em- 
pires." This appears to range the United States 
against any pohcy of attempting to resolve the 
Hapsburg monarchy into its constituent elements. 

The Balkans. The Balkan situation is so com- 
plex that the attempt to effect a satisfactory adjust- 
ment will probably, in any event, have to be made 
the subject of a special conference. A peace treaty 
could presumably include agreement only on the 
most general principles. 

Time alone can show whether those South-Slavs 
who desire a new federal state, made up of Slovenes, 
Croats and Serbs, as projected in the Corfu Pact of 
July 20, 1917,^ can realize their wish; what rela- 
tion, in that case, such a state can hold to Austria- 
Hungary; and whether Bulgaria can secure fairer 
treatment for her " unredeemed " Bulgarians than 
she got under the treaty of Bucharest. 

German Claims on Russia. The evacuation of 
Riga on August twenty-third has led to a flaring up 
in Germany of annexationist hopes with regard to 
Lithuania and the Baltic Provinces. The hardships 
of the Germans in the latter have been real enough, 
but they do not point, on the principle of nationality, 
to German annexation as the remedy. The German 
populations, influential as the property-holding 
class, are few in numbers.^ 

^ See Stanoyevitch, " A New Phase of the Balkan Question," 

Times Current History, Oct., 1917, also ibid., Sept. 431-3, and the 
Nenv Statesman, he. cit. 

Total population Germans Letts Esths. Others 

Courland 674,000 56,000 534,000 84,000 

Livonia 1,295,000 98,000 562,000 518,000 117,000 

Esthonia 414,000 16,000 366,000 31,000 

Total 2,383,000 170,000 1,096,000 884,000 232,000 

Census of 1897. Toynbee, Nationality and the War, p. 303. 

[140] 



in considering these difficult questions of terri- 
torial readjustment it must be borne in mind that 
even if an intelligent and all powerful statesman 
could " remake this sorry scheme of things entire," 
so far as drawing boundaries is concerned, he could 
not by such means secure the rights of all nation- 
alities. 

Tolerance. In many places nationalities live in- 
termingled, not only in the same provinces, but in the 
same villages. In such cases it is impossible to dis- 
entangle the nationalities and give separate inde- 
pendent existence to each. The only practicable 
solution includes a growth of tolerance which will 
make the conditions of life not only bearable but 
satisfying to national minorities: abandonment of 
the disastrous old ideal of " assimilation," com- 
plete freedom of speech and of worship, and — as 
demanded in President Wilson's Senate address, — 
secure opportunity for social and industrial devel- 
opment for all. Affairs now move in a vicious 
circle — suppression driving national minorities to 
agitate for political separation, and propaganda for 
pohtical separation, especially if compelled into un- 
derground channels and conspiracy, creating the 
conviction that suppression is necessary. Cases like 
Provence and Brittany show how unnecessary it is to 
associate the cult of a differing speech and litera- 
ture with separatist aspirations.^ 

1 On the subject of European problems of nationality the follow- 
ing books will be found useful: 
Rose — " Nationality in Modern History." 
Toynbee — "Nationality and the War." 
Jordan — "Alsace-Lorraine: A Study in Conquest." 
Dominian — " The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in 

Europe." 
Seton-Watson, Dover Wilson, Zimmern and Greenwood — " The 
War and Democracy." Macmillan, 1915. 

[141] 



The Near East. The territorial questions of 
Western and Central Europe, only, have so far been 
touched on. But there are also the questions of the 
Near East — Constantinople, Palestine and Zion- 
ism, Syria and the latent French claims there, Ar- 
menia and the determination of humanity that the 
atrocities of the past shall be made impossible here- 
after, and, still further afield, Bagdad and Mesopo- 
tamia — a whole world to be readjusted. 

The Allies' terms of January tenth specified " the 
enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody 
tyranny of the Turks, the expulsion from Europe of 
the Ottoman Empire decidedly alien to western civili- 
zation." Arabia seems to be taking affairs into her 
own hands and securing independence for herself. 
It is questionable how much Germany will be ready 
to sacrifice to safeguard the possessions of her Turk- 
ish ally, whether as a matter of honor, or for the 
sake of that prestige which is such an important ele- 
ment of power in the East, or for commercial and 
imperialist ambitions. 

International Proposals: The Straits. For deal- 
ing with these regions, various interesting proposals 
of international administration have been made. 
The British Union of Democratic Control, which, as 
representing the views of a small but distinguished 
group in parliament, has distinct political significance, 
offers the following plan : 

" Russian democracy has repudiated the imperialistic pol- 
icy of the Czar to annex Constantinople. The way is, there- 
fore, open for a proposal to neutralize or internationalize the 
city and the straits. It is against the interest of the world 
that the great trading waterways of the world should be in 
the hands of single powers. 
[142] 



" The policy of international control over the Ottoman 
empire should be maintained and extended so as to provide 
full security for the Christian peoples and freedom of de- 
velopment for other races under the suzerainty of the Sultan. 

" But no immediate settlement of the Turkish empire 
could be regarded as final. The arrangements would neces- 
sarily have to be revised from time to time by the League of 
Nations. The maximum of freedom for the various nation- 
alities and freedom of trade between all the parts, and 
equality of economic opportunity for the nationals of all 
European powers should be the policy followed." 

Mesopotamia. As to Mesopotamia, Lloyd 
George, in his Glasgow speech of June 29, con- 
tented himself with saying: " It is not and never 
has been Turkish. You have only to read the ter- 
rible reports to see what a wilderness the Turks have 
made of the Garden of Eden. What is to happen 
to Mesopotamia must be left to the peace committee, 
and there is one thing that will never happen to It. 
It will never be restored to the blasting tyranny of 
the Turks. The same observation applies to Ar- 
menia." The memorandum on war aims of the 
British Labor Party condemns " handing back to 
the universally execrated rule of the Turkish Gov- 
ernment any subject people once free therefrom," 
and proposes that Mesopotamia, Armenia and 
Arabia be placed under the government of a League 
of Nations with the administration In the hands of 
a commission. 

Armenia. Norman Hapgood's foreign news let- 
ter in the New York Evening Post of July 21 speaks 
of the possibility of a collective protectorate for 
Armenia,^ and again on October 6 makes the in- 
teresting statement: 

1 " The aspect of the Turkish situation on which I want to put 
emphasis to-day is the change in the position of Armenia growing 

[143] 



" A few of my readers may remember that many 
months ago I said that some of the best-informed 
British statesmen believed a better solution might be 
found by saving Turkey's face than by undertaking 
to extirpate her as an empire; and I went into the 
method by which a financial commission could rule 
Constantinople. Since then it has become not im- 
probable that for the rest of Turkey also, including 
Arabia, Mesopotamia, Armenia, and Palestine, some 
kind of an international rule with nominal Turkish 
sovereignty may be the outcome." 

5- 
Colonies. Another question which comes under 
the head of territorial readjustments is that of the 
disposition of the captured German colonies. These 
come squarely within the Russians' ban on annexa- 
tions. As Socialists they must condemn the whole 
colonial system, based as it is on the exploiter's at- 
titude toward both inhabitants and natural re- 
sources.^ 



out of the Russian revolution. In 1916 there was a written agree- 
ment made between Russia, France, and England in regard to the 
exact parts of Armenia that should come under their influence and 
later Italy was let into the understanding with compensation along 
the western coast of the Turkish Empire from Adalia to north of 
Smyrna. Then came the revolution in Russia. Through it Eng- 
land and France were led to go far in the direction of the principle 
of annexation. Armenia may well be under the protection of a 
group of Powers, rather than having its different parts controlled 
by separate Powers. There has been among diplomats a certain 
hostility to collective protectorates because of the failure of that 
plan in Egypt. There is, however, no analogy. In Egypt there 
was actual detailed administration, and each of the protecting 
Powers sent administrators. The result was failure and the turn- 
ing over of the job to England." 

1 See for instance, p. 184 and 191, also the statement of the Inter- 
national Socialist Congress of London in 1896, quoted in Walling, 
Socialists and the War, pp. 41-2. See however, for a Russian view, 
p. 240. 

[144] 




RT. HON. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 



This is also one of the few points on which the 
Pope's note is quite specific. He proposes, on the 
one hand, restitution of the German colonies; and, 
on the other, evacuation of French territory, and 
entire independence in every respect for Belgium. 

British Colonial Views. Neither the Allies' Jan- 
uary statement of terms nor President Wilson's re- 
ply to the Pope deal with the question. The British 
position on the subject seems to have been that the 
wishes of British colonial populations — notably of 
the South Africans and Australians — were of domi- 
nant importance in the matter. Of special weight, 
therefore, are certain statements by their spokesman, 
Mr. Walter Long, British Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. In January he said: "Let no man 
think that these colonies will ever return to German 
rule. Our Oversea Empire will not tolerate any 
suggestion of the kind." In August, however, after 
the Imperial Conference, he was " struck by the de- 
termination of the dominion representatives not to 
dogmatize or lay down that this or that must be 
done." Colonial feeling " did not originate in any 
desire for increased territory, but for an end of the 
war which would bring ultimate peace to the world 
and security to the British Empire." 

Treatment of the Natives. The importance of 
the interests of the natives themselves is also em- 
phasized in England, notably by Lord Robert Cecil 
in Parliament, on May i6, and by Lloyd-George in 
his Glasgow address, where he said: 

" As to the German colonies, that is a matter 
which must be settled by the great International 
Peace Congress. Let me point out that our critics 
talk as if we had annexed lands peopled by Ger- 
mans. When you come to settle who shall be the 

[145] 



future trustees of these uncivilized lands you must 
take into account the sentiments of the people them- 
selves. 

" Whether they are anxious to secure the return 
of their former masters, or whether they would 
rather trust their destinies to other and juster and 
— may I confidently say? — gentler hands than 
those who have the governing of them up to the 
present time, the wishes, the desires, and the inter- 
ests of the people of these countries themselves must 
be the dominant factor in settling their future gov- 
ernment. That is the principle upon which we are 
proceeding." 

On the other hand Sir Joseph Ward, Finance 
Minister of New Zealand, and Mr. Massey, Prime 
Minister of New Zealand, both say that the Pacific 
colonies can never go back to Germany, and a Mel- 
bourne dispatch of August i6 states that the Senate 
has passed a resolution deprecating their return. 

Japan's Claims. Japan also seems determined 
that the German colonies shall not be returned. 
She apparently wished her claims with regard to 
them stated in the answer to President Wilson's De- 
cember peace note. France and Britain are said to 
have asked her to defer such a statement of her 
claims. She did so, but with specific reservation of 
her rights. 

An interesting suggestion was made on behalf of India 
by Mr. Ghokale in the political " testament " which he left 
on his death, the proposal, namely, that East Africa should 
be reserved for Indian colonization and handed over to the 
government of India. 

How long Germany would be willing to prolong 
the war in order to get back her colonies, can not of 
[146] 



course be told; but there is a powerful school of 
German publicists who lay stress on the importance, 
not of annexations in Belgium and France, but of 
colonial expansion. 

Statements of this point of view were made by the Co- 
lonial Secretary, Solf, on June 7, by Delbriick in a recent 
issue of his Preussische Jahrbuch, and by Emil Zimmermann 
in an article of July 14/ in the extreme Pan-German tone, 
A frequent suggestion is that Belgium might be traded for 
colonies, the Belgian Congo perhaps. One rumor had it 
that von Kiihlmann was going to propose in his reply to the 
Pope that Germany should pay down a certain sum in return 
for colonies — her old possessions or other territories as 
might be arranged — this sum to be used to restore Bel- 
gium, thus saving Germany's face while in substance con- 
ceding the demand for restitution. 

Super-national Views: Australian Socialists. 
Most encouraging of all is the evidence of a growth 
of a super-national way of envisaging the whole 
problem. The Australian Labor Socialists oppose 
annexation of the captured German possessions in 
the Pacific on anti-capitalist grounds, and suggest 
that they should be neutralized and placed in the 
hands of an international court, which would prevent 
their being a military menace to any one.^ 

Even more thoroughgoing is the proposal of the 
Executive Committee of the British Labor Party for 
the transfer of all present colonies in tropical Africa, 
together with the nominally independent republic of 
Liberia, to the proposed League of Nations, and ad- 
ministration of them by an impartial commission un- 
der the League's authority.^ 

1 See The Neiv Europe j August 9, 1917. 

2 See page 209. 

3 See page 227. 

[147] 



British C. W. S. Pro ff ram. The program prepared for 
the British Council of Workmen and Soldiers adds that non- 
European races in Africa must not be trained for war nor 
subjected to conscription or servile labor and that their gov- 
ernment must be regarded as a public trust.^ 

U. D. C. Program. The program of the British 
Union of Democratic Control is as follows: 

" Great Britain should repudiate definitely any claim to 
annex German colonies by right of conquest. 

" As recently as 1885, by the general act of the conference 
of Berlin, an assignment of sovereign rights in Africa was 
made by the great powers. A shifting of the political fron- 
tiers in existence before the war has become inevitable. It 
maj'^ be that such territorial readjustments will involve po- 
litical changes under which some part of the African terri- 
tory hitherto administered by Germany may be transferred. 

" The principle of no annexations, however, requires a 
frank recognition that in the interests of a lasting peace Ger- 
many is not less entitled than other great powers to organize 
and develop over-sea dependencies. 

" The great zone of tropical Africa should be neutralized 
under an international guarantee, and absolute freedom of 
enterprise established there. 

" A less exclusive trade policy enforced throughout Africa 
by international arrangement would greatly facilitate the 
adjustment of national territorial claims. 

" Under a general rearrangement of territories, the Pacific 
islands might be dealt with, as well as Africa." ^ 

Not Permanent Arrangements hut Elasticity. It 
is important to remember in connection with the 

1 See p. 220. Similar plans have been put forward by Rear 
Admiral Chadwick, who proposes an International Board of 
Colonial Control, by H. G. Wells in The World Set Free and else- 
where, by Walter Lippmann in The Stakes of Diplomacy, editori- 
ally by the Netv Republic, by H. N. Brailsford, and by various con- 
tinental writers. 

2 P. 272-3. 

[148] 



settlement of the war, and especially in connection 
with the question of territorial adjustments, that the 
development of Europe and the rest of the world 
will not end with the treaty that settles affairs after 
the war. To desire durable peace is not to desire a 
permanent settlement. What is immediately de- 
sirable is such an international arrangement as shall 
hereafter make readjustments more easily attainable. 
When Sweden and Norway separated — though not 
without difficulty, yet peacefully — a new era was 
foreshadowed, as we must hope. The only ade- 
quate system is one sufficiently elastic to permit nec- 
essary changes, and to make it possible for them to 
occur with a reasonable degree of ease. Otherwise 
there must be stagnation tempered by explosions. 



Indemnities. Next to territorial questions comes 
the question of indemnities. This is in fact a far 
more immediate question than most of those con- 
cerning territorial adjustments, many of which will 
doubtless have to await settlement in a later con- 
ference. 

The word indemnity is unfortunately very am- 
biguous. Germany forced an enormous war " in- 
demnity " from France at the close of the Franco- 
Prussian war. Only recently, it would seem, has 
she ceased to expect to cover the costs of the present 
war by a similar indemnity : Reventlow and others 
still insist upon it.^ 

A " Peace that Pays " for France. In France, 

1 Cf., in a dispatch in the A'^. Y. Times of August 26, a statement 
by a Munich group advocating a " German peace " and protesting 
that Germany must secure an indemnity to avert " a period of 
grinding poverty and crushing taxation." 



[149] 



similar ideas have not been unrepresented. The 
Finance Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, re- 
porting a new income tax on May tenth, 19 17, urged 
that " a peace that pays " must be effected, in order 
to throw upon the enemy the chief burden of the war 
costs. Besides reintegration of Alsace-Lorraine, 
" which will aid us in repairing many ruins," France 
should know to what extent the Central Powers can 
pay in money the indemnities that will be required 
of them. In case not enough can be paid in cash, 
France must secure, as guarantees of the annual 
payments due, the Sarre mines and financial control 
of customs, ports, forests, railroads, mines and other 
German national property. {New York Times, 
May II, 1917.) 

Payment for Injuries and Levies. But the only 
sort of indemnities which now come seriously into 
consideration are indemnities in quite a different 
sense, claims for payment for damage deliberately 
inflicted, and the still more unquestionable claims for 
repayment of financial levies and fines, forced, under 
military compulsion, from occupied cities and vil- 
lages. 

What Does "No Indemnities" Mean? The Russian 
formula of " no indemnities," and the papal formula of 
" entire and reciprocal condonation " (better translated " re- 
mission"), have both been modified by interpretation. The 
Pope expressly makes an exception of Belgium; the Russian 
word '' contribucia " should "perhaps rather be translated 
tribute or war levy. In this country it has commonly been 
given the form, as by the People's Council, of "no punitive 
indemnities." 

President Wilson^ s View. President Wilson has 
said, in his reply to Russia : " No indemnities must 

[150] 



be Insisted upon except those which constitute pay- 
ment for manifest wrongs done; " and again in his 
reply to the Pope, " We believe that the intolerable 
wrongs done In this war by the furious and brutal 
power of the Imperial German Government ought 
to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sover- 
eignty of any people — rather a vindication of the 
sovereignty both of those that are weak and those 
that are strong." At the same time he disavowed 
any " punitive damages." 

Constructive plans. Various constructive pro- 
posals have been put forward, both by Socialist 
bodies ^ and by various private persons, looking to- 
ward international cooperation In the work of re- 
construction. Some would make this a matter of 
mutual obligation, apportioned either on the basis 
of responsibility for damage done, or in proportion 
to economic capacity to contribute. Others would 
make it purely a matter of sympathy and voluntary 
assistance. 

Mr. Cyrus Sulzberger, in a widely circulated proposal, 
also printed in the New York Evening Post for August 15, 
suggests that America make a free will offer to meet the need 
for compensation with a gift of ten billion dollars to be 
spent as decided by the peace conference. 

The Australian Labor Socialists have made the original 
suggestion: "That prior to the disbandment of the com- 
batant armies and navies they shall be utilized under inter- 
national control for the restoration of the devastated terri- 
tories, at the expense of the invaders, and not subject to 
military supervision." 

In case the settlement should come to hang on the 
question of indemnities, a very real difficulty would 

1 Cf. pp. 173, 197, 209) 223, »73- 



be presented by the widespread feeling in the Allied 
countries that any concession in regard to indemni- 
ties (and indemnities of a punitive character) is 
equivalent to compounding a felony. Like Belgian 
independence, it is made the symbol of justice, and 
is lifted out of the realm of practical politics to the 
moral realm where compromise is impossible. It 
is easy to forget the difference between abstract 
justice and an award made in the heat of conflict by 
one party in its own favor; ^ it is easy to forget that 
the powerful and privileged determine policies and 
the poor and weak bear the heaviest burden of taxes 
to pay for their deeds. 



The "War After the JFar." Beyond the war 
itself has loomed the hideous shadow of a trade war 
after the war. Reference has been made to the 
Paris Economic Conference of April, 1916.^ Many 
of the matters discussed at this meeting were of a 
merely technical or even of a constructive nature; 
but others, and those that the Conference has come 
to stand for, looked toward trade discrimination 
against the Central Powers after the war.^ 

Similarly the British Imperial War Conference 
of May, 19 17, laid plans for a close economic union 
of that vast congeries of countries, resolving in fa- 

lA Canadian author suggests the formula: "no punitive in- 
demnities unless imposed by an international tribunal and paid, 
not to a single government, but into an international fund, to be 
administered by an international commission for the rehabilitation 
of devastated areas." 

2 See p. 18. 

3 For the resolutions of the Conference, see European Economic 
Alliances published, by the National Foreign Trade Council, India 
House, Hanover Square, N. Y. C. 

[152] 



vor of " making the empire independent of other 
countries in respect of food supplies, raw materials, 
and essential industries." 

" Mittel-Europa." On the side of the Central 
Powers similar conferences have been held, and the 
threat of the creation of a closed commercial system 
holding the core of the continent and stretching 
across the Dardanelles into the Near East — the 
" Mittel-Europa " plan of the Pan Germanists — 
has caused grave alarm. 

On both sides the commercial weapon — sub- 
marine against blockade — and the fear of commer- 
cial injury after the war, have played an ever in- 
creasing part. 

Economic Conditions After the War. But with 
the unprecedented scale of wastage, both by direct 
destruction and by diversion of labor and materials, 
the problem has altered in a way that has only gradu- 
ally come to be widely realized. The crucial point 
after the war will be not to find a market for prod- 
ucts but to get a chance as a purchaser at the inade- 
quate supplies of foodstuffs and. raw materials. In 
case the Allies cold-shouldered Germany out of the 
territories that they control, not even a Mittel- 
Europa organized beyond her wildest dreams could 
compensate her. With the entry of the United 
States and more lately China Into the war, and with 
the growing unfriendliness in South America, the 
seriousness of this menace to Germany is enormously 
increased. 

" After three years of warfare and at least two years of 
strict blockade, the stock of raw materials at the disposal of 
the Central Powers has, by universal admission, run very 
low. Germany's first and most pressing need after the war, 
more pressing even than the importation of foodstuffs, is 

[153] 



seen to be the replenishing of those stocks, for without them 
she cannot * reconstruct ' her industries on a peace basis, or 
even revive the fertility of her exhausted soil. Moreover, 
without employment available for her industrial workers, she 
dare not demobilize her armies ; for widespread ' unemploy- 
ment,' after the pressure of the war has been withdrawn and 
the means for curbing public discussion can no longer be used 
with effect, would, as Dr. Dernburg has recently declared, 
lead to ' fatal misunderstandings.' * Misunderstandings,' in 
war-time, can be ignored, or at least, suppressed. But when 
the soldiers come home, revolution may come with them. 

" The Allies, in fact, controlling, as they do, so large a 
proportion of the natural resources of the world, have their 
finger on Germany's windpipe "... this " explains what 
the Chancellor means by the curious expression, ' economic 
blockade,' i.e., a blockade not maintained by naval force, 
but operating in time of peace. He is afraid of Germany 
finding herself in a position in which there is no physical 
obstacle to the import of supplies, but in which the supplies 
themselves are simply not purchasable in sufficient quantity, 
owing to their having been diverted elsewhere to meet the 
needs of the Allied and neutral governments and their peo- 
ples. For, as the Chancellor knows well, having served in 
the German Food-Contmller's office, Germans are not the 
only people who will be famished for supplies after the war ; 
and it is not likely, unless arrangements are specifically made 
to that end in the peace-treaty, that the Allies will allow 
Germany a share in any supplies which they control prior 
to satisfying the just claims of Belgium, Serbia, and Poland, 
and the other peoples who have suffered and starved at Ger- 
many's hands." (The New Europe, August 9, 1917, pp. 
1 00- 1 01.) See also, ibid., Oct. 4, 353-359. 

Germany's situation. According to this interpre- 
tation, the great factor making Germany seek — as 
Dernburg urged upon a recent Conference of the 
German, Austrian, and Hungarian Economic Asso- 
ciations at Budapest — a " peace by agreement, free 
[154] 



from anger or menace," is this need to be admitted 
to get her share of supplies when the blockade ceases. 
The article in The New Europe, quoted above, con- 
cludes : 

" The process of restocking and revictualing the belligerent 
and neutral countries is essentially one for cooperative rather 
than for competitive action. How Germany will be affected 
by it and what share she will have in its proceedings depends, 
not, as the Chancellor thinks, on how many square miles of 
conquered territory she will be willing to evacuate, but on 
the kind of Germany that confronts the Allies at the making 
of peace." 

This is the position taken by President Wilson In 
his answer to the Pope — peace depends on the kind 
of Germany that seeks it. In his Senate address he 
laid down the general principle that " the free con- 
stant unthreatened intercourse of nations is an es- 
sential part of the process of peace and develop- 
ment." And in his reply to the Papal Note he said 
that the American people believe that peace " should 
rest upon the rights of peoples ... to a participa- 
tion on fair terms in the economic opportunities of 
the world — the German people of course included, 
if they will accept equality and not seek domina- 
tion." President Wilson states what Germany may 
expect if she ceases to make herself felt as a menace, 
and the Allies what in the contrary case she has to 
fear. 

The Choice Before the World. It is becoming 
constantly clearer that the world of international 
commerce after the war, will, like everything else, 
have been metamorphosed. Apparently there will 
be, either an organized and very ugly rivalry of 
great trade alliances in cut-throat competition, or a 

[155] 



world-system of distribution constantly becoming 
more organic. 



How Make Peace. An attempt has been made 
to analyze the contrasting points of view of different 
groups, and to define the issues as they appear to be 
shaping themselves. 

There remains a third question of very great im- 
portance, namely, the method of making peace. 

The New Diplomacy. There is a rising demand 
that secret diplomacy shall come to an end. Ac- 
quaintance with the history of the fateful " twelve 
days," the revelations and suspicions of all sorts of 
backstair dealings controlling vast issues, the grow- 
ing interest in and understanding of foreign affairs, 
the sharpened sense of diverging points of view as 
to what should be the objects sought in foreign poli- 
cies — all contribute to swell the demand. 

It finds especially forceful expression in Socialist criti- 
cisms. The Italian Socialists (see page 203) propose that 
foreign affairs should be taken out of the hands of the Execu- 
tive and placed exclusively under parliamentary control. 
They hope in this way to put an end to secret agreements 
and diplomatic intrigue, together with the coercion now 
exercised on Parliament by diplomats who are enabled to act 
first and then seek ratification for the necessary consequences 
of their acts. Publicity will, they believe, " restore elemen- 
tary honesty in international relations " and make it impos- 
sible for an " inspired press to corrupt popular opinion to 
the advantage of the great parasitical industrial and commer- 
cial interests." 

Of especial significance is the demand that elected 
representatives of the people, men and women, 
[156] 




Photo by Paul Thompson 

LORD ROBERT CECIL 

British Minister of Blockade 



should replace diplomats, or at the least sit with 
them, in the peace conference. 

The preliminary step to be taken previous to the 
meeting of any peace conference between belligerents 
— whether that come soon, or many months or even 
years hence — is a conference between the partners 
themselves to work out their common problems. 

Understandings between them already exist, of 
course, though except for occasional leakages their 
terms do not reach the public. Just what has been 
promised Italy or Roumania or Japan, Turkey or 
Bulgaria, and on what contingencies, is not known. 
We only know that by the Pact of London the Allies 
have bound themselves absolutely and publicly not 
to make peace separately.^ 

As a result of Russia's demand upon the Allies 
that they reconsider these arrangements, it was 
agreed that they should hold a conference to con- 
sider war-aims with a view to a possible restatement. 

Norman Angell's Proposal for an Inter-Allied 
Conference. For such a conference Mr. Norman 
Angell, in the New Republic for August ii, 19 17, 
made most original and interesting suggestions. 

He proposed that it should have for its object: 

" To frame the international arrangements for mutual 
protection by which after the war the nations of the Alli- 
ance — and ultimately those of the world — are to be as- 
sured military security, national independence, and economic 
rights (access to raw materials and markets, equality of op- 
portunity in undeveloped territory like Africa, Asia and 
South America, access to the sea for states that have insuffi- 
cient, or no, ports, etc.), some plan for a League of Nations, 

1 Fear was felt in the United States, when our country entered 
the war, that we should assume the same obligation ; but this 
evidently was not done. 

[157] 



such as that forecast by Mr. Wilson and approved by the 
other leading Allied statesmen." 

As to its composition, he proposed that it " con- 
sist of two bodies, a smaller one composed, as in in- 
ternational Congresses of the past, of the delegates 
or nominees of the governments participating, and 
a larger body representing proportionately the com- 
ponent parties of the respective parliaments." 

" The smaller body should act as the initiating and draft- 
ing committees, their proposals being subject to amendment, 
approval or rejection by the larger body before being finally 
ratified by the constituent states of the Congress." 

But precedent even to an Inter-Allied Conference 
is the need for some " preparedness " on the part of 
each individual nation, some clear working out of its 
purposes. This work is now being organized, for 
the United States, by Colonel House. ^ 

Representation of all Groups. Mr. Angell's plan 
does not stop with the conference of Allies. The 
second part of his proposal is that this conference 
of the partners on one side be taken as the model 
for the inter-belligerent peace conference itself. As 
he points out, this plan " would make German So- 
cialists and Liberals, not governmental delegates and 
Prussians, the predominant element of German rep- 
resentation at the peace settlement. And of course 

1 David Lawrence, in the New York Evening Post, September 
II, 1917, writes: "There must be preparation for the many ques- 
tions that will come up at the peace conference. America must 
thresh out for herself, for example, how far she is willing to go in 
a league to enforce peace, to what extent she is ready to disarm, 
and what her own . . . economic relations with Europe are to be 
after the war. . . . Preparedness for a peace which shall safeguard 
American interests, in accord with the tradition and desires of the 
American people, is no task to be suddenly begun when the moment 
for peace negotiations arises." 

[158] 



we should have enlisted German democratic support 
of the plan. We should, by this fact, have democra- 
tized Germany in her international relations. And 
it is those relations, of course, with which we are 
concerned. 

" The principle would also, in the same way, give 
to Austrian representation not purely a governmen- 
tal or Hapsburg character, but would ensure a fair 
representation of the subject nationalities of the 
Central Empires. The publicity given to their case 
would be a powerful plea in their fight for au- 
tonomy." 

Moreover, as he points out, a body so composed 
would not be so hopelessly nationalistic in its cleav- 
ages, it would be a far better representative of the 
true interests involved. As he says : 

" In a conference composed of delegates nom- 
inated by governments, each delegate is in the posi- 
tion of a lawyer representing his client. He will be 
sensitive to home criticism of a ' nationalist ' kind, 
particularly if he is looking to a successful future in 
the political life of his country. But, under the sys- 
tem suggested, the chief responsibility for the char- 
acter of terms finally agreed to by the conference 
would lie with the larger body. He would there- 
fore feel covered, and take freer hand for a liberal 
give-and-take settlement. A body composed of 
' British,' ' American,' ' French,' ' Italian ' delegates 
would be a body which necessarily* divided on the 
questions at issue on lines of national division. On 
such questions as Sea Law, the Open Door, Access 
to Raw Materials, Economic Rights of Way, Terri- 
torial Divisions, the British delegate would neces- 
sarily stand for ' British ' conceptions as opposed to 
American or Italian, as the case might be. But a 

[159] 



body In which British conservatives would be advo- 
cating a solution opposed to that advocated by 
British radicals or socialists, but in agreement with 
that supported by French or American consei-vatives, 
and opposed by French or American radicals and 
sociaHsts, would be a body In which the sharpness 
and rigidity of national divisions would be lessened 
and in which rival principles of settlement rather 
than rival national interests would be the predom- 
inant issue." 

Such a body would be, Mr. Angell admits, cum- 
bersome and slow moving. But " at the close of 
the war, a long period of ' provisional settlement ' 
which can be modified, would probably be a good 
thing." 

Giving the nations time to allow their angers and 
resentments to cool, and keeping arrangements from 
becoming fixed too early or too rigidly, would tend 
to make the settlement fairer and more stable. 

President Eliot's Proposal. President Eliot has 
come forward with a different suggestion in a plan 
brought out In the New York Times, August 27, 
19 17, and further elaborated in that of October 7 
(see p. 292). 

The thing to be done, to his mind. Is to secure 
" a frank and sincere conference of the belligerent 
nations without an armistice," a conference to con- 
fer, not a conference to decide, and purely prelim- 
inary. 

His plan in fuller outline is : " to bring appointed con- 
ferees from all the belligerent nations into one room for 
the oral discussion of subjects previously agreed upon, the 
conferees being selected by the several Governments, but 
receiving no instructions either before or during the confer- 
ence from the appointing povv'^ers, and having no povrer of 

[160] 



commission except to make a brief public report of their con- 
clusions. The function of the several Governments would 
be limited to the appointment of the conferees and the grant- 
ing of the necessary safe conducts. In order to keep the size 
of the conference moderate, each small State might be re- 
stricted to two conferees and each large State to four." 

After giving a program of possible subjects of discussion, 
President Eliot concludes " it would certainly facilitate the 
proceedings of an international conference in the interest of 
durable international peace, if it could be understood before- 
hand that all the participating nations had come to the con- 
clusion that war on the modern scale and with the new im- 
plements of destruction is not an available means, in the 
present state of the civilized world, of settling international 
disputes or of extending national influence and power." 

These proposals, as to steps in working out the 
settlement are then: 

( 1 ) On the part of each country to define her 
ideas of the world-order that she wants 
to help bring into being; 

(2) On the part of the AUies to clarify and 
organize the purposes of the AUies and 
America in further joint conferences, or- 
ganized as suggested by Mr. Angell or 
otherwise ; 

(3) To bring representatives of the beUiger- 
ents into face-to-face conference, without 
power and without armistice as proposed 
by Dr. Eliot. 

Unless such a joint conference included represen- 
tatives of all groups, as suggested by Mr. Angell, 
there would doubtless be a determined effort on the 
part of those with the radical working-class point 
of view to bring together a conference at Stockholm 
or elsewhere in the interests of internationalism as 
they understand it. 

[161] 



PART TWO 
DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES 



I 

SOCIALIST AND LABOR DOCUMENTS 
AND PEACE PROGRAMS 

APPEAL TO THE SOCIALISTS OF THE WORLD 
ISSUED BY THE RUSSIAN COUNCIL OF 
WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DELE- 
GATES, MAY 15, 1917 

[This appeal was issued two months after the ab- 
dication of the Czar. On May i, the Russian Gov- 
ernment had notified the Allied governments of Rus- 
sia's renunciation of imperialistic aims. On May 9, 
the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates 
voted to appeal to the peoples of the world to call a 
peace conference. This appeal accordingly followed.] 

" The revolutionary democracy of Russia does not desire 
a separate peace which would loose the hands of the Austro- 
German alliance. It is well aware that such a peace would 
be a betrayal of the cause of democracy and of labor in all 
countries. This cause would by such an action be paralyzed 
in the face of a triumphant imperialism. It knows that 
such a peace may lead to the ruin of other countries and 
the triumph of the ideals of Chauvinism and revenge in 
Europe, which would leave the Continent in a state where it 
would inevitably prepare in the near future for a fresh and 
sanguinary collision. 

" The Russian revolutionary democracy addresses itself 
in the first place to you, Socialists of the allied countries. 
You must not allow the voice of the Russian Provisional 

[165] 



Government to remain isolated from the union of the allied 
powers. You must force your Governments to proclaim 
resolutely the platform of peace without annexations or in- 
demnities and the right of the people to settle their destinies. 

" You will thus afford our revolutionary army, which 
desires peace between the peoples, the assurance that its 
bloody sacrifices will not be utilized in an evil manner. You 
will give it strength to carry out with all its revolutionary 
enthusiasm the military operations which fall to its lot. 
You will fortify its mind in the belief that in defending the 
liberty conquered by the revolution the army also is strug- 
gling in the interests of an international democracy. 

" You will force the Governments of enemy countries to 
renounce forever their policy of usurpation, pillage, and vio- 
lence, and openly to recognize their crimes, thus calling upon 
their heads the just anger of their peoples." 

[The above extract from the appeal is quoted from 
the New York Times of May i6. The following 
passage, addressed to the Socialists of Austria and 
Hungary, is from the London Times of the same 
date.] 

" The democracy of Revolutionary Russia appeals to you, 
Socialists of Austria and Germany. You cannot allow the 
troops of your Governments to be the executioners of Rus- 
sian liberty. You cannot allow your Governments, taking 
advantage of the joy evoked in the Russian Army by liberty 
and fraternity, to hurl your troops on the Western front, in 
the first place in order to crush France, then to dash on 
Russia, and finally to crush you, as well as the international 
proletariat, in the grip of Imperialism. The democracy of 
Revolutionary Russia appeals to the Socialists of neutral 
and belligerent countries not to allow the triumph of Im- 
perialism. May the cause of peace proclaimed by the Rus- 
sian Revolution be brought to a happy conclusion by the 
efforts of the international proletariat. 

" So as to unite these efforts, the Council of Workmen's 
[i66] 



and Soldiers' Delegates in Petrograd has decided to take the 
initiative in convoking an international conference of all 
Socialist parties and groups in all countries. Whatever may 
have been the dissensions which have rent Socialism during 
the three years of the war, no section of the proletariat 
ought to renounce participation in the common struggle for 
peace begun by the Russian Revolution. We are convinced 
that we shall see representatives of all Socialist groups at 
the conference which we are convoking. The unanimous 
decision of the international proletariat will be the first vic- 
tory of the workers over the international Imperialists. 
" ' Proletariat of all countries, unite ! ' " 



[167] 



PETROGRAD APPEAL TO SOCIALISTS AND 
LABOR UNIONS OF THE WORLD 

[The initiative in the plan for a peace conference 
was taken by the Petrograd Council of the Workers' 
and Soldiers' Delegates. The following account of 
the action of the Petrograd Socialists is taken from 
the London Times of June 6.] 

" On March 28 the Petrograd Council of Workmen's 
and Soldiers' Delegates published an appeal ' to the peoples 
of the world ' in which it called the peoples of Europe to 
united and resolute action in favor of peace. The Council, 
in full accord with the whole of democracy, inscribed on its 
banner ' peace without annexations and without indemnities 
on the basis of the rights of nations to decide their own 
destinies.' 

" The Russian democracy forced the first Provisional 
Government to accept its program, and, as the events of 
May 3 and 4 clearly showed, it did not tolerate any depar- 
ture on the part of the Provisional Government from that 
program, 

" The second Provisional Government, under pressure by 
the Council, put forward the same program as the foremost 
article of its Declaration. On May 9 the Executive Com- 
mittee of the Council decided to take the initiative in sum- 
moning an international conference, and on May 15 the 
Council directed an appeal to the Socialists of all countries, 
calling them to the common struggle for peace. 

" The Council is of opinion that a speedy termination of 
the war and restoration of international peace on the basis 
required by the general interests of labor as well as of man- 
kind can only be achieved if the Socialist and Labor parties 
[168] 



and the trade unions of all countries, belligerent and neutral, 
will unite their efforts in a stubborn and energetic fight 
against this universal slaughter. 

" The first important step in that direction is the sum- 
moning of an international conference, whose main object 
should be to arrive at an agreement between the repre- 
sentatives of the Socialist proletariat in regard to a termina- 
tion of the [' party ' ' truce '] with the imperialistic Govern- 
ments and classes which render nugatory a real struggle 
for peace, as well as to find out ways and means to carry 
this endeavor into practical effect. An international agree- 
ment upon such a policy is the main preliminary condition 
for placing the struggle for peace on a broad international 
footing. This road is indicated to the proletariat by all its 
international treaties. At the same time the summoning of 
a conference is strongly dictated by the most vital interests 
of the proletariat and all peoples. 

" All parties and organizations representing the working 
classes which share these views and opinions, and are pre- 
pared to unite their efforts to carry them into operation, are 
cordially invited by the Council to take part in the proposed 
conference. The Council begs to express its conviction that 
the parties and organizations which accept this invitation 
will by so doing so accept the obligation to carry out unfail- 
ingly all the decisions adopted by the conference. 

" The conference will be opened at Stockholm on a day 
between June 28 and July 8." 

[A German translation of this call appeared in 
Vorwarts of June 5. As reproduced in the Holland 
News J June 20, the text (in German) is not quite so 
full as the above, the passage italicized being omit- 
ted.] 



[169] 



QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE DUTCH-SCANDI- 
NAVIAN SOCIALIST COMMITTEE 

Submitted to the Delegates of the National Sections of the 
International, at Stockholm, May, 1917 

[The first attempted conference at Stockholm was 
called by the International Socialist Bureau. No 
regular assembly was held, but a series of " conver- 
sations " began May 13. In order to elicit the spe- 
cific views of the different national Socialist groups, 
the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee, under 
the leadership of Branting, of Sweden, issued the 
following questionnaire.] 

/. Terms of Peace 

1. General principles of peace: 

Right of peoples freely to dispose of themselves: 

Autonomy of nationalities: 

Annexations : 

War Indemnities: 

Restoration. 

2. Application of these principles to concrete cases: 

1. Belgium, Serbia, other Balkan countries, Poland, 
Finland, Alsace-Lorraine, North Schleswig, Ar- 
menia : 

2. Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Czechs (Bohemians), 
Jews: 

3. Colonies. 

//. Elementary Principles of International Relations 
I. International Law (Volkerrecht) ; international law (in- 
ternational Ordnung), international boards of arbitra- 
tion, obligatory delay for investigation in case of con- 
[170] 



flict, other means for the maintenance of peace, sanc- 
tions, means of compulsion. 

2. Disarmament and freedom of the seas. 

3. Means of satisfying justifiable needs of economic expan- 

sion without extension of territory (internationaliza- 
tion of international commercial routes, straits, canals, 
chief railroads, etc.). 

4. Abolition of secret diplomacy. 

///. Practical Realization of These Aims 

1. How far should these questions be handled at the peace 

conference ? 

2. Shall committees be appointed to make preparatory studies 

for the solution of certain questions? 

IV. Action of the International and of Democracy 

1. Cooperation of Neutrals for peace; 

2. Direct cooperation of parliaments; 

3. Cooperation of Socialist Parties; 

4. Measures to be taken through the International and dur- 

ing the preparation of the business and during the ses- 
sion of the official peace conferences, to bring continu- 
ous influence to bear. 

V. General Socialist Conference 

1. Readiness to take part in a general conference, (i) Un- 

conditionally? (2) If not, on what conditions? 

2. Report on the position of the Socialist party during the 

war; the question of responsibility. 

3. Majority and minority. 

[Translated from the Holland News, Review of 
the Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlag Raad, June 20, 19 17. 
24 Raamweg, the Hague.] 



[171] 



MEMORANDUM OF THE GERMAN 
MAJORITY SOCIALISTS 

[This reply to the questionnaire issued by the 
Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee is one of 
the significant statements of peace-views elicited by 
the Stockholm conversations. It should be com- 
pared v^^ith the Minority statement which follows 
next in order.] 



The German Socialist Democracy aspires to a peace 
based upon mutual understanding and demands guarantees 
for the freedom of political, economical and cultural devel- 
opment of its own nation. It also disapproves all violence 
against the vital interests of other peoples. Only such a 
peace can bring with it guarantees of durability. It alone 
will allow the nations to triumph over an atmosphere of 
hostility and to place all their strength in the service of social 
betterment and the progress of civilization. 

Starting out from this general viewpoint we have given 
our assent to the project of the Workmen's and Soldiers' 
Council of Petrograd in view of a peace without annexations 
or indemnities on the basis of the right of peoples freely to 
dispose of themselves. Consequently our attitude toward 
the particular points of the questionnaire is as follows: 

I. ANNEXATIONS 

We are opposed to annexations of territory by force. 

As far as the modification of frontiers on the basis of a 

mutual understanding is concerned, the people interested, 

when they desire to remain in their old government, 

[172] 




Photo by Paul Thompson 

PHILIP SCHEIDEMANN 

Vice-President of the Reichstag and Leader of the 
Majority Socialists 



must be assured regarding all judicial and economic pos- 
sibilities connected with changing their residence. It is 
understood the rejection of all forced annexations also 
covers the restitution of invaded colonies. 

II, WAR INDEMNITIES 

The imposition of war indemnities has been rejected. It 
could not be realized otherwise than by totally crushing 
one of the belligerents. But each day of continued 
struggle increases so much the sum of sacrifices in wealth 
and blood for both sides that, merely for that motive, it 
would be inadmissible to retard peace for the sake of ob- 
taining indemnities. Otherwise, the economic oppression 
of one nation by another would make a durable peace im- 
possible. 

III. RESTORATIONS 

In so far as this question applies to political restoration, 
— that is, to the reestablishment of national independence — 
our answer is in the affirmative. On the contrary, we re- 
ject the idea of one-sided obligations to repair damages in 
territories affected by the war. These damages have re- 
sulted on all fronts from acts of hostile as well as friendly 
troops advancing or in retreat. Sometimes they were the 
immediate results of gun-fire, at other times they were 
measures taken for military safety. 

It appears to us extremely difficult to determine the 
origin of each damage case and to examine military justifica- 
tion. An obligation binding on one side only to repair 
damages would be nothing less than a disguised form of 
war indemnity. 

For states ruined by the war, which would be unable 
to reestablish by themselves their economic life, international 
financial assistance could be provided on the basis of mutual 
understanding. 

Besides, we Socialists consider the destruction of private 
property only the least part of the damages produced. The 
greatest losses affecting humanity — the destruction of human 

[173] 



life — can be repaired by no amount of effort and future 
human happiness. 

IV. THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO DISPOSE OF THEM- 
SELVES 

By the right of peoples to maintain or to modify their 
conditions, we mean political independence. 

The first states to be considered are those which, like 
Belgium, Serbia and other Balkan states, have lost their 
independence in this war. We are in favor of the re- 
establishment of an independent Belgium. Belgium ought 
not to be a vassal state of Germany, of England or of 
France. 

As regards Serbia and the Balkan states, we refer the 
matter to what has been said by our Austrian com- 
rades. 

A second group, in reference to which the question of 
the right of nations to dispose of themselves comes up, is 
formed by peoples who lost their independence long 
ago, but who consider themselves freed from foreign 
domination by the events of the war. This applies to 
Poland of the times of the Congress of Vienna, and to Fin- 
land. They cannot be denied the right to dispose of them- 
selves. 

Other allogeneous territories, in so far as there is no 
question of the independence of a state, ought to have guar- 
anteed to them at least autonomy sufficient to cover the de- 
velopment of their own national life. 

A third group is composed of peoples, formerly independ- 
ent, of a higher civilization, which became the prey of 
imperialistic domination, but the political rights of which 
have undergone no changes during the present war. To 
this group belong Ireland, Egypt, Tripoli, Morocco, India, 
Thibet, Corea and other countries, which once were in- 
dependent states. 

The German Socialist Democracy feels the greatest 
sympathy with the efforts of all these peoples to recover 

[174] 



their national liberty, and would be pleased if the Social- 
ists in the states which dominate those countries would 
raise their voices so that the oppressed nations might be 
freed from the yoke of foreign domination. 

V. AUTONOMY OF NATIONALITIES 

In regard to cultural autonomy of portions of populations 
speaking other languages than that of the larger state 
into which they were incorporated, the German Socialist 
Democracy, in accordance with the attitude it has hither- 
to held, insists on the greatest extension of that autonomy 
in the future. 

The German Empire w^ill have to consider the demands 
of our Danish, Polish and French fellow citizens in 
Schleswig on the north, in Poland and Eastern Prussia, as 
well as in Alsace-Lorraine. 

We most rigorously condemn every attack made against 
the use of the mother tongue and all hindrances to the ex- 
ercise of what constitutes the character and the particular 
national civilization of those nations. 

The portions of allogeneous nations bordering on the 
territories of a state ought not to form obstacles to friendly 
relations, but rather serve as bridges for a mutual under- 
standing between one people and another, one civilization 
and another. The introduction of truly democratic con- 
ceptions in all countries would make possible the realization 
of this aim. 

Regarding the situation of the different nationalities in 
Austria-Hungary, we refer their case to the statements made 
by our Austrian comrades. 

VI. ALSACE-LORRAINE 

In regard to Alsace-Lorraine, which was counted in the 
questionnaire among the " nationalities," it must be said 
first of all that Alsace-Lorraine has never been an independ- 
ent national state and that, besides, it could not be consid- 
ered a particular nationality. According to its ethnographic 

[175] 



nature, that is, according to its race and language, the 
population of Alsace-Lorraine is nearly nine-tenths Ger- 
man. French as a mother tongue is spoken by no more than 
1 1.4 per cent, of the population. 

Besides, Alsace-Lorraine is not a territory which has 
changed hands during the war; it has remained, all except 
a very narrow band near the frontiers, under the dominion 
of the German state. It would be impossible, then, from 
this point of view to open the question of annexing Alsace- 
Lorraine to this or that state. 

The territories of Alsace-Lorraine, which originally, both 
politically and ethnographically, belonged to Germany, had 
been wrested by France from the German Empire together 
with other territories. By the peace of Frankfurt, in 1871, 
they resumed their original status. Consequently, it is al- 
most unjustified to speak of a historical right of France 
to these territories. To force the restitution of Alsace- 
Lorraine would amount to nothing less than the annexa- 
tion on the part of France, an annexation of territory 
where a foreign language is spoken. The Socialist 
Democracy demands for Alsace-Lorraine the guarantee of 
a complete equality of rights as a confederate independent 
state in the German Empire and a free democratic con- 
stitution providing for its legislation and interior admin- 
istration. The German Socialist Democracy made that 
statement at the Congress of Jena, in 191 3, in a resolution 
presented by comrades from Alsace-Lorraine. This settle- 
ment of the question, granting to Alsace-Lorraine equality 
of rights in the confederation and extensive interior 
autonomy, was in accord with the views of our comrades 
of the French Socialist party before the war. Besides, it 
answers the wish expressed on several occasions and even 
recently manifested by the national representatives of Al- 
sace-Lorraine, who are elected by universal, equal, direct 
and secret suffrage. 

The principle of peace without annexations, naturally, 
does not exclude friendly agreements on the question of 
modifying frontiers. 

[176] 



Fundamental Elements of International Relations 

Taking into account the vital legitimate interests of all 
peoples, the right of each people to political independence 
and to freedom of economic development cannot be per- 
manently guaranteed unless the future treaty of peace con- 
tains a general outline of the rights of men. The work of 
years of peace will be required to build up, internationally, 
on common principles, political law, labor law, civil law 
and commercial law, aiming to create among the peoples 
a community of judicial and economic civilization. 

I. provision for the rights of men 

• The aim for a world peace guaranteed by judicial inter- 
national institutions is considered the highest moral obliga- 
tion according to the principles formulated on August i6, 
19 15. by the national council and a fraction of the German 
Socialist party. 

In accordance with the resolutions of the international 
Socialists congress at Copenhagen, we particularly demand 
in the treaty of peace: 

(a) The recognition of an international court of 
arbitration, to which all disputes between states shall be 
submitted ; 

(b) A superior judicial organization for each state, to 
be created for the prevention of the violation of contracts 
established by human law. 

II. DISARMAMENT AND FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 

In the treaties of peace mention will have to be made 
of arrangements for the limitation of armaments on land 
and sea. The aim of these arrangements ought to be to 
create a popular armed force for the defense of territories 
against warlike aggressions and strong oppression. The 
period of service in each of these categories of armies ought 
to be reduced to a minimum. 

The legitimate means of carrying on war ought to be 



limited by contract. The ammunition industry ought to 
be nationalized. The supplying of arms and munitions 
by neutral nations to belligerents ought to be forbidden 
internationally. The right of capture on the sea ought 
to be suppressed. The arming of commercial vessels ought 
to be forbidden. All straits which are important for world 
relations and all interoceanic canals ought to be under inter- 
national control. 

Efficacious guarantees must be made for the safety of 
world commerce during war. The nature of contraband 
ought to be internationally defined. All clothing and food 
materials ought to be banished from the lists of war 
contraband. Private property ought to be protected against 
the encroachments of belligerents. Postal relations between 
belligerents and neutrals, and between neutrals likewise 
ought to be guaranteed in times of war. The matter of 
blockade ought to be defined anew. 

III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS 

In order that the fraternizing of peoples may not be 
hindered, it will be necessary in the treaties of peace to 
include clauses guaranteeing against a continued war in 
the form of an economic war. 

The freedom of communication by land and sea ought to 
be reestablished in the treaties of peace. 

The system of protective laws ought to be entirely done 
aw^y with. The aim of all commercial politics ought to 
be based on the suppression of customs duties and com- 
mercial barriers. 

In the colonies, the " open door " system, that is, the 
right of all peoples to economic activity, ought to be estab- 
lished. 

The freedom of international circulation, the right of 
coalition, the protection of labor, workingmen's insurance, 
the protection of working women and children and home 
work ought to be regulated according to the well-known 
program of the International Federation of Syndicates. 

[178] 



IV. THE SUPPRESSION OF SECRET DIPLOMACY 

We demand that all treaties between states and all 
international agreements be submitted to the democratic 
control of national representatives. 

3 
The Practical Realization of These Aims 

Commissions for the study of various problems would 
furnish valuable explanations in regard to national and 
economic questions. The main problem, however, for 
international socialism is to bring about peace as soon as pos- 
sible. And peace, we are convinced, can be obtained by 
mutual agreement on the basis of " No annexations and no 
indemnities," even before the commissions begin their work. 

4 
The Activity of the Internationale 

Neutral countries have been, without exception, more or 
less interested in the war. All have an interest in an early 
peace. Consequently, it is necessary to summon them to 
regulate economic, social and judicial questions of an inter- 
national character. 

The other questions concerning the collaboration of the 
Internationale during peace negotiations have already re- 
ceived a sufficient reply. 

As far as the Socialist parties in belligerent countries are 
concerned, their influence on the governments, national rep- 
resentatives and official peace conference ought to become 
stronger every day. 

5 
Activities of Socialist Parties for Peace 

We are coming now to the question of motives which 
led the German delegation to ask, on the yth of June, that 

[179] 



a report of each delegation of the work of its party, in view 
of a permanent peace, be added to the questionnaire. 

The bureau of the Social Democratic party in Germany 
issued two pamphlets containing a collection of statements, 
manifestos and discourses delivered in the Reichstag, in 
which the attitude of the party in regard to war and war 
aims is explained. 

In this collection of documents proof is furnished that 
the German Social Democratic party has worked from the 
first day of the war for an early peace, and that it knows 
no other conditions for a peace agreement than the fact 
that the adversaries are equally ready for such a peace. 

But the German Social Democratic party is not satisfied, 
in its work for peace, with mere parliamentary discourses, 
manifestos and statements cited in the above-mentioned 
collection. It has held meetings for peace in all parts of 
the empire and obtained signatures to petitions in which the 
government was asked to declare its readiness for peace 
under the condition of renouncing all plans of conquest. 

This work for peace has had a great measure of success. 
Unfortunately, the endeavors of the Social Democratic party 
of Germany to renew the ties of friendship with the So- 
cialist parties in Germany and France have remained un- 
successful. 

The work for peace can bring no favorable results un- 
less it be undertaken simultaneously on both sides. This, 
we believe, could have been done and should have been 
done long ago, without necessitating either party's having to 
ask for something resembling the abandonment of the na- 
tional cause. 

We declare to all nations that we have no other obliga- 
tion than that of defending our own nation and no mission 
to punish other peoples for the imaginary or real crimes 
of their governments. It is in this sense that the German 
Social Democratic party has not ceased to work. 



[i8o] 



6 

General Socialist Conference 

We are ready to participate without reserve in a general 
Socialist conference for peace, because we believe the first 
duty of all Socialists is to act for peace. An explanation of 
the attitude of all Socialist parties would be simplified if 
all of them would prepare a collection of documents re- 
garding their activities in favor of peace. 

In regard to the explanation of responsibilities, from 
which we cannot escape, we believe such a statement would 
not facilitate the attainment of the aim of the conference. 
There is no need of discussing the past; what we ought to 
do is to come to an understanding in reference to the future, 
namely, in reference to the realization of a permanent peace 
in accordance with our principles and our ideals. 

We have no objection to the participation of all minority 
Socialists at the general conference. 

[From the New York Tribune, Aug. 12, 191 7.] 



[181] 



MEMORANDUM OF THE GERMAN 
MINORITY SOCIALISTS 

[In reply to the questionnaire of the Dutch- 
Scandinavian Committee. This memorandum was 
not allowed to circulate in Germany.] 

In its peace views, as in its general policy, the German 
Independent Social Democratic party proceeds from the 
common interests of the international proletariat and the de- 
velopment of society. These interests demand immediate 
peace. 

In the peace to be concluded we demand an international 
arrangement for general disarmament, as being the chief 
means of strengthening the debilitated states. General dis- 
armament is the only way to break any militarist supremacy 
and to secure a lasting and peaceful understanding between 
the nations. 

We demand the fullest freedom for international trade 
and intercourse, as well as an unlimited right of migration. 
We condemn any economic barriers or any economic 
struggle between states. 

All disputes between states must be settled by compulsory 
international arbitration. 

We demand international treaties to secure the workers 
against impoverishment, especially in regard to women and 
children. 

Political rights for women we regard as a social neces- 
sity. 

Equal rights should be granted for all the inhabitants 
of any country without regard to tongue, race or religion. 
This would also mean the securing to national minorities 
the right to develop their national life. 
[182] 




Photo by Press Illustrating Service 

KARL LIEBKNECHT 

Prior to his imprisonment 



National and social liberation cannot be achieved by the 
governments at v^^ar. It can only be done by democracy. 

Democratic control of foreign policy will prevent aggres- 
sive measures. Secret treaties must be abolished, and all 
state treaties must be made dependent upon the assent of the 
parliaments. 

Though not regarding state boundaries as inviolable, we 
condemn the war and its prolongation as a means of regulat- 
ing boundaries. Regulation of frontiers must be conditional 
upon the assent of the populations concerned, and not an act 
of force. 

With all firmness we object to the violation in any 
form of any nation. 

From the beginning of the war we have consistently de- 
manded peace without annexations or indemnities, based upon 
national self-government. 

It is not our affair to draw up a program covering 
all the questions to be dealt with in the peace settlement, 
but in regard to the questions raised in the discussions now 
going on we declare the following: 

The reestablishment of Serbia as a self-governing, in- 
dependent state is our absolute demand. 

The uniting of all Serbs in a single national state and its 
combination with the other Balkan States in a Republican 
Balkan Federation we regard as the best way of removing 
the Eastern question as a cause of war. 

We understand the deep feeling of the Poles for national 
unity. To admit the right of Russian Poland to national 
independence but to deny that same right to Prussian and 
Austrian Poland is contradictory. 

Just as with Serbia and Poland, so do we condemn the 
prolongation of the war as a means of settling the ques- 
tion of Alsace-Lorraine. The population of Alsace-Lor- 
raine, which in 187 1 was annexed against its will, will not 
obtain peace any earlier than it will itself obtain the op- 
portunity through a direct and free vote to express its wish 
as to the state to which it shall belong. The German 
people would obtain by this mode of settlement an economic, 

'[183] 



political, and moral gain that would be greater than any 
possible loss, even if the voting gave another result than 
it had anticipated. 

The full independence and economic self-dependence (i.e., 
freedom from economic interference) of Belgium is inevi- 
table. In fulfillment of the German government's prom- 
ise at the beginning of the war, the Belgian nation has 
to be compensated for the damage caused by the war, and 
especially for the economic values that have been taken 
away. Such a repayment has nothing to do with the 
various kinds of indemnities, which simply mean the 
plundering of the vanquished by the victor, and which we 
therefore reject. 

As opponents of any policy of conquest and foreign 
dominion, we reject, as we have always done, a policy of 
colonial conquest. The possession of any colony without 
its own self-administration is nothing else than the pos- 
session of an unfree people and, just as slavery, is incom- 
patible with our principles. 

Neither by the acquirement of colonies nor by a change of 
possessor is the population's right to self-determination re- 
spected. The possession of colonies, too, is not necessary for 
industrial development. 

Only if the Internationale is erected, independent and 
powerful; if the proletariat everywhere lend it its full force 
through keeping control over governments and maintain- 
ing peace — only then will there come in the future a state 
of mutual confidence between the nations instead of an 
armaments contest. 

The proletariat in every country must now do its all to 
bring the war to an end. To attain this aim the independ- 
ence of the Socialist parties in relation to their imperial 
governments must be presupposed. 

The drawing up of a common peace program is im- 
portant, but this program has no worth if it is not sup- 
ported by the energetic international action of the masses. 
Every government must be challenged to give its uncondi- 
tional adhesion to the international peace program. 
[184] 



Credits are to be refused to any government that refuses 
this program or answers evasively or does not declare it- 
self ready to enter upon peace conversations on the basis 
of this program. Such government must be fought in 
the sharpest manner. 

To undertake and further such common peace action 
must be the first object of the planned International Peace 
Conference. A proletariat organization that jvill not join 
in this action would thereby forfeit the right henceforth 
to be regarded as an organization of international socialism. 

[From the New York Tribune j Aug. 12, 191 7.] 



[185] 



STATEMENT OF THE AUSTRO-GERMAN 
SOCIALIST DELEGATES 

[To the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Com- 
mittee Statement.] 

In the opinion of the Austrian delegation imperialism is 
the universal cause of w^ar, but national questions (questions 
of nationality) have frequently served as pretexts. Al- 
most everywhere in central, w^estern and south-eastern 
Europe the settlement of nations^ is so intermingled that 
a delimitation of territories vi^ould be impossible and con- 
stitute a renewed occasion of wars. Even where the separa- 
tion of nations was possible it would mean such small 
states (Kleinstaaterei) that the political and economic rise 
of these nations would be endangered. To break up al- 
ready existing large political and economic units would 
profit only the bourgeoisie of the larger states who could 
easily play off the many small states against one another 
and dominate them. Therefore the Delegation accepts na- 
tional autonomy on the basis of the Basle manifesto and 
is of the opinion that the attainment of this freedom must be 
the work of these nations themselves. In especial the Dele- 
gates declare 

( 1 ) that they favor peace without annexations, 

(2) that they regard all bourgeois governments and con- 

trolling bourgeoisies as alike responsible for the 
war; and for this reason too they are for a speedy 
peace without indemnity. From this it follows 
that an answer to the question of responsibility for 

^ The word nations is used throughout, though what are com- 
monly called nationalities are generally meant. 
[186] 



the war must be waived. As regards particular na- 
tional questions the delegates have declared them- 
selves against the annexation of Belgium, and for 
the political independence of the Serbian people 
as well as for a free access for Serbia to the sea 
by means of union with Montenegro. The 
Balkan states can arrange their political relations 
with one another by mutual agreement and them- 
selves realize the old demand " The Balkans for 
the Balkan peoples" by a federation (Biindniss). 

(3) The South-Slav nations and the provinces of 

Austria-Hungary including Bosnia should remain 
within the framework of the monarchy. But the 
Delegates bind themselves always to further the 
efforts of these peoples towards autonomy. 

(4) The independence of Finland and Russian Poland 

should be assured, the Poles of Galicia and Prus- 
sia should receive their full autonomy within the 
framework of the two states, likewise full na- 
tional autonomy is demanded for the Ruthenians 
of Austria. The Delegates look to the future 
and to voluntary agreements between restored 
Poland {Kongress-Poleuj Poland of the Congress 
of Vienna) and the Central Powers for a lasting 
settlement of the Polish question. 

(5) In the face of certain claims that this war has to do 

with the freeing of the small nations of Austria the 
Delegation maintains that the Austrian state will 
retain the small nations. 

The Delegates regard as an essential part of the 
peace treaty international economic questions. 
They demand the reestablishment of freedom of 
intercourse by land and by sea, the demolition of 
the system of high protective tariffs, the open 
door in all colonies with a common international 
administration of all sea routes and interoceanic 
canals and the creation of new world railroad 
routes shared and administered by all powers. 

[187] 



The Delegates protest againt economic war as 
erected into a system by the Paris Conference of 
19 1 6 and are of the opinion that tariff unions 
are a step forward only when they aim at an ex- 
tension of free trade. (Erweiterung des freien 
Verkehrs.) The peace proposal should contain 
general agreements in the direction of the de- 
mands of the international trade-union Congresses. 
(6) The war has destroyed all guarantees of hitherto 
existing laws of maritime warfare. The develop- 
ment of law which was begun in the 1856 Peace 
of Paris must be carried further. Here belong 
prohibition of privateering, and of arming of 
merchant vessels, abolition of the law of capture at 
sea, limitation of the scope of contraband, (from 
which must be excluded at least the raw materials 
for food and clothing) , the return of the right of 
blockade to its old limits, prohibition of the dec- 
laration that a part of the open sea is a war 
zone, limitation of permissible means of warfare by 
sea and in the air. 

The delegates further advocated the continua- 
tion of the work for peace of the two Hague 
Conferences; limitation, by agreement, of arma- 
ment by land and sea, until standing armies are 
completely disarmed, the organization of a popular 
militia for defense only; as far as munitions are 
necessary the whole munitions industry should be 
nationalized. 

Austrian Social Democracy is unconditionally 
for the calling of a Socialist congress and con- 
siders it the duty of all sections of international 
trade-unions to take part in it. The Delegates 
expect that all affiliated sections should enter into 
connection, and regard it as necessary that the na- 
tional sections (of the Socialist party) should 
be represented by their minority as well as by their 
majority group. The Bohemian, Polish and 
[188] 



Bosnian Delegations will state their point of view 
after consulting with the other sections which de- 
pend on theirs, and whose special problems they 
have to consider. 

[Translated from the Holland News, Review of 
the Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlag Raad. June 20, 
1917.] 



[189] 



STATEMENT OF THE 
HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST DELEGATES 

[To the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist-Commit- 
tee.] 

I. The Hungarian Social Democracy stands for an im- 
mediate peace, based upon the universal principles: No 
annexation, no war indemnities. It demands complete 
political restoration of all occupied states. The economic 
restoration of all ravaged territories is the task of those 
states in whose hands these ravaged territories remain, but 
with two exceptions: 

(a) Belgium, the complete restoration of which was 

agreed to by the German Government in the 
declaration of August, 19 14. The Hungarian 
Delegation holds that the declarations of the Ger- 
man Chancellor in regard to the restoration of 
Belgium by Germany is still right in principle. 
But, if to secure this were to mean prolongation 
of the war, then the burden of restoring Bel- 
gium should be borne by all belligerent Powers 
according to their economic strength. 

(b) Since Serbia is too small and too weak for her own 

restoration, she should receive the collective help 
of all the belligerent Great Powers. The Dele- 
gation also demands for Serbia free assured ac- 
cess to the sea and a trade policy on the part 
of Austria-Hungary, such as to make good rela- 
tions between the two countries possible. 

(c) In regard to Alsace-Lorraine the Delegation desires 

to see an agreement between the German and 
[190] 



French Social-Democrats, and sees in this solution 
alone the guarantee of a lasting peace between 
peoples. The Serbian and Bulgarian Social- 
Democrats should, according to their opinion, fol- 
low the same course with regard to Macedonia. 

(d) In principle the Delegation is in favor of all Polish 

territories being united as an independent state 
bound to all her neighboring states by friendly 
relations and freedom of trade; they demand, 
however, as a minimum the independence of 
" Congress-Poland," in case this is the desire of 
the inhabitants, together with national freedom 
and assurance of the possibilities of development 
in those Polish territories remaining under another 
state. 

(e) The national questions of Austria-Hungary should 

not be solved by dismemberment of the empire, but 
through far-reaching democratic reforms, national 
autonomy, free cultural and economic development 
within the present state. 

(f) The principle " without annexation " implies also the 

return of occupied colonies. With regard to the 
colonies we stand for the principle of the " Open 
Door." 

2. The Hungarian Social Democracy desires the future 
peace to be built upon the foundation of international law, 
of obligatory arbitration, disarmament by sea and by land. 
It recognizes the relation between disarmament on land 
and the restoration and assurance of freedom of the seas. 
It wishes, for safeguarding the freedom of the sea, a mari- 
time police, subject to international principles, to oversee the 
internationalization of straits and channels and the chief in- 
ternational routes of commerce, such as the Dardanelles, 
Gibraltar and so on. 

It considers it the duty of all Social Democratic Parties 
already to express opposition to attempts to carry on an eco- 
nomic war after the conclusion of peace and for this reason 

[191] 



desires an energetic fight against the resolution of the Paris 
Conference in June, 191 6, and against the so-called " Mittel 
Europa " movement in the countries of the Central Powers. 

The Hungarian Delegation hopes that the peace discus- 
sions of the belligerent powers and the peace work of the 
International may not be exclusively dominated by national 
and territorial questions. As representatives of the working 
classes they want to direct the attention of the International 
to the fact that there is not only national, but also social 
oppression, and wish to have questions of labor protection 
and social politics included in the peace discussions. 

3. The Delegation stands for unconditional participation 
in the [Stockholm] Conference; it is opposed to the discus- 
sion in the Conference of the question of responsibility, be- 
cause it considers discussion of these questions at this time 
to be without object and not serviceable to peace. But if 
the meeting of a genuine and completely international Con- 
ference depends upon the taking up of these questions, the 
Hungarian Delegation does not consider this sufficient reason 
for not taking part in the Conference. 

The Delegation emphasizes, that according to its under- 
standing, the people of all the belligerent states are peace- 
fully-minded, that their Governments in all countries are 
responsible for the war, and that not accidental circum- 
stances, but the constantly operating forces of national and 
social oppression and exploitation led to the war. Imperial- 
ism, high protective tariffs, national oppression, [oppression 
of nationalities] the lack of democracy, the want of real 
parliamentary control even in the countries governed on 
parliamentary principles, the domination of the financial oli- 
garchy in France, Czardom in Russia, the feudal national- 
istic oligarchy of Hungary, Junkers and large-scale industry 
in Prussia-Germany (Preussen Deutschland ) , the lack of a 
parliamentary system of government in the German Empire, 
are, in the opinion of the Delegation, some of the real causes 
of the war. The glorious Russian revolution has removed 
one of these causes of war and the Delegation expresses its 
belief that the International will do much happier work for 

[192] 



peace if the various national sections, instead of fruitless 
debate on the question of blame, come forward each in its 
own country, against the organic war producing forces — 
against the nationalism of France, against the domination of 
the Junkers and bureaucrats in Prussia-Germany and against 
the national and social servitude of the masses in Hungary. 

The Hungarian Delegation pledges itself to fight in this 
spirit for the complete democratization of Hungary and ex- 
presses the wish that the French comrades should now with 
their whole strength take up the fight against the chauvinistic 
ideology [idealization of patriotism], the German Social 
Democracy the fight for equal suffrage and a parliamentary 
system of government in the Empire. 

The Delegation expresses this wish, not as assuming to 
meddle with the internal affairs of other countries, or 
brother-parties, or associations, but because consideration of 
the condition of the world and the possibility of peace has 
convinced them that democracy is a requisite of international 
politics and the necessary condition of a speedy and lasting 
peace. 

[Translated from the Holland NezvSj June 20, 
1917.] 



[193] 



STATEMENT OF THE BOHEMIAN 

CENTRALIST SOCIALIST 

PARTY 

[To the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Commit- 
tee.] 

The Socialist Party of Bohemia concurs in general in 
the views expressed by the German- Austrian delegation; 
it stands for a peace without annexations, without war- 
indemnities, without the humiliation of any people. It 
laments that the war has imposed heavy trials on various 
countries, and regards the restoration of their territories 
as not only an imperative duty according to every idea 
of morality and justice but also as necessary to the future 
of Europe. Belgium, Serbia and Roumania must arise again.' 
Furthermore peace must give to every people opportunity 
for free development, national, economic and cultural. 
This right must not be curtailed, in particular as regards 
the Czech people. They demand the most complete 
autonomy and freedom and are moreover entitled to them. 
This policy will be best carried out through the democ-! 
ratization and remodelling of Austria according to the 
program as to nationalities drawn up by the Socialist Party. 
We will pursue the realization of this task in cooperation 
with other Socialist and proletarian organizations of our 
country. 

From the first day of the world conflagration we held 
that it was the duty of the International to do everything 
possible to put an end to the slaughter. The calling of the 
Stockholm Conference brought us nearer to this goal. We 
expect from it not only the revival of the International but 
also the simultaneous spreading of the universal thought of 

[194] 



peace. The discussion of the questions the solutions of 
which must enter into the peace treaty will make it pos- 
sible to set forth the efforts of the working class every- 
where to establish definitely the general conditions of peace 
and to eliminate hindrances and misunderstandings, and it 
will be able to shorten the war which threatens to pro- 
long itself still further, if the organized workers do not 
get into touch again (sich nich wieder finden). 

[Quoted in The Holland News, June 20, from 
Vorwdrts, June 3, 1917. Translated.] 



[195] 



MANIFESTO ADDRESSED TO THE DUTCH- 
SCANDINAVIAN SOCIALIST COMMITTEE 
BY MM. VANDERVELDE AND 
DE BROUCKERE 

[Vandervelde and de Brouckere, as the delegates 
of Belgian Socialists, issued the following reply, July 
5, to the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee at Stock- 
holm.] 

The war appears to us to be less a war between peoples 
than a struggle, probably decisive, between two political 
principles. It is in this sense that it has been justly called 
civil war within the society of nations. The Russian Revo- 
lution and the entry of the United States have had the ef- 
fect of ranging on one side all the free nations, that is to 
say, those who have already effected their democratic revo- 
lution, and, on the other hand — almost entirely isolated — 
the last three semi-feudal, semi-absolute Powers — namely, 
the Empire of the German Emperor, that of the Sovereign 
of Austria-Hungary, and that of the Grand Turk. 

In the deliberate execution of a long-cherished project, 
these Powers have let loose war on the most villainous pre- 
texts and for the most wretched of causes. Imperialism has 
been able to carry out its plan, thanks to a popular passivity 
which would have been inconceivable in any other country. 
Attack and invasion have placed upon us the burden of the 
most crushing of tyrannies — the German military tyranny, 
whose object, as defined by Bismarck, is to leave a people 
only their eyes with which to weep. 

Belgian Socialism has not for one moment believed that it 
ought to bow before external oppression when our villages 
were burnt, our women insulted, and our dearly acquired 
[196] 



liberties brutally oppressed. It has not admitted that it was 
" a simple bourgeois quarrel, which ought to leave the pro- 
letariat indifferent." If it had abandoned the struggle un- 
der the pretense that the soldiers of William 11. were too 
numerous and his guns too powerful, it would have been 
dishonored in its own eyes. It has never reckoned cowardice 
amongst revolutionary virtues. 

Defense against aggressive Imperialism implies for us 
something more than the mere repulse of the invader. The 
destruction of German Imperialism might have been the 
business of the Germans alone, if their Imperialism had 
stayed at home. But it crossed our frontiers, and we want 
to break the power of our tyrant. Our desire is as legiti- 
mate as that of the Russians, who have broken the power of 
their tyrant; and the fact that our tyrant is enthroned at 
Berlin is not sufficient reason for changing our opinion. 

We cannot conceive any possible lasting peace if Hohen- 
zollern and Hapsburg retain their powers. The greatest 
present danger is that of seeing free countries accept a pre- 
carious peace. We could not lend ourselves to this without 
betraying our deepest convictions as Socialists. 

We adhere to the Petrograd formula of " no annexations 
and no indemnities." But " refusal of annexations " does 
not imply maintenance of the territorial status quo. If, in 
accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, Alsace-Lor- 
raine were restored to France we should not consider it an 
" annexation " but a " disannexation." In the^same way the 
unification of Poland and the completion of Italian and 
Serbian unity, as desired by the peoples concerned, would not 
be " annexation." Near Stavelot there are Walloon villages 
which appear to desire once more to become Belgian. The 
peace treaty might accept their aspirations. This, too, 
would apply to Luxemburg, with its 200,000 inhabitants, 
if it should consider that a return to Belgium, frorri whom it 
was separated in 1839, would be to its advantage. 

While we repudiate the exaction of " indemnities " such 
as Bismarck in 187 1 levied on France and such as Germany 
is continually imposing on occupied Belgium, we could not 

[197] 



recognize a peace that sanctioned the exactions of the in- 
vader. For Belgium this question is vital. 

The Germans have by menaces, compulsion, and violence, 
exacted from our towns many millions of pounds in cash. 
Since the occupation they have levied monthly for the needs 
of the army a contribution of £2,000,000, and for some 
time past have raised the sum to £2,400,000. They have 
levied several hundred million pounds in foodstuffs, in kind, 
and in raw materials and machinery. In the interest of mili- 
tary operations they have done countless deeds of destruction, 
and, in many cases, simply in order to terrorize the popula- 
tion and to gain future economic advantage by suppressing 
an embarrassing competitor. 

The Belgian nation will have to indemnify the victims of 
these acts of violence, and this charge upon it must be added 
to all those we have just enumerated. Would it not be the 
height of iniquity to make the victim bear this burden at the 
risk of seeing him succumb under the weight of peace ? Does 
not justice demand reparation from those guilty of outrage 
in so far as the outrage may be reparable ? 

Ever since August 4, 19 14, the German Chancellor ac- 
knowledged in the Reichstag that Germany was violating 
the rights of Belgium and owed her reparation. We are 
firmly convinced that the Russian democracy will not be less 
solicitous than was the representative of the Kaiser of the 
clear rights of an oppressed nation. 

As for the " right of nations to dispose of their own des- 
tinies," it would be as tyrannous to keep by force in Austria- 
Hungary, populations like those of Bohemia, Transylvania, 
or Bosnia, which aspire to other national destinies, as it 
would be to attach Belgium by force to the German Empire. 
Indeed, we could hardly describe Germany as free, in this 
sense, so long as the semi-absolutism of the Hohenzollerns 
endures. We consider that a democratic constitution for 
Germany is not only a right to which the Germans are en- 
titled, but that it is also a condition upon the fulfillment of 
which other nations are entitled to make their adhesion to a 
general peace depend. A treaty guaranteed only by an 

[198] 



Emperor who is accustomed to hold his word cheap would be 
merely another scrap of paper. 

We do not, of course, refuse to meet the Germans; but 
what we decline is to associate ourselves with German So- 
cialist supporters of the Imperialism of the Emperor William 
and of the Emperor Charles. We should not object to con- 
certed action with those in the Central Empires who oppose 
a policy of aggression and of conquest, and who in effect 
pursue the same end as we ourselves. We should not de- 
cline to meet the German Majority Socialists if they re- 
nounced the error of their present ways, and took an open 
and manly part against their Emperors. But, pending such 
action on their part, we should regard a meeting with them 
as not only useless but dangerous to the international demo- 
cratic cause — dangerous, since it would tend to accredit the 
illusion that a just and lasting peace is possible before ag- 
gressive imperialism has been destroyed; and because the 
maintenance of false hopes of an impending equitable solu- 
tion relaxes effort and strengthens the current that is carry- 
ing the weak-willed towards a peace at any price. 

This is why, following the example of the French and 
British representatives, we urged that admission to the pro- 
posed conference should be conditional upon frank adhesion 
to an anti-Imperialist program. 

In a word, our attitude may be summed up as follows: — 

(i) We urge that in every country Socialists, by a cam- 
paign among the masses, should cause their Governments to 
renounce every Imperialist war aim and to accept, in a more 
precise form, the Petrograd peace formula. 

(2) We accept an exchange of views, such as is being con- 
ducted by the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee at Stockholm, 
provided that they are based on the principle laid down in 
the preceding paragraph. Exchanges of this kind may lead 
to great results. 

(3) Finally, we believe that these preliminaries might 
lead to the elaboration of a program for a general confer- 
ence that would be precise enough to leave no room for 
equivocation; to discourage any diplomatic manoeuvers by 

[199] 



our adversaries; and to keep away such nominally Socialist 
groups as might not be prepared loyally to cooperate in the 
anti-Imperialist work to which the " Internationale " is 
called. 

When these conditions have been fulfilled, the Belgian 
Socialists will be happy to take part in what will then be 
the general meeting of the true " Internationale." 

[From the London Times, July 6, 19 17.] 



[200] 



ITALIAN SOCIALISTS' PROCLAMATION 

[Issued by three of the most important Socialist 
groups in Italy — the board of directors of the Italian 
Socialist Party, the Socialist Parliamentary Group, 
and the General Federation of Labor.] 

Peace is inevitably coming, after the long, terrible struggle 
which, for more than three years, has been holding civiliza- 
tion back and sealed the fate of the political regimes that 
caused it. The hour is coming in which the whole re- 
sponsibility will be laid before the high court of history. 
After the long and cruel devastation, a period of readjust- 
ment of social life is unavoidable, and the introduction of 
new social and political conditions is predicted. The feel- 
ing has spread beyond our own party, that it is absolutelj^ 
necessary that the terrific experience we have had, will 
bring us at least the firm will to prevent the scourge from 
breaking out again in the near future. The magnificent 
advent of the Russian revolution, added to all these facts, 
show the Socialist parties in general - — and specially for the 
Italian Socialist party — that, even in these troubled times, 
they should be faithful to the great principle of class struggle 
and international solidarity on the part of the proletariat; 
they should reaffirm and put forward such plans, out of their 
program, that are immediately needed, in view of the fact 
that peace is coming, and also to attend to such measures as 
are to be adopted immediately after war is ended. 

Since peace is coming, the Italian Socialist party must re- 
affirm its immutable and basic principles in the matter of in- 
ternational policy; principles which were reasserted in the 
middle of the war — and in spite of it — at the historic con- 
vention of Zimmerwald. 

That is why our party proclaims the necessity of a peace, 

[201] 



not only without forcible annexation, but also respectful of 
autonomy for all, which leaves to each people the selection 
of its own grouping; which, together with international con- 
trol of the channels and all other points of confluence of 
human races, and with the most absolute freedom of the seas, 
will suppress the most immediate causes of conflict in the 
future. 

Taking into account, furthermore, that the existence of 
various kinds of militarism, protectionism, the lack of a 
stable organization for the rapprochement of nations — facts 
which, besides impoverishing the masses for the benefit of 
the privileged classes and artificially created parasites, help 
to a great extent to separate the peoples from each other — 
make the contrasts between countries more marked, and 
prevent reasonable adjustment of their differences. It is, 
therefore, necessary to take action as to the following points : 

(a) The immediate and simultaneous disarmament of 
every state. 

(b) The suppression of barriers created by customs house 
duties. 

(c) The establishment of a Judicial Federation formed 
by all civilized countries. 

Such aims, however, without which no durable, real, and 
just peace can be expected, will not be attained, or, if at- 
tained, will soon be misapplied and frustrated, if the pro- 
letariat — which is the only class truly and deeply interested 
in the suppression of all cause for armed conflicts between 
countries — have not the strength, ability, and will to make 
them effective and put them actually in force. 

It is necessary, therefore, in the sphere of the internal 
political action of each state, and as a preliminary step for 
the complete emancipation of the laboring class, and for the 
end of all class domination and the realization of the So- 
cialistic ideal, to adopt a series of institutional, politic, ad- 
ministrative, and economic reforms, which can be summed 
up in the following general program: 

( I ) Republican form of government, based on popular 
sovereignty made effective by the right of the elective cham- 

[202] 




[Courtesy of L'Asinol 

THE SITUATION 

Kaiserism and Militarism hang over the abyss 

depending on the ignorance of the peoples. 



ber to call its own sessions and control its own affairs. Abo- 
lition of the Senate. Universal suffrage, equal and direct, 
for every citizen, without sex discrimination. Election by 
scrutin de liste, on a large basis and with proportional repre- 
sentation. Right for the people of initiative, referendum, 
and veto. Unlimited freedom of reunion, organization, 
strike, and propaganda. Suppression of the political police. 

(2) Foreign policy taken off the hands of the executive 
power and placed exclusively in the hands of the deliberating 
Parliament, This will automatically do away with diplo- 
matic intrigue, with pressure brought on parliamentary vote 
under the illegitimate coaction of accomplished facts, and 
with the possibility and validity of underhand dealings and 
secret treaties between governments. 

Publicity will restore the elementary honesty in interna- 
tional relations. It will also put an end to the possibility, 
for the press, placed at the service of the great parasitical 
industrial and commercial interests, to corrupt public opin- 
ion and the sentiment of the masses, by an inspired publicity. 

(3) Development of regional and municipal autonomy. 
Decentralization of administrative power and control, which 
now hinder and corrupt parliamentary action. Reform of 
Bureaucracy — which has become a State within a State — 
so as to make it efficient, by the extension of elective principle 
to the higher offices, together with the fuller direct personal 
responsibility for the officials, and a simplified organization 
of executive departments, according to the industrial type. 
Free justice and judges elected. 

(4) A labor policy intended to develop the potential 
forces and wealth of the country, to repair soon impoverish- 
ment and devastation caused by the war; to stop, without 
coercion, emigration — this hemorrhage which is the neces- 
sary effect of desperate misery — nationalization and judi- 
cial utilization of water power and natural wealth, giving 
preference in all grants to local organizations. Agricultural 
and industrial reforms, by compulsory association, with the 
support of the State, of owners' public entities, and labor 
organizations. 

[203] 



(5) An Internal policy for the defense of the consumer, in 
accordance, whenever possible, with the control of products, 
and intended to make stable and to develop with a new 
spirit, and for ampler social purposes, such institutions as 
have arisen — although unsystematically, and in the interests 
of the bourgeoisie who initiated them under the necessity 
created by the war, against private speculators. 

(6) Real recognition given to every workman of his right 
to a more dignified and human living. Consequently, es- 
tablishment of a general system of insurance against unem- 
ployment, accident, illness, old age, etc. Change of charity 
into assistance and social prevision. Intense diffusion of 
compulsory school, popular and professional, until the age 
of eighteen, with all supplementary educational institutions. 
Promotion of cooperative agriculture and industry. A more 
strict labor inspection. Legislation on individual and col- 
lective labor contracts. Regulation of hours, giving a maxi- 
mum of eight hours to adult male workers. Legal mini- 
mum wages in relation to the fundamental necessities of 
life. Equal privileges for men and women. An ampler 
recognition of the action and intervention of labor organi- 
zation in everything belonging to the protection of labor and 
labor contracts. 

(7) Solution of the agricultural problem according to 
the following lines: 

In reference to the lands: Socialization of lands, by the 
organization of a vast collective domain the first nucleus of 
which will be formed by lands belonging to the Govern- 
ment, to charitable institutions, and uncultivated or poorly 
cultivated lands. 

In reference to agriculture and agricultural production: 
Land to be given or granted only to people who directly 
cultivate it. Compulsory association of farmers. Tech- 
nical control and direction of agricultural production, in 
order to obtain a maximum production at a minimum cost. 

(8) A system of taxes founded mainly on the direct and 
progressive tax, with exact valuation. Reduction of interest 
of the public debt. Extension of State monopoly, both for 

[204] 



the use of industrial production in the benefit of the com- 
munity, and for the control of the great transportation 
services, communications, and provisioning. Heavy taxes on 
legacies, and limitations of the rights of heirs. Compulsory 
national loans for works undertaken in the interest of peace, 
on the same basis as loans are made for the destructive pur- 
poses of w^ar. 

Enforcement of these measures, v^^ith the modifications 
and additions as may be suggested by the special conditions 
inherent to each country, cannot be attained except by con- 
scious effort of the proletariat in each individual State, it is 
pointed out, but such effort will be favored and made more 
valuable by the international cooperation of the laboring 
class. The Italian Socialist party intends, as the main pur- 
pose of its action, to work for the prompt and efficient re- 
organization of the International, and to give it such strong 
organization as to avoid in the future the delusions that 
marked the last period of its life, and to promote the co- 
operation of the different nations for the direction and mak- 
ing of the new history of the world. 

[New York Evening Post, July I7,i9i7-] 



[205] 



STATEMENT OF THE FINNISH SOCIALIST 
DELEGATION 

[In reply to the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist 
Committee's Questionnaire.] 

The representatives of the Finnish Party Committee and 
Finnish Social-Democratic Group in Parliament have pre- 
sented their report in regard to how best to arrange the 
legal status of Finland. In their opinion this view is shared 
by the politically mature elements among the Finns. Ac- 
cording to this view this question must be considered as of 
an international character and therefore to be treated of 
where international questions in general are to be considered, 
that is at the coming Peace Conference. 

This claim is based upon the defenseless condition in which 
Finland would find herself if, in the future, a nationalistic 
or even perhaps an imperialistic tendency should get the 
upper hand in Russia. The gratitude which the Finns owe 
to the revolutionary elements in Russia, as those by which 
Finland also has been freed from Czardom and the reaction- 
ary elements of the Russian democracy, by no means releases 
the Finns from the duty of securing their own future upon 
the firmest basis. The position of Finland must be estab- 
lished upon a foundation which would guarantee to her full 
possibility of free development, and the Finnish people cherish 
the heartfelt hope that the Russian democracy will recognize 
this claim and be able to carry it into execution, so that the 
realization of the Finnish demand may meet with no hin- 
drance from the side of Russia. The autonomous position 
of Finland has in the past in spite of all defects made pos- 
sible a considerable cultural development of the country. 
The greatest of these defects lay in the fact that decisions 
in regard to Finnish affairs were made at Petrograd. 
[206] 



It was thus the case that interests opposed to those of the 
Finns influence the decision of Finnish questions. This led 
from time to time to ruthless disregard of the interest of 
the Finnish people and must in any case be felt by the na- 
tional consciousness as a humiliation. The striving of Fin- 
land for a greater degree of self direction was based on 
the whole historical development of Finland which had never 
been similar to that of Russia. The social constitution of 
Finland, her form of culture, language, etc., were also un- 
like those of the Russian people. Consequently the Finnish 
people strove for the attainment of the fullest possible in- 
dependence. The bearers of the Russian revolution had 
written upon their banners, the freedom of the peoples. 
This fact had strengthened in the people of Finland the 
conviction that the time had now arrived to realize the wish 
of the people of Finland for full independence, which was 
regarded as the only sure way to promote the national 
claims of the Finns and to avoid the conflicts which might 
spring from a permanent union with Russia. The Social- 
ists of Finland base themselves entirely upon the right of 
self-direction of all peoples laid down as a principle by In- 
ternational Social Democracy and they demand that the 
Finnish people also be allowed to decide their own status. 
They appeal to the Comrades of other countries and hope 
that the efforts of the Finnish proletariat for whom they have 
so often expressed their sympathy will now too receive their 
full support. 

With regard to remaining political questions the Delega- 
tion, not having as yet received a mandate, confined itself 
to expressing its personal opinion. It will later make known 
either in writing or orally the position of the Party. The 
Social Democracy of Finland has of course declared itself 
in favor of a general conference. 

[Quoted in the Holland News, June 20, 1917, 
from the Frankfurter Zeitung, May 27, 19 17. 
Translated.^ 



[207] 



DECLARATION ON PEACE BY AUSTRALIAN 
LABOR SOCIALISTS, JUNE 11, 1917 

[The Labor Socialists of Australia, in conference 
June II, 191 7, to discuss terms on which a lasting 
peace can be secured, made the following declaration, 
quoted in a dispatch from Sidney to the Milwaukee 
Leader by W. Francis Ahern.] 

" That as the governments of Europe have failed utterly 
to preserve peace, or to bring the present war within a 
measurable distance of a conclusion, we contend that only by 
an organized system of production for use, under democratic 
control, can a recurrence of such calamities be permanently 
avoided. 

" We rejoice over the revolution in Russia, and con- 
gratulate the people upon their efforts to abolish despotic 
power and class privileges, 

" We therefore urge that immediate negotiations be ini- 
tiated for an international conference, for the purpose of 
arranging equitable terms of peace, on which conference 
the working class organizations shall demand adequate rep- 
resentation, and the inclusion of women delegates, and we 
further urge that the British self-governing dominions shall 
be granted separate representation thereon. 

" We submit that in framing the terms of a lasting peace, 
the following principles should be observed: 

" The rights of small nations, including Ireland, to po- 
litical independence. 

" That the European countries invaded be immediately 
evacuated, and their future territorial integrity guaranteed 
— provided the ownership of disputed territories shall be 
determined by a plebiscite of the inhabitants under an inter- 
national commission. 
[208] 



" That prior to the disbandment of the combatant armies 
and navies they shall be utilized under international control 
for the restoration of the devastated territories at the ex- 
pense of the invaders, and not subject to military supervision. 

" That w^here an amicable arrangement cannot be reached 
by the peace conference in regard to captured colonies and 
dependencies, such territories shall be placed provisionally 
under international control. 

" That the freedom of the seas be secured on the lines 
laid down by President Wilson, May, 191 6, where he ad- 
vocated, ' A universal association of the nations to maintain 
the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the 
common and unhindered use of all nations of the world.' 

" The abolition of trading in armaments, and the pro- 
hibition of the private manufacture thereof. 

" The abolition of conscription in all countries simul- 
taneously. 

" The control of foreign relations under a democratic 
system, based upon publicity, in lieu of the present methods 
of secret diplomacy. 

" That the existing machinery for international arbitra- 
tion be expanded to embrace a concert in Europe, ultimately 
merging into a worldwide parliament, as advocated by Pres- 
ident Wilson, in a recent message to the American Congress. 

" From the conference of the Labor Leagues and Trades 
Unions now considering it, the declaration will be dealt by 
the various Australian organizations throughout the world. 
It may be that these proposals will form the basis of the 
peace of the world in the future. 

" Delegates opposed the annexation of the captured Ger- 
man possessions in the Pacific since Australia had enough 
to do to people the land she already held. Any islands cap- 
tured in the Pacific would not benefit the workers of Aus- 
tralia who would be taxed to keep them going for the bene- 
fits of the capitalists. If they wanted to remove the Ger- 
man or any other menace from the Pacific they should neu- 
tralize the captured islands and place them in the hands of 
an international court and so prohibit any nation turning 

[209] 



them into neutral bases. Any burden placed on the enemy 
countries would have to be borne by fellow workers in those 
countries and labor in Australia should strenuously op- 
pose that. 

" When this war was over the workers would work to 
see to it that never again would capitalists plunge the world 
into a bloody war. Capitalists would be forced to remem- 
ber that in any future war they might feel inclined to en- 
gage in they would have to do the fighting themselves." 



[210] 



JOINT SOCIALIST STATEMENT ON THE RE- 
FUSAL OF PASSPORTS TO STOCKHOLM 

[Following the lead of the United States, most 
of the Allied Governments refused to permit So- 
cialist delegates to attend the Stockholm Conference 
called by the Russian Council of Workers' and Sol- 
diers' Delegates to meet in September. Delegates, 
from other countries, already assembled in Stockholm, 
joined in the following protest.] 

" The Stockholm conference, called at the instance of the 
Russian Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates to 
discuss and formulate the basis of a democratic and durable 
peace betw-een the masses of the peoples, has been postponed 
because the governments of Italy, France, England and the 
United States have refused passports to delegates. For this 
action the American government is largely responsible. 

" At the entente conference in Paris, it was the Italian 
government, through Baron Sonnino, which headed the op- 
position to the Stockholm conference. France also voted no, 
though the favorable attitude of Petrograd was known. 
The Russian representative did not vote. England de- 
clared herself in favor of allowing Socialist and labor dele- 
gates to go to Stockholm. 

" There remained only the American government, which 
practically cast the deciding vote. The American govern- 
ment voted no. 

" We do not understand President Wilson's course of 
action. When, in the Senate in December, 191 6, he ad- 
dressed the peoples of the world, the Socialists and labor 
organizations of Europe supported him with all their 
strength. 

[211] 



" In all Wilson's public utterances it has been made per- 
fectly plain that the main obstacle to American peace with 
Germany is the German political autocracy, and that Amer- 
ica's object in the war is to secure the democratization of 
the German government. 

" The Stockholm conference is the best and, perhaps, the 
only opportunity for the representatives of the entente peo- 
ples to make clear to the German masses the conditions upon 
w^hich peace is possible. And yet President Wilson refuses 
to allow the delegates of American Socialist and Labor 
groups to come to Stockholm. 

" The peoples of the world are sick of war, whatever 
policy their governments see fit publicly to adopt. 

" In the invitation to the Stockholm conference and its 
acceptance by democratic political and economic elements in 
all the belligerent countries is to be seen the first action of 
the international masses, growing conscious of their power, 
awakening to the colossal error of unending war and de- 
termination that government shall be of, by and for the 
Social Democracy." 

This statement is signed by Panin, delegate Russian Coun- 
cil of Workmen and Soldiers; Axelrod, delegate Russian 
Social Democratic party; Troelstra and Van Kol, Dutch 
Social Democratic party; B ranting, Soederberg and Moel- 
ler, Swedish Social Democratic party; Vidnes, Norwegian 
Social Democratic party; Bjorgberg, Danish Social Demo- 
cratic party; Huysmans, secretary International Socialist 
Bureau. 

[Cablegram by John Reed to the New York Call, 
Sept. 9, 191 7.] 



[212] 



ARNOLD BENNETT ON THE STOCKHOLM 

CONFERENCE 

[The refusal of passports to Stockholm and the 
consequent failure of the plan for a conference, called 
forth this criticism from Arnold Bennett, the well- 
known British author and pro-war radical.] 

Now that the idea of the Stockholm conference is, in the lan- 
guage of the reactionaries and their dupes, " decently buried," 
we may perhaps examine it with the detachment and the 
new vision with which one examines the dead. Three main 
objections have been raised to the conference. The first, 
and the most comprehensible, is based on a natural unwill- 
ingness to meet Germans except in physical combat. I un- 
derstand and share this unwillingness. In spite of Lord 
Hugh Cecil and Dr. Lyttelton, I have not the slightest in- 
tention of loving the Germans, and, if I am to think kindly 
of them, I prefer to do so at a distance. Nevertheless, 
sentiment is sometimes a luxury, and luxuries may have to 
be abandoned in the days of danger. Representatives of the 
ruling classes of this country have already sacrificed senti- 
ment to the welfare of prisoners. Real Englishmen have 
argued politely across a table in a room with real Germans 
while other real Englishmen and other real Germans were 
killing each other outside; and nobody was any the worse 
for the conference, whereas prisoners are going to be a great 
deal better for it. If such a deed can be done for the wel- 
fare of a few hundred thousand prisoners, surely it can be 
done for the welfare of the whole world. 

Moreover, the initiators of the Stockholm conference did 
not propose to force anybody to go to Stockholm. People 
whose feelings were too strong for their reason were at per- 

'[213] 



feet liberty to stay at home. As often happens, howeverj 
with people whose feelings are too strong for their reason, 
perfect liberty for themselves did not suffice for these per- 
sons; they wanted perfect liberty for themselves, with the 
addition of perfect coercion for others. They would not 
go to Stockholm, and they would not let anybody else go. 
The attitude of Belgian Socialists was, fortunately, better 
than this. That Belgians should object to meeting Ger- 
mans was inevitable, and not unadmirable. Belgian So- 
cialists made no outcry; with much dignity they left the 
affair absolutely alone. Frenchmen might well have been 
excused if they had done the same. But French Socialists 
put reason before sentiment, and did desire to attend the 
conference. 

Truly, sentiment, noble as it may be, is very illogical. 
Headed by President Wilson, we are all busy telling thg 
German people that they are under the thumb of a wicked 
and bloodthirsty autocracy, and that they must get a fresh 
government if they wanted to come to terms with us. Now, 
German Socialists have always been the enemy of the Ger- 
man government, except in the opening stages of the war, 
when they were doped. Assuredly, they are the enemy oi 
the German government at the present moment. We have 
had a chance of meeting this enemy of the German govern- 
ment face to face — and we have refused it. 

The second main objection to the conference is that at- 
tendance at the conference would prove that our will to win 
the war is weakening. I do not see how it would prove 
anything of the kind. Everybody in his senses must be 
aware that military considerations will put an end to the 
war, and no other. So long as any one of the principal 
nations remains convinced that in its army it possesses an 
instrument efficient to conquer, so long will the war con- 
tinue, and it will go on until the conquest has been achieved. 
The war will stop either when the conquest has been achieved 
or when all the chief belligerents are convinced that con- 
quest cannot be achieved. The aim of the Stockholm con- 
ference was not an armistice, but enlightenment, and its 

[214] 



effects would have been seen, not during the war, but at the 
close of the war. It was intended to supplement, not to 
take the place of the military arm. 

And, assuming that our national will to win the war 
was, in fact, weakening, does anybody, even the war cabinet, 
suppose that the refusal of passports to Stockholm would 
give new strength to our resolution? Far from strength- 
ening our resolution, it would weaken it still further. A 
few candid words about the British national spirit will be in 
place here. We have a pacifist party, very small, perhaps 
negligible, but not decreasing. We have a weary party, 
which was to be expected. 

For some grow too soon weary, and some swerve 
To other paths, setting before the Right 
The diverse far-o£E image of Delight. 

The weary party need not trouble us. Beyond these two 
trifling parties there is nothing in Britain that is not solid 
for the intense continuance of the war. 

There is, however, a powerful and growing popular party 
which is anti-government. Anti-government must not be 
confused with anti-war. We have a war cabinet consisting 
of a Teuton, a self-glorifying traitor, a reactionary bureau- 
crat and the writer of Mr. Lloyd George's public letter to 
Mr. Henderson, with the addition of a labor representative 
who may or may not be kept in an outer office while the 
other four confabulate. The deeds and the misdeeds of 
this cabinet in 191 7 have accorded with its personnel, and 
they have extremely antagonized the people of Britain. If 
the government chooses to confuse anti-war and anti-gov- 
ernment, it only does so for its own purposes. The gov- 
ernment owes its existence to-day to the fact that the na- 
tional cause is a thoroughly righteous cause, and the mass of 
the nation is thoroughly determined on the triumph of the 
cause. To hint that the mass of the nation needs any stif- 
fening from the oligarchy is ridiculous. 

The third main objection to the conference is that it is 

[215] 



a pro-German device, and that even if it were not a pro- 
German device those clever Prussians would get the better 
of the simple-minded French, Italians and English, not to 
speak of the Russians. Well, if anybody is so ignorant of 
political individualities as to believe that the Swedish So- 
cialist leader, Branting, would help a German device, or 
would not see through a German device, he must be left 
in his belief. Mr. Branting is the real originator of the 
idea of the conference. 

As for the Prussians getting the better of us across a 
table — it is astonishing how the legend of Prussian superi- 
ority dies hard, how affectionately we cling to the legend. 
To my mind, the boot would be entirely on the other leg. 
There are at least two members of the British Socialist 
parties who would make mince meat of any Prussian in a 
contest of wits across a table. And I do not desire British 
participation in the conference because of my fear that the 
Germans would befool the Russians. I do not think they 
would. So far as national rivalries go, I desire participa- 
tion in the conference because it presents an unsurpassed 
opportunity for pro-ally propaganda. German Socialists 
have already had one eye-opener at Stockholm. They would 
be absolutely staggered at a full conference. They would 
have such an experience as could not fail to react with 
enormous force against the German government. And, in- 
cidentally, the laborious work of the German censorship 
would be definitely undone in a few days or hours. The 
fanciful picture of the astute Prussian (so famous for his 
diplomatic finesse!) dominating a Socialist world-conference 
to his own ends strikes me as extraordinarily funny. I do 
not for an instant imagine that any member of the govern- 
ment takes the picture seriously. 

In my opinion, the opposition to the Stockholm con- 
ference is due to reasons quite different from those which 
have been avowed by the authorities. The true importance 
of the Stockholm conference resides, not in its opportunities 
for dialectic and propaganda and persuasion, but in the fact 
that it would constitute an unprecedented and supreme 

[2l6] 



phenomenon of democracy taking care of itself, and taking 
care of the world, and of the future. And herein is the 
root of the opposition to the conference. Confining myself 
to the British opposition to the conference, I may point out 
that our ruling classes are strongly desirous of two things — 
an economic war after the war, and a terrific extension of 
the British empire in Africa. I may also point out that the 
British working classes are opposed to these two notions, 
and that, if the working classes had the settling of peace 
terms, the peace terms would be of such a nature as to ren- 
der both notions impossible. But the Stockholm conference 
would have discussed peace terms! Here alone is sufficient 
explanation of the opposition to the holding of the con- 
ference. 

But the origin of the opposition lies still deeper. It lies, 
not in any difference of opinion between the ruling classes 
and the masses of the nation about particular terms of peace, 
but in the fundamental objection of the ruling classes to the 
mass of the nation having any hand at all in the drafting 
of peace terms. The theory that international affairs ought 
to be and are the monopoly of an exclusive caste is still held 
by the exclusive caste. The Cecils, typical members of the 
caste, have recently voiced it. Lord Robert Cecil, with an 
honesty born of mediaeval zeal, and Mr. Balfour, with an 
honesty born of the most profound and candid cynicism. 
Mr. Balfour, an extremely dangerous enemy of democracy, 
can stand up before the representatives of the people and 
calmly sneer at their pretensions to guide the ship of state, 
and so low are the representatives of the people fallen that 
not one per cent, of them dares to make an effective protest^ 

It is natural that in such an anti-democratic atmosphere 
as now prevails any comprehensive scheme for the participa- 
tion of the people in the molding of peace terms should be 
scotched by the representatives of privilege and the foes of 
popular freedom. The representatives of privilege gener- 
ally have made a dreadful mess of diplomacy as a whole. 
To give one recent instance. The war would have been 
over by this time, but for the privileged diplomatic system 

[217] 



and the utterly rotten ignorance and stupidity of its chosen 
pets, as exemplified at Constantinople before the war and in 
the first three months of the war. On the other hand, the 
Labor party has demonstrated its aptness for the work to 
which labor aspires by producing the most constructive and 
most statesmanlike draft terms of peace yet published by 
anybody. But such considerations will have no weight what- 
ever with the privileged caste. The privileged caste will not 
argue, because it cannot; it simply will deny; it simply will 
block; it simply will delude; it simply will stick to what it 
has got — until it is forced to let go. 

The future time which we vaguely describe as " after 
the war " will be a relatively bad or a relatively good time, 
according as democracy does or does not take a hand, and 
a strong hand, in the shaping of it. The privileged caste 
was unchallenged a hundred years ago, and the years fol- 
lowing the great triumph of Waterloo were years of reac- 
tion and misery throughout Europe. And to-day, if the 
privileged caste is unchallenged when the fighting ceases, 
the present war, too, will be followed by Europe [an era?] 
of reaction and misery throughout Europe. This is why a 
meeting of world's representatives of uncompromising de- 
mocracy is so desirable. Few even among democrats realize 
what would be the moral effect of such a conference. It 
would be tremendous. The challenge to vested interests 
would be almost shattering. The impulse towards interna- 
tionalism, which means the end of war, would be irresistible. 
The League of Nations would be in being. 

The power of democracy as an international force is 
growing. To see how fast it is growing you have only to 
contrast the interest aroused by the allied conference of 
labor parties held in London a short time ago with the 
complete indifference which greeted the allied conference 
of labor parties held in London thirty months ago. Democ- 
racy has received a check. But I imagine that it will recover. 
The idea of the Stockholm conference is not dead, far less 
buried. 

[218] 



A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR THE BRITISH 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF WORKMEN AND 
SOLDIERS 

This organization was created by a Conference held at 
Leeds on June 3, 19 17, with 1,150 delegates, supposed to 
represent between four and five million constituents — trade 
unionists, socialists, cooperators and others. It voted to send 
the following cablegram to the Russian Workmen's and Sol- 
diers' Council: 

" The largest and greatest convention of labor. Socialist, 
and democratic bodies held in Great Britain during this gen- 
eration has to-day endorsed Russia's declaration of foreign 
policy and war aims, and has pledged itself to work through 
a newly constituted Workmen's and Soldiers' Council for 
an immediate democratic peace. The Convention received 
your telegram of congratulation with gratitude and enthu- 
siasm." 

[For an account of the proceedings see the Manchester 
Guardian, June 4, 191 7.] 

PROPOSALS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 

The Workers Organized Against War 

(a) Communications between workers to be maintained in 
war as in peace. 

(b) Negotiations to be instituted at once to end the pres- 
ent war on the following basis : 

The right of all people to decide their own destiny. No 
indemnities, but each belligerent to restore the damage he 
has done, or to compound such reparation by concessions to 
be agreed by negotiation. 

[219] 



Equal access by all peoples to the trade and raw materials 
of the world. 

The government of non-European races in Africa to be re- 
garded as an international trust, with no exclusive advan- 
tages to the sovereign state; such populations not to be 
trained for war or subject to conscription or servile labor. 

All secret treaties, or treaties not ratified by the people, to 
be void. 

Disarmament by International Agreement 

If democracy is to be reality in the future, the competition 
for preponderant military power, which necessarily mili- 
tarizes all the nations taking part in it, must be brought to 
an end. But the attempt on the part of one nation to create 
over vast areas of the world special reserves for its own 
trade and industry or to block therein the access of other 
nations to necessary raw materials, will be certain, sooner or 
later, to be resisted by military means. These conflicts, 
though the workers as a whole never benefit from them, are 
the main . source of modern wars. The price of peace is 
equality of economic opportunity for all nations big and lit- 
tle. If the arming of the black millions of Africa for the 
purpose of fighting the white man's quarrels is permitted, a 
new danger as well as a new horror will be added to civiliza- 
tion. If a people is not fit to share the privileges of the 
British Empire in the shape of self-government it should 
not be asked to share its burdens by fighting its wars. 
Forced fighting, like forced labor, is in such cases, whatever 
it may be elsewhere, undisguised slavery. The only certain 
cure for war is disarmament. If the nations are not loaded 
they will not explode. 

[Printed in the London Herald.'\ 



[220] 




[Courtesy of L'AsJnol 

THE PEACE TREE 

Peace springs from the decay of feudalism, imperial- 
ism, autocrac}^ militarism and nationalism. 



BRITISH LABOR PARTY DRAFT OF A PROGRAM 

FOR LONDON INTER-ALLIED SOCIALIST 

CONFERENCE 

[This program was prepared by the Executive 
Committee of the Labor Party, for consideration by 
the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference in London, Aug. 
28-29, 1917-] 

I. — THE WAR 

The Conference, in the name of the Socialist and Labor 
Parties of the nations now allied against the Governments 
of the Central European Powers, ratifies and reaffirms the 
declaration unanimously agreed to at the Conference of the 
Socialist and Labor Parties of allied nations on February 
14, 1915.1 

II. THE PEACE 

The war, which has become almost world-wide, bringing 
misery and desolation to nearly all nations, has now lasted 
for more than three years. It has already been the occasion 
of one great social revolution in the destruction of Tzardom 
in Russia, on which the Conference most heartily congratu- 
lates the Russian people. It has united, in the defense of 
democracy, the old World and the New; and the Confer- 
ence warmly welcomes the assistance to the cause of human 
freedom, in council no less than on the battlefield, that is 
now being afforded by the American people. So far as the 
Socialist and Labor Parties of the Allied nations are con- 
cerned, it is against the ruthless imperialism of autocratic 
governments that the struggle is being waged. The Con- 
ference now, as on February 14, 191 5, asks the people of 
the several nations, and particularly their Socialist and La- 

1 For these resolutions, see Walling, " The Socialists and the War," 
pp. 424-5. 

[221] 



bor comrades in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Turkey, whether it is not possible for the united action of 
the working classes of the world to bring this monstrous 
conflict to a summary conclusion conformably to the prin- 
ciples of the International. 

III. — THE RUSSIAN DECLARATION 

The Conference cordially welcomes the declaration of the 
Russian Government, in agreement with the Council of 
Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, that the only satisfac- 
tory basis of peace lies in the formula of "no annexations 
and no indemnities; leaving to each people the freedom to 
settle its own destinies." The Conference repeats its de- 
termination to resist any attempt to transform this war into 
a war of conquest, whether what is sought to be forcibly 
acquired is territory or wealth. The only readjustments of 
national boundaries or national citizenship of which the 
Conference can approve are those that may be arrived at by 
common agreement for the purpose of setting the several 
peoples free to settle their own destinies, or of removing 
some plain cause or excuse for another war. The Confer- 
ence equally protests against any perpetuation of the war in 
the expectation of any Government being able to inflict on 
any nation whatever the crushing burden of an indemnity 
by way of punishment for having caused the war. 

IV. — THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 

Of all the war aims, none is so important to the peoples 
of the world as that there should be henceforth on earth no 
more war. Whoever triumphs the world will have lost^ 
unless some effective method of preventing war can be 
found. As a means to this end the Conference relies very 
largely upon the complete democratization of all countries, 
including Germany and Austria-Hungary, which now can- 
not fail to place themselves in line with other civilized na- 
tions; on the frank abandonment of every form of " imperi- 
alism " ; on the suppression of secret diplomacy and the 
placing of foreign policy, just as much as home policy, under 
[222] 



the control of popularly elected legislatures; on the absolute 
responsibility of the Foreign Minister of each country to its 
legislature; on such concerted action as may be possible for 
the common limitation of the costly armaments by which 
all the peoples are burdened, and upon the entire abolition 
of profit-making armament firms, whose pecuniary interest 
lies always in war scares and rivalry in preparation for war. 
But the Conference demands, in addition, that it should be 
an essential condition of the Treaty of Peace itself that 
there should be forthwith established a super-national au- 
thority, or League of Nations, which should not only be 
adhered to by all the present belligerents, but which every 
other independent sovereign State in the world should be 
pressed to join ; the immediate establishment by such League 
of Nations not only of an International High Court for the 
settlement of all disputes between States that are of justici- 
able nature, but also of appropriate machinery for prompt 
and effective mediation between States in issues that are not 
justiciable; the formation of an International Legislature in 
which the representatives of every civilized State would 
have their allotted share; the gradual development, as far 
as may prove to be possible, of International legislation 
agreed to by and definitely binding upon the several States; 
and for a solemn agreement and pledge by all States that 
every issue between any two or more of them shall be sub- 
mitted for settlement as aforesaid, and that they will all 
make common cause against any State which fails to adhere 
to this agreement. 

V. — RESTORATION OF DEVASTATED AREAS 

The Conference holds that one of the most imperative 
duties of all countries immediately peace is declared will 
be the restoration, so far as may be possible, of the homes, 
farms, factories, public buildings, and means of communi- 
cation in France, Belgium, the Tyrol and North Italy, East 
Prussia, Poland, Galicia, Russia, Roumania, and the other 
Balkan States, Armenia, and Asia Minor. Apart from Bel- 
gium, which has already been referred to, the Conference 

[223] 



holds that the restoration of these devastated areas should 
be undertaken at the expense of an International Fund, to 
which all the belligerent Governments should be required to 
contribute in proportions to be agreed upon, having regard 
among other things to their several responsibilities and par- 
ticipation in the damage; that the restoration should not be 
limited to compensation for public buildings, capitalist un- 
dertakings, and material property proved to be destroyed or 
damaged, but should be extended to setting up the wage- 
earners themselves in homes and employment; and that to 
ensure the full and impartial application of these principles 
the assessment and distribution of the compensation, so 
far as the cost is contributed by the International Fund, 
should be made under the direction of an International Com- 



VI. — INQUIRY INTO WRONGDOING 

The Conference welcomes the fact that public feeling 
will not be satisfied unless a full and free judicial investiga- 
tion into the accusation so freely made on all sides that 
particular Governments have ordered, and particular officers 
have exercised, acts of cruelty, oppression, violence, and theft 
against individual victims, for which no justification can be 
found in the ordinary usages of war. The Conference 
draws attention, in particular, to the loss of life and property, 
of merchant seamen and other non-combatants (including 
women and children), resulting from the inhuman and ruth- 
less conduct of the submarine warfare. The Conference 
recommends that it should be part of the conditions of peace 
that there should be forthwith set up a Court of Claims and 
Accusations, which should investigate all such allegations as 
may be brought before it, summon the accused person or 
Government to answer the complaint, to pronounce judg- 
ment, and award compensation or damages, payable by the 
individual or Government condemned, to the persons who 
had suffered wrong, or to their heirs. 



[224] 



VII. BELGIUM 

The Conference once more declares that the foremost 
condition of peace must be the reparation by the German 
Government of the wrong, admittedly done to Belgium ; pay- 
ment for all the damage that has resulted from this wrong; 
and the restoration of Belgium to complete and untrammelled 
independent sovereignty, leaving to the decision of the Bel- 
gian people the determination of their own future policy in 
all respects. 

VIII. — THE BALKANS 

The Conference insists on the restoration to their several 
peoples of the territories of Serbia and Montenegro. It sug- 
gests that the whole problem of the reorganization of the 
administration of the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula might 
be dealt with by a special conference of their representatives, 
or by an authoritative International Commission, on the 
basis of (a) the complete freedom of these people to settle 
their own destinies, irrespective of Austrian, Turkish, or 
other dominion. 

IX — ALSACE AND LORRAINE 

The Conference reaffirms its reprobation of the crime 
against the peace of the world by which Alsace and Lorraine 
were forcibly torn from France in 1871, a political blunder 
the effects of which have contributed in no small degree to 
the continuance of unrest and the growth of militarism iq 
Europe; and the Conference, profoundly sympathizing with 
the unfortunate inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine who 
have been subjected to so much repression, asks that they 
shall be allowed to satisfy their inflexible desire for restora- 
tion to the French Republic. 

X. — ITALY 

The Conference declares its warmest sympathy with the 
people of Italian race and speech who have been left outside 
the inconvenient and indefensible boundaries that have, as a 
result of the diplomatic agreements of the past, been assigned 

[225] 



to the kingdom of Italy, and supports their claim to be 
united with those of their own race and tongue. 

XI. — POLAND, ETC. 

With regard to the other cases in dispute, from Luxem- 
burg on the one hand, of which the independence has been 
temporarily destroyed, to the lands now under foreign domi- 
nation inhabited by other races — the outstanding example 
being that of the Poles — the Conference relies as the only 
way of achieving a lasting settlement on the application of 
the principle of allowing each people to settle its own des- 
tiny. 

XII. THE JEWS AND PALESTINE 

The Conference demands for the Jews of all countries 
the same elementary rights of tolerance, freedom of residence 
and trade, and equal citizenship that ought to be extended to 
all the inhabitants of every nation. But the Conference 
further expresses the hope that it may be practicable by 
agreement among all the nations to set free Palestine from 
the harsh and oppressive government of the Turk, in order 
that this country may form a free State under international 
guarantee, to which such of the Jewish people as desire to do 
so may return, and may work out their own salvation free 
from interference by those of alien race or religion. 

XIII. PROBLEM OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE 

The Conference realizes that the whole civilized world 
condemns the handing back to the universally execrated rule 
of the Turkish Government any subject people which has 
once been freed from it. Thus, whatever may be proposed 
with regard to Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, they 
cannot be restored to the tyranny of the Sultan and his 
Pashas. The Conference disclaims all sympathy with the 
Imperialist aims of Governments and capitalists, who would 
make of these and other territories now dominated by the 
Turkish hordes merely instruments either of exploitation or 
militarism. If in these territories it is impracticable to leave 
[226] 



it to the peoples to settle their own destinies the Conference 
suggests that they should be dealt with in the same way as 
the Colonies of Tropical Africa, and placed for administra- 
tion in the hands of a Commission acting under the Super- 
national Authority or League of Nations, The Conference 
further suggests that the peace of the world requires that 
Constantinople should be made a free port, permanently 
neutralized and placed (together with both shores of the 
Dardanelles and possibly some or all of Asia Minor) under 
the same impartial administration. 

XIV. COLONIES OF TROPICAL AFRICA 

With regard to the Colonies of the several belligerents in 
Tropical Africa, from sea to sea (north of the Zambesi 
River and south of the Sahara Desert), the Conference dis- 
claims all sympathy with the Imperialist idea that these 
should form the booty of any nation, should be exploited for 
the profit of the capitalist, or used for the promotion of the 
militarist aims of Governments. In view of the fact that it 
is impracticable here to leave the various peoples concerned 
to settle their own destinies, the Conference suggests that the 
interests of humanity would be best served by the full and 
frank abandonment by all the belligerents of any dreams of 
an African Empire; the transfer of all the present Colonies 
of the European Powers in Tropical Africa, together with 
the nominally independent Republic of Liberia, to the pro- 
posed Supernational Authority or League of Nations herein 
suggested; and their administration by an impartial Com- 
mission under that authority, with its own trained staff, as a 
single independent African State, on the principles of (i) 
the open door and equal freedom of enterprise to the traders 
of all nations; (2) Protection of the natives against ex- 
ploitation and oppression and the preservation of their tribal 
interests; (3) all revenue raised to be expended for the 
welfare and development of the African State itself; and (4) 
the permanent neutralization of this African State and its 
abstention from participation in international rivalries or any 
future wars. 

[227] 



XV. — SUPPLIES AFTER THE WAR 

That, in view of the probable world-wide shortage, after 
the war, of exportable foodstuffs and raw materials, and of 
merchant shipping, it is imperative, in order to prevent the 
most serious hardships, and even possible famine, in one 
country or another, that systematic arrangements should be 
made on an international basis for the allocation and con- 
veyance of the available exportable surpluses of these com- 
modities to the different countries in proportion, not to their 
purchasing powers, but to their several pressing needs; and 
that, within each country, the Government must for some 
time maintain its control of the most indispensable commodi- 
ties. 

XVT. — PREVENTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT 

The Conference cannot but anticipate that, in all countries 
without exception, the dislocation of industry attendant on 
peace, the instant discharge of millions of munition makers 
and workers in war trades, and the demobilization of mil- 
lions of soldiers — in face of the scarcity of industrial capital 
and the insecurity of commercial enterprise — will, unless 
prompt and energetic action be taken by the several Gov- 
ernments, plunge a large part of the wage-earning popula- 
tion into all the miseries of unemployment more or less pro- 
longed. In view of the fact that widespread unemploy- 
ment in any country, like a famine, is an injury not to that 
country alone, but impoverishes also the rest of the world, 
the Conference holds that it is the duty of every Government 
to take immediate action, not merely to relieve the unem- 
ployed, when unemployment has set in, but actually, so far 
as may be practicable, to prevent the occurrence of unem- 
ployment. The Conference, therefore, urges upon the So- 
cialist and Labor Parties of every country the necessity of 
their pressing upon their Governments the preparation of 
plans for the execution of all the innumerable public works 
(such as the making and repairing of roads and railways, the 
erection of schools and public buildings, the provision of 
working-class dwellings, and the reclamation and afforesta- 
[228] 



tion of land) that will be required in the near future, not 
for the sake of finding measures of relief for the unemploj^ed, 
but with a view to these works being undertaken at such a 
rate in each locality as will suffice, together with the various 
capitalist enterprises that may be in progress, to maintain at 
a fairly uniform level year by year, and throughout each 
year, the aggregate demand for labor, and thus prevent there 
being any unemployment. 

XVII. — ECONOMIC RELATIONS 

The Conference declares against all the projects now be- 
ing prepared by Imperialists and capitalists, not in any one 
country only, but in practically all countries, for an economic 
war after peace has been secured, either against one or other 
foreign nation or against all foreign nations. Such an eco- 
nomic war, if begun by any country, would inevitably lead to 
reprisals, to which each nation in turn might in self-defense 
be driven. The Conference realizes that all such attempts 
at economic aggression, whether by protective tariffs or cap- 
italist trusts or monopolies, inevitably result in the spoliation 
of the working classes of the several countries for the profit 
of the capitalists; and the Conference sees in the alliance 
between the Military Imperialists and the Fiscal Protection- 
ists in any country whatsoever not only a serious danger to 
the prosperity of the masses of the people, but also a grave 
menace to peace. On the other hand, the right of each na- 
tion to the defense of its own economic interests cannot be 
denied. The Conference accordingly urges upon the Social- 
ist and Labor Parties of all countries the importance of 
insisting, in the attitude of the Government towards com- 
mercial enterprise, on the principle of the open door, on 
Customs duties being limited strictly to revenue purposes, 
and on there being no hostile discrimination against foreign 
countries. But the Conference urges equally the importance 
of the utmost possible development by appropriate Govern- 
ment action of the resources of every country for the benefit 
not only of its own people, but also of the world, and the 
need for an international agreement for the enforcement in 

[229] 



all countries of the legislation on factory conditions, hours of 
labor, and the prevention of " sweating " and unhealthy 
trades necessary to protect the workers against exploitation 
and oppression. 

XVIII. — THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL 

The Conference declares that the proposals made for the 
security of peace in this memorandum will be made more 
secure if the Socialist International is reconstituted. 

XIX. — THE BASIS OF AGREEMENT 

The Conference holds that agreement among the warring 
Governments can be secured only by a free and frank dis- 
cussion of each other's claims and desires. 

[From the London Times, August lO, 1917]. 



[230] 



THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL OF AMERICA 

[The People's Council of America for Democracy 
and Terms of Peace grew out of a series of Confer- 
ences held in New York the end of May, 191 7, and 
was formally organized in Chicago, Sept. 1st and 2nd. 
Its objects are] 

II. OBJECTS 

To strive for a speedy democratic and general peace based 
upon the principles of 

No forcible annexations, 

No punitive indemnities. 

Free development of all nationalities and an interna- 
tional organization for the maintenance of world peace, in- 
cluding disarmament. 

To defend our constitutional rights of free speech, free 
press, peaceful assemblage and the right to petition the gov- 
ernment and to secure democratic control of foreign policies 
and a popular referendum of all questions of war and peace, 
and to work for the repeal of the conscription laws. 

To uphold the civil and political rights of the workers, to 
prevent deterioration of their economic standards and the 
suspension or abrogation of labor laws ; to demand that none 
of the revenue required for the prosecution of the war shall 
come from the taxation of the necessities of life. 

Report on Peace Terms 

The People's Council of America for Democracy and 
Terms of Peace at its constituent assembly reaffirms the dec- 
laration of its organizing committee in favor of a speedy, 
universal and durable peace, to be brought about by inter- 
national agreement, not by the crushing of either group of 

[231] 



warring powers, and to rest on these democratic primary 
bases: No forcible annexations, no punitive indemnities, 
freedom of development for all peoples. 

Such a peace cannot be secured by secret negotiations 
carried on over the heads of the peoples or behind their 
backs. It must rest upon the people's will, freely expressed 
in all countries. It will be brought about by the victory of 
the great popular movements which are to-day gaining 
strength in France and Germany, in Britain and Russia, in 
Italy and in the United States. 

The more clearly it is demonstrated in this country that 
the American people desire a peace without conquest, with- 
out tribute, without imperialistic aggrandizement, the sooner 
will the reactionary rulers of Germany be compelled to yield 
to the powerful and growing movement in Germany in favor 
of such a peace. 

A peace without forcible annexations does not necessarily 
mean the perpetuation of political boundaries just as they 
existed before the war. It does mean that the war map 
cannot be made the basis of readjustment. We repudiate 
the so-called right of conquest. We declare that no people 
should be transferred from one sovereignty to another with- 
out their own consent or against their will. 

A peace without punitive indemnities does not exclude re- 
payment of contributions levied during the war or restoration 
of the ravaged lands, so far as the restoration is possible. 
There is not one of the peoples that would go on fighting 
another day if this were the question at issue. But we 
condemn every project, whether on the one side or the other, 
for the enrichment of one set of nations at the expense of 
the other, whether by the taking of money tribute or the 
annexation of colonies. 

A peace consistent with freedom of development for all 
nationalities does not necessarily mean the multiplication of 
politically independent states. The questions of independ- 
ence or autonomy, of centralized or decentralized admin- 
istrations, are questions which can in any case be justly and 
lastingly decided only by the will of the peoples concerned. 

[232] 



The peace we aim at is not a mere cessation of hostilities, 
but a removal of the great causes of the war. For that 
end we declare for: 

1. Simultaneous, progressive disarmament, leading to the 
complete abandonment of national armies and navies. 

2. Agreement for the arbitration or adjudication of all 
disputes among nations. 

3. International agreement for equality of civil and 
political rights for the various racial and national minorities 
in all countries. 

4. Abandonment of the imperialistic policies hitherto pur- 
sued in greater or less degree by all the great nations, in 
rivalry with one another, for the monopolistic control of the 
seas and waterways, of foreign markets, of sources of food 
stuffs and raw materials, and of opportunities for the ex- 
ploitation of backward peoples. 

Conscious that we express the will and desire of the great 
mass of the American people, we join with growing millions 
in every country of the world in urging the immediate call- 
ing of a general peace conference, including representatives of 
the peoples as well as of the governments. 

Resolution on International Peace Conference 

Whereas the President of the United States has declared 
himself against the achievement of a military victory over 
the German people, and in his reply to the Pope has refused 
to agree to any arrangement by the Allied governments for 
a trade war to follow the close of hostilities, and whereas 
the German Social Democracy has expressed its approval of 
the President's statement and has declared its determination 
to work for the further democratization of Germany and 
the reconstruction of the world in harmony with the pro- 
gram of the organized democracies of Russia, England, 
France and America, thus removing the last obstacle to the 
assembly of the peace conference of the representatives of 
all governments involved in the war, therefore, be it 

Resolved, that the People's Council of America call upon 
the President of the United States to encourage congresses 

[233] 



of peoples' representatives to meet and formulate their opin- 
ions, and be it further resolved, that we demand that the 
President immediately take the initiative in calling a con- 
ference to settle by negotiation the issues presented by the 
war, and that we demand the cessation of hostilities while 
armistice be arranged. 

[Bulletin of the People's Council of America, Vol. 
I, No. 6, Sept. 25, 1917.] 



[234] 



RESOLUTIONS OF THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 
FOR LABOR AND DEMOCRACY 

[The American Alliance for Labor and Democracy 
met at Minneapolis, Sept. 6. It was presided over by 
Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federa- 
tion of Labor. Resolutions were unanimously 
adopted condemning the efforts of pacifists. The 
war aims of the United States were presented in the 
following resolutions, unanimously adopted.] 

Since the United States entered the war the President has 
upon three notable occasions clearly and explicitly set forth 
the American aim, the objects which must be attained by any 
peace to which the United States can agree. We refer, espe- 
cially to the war message of April 2, 19 17, the note to Russia 
on May 26, and the reply to his Holiness the Pope, dated 
Aug. 27, 191 7. The war objects stated by the President 
in these historic documents were as follows: 

1. Recognition of the rights and liberties of small na- 
tions. 

2. Recognition of the principle that government derives its 
just power from the consent of the governed. 

3. Reparation for wrongs done and the erection of ade- 
quate safeguards to prevent their being committed again. 

4. No indemnities except as payment for manifest wrongs. 

5. No people to be forced under sovereignty under which 
it does not wish to live. 

6. No territory to change hands except for the purpose of 
securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. 

7. No readjustments of power except such as will tend 
to secure the future peace of the world and the future wel- 
fare and happiness of its people. 

[235] 



8. A genuine and practical cooperation of the free peoples 
of the world in some common covenant that will combine 
their forces to secure peace and justice in the dealings of 
nations with one another. 

We, the men and women of the trade union and Socialist 
movements of America, organized into the American Alliance 
for Labor and Democracy, in submitting this record to our 
fellow-citizens, assert that in all history no Government has 
ever stated its aims on entering a war, or while such war was 
being fought, with anything approaching the definiteness, 
clarity, and candor revealed by these utterances. We as- 
sert, moreover, that in all essential particulars the aims thus 
set forth are entirely consistent with the great ideals of 
democracy and internationalism, for which the American 
labor movement has always stood and which are fundamental 
to its being. 

We rejoice at the fact that we are thus solemnly com- 
mitted to the principle of the complete autonomy and inde- 
pendence of nations. Only upon the basis of this generous 
nationalism can anything like a great and worthy interna- 
tionalism be established. We rejoice, too, that this nation 
is thus solemnly pledged not only to refrain from attempting 
to extend its own dominion over any other nation or people, 
but to use its great influence to the end that no nation shall 
" attempt to extend its policy over any other nation or peo- 
ple." 

We approve unreservedly the distinction drawn by the 
President between the German people and their Government, 
and we believe that by insisting that peace cannot be made 
with the Hohenzollern dynasty, but only with a democrat- 
ized Germany, the President of the United States has, as 
befits his great station, rendered noble service to the cause of 
international democracy. 

[From the New York Times Current History, 
October, 1917.] 



[236] 



NATIONAL NONPARTISAN LEAGUE: 
RESOLUTIONS ON THE WAR 

[The Nonpartisan League is the organization of 
political and economic radical democracy in the 
Northwest. Adopted in convention, Sept. 19, 191 7.] 

Our country being involved in a world war, it is fitting 
that the National Nonpartisan League, while expressing its 
loyalty and willingness to support the government in its 
every necessity, should declare the principles and purposes 
which we as citizens of the United States believe should 
guide our nation in the conduct of the war. 

Whatever ideas we as individuals may have had, as to the 
wisdom of our nation engaging in this war, we realize that 
a crisis now confronts us in which it becomes necessary that 
we all stand unreservedly pledged to safeguard, defend and 
preserve our country. 

In making this declaration of our position, we declare 
unequivocally that we stand for our country, right or wrong, 
as against foreign governments with whom we are actually 
engaged in war. Still we hold that when we believe our 
country wrong, we should endeavor to set her right. 

The only justification for war is to establish and maintain 
human rights and interests the world over. For this reason 
we are opposed to waging war for annexation, either on our 
part or that of our allies, or demanding indemnity as terms 
of peace. Bitter experience has proved that any exactions, 
whether of land or revenue, serve only to deepen resentments 
and hatreds which inevitably incite to future wars. 

We therefore urge that our government, before proceed- 
ing further in support of our European allies, insist that 
they, in common with it, make immediate public declaration 

[237] 



of terms of peace, without annexations of territory, indemni- 
ties, contributions, or interference with the right of any 
nation to live and manage its own internal affairs, thus being 
in harmony with and supporting the new democracy of Rus- 
sia in her declaration of these fundamental principles. 

We demand of no nation any concession which should be 
hid from the world. We concede to no nation any right 
of which we are ashamed. Therefore we demand the abo- 
lition of secret diplomacy. The secret agreements of kings, 
presidents and other rulers, made, broken or kept, without 
the knowledge of the people, constitute a continual menace 
to peaceful relations. 

We demand that the guarantees of human conservation 
be recognized, and the standard of living be maintained. 
To this end we demand that gambling in the necessaries of 
life be made a felony, and that the federal government con- 
trol the food supply of the nation, and establish prices for 
producer and consumer. 

As a direct result of the war, private corporations in our 
country have reaped unparalleled profits. The net earnings 
of the United States Steel Corporation for 1916 were $271,- 
531)730, as against $23,496,867 in 1914, an increase of 
$248,034,962. 

The Du Pont Powder Company shows a similar record. 
Its net earnings for 1916 were $82,107,693, as against 
$4,831,793 in 1914, an increase of $77,275,900. 

We are unalterably opposed to permitting stockholders of 
private corporations to pocket these enormous profits, while 
at the same time a species of coercion is encouraged toward 
already poorly paid employees of both sexes, in urging them 
to purchase government bonds to help finance the war. 
Patriotism demands service from all according to their ca- 
pacity. To conscript men and exempt the blood-stained 
wealth coined from the sufferings of humanity is repugnant 
to the spirit of America and contrary to the ideals of de- 
mocracy. 

We declare freedom of speech to be the bulwark of human 
liberty, and we decry all attempts to muzzle the public press 

[238] 



or individuals, upon any pretext whatsoever. A declaration 
of war does not repeal the Constitution of the United States, 
and the unwarranted interference of military and other au- 
thorities with the rights of individuals must cease. 

The contributory causes of the present war are various; 
but above the horrible slaughter loom the ugly incitings of 
an economic system based upon exploitation. It is largely 
a convulsive effort on the part of the adroit rulers of warring 
nations for control of a constantly diminishing market. 
Rival groups of monopolists are playing a deadly game for 
commercial supremacy. 

At the close of this war sound international standards 
must be established on the basis of a true democracy. Our 
economic organizations must be completely purged of privi- 
lege. Private monopolies must be supplanted by public ad- 
ministration of credit, finance and natural resources. The 
rule of jobbers and speculators must be overthrown if we are 
to produce a real democracy; otherwise this war will have 
been fought in vain. 

Only in this spirit do we justify war, and only thus can 
lasting peace be established. 



[239] 



PEACE TERMS PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIAN 

COUNCIL OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' 

DELEGATES FOR THE INTER-ALLIED 

CONFERENCE 

[The Russian peace program, as drawn up by the 
central executive committee of the Council of Work- 
men's and Soldiers' Delegates in the form of instruc- 
tions to M. Skobeleff, ex-Minister of Labor, as its 
delegate to the forthcoming Paris Conference.] 

1. Evacuation by the Germans of Russia and autonomy 
of Poland, Lithuania and the Lettish provinces. 

2. Autonomy of Turkish Armenia. 

3. Solution of the Alsace-Lorraine question by a plebiscite, 
the voting being arranged by local civil authorities after the 
removal of all the troops of both belligerents. 

4. Restoration to Belgium of her ancient frontiers and 
compensation for her losses from an international fund. 

5. Restoration of Serbia and Montenegro with similar 
compensation, Serbia to have access to the Adriatic, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to be autonomous. 

6. Disputed Balkan districts to receive provisional auton- 
omy, followed by a plebiscite. 

7. Rumania to be restored her old frontiers on condition 
that she grant D'obrudja autonomy and grant equal rights 
to Jews. 

8. Autonomy for the Italian provinces of Austria, to be 
followed by a plebiscite. 

9. Restitution of all colonies to Germany. 

10. Reestablishment of Greece and Persia. 

11. Neutralization of all straits leading to inner seas and 
also the Suez and Panama canals. Freedom of navigation 

[240] 




Photo by Press Illustrating Service 

SKOBELEFF 
Minister of Labor Under Kerensky 



for merchant ships. Abolition of the right to torpedo mer- 
chant ships in wartime. 

12. All belligerents to renounce war contributions or in- 
demnities in any form, but the money spent on the main- 
tenance of prisoners and all contributions levied during the 
war to be returned. 

13. Commercial treaties not to be based on the peace 
treaty. Each country may act independently with respect 
to its commercial policy, but all Countries to engage to re- 
nounce an economic blockade after the war. 

14. The conditions of peace should be settled by a peace 
congress, consisting of delegates elected by the people and 
confirmed by Parliament. Diplomatists must engage not to 
conclude secret treaties, which hereby are declared contrary 
to the rights of the people and consequently void. 

15. Gradual disarmament by land and sea and the estab- 
lishment of a non-military system. 

The instructions to M. Skobeleff end by recommending 
him to seek to remove all obstacles to the meeting of the 
Stockholm Conference and to secure the granting of pass- 
ports. 

[N. Y. Tribune. Oct. 22, 1917.] 



[241] 



PEACE PROGRAMS 

THE " MINIMUM PROGRAM " OF THE 

CENTRAL ORGANIZATION FOR A 

DURABLE PEACE 

[This program was agreed upon at an international 
gathering held at The Hague from the seventh to 
the tenth of April, 19 15. The meeting was arranged 
by the " Dutch Anti-War Council " (or Anti-Oorlog 
Raad). The United States of America, Austria, Bel- 
gium, Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Hungary, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland were represented 
and letters of sympathy were received from Denmark, 
France, Italy, Russia and Spain. 

The object of the meeting was not to suggest steps 
to bring the war to an end, but to consider by what 
principles the future peace of the world could be 
best guaranteed. After full discussion the program 
was unanimously adopted. A series of very valuable 
studies by international committees of experts, dealing 
in detail with the problems unsolved in this program 
have been published in two volumes under the title 
Recueil de Rapports sur les Differents Points du 
Programme Minimum. 

Nijhoff. The Hague, 1916. 

See also Bourne, " Towards Enduring Peace."] 

1. No annexation or transfer of territory shall be made 
contrary to the interests and wishes of the population con- 
cerned. Where possible their consent shall be obtained by 
plebiscite or otherwise. 

2. The States shall guarantee to the various nationalities, 
included in their boundaries, equality before the law, re- 
ligious liberty and the free use of their native languages. 

[242] 



3- The States shall agree to introduce in their colonies, 
protectorates and spheres of influence, liberty of commerce, 
or at least equal treatment for all nations. 

4. The work of the Hague Conferences with a view to 
the peaceful organization of the Society of Nations shall be 
developed. 

The Hague Conference shall be given a permanent or- 
ganization and meet at regular intervals. 

5. The States shall agree to submit all their disputes to 
peaceful settlement. For this purpose there shall be cre- 
ated, in addition to the existent Hague Court of Arbitra- 
tion (a) a permanent Court of International Justice; (b) a 
permanent International Council of Investigation and Con- 
ciliation. 

6. The States shall bind themselves to take concerted 
action, diplomatic, economic or military, in case any State 
should resort to military measures instead of submitting the 
dispute to judicial decision or to the mediation of the Council 
of Investigation and Conciliation. 

7. The States shall agree to reduce their armaments. 

o. In order to facilitate the reduction of naval armaments, 
the right of capture shall be abolished and the freedom of 
the seas assured. 

9. Foreign policy shall be under the effective control of 
the Parliaments of the respective nations. 

Secret treaties shall be void. 



[243] 



PROPOSAL FROM THE NEUTRAL CONFER- 
ENCE FOR CONTINUOUS MEDIATION, 
STOCKHOLM 

[This was the statement issued by the International 
Conference organized on the initiative of Mr. Henry 
Ford. Easter, 191 6.] 

To the Governments, Parliaments and Peoples of the War- 
ring Nations: 

A conference composed of delegates from six neutral coun- 
tries — Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United States — has been convened at Stockholm 
upon the initiative of Henry Ford to work for the achieve- 
ment of an early and lasting peace, based upon principles of 
justice and humanity. This conference represents no gov- 
ernment. It has no ofKcial sanction. It represents the good 
will of millions throughout the civilized world who cannot 
stand idly by while the deadly combat rages unchecked. It 
does not attempt to impose its judgment upon the belliger- 
ents, but its members, as private individuals, unhampered by 
considerations which restrain governments, have resolved to 
do everything within their power to promote such discussion 
as may tend to bring the belligerents together on just and 
reasonable terms. 

Through a thousand channels utterances • have already 
reached the conference pleading that a long continuance of 
the struggle will mean ruin for all, but as both sides believe 
that only complete victory can decide the issue, ever new 
sacrifices of blood and treasure are made, exhausting the 
present and impoverishing the future. Still, we are con- 
vinced that an agreement between the warring nations might 
even now be reached were certain universal principles to be 

[244] 



accepted as a basis of discussion; principles which cannot be 
violated with impunity, whatever the military results of 
the war. 

The first duty of a neutral conference, then, is to call at- 
tention to those universal principles and concrete proposals 
upon which agreement seems possible, and upon which there 
may be founded a peace that will not only satisfy the legiti- 
mate demands of the warring nations themselves, but also 
advance the welfare of humanity at large. The neutral 
conference does not propose to discuss all the issues at stake. 
Nor does it desire to set forth a plan for the construction of 
a perfect world. But it emphasizes the universal demand 
that peace, when it comes, shall be real, insuring mankind 
against the recurrence of a world war. Humanity demands 
a lasting peace. 

In presenting this appeal to governments, parliaments and 
peoples for discussion and comment the neutral conference 
hopes that no formal objection may prevent its sympathetic 
consideration both by those in authority and by the people 
whom they represent. 

(A) Right of Nations to Decide Their Own Fate. — His- 
tory demonstrates that dispositions contrary to the wishes 
of the peoples concerned bring with them the danger of 
future wars of liberation. Hence the acceptance of these 
principles appears generally to be regarded as an essential 
prerequisite to the satisfactory settlement of this war; namely, 
that no transfer of territory should take place without the 
consent of the population involved, and that nations should 
have the right to decide their own fate. 

It follows that the restoration of Belgium must first be 
agreed upon before there can be an understanding between 
the belligerent powers. Furthermore, the occupied French 
territory should be returned. A reconsideration of the diffi- 
cult Alsace-Lorraine question is also an absolute necessity. 
The independence of Serbia and Montenegro should be 
assured. 

In its wider interpretation, the principle of the right of 
nations to decide their own fate postulates the solution of a 

[245] 



problem like the Polish question by guaranteeing the union 
of the Polish nation as an independent people. Further ap- 
plications would be the adjustment of the frontiers between 
Austria and Italy, as far as possible, according to the princi- 
ple of nationality; autonomy for Armenia under interna- 
tional guarantee, and the solution of various national ques- 
tions in the Balkans and in Asiatic Turkey by international 
agreement. 

(B) Economic Guarantees. — Economic competition is 
generally admitted to be one of the causes of the present war. 
Hence the demand becomes more and more insistent that 
the economic activity of all peoples should be afforded de- 
velopment on equal terms. The recognition of the principle 
of the open door in the colonies, protectorates, and spheres 
of influence would be an important step in this direction, as 
would also the internationalization of certain waterways, 
e.g., the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The German colo- 
nies ought to be returned, the exchange of colonies made pos- 
sible by satisfactory compensation, and Germany's access to 
the Near East guaranteed. 

(C) Freedom of the Seas. — The principle of the freedom 
of the seas should be recognized. 

(D) Parliamentary Control of Foreign Policy. — Effec- 
tive parliamentary control of foreign policy should be estab- 
lished, so that secret treaties and secret diplomacy may no 
longer endanger the most vital interests of the nation. 

(£) International Organization. — Far more important, 
however, for the welfare of humanity than the solutions thus 
far suggested is the creation of an international organization, 
founded upon law and justice, which would include an 
agreement to submit all disputes between States for peaceful 
settlement. Hence the almost universal opinion that in the 
coming treaty of peace the principle of such an international 
order of justice must be accepted. 

(F) Disarmament. — Equally important with the insist- 
ence upon an international organization is the demand that 
disarmament be brought about by international agreement. 

(G) A World Congress. — In order to bring about the 

[246] 



creation of an international order of justice it will be neces- 
sary to secure the adherence thereto of both belligerents and 
neutrals. The difficulties that result from the present catas- 
trophe do not affect the warring nations alone. They aflfect 
the whole world. In their settlement the whole world 
should participate. A world congress should therefore be 
called together. Such a congress should concern itself with 
more than the immediate questions arising out of this war. 
Problems like that of guaranteeing political and spiritual 
freedom to special nationalities united with other peoples, 
though not direct issues of this war, are nevertheless of vital 
importance to the future maintenance of peace. 

In the foregoing an attempt has been made to suggest a 
possible approach to the task of uniting again the interna- 
tional bonds that have been torn asunder in this fratricide 
war. Whatever may be the ultimate solution, there is abun- 
dant evidence of the growing conviction among belligerents 
and neutrals alike that the hope of the world lies in the sub- 
stitution of law and order for international anarchy. The 
neutral conference, therefore, feels justified in hoping that 
the end of this war will witness the institution of an inter- 
national order of justice which shall make possible an en- 
during peace for all mankind. 

Easter, 191 6. 



[247] 



PROGRAM PREPARED BY THE AMERICAN 

SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 

COMMITTEE OF WOMEN FOR 

PERMANENT PEACE 

[For presentation to the proposed after-the-war 
Congress of the International Committee of Women 
for Permanent Peace.] 

National Problems 

1. Democratic control of foreign policies through Parlia- 
ments elected by men and women . . . such policies to be 
based upon the recognition of moral obligation toward other 
states and the intention to advance the welfare of all peoples. 

2. Proposal that only civilian delegates shall have the 
voting Power at the Third Peace Conference at The Hague, 
the military delegates to have merely advisory functions. 
In general, members of legislative bodies, administrative offi- 
cials, and non-official persons, as well as diplomats, to be se- 
lected. Women not to be debarred from this Conference 
nor from the Permanent International Conference (which it 
is hoped will be provided for by the Third Peace Confer- 
ence). 

3. Social, moral and political pressure by citizens on their 
own government for the attainment of specific measures dis- 
cussed at the Congress of Women after the War. 

4. All possible efforts to hasten the passing of animosities. 
Courses in schools and colleges on positive international 
ethics, on the principles of world organization including the 
relation of tariff barriers to the realization of world peace. 

5. A persistent effort to extend the principles of democracy 
to all the departments of the government and especially, as 
far as possible, to secure a change in the fundamental law, 

[248] 



requiring a national plebiscite or referendum before declara- 
tion of war, or of a state of war, except in case of actual 
or imminent invasion of territory. 

International Problems 

I. What the Peace Settlement Conference should provide 
for: 

( 1 ) A declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations. 

(2) That no transference of territorj^ shall take place 

without the consent of its men and women, nor 
autonomy and a democratic government be refused 
to any people. 

(3) A Concert or League of Nations open to all States. 

(4) A drastic reduction of rival armies and navies, look- 

ing toward disarmament. 

(5) International protection for unorganized regions, 

such as the African dependencies. 

(6) New international adjustments giving adequate out- 

lets or establishing changes of jurisdiction in the 
interests of justice, peace and of economic oppor- 
tunity for all nations. 

( 7 ) The international control of seas and of international 

waterways. 

II. What the Third Peace Conference at The Hague 
should provide for. (It is hoped that this conference will 
be convened at an early date after the Peace Settlement Con- 
ference. ) 

( 1 ) A reconstruction of international law, based on the 

Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations. 

(2) The continued stability of the Permanent Court of 

Arbitration. 

(3) A world Court of Justice (in addition to the Perma- 

nent Court of Arbitration, provided for in 1899), 
with jurisdiction over international disputes, not 
settled by negotiation, that are justiciable in char- 
acter. 

[249] 



(4) A permanent International Council of Conciliation 

which shall not only examine specific cases of fric- 
tion but shall study and report on existing situ- 
ations and policies leading to war and shall recom- 
mend methods that might prevent war. 

(5) A Permanent International Conference, meeting 

regularly every two or three years, which shall 
formulate rules of international law to govern in 
the decisions of the World Court. 

(6) A Permanent Continuation Committee of the Con- 

ference to carry out the provisions of the Interna- 
tional Conference, to study international relation- 
ships and to prepare the programs for the Interna- 
tional Conference. 

(7) Permanent International Administrative Commis- 

sions on matters of common international interest 
(such, for example, as the protection of unorgan- 
ized regions, as referred to above, public health, 
waterways, immigration and emigration and pro- 
tection of expatriated nationals, international 
finance and trade). 

III. Educational Foundations. 

An exposition by an international committee of the appli- 
cation of the universally recognized moral code to relation- 
ships among states and between citizens of different states. 
Such a code to be especially prepared for use in schools. 



[250] 



THE LEAGUE OE NATIONS SOCIETY 

[The League of Nations Society (i Central Buildings, 
Westminster), was founded March lo, 1915. The chair- 
man is the Rt. Hon. W. H. Dickinson, M.P.] 

PROGRAM 

1. That a Treat}' shall be made as soon as possible 
whereby as many States as are willing shall form a League 
binding themselves to use peaceful methods for dealing with 
all disputes arising among them. 

2. That such methods shall be as follows : 

(a) All disputes arising out of questions of International 

Law or the interpretation of Treaties shall be re- 
ferred to the Hague Court of Arbitration, or some 
other judicial tribunal, whose decisions shall be 
final and shall be carried into effect by the parties 
concerned. 

(b) All other disputes shall be referred to and investi- 

gated and reported upon by a Council of Inquiry 
and Conciliation, the Council to be representative 
of the States which form the League. 

3. That the States which are members of the League shall 
unite in any action necessary for insuring that every member 
shall abide by the terms of the Treaty. 

4. That the States which are members of the League shall 
make provision for mutual defense, diplomatic, economic, or 
military, in the event of any of them being attacked by a 
State, not a member of the League, which refuses to submit 
the case to an appropriate Tribunal or Council. 

5. That any civilized State desiring to join the League 
shall be admitted to membership. 

[251] 



LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 

[On June 17, 191 5, on the call of one hundred 
and twenty of the most influential and representative 
men from all sections of the country about four hun- 
dred met in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, and 
organized this League whose reason-for-existence is 
to " adopt a program of action to follow the present 
war which would look towards the possible preven- 
tion of future wars." 

Ex-President Taft has served as President of the 
League and President A. Lawrence Lowell of Har- 
vard as President of the Executive Committee from 
the beginning.] 

PROPOSALS 

We believe it to be desirable for the United States to join 
a league of nations binding the signatories to the following: 

First: All justiciable questions arising between the sig- 
natory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to 
the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal 
for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon 
any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question. 

Second: All other questions arising between the signa- 
tories, and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a 
council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recom- 
mendation. 

Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith 
both their economic and military forces against any one of 
their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, 
against another of the signatories before any question arising 
shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing. 

The following interpretation of Article 3 has been au- 
thorized by the Executive Committee: 

" The signatory powers shall jointly use, forthwith, their 
[252] 




Photo by International Film Service 



J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, M.P. 



economic forces against any of their number that refuses to 
submit any question which arises to an international judicial 
tribunal or council of conciliation before issuing an ulti- 
matum or threatening war. They shall follow this by the 
joint use of their military forces against that nation if it 
actually proceeds to make war or invades another's territory." 
Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall 
be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of 
international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify 
its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in 
the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article 
One. 



[253] 



CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE 

UNITED STATES: 

REFERENDUM ON PEACE 

[In November, 1915, the Board of Directors of 
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
(which has a membership of 350,000), sent out a 
referendum on the subject of the several proposals 
of the League to Enforce Peace. (See above.)] 

I. The Committee recommends action to secure confer- 
ences among neutral countries, on the initiative of the United 
States, for the purpose of defining and enunciating rules 
which will at all times give due protection to life and prop- 
erty upon the high seas. 

II. The Committee recommends that for the decision of 
questions which arise between nations and which can be re- 
solved upon the application of established rules or upon a 
determination of facts the United States should take the 
initiative in joining with other nations in establishing an 
International Court. 

III. The Committee recommends that for consideration 
of questions which arise between nations and which do not 
depend upon established rules or upon facts which can be 
determined by an International Court the United States 
should take the initiative in joining with other nations in 
establishing a Council of Conciliation. 

IV. The Committee recommends that the United States 
should take the initiative in joining with other nations in 
agreeing to bring concerted economic pressure to bear upon 
any nation or nations which resort to military measures with- 
out submitting their differences to an International Court or 
a Council of Conciliation, and awaiting the decision of the 

[254] 



Court or the recommendation of the Council, as circum- 
stances make the more appropriate. 

V. The Committee recommends that the United States 
take the initiative in joining with other countries in agreeing 
to use concerted mihtary force in the event that concerted 
economic pressure exercised by the signatory nations is not 
sufficient to compel nations which have proceeded to war to 
desist from military operations and submit the questions at 
issue to an International Court or a Council of Conciliation, 
as circumstances make the more appropriate. 

VI. The Committee recommends that the United States 
should take the initiative in establishing the principle of 
frequent international conferences at expressly stated inter- 
vals for the progressive amendment of international law. 

[In response, over 96 per cent, of the vote was in 
favor of the proposition that the United States take 
the initiative in securing periodic international con- 
ferences for the purpose of codifying international 
law to meet new and changed conditions. A major- 
ity of more than two-thirds voted to approve of the 
proposition that this country take the initiative in 
forming a league of nations under a treaty agreeing 
to submit justiciable questions arising between any 
of its members to an international court, and non- 
justiciable questions to a council of conciliation for 
their respective decision or recommendation, before 
resorting to war. The vote in favor of the third 
proposal of the League amounted to a very consider- 
able majority of the total membership, though a little 
short of the two-thirds necessary for official endorse- 
ment.] 

[See Goldsmith, " A League to Enforce Peace," 
pp. 292-3.] 



12551 



SOCIETY TO ELIMINATE THE ECONOMIC 
CAUSES OF WAR 

[This organization, stressing the economic causes 
of war and looking for their elimination by free 
trade and new types of world organization, represents 
the views of its Secretary, Mr. Roger W. Babson, of 
Wellesley Hills, Mass. Mr. Babson is an expert in 
statistics as an aid to the diagnosis of trade condi- 
tions.] 

Statement of Principles 

The surest way to prevent war is to remove the tempta- 
tion to war. This can best be done by providing the 
means by which nations can secure and retain peacefully, 
through some representative organization, the ends which 
they would otherwise seek to secure through war. Al- 
though the world cannot remain in statu quo, there must 
be a more efficient means of determining policies and bring- 
ing about changes than by resort to war. 

It is generally agreed that the causes of war in modern 
times are largely matters of commerce and trade. If some 
method can be found by which international trade routes 
shall become neutral, and further unfair legislation by 
one nation against another shall cease, a long step toward 
the elimination of wars will have been taken. 

The present disturbed condition of the world's trade 
makes this a favorable moment for the consideration of a 
plan which should eliminate these economic causes of war. 
The neutralization of trade routes and the prevention of 
additional legislation by any one nation against the people 
or trade of any other nation, excepting by consent of a 
[256] 



representative international commission, supported by in- 
ternational force, presents such a method. 

This plan provides security and opportunity for all, 
eliminates the necessity for the control of trade routes and 
barriers by any one power, and the opposition to such con- 
trol by any other. It provides what perhaps no other plan 
does, an incentive to states to combine. Nations will na- 
turally combine to protect the neutrality of trade routes and 
the joint regulation of the extension of natural barriers — 
once such neutrality and joint regulation have been secured 
— as the easiest and cheapest method of protection. Com- 
mercial alliance appeals where political alliance does not. 

The plan involves the yielding of some so-called sovereign 
rights ; but this is more than offset by an ultimate advantage 
of almost incalculable value. Unless nations are willing 
to join in a movement for international protection they 
must continue to compete in expenditures for national 
defense. There is no half-way ground. 

Further Statement by the Secretary 

An international commission, permitting the peoples of 
each nation to govern themselves so long as they do not 
block the peaceful growth of other nations, but obliging 
them to cooperate on international policies, could ( i ) take 
over certain strongholds and armaments of the nations in 
exchange for assuming their war debts; (2) regulate the 
shipping, mailing, cabling, etc., between nations so as to 
guarantee to all security of intercourse; and (3) have a veto 
of discriminatory tariffs, immigration restrictions, and other 
policies of separate nations which lead to war. 

Such an international commission, built like the present 
great republics and getting its income from a uniform 
tax on trade, would operate along lines suggested by the 
founders of the League to Enforce Peace 



[257] 



A GERMAN PETITION TO THE REICHSTAG 

Four German pacifist organizations, the German Peace 
Society, the League of the New Fatherland, the Na- 
tional Women's Committee for a Durable Peace, and the 
Central Organization for the Rights of Peoples, addressed 
recently to the Reichstag a petition demanding, in view of 
the situation caused by the Russian revolution, ( i ) that 
Germany declare itself ready to conclude a peace with Rus- 
sia on condition that the rights of Germans in Russia be 
guaranteed in the same manner as those of other nationals 
within Russian borders; (2) that the government declare 
itself willing to complete the offer of peace to Russia of 
December 12, stating the sanctions it will advocate for a 
durable peace; (3) that the Reichstag declare for an inter- 
national organization to maintain peace (a pacific alliance 
of all nations), and for the limitation of armaments, and 
(4) that the Reichstag declare itself ready to establish a 
foreign policy, based on the experiences of this war, which 
shall avoid the obstacles at present standing in the way of 
international harmony and cooperation. 

{Advocate of Peace, Aug., 191 7, p. 244.] 



[258] 



BUND NEUES VATERLAND 

[The Bund Neues Vaterland (not to be confused 
with the Pan-German New Fatherland Society) 
formed soon after the outbreak of the war, has stead- 
fastly stood for humanitarian ideals and international 
morality. Its pamphlet " Sollen wir Annektieren " 
is a powerful protest against annexation as opposed 
to the best interest even of Germany herself.] 

1. Development of international organization. 

2. Further development of international law by future 
Hague conferences. 

3. No annexation. 

4. No secret treaties. 

5. Open door. Freedom of the seas. 

[Bourne, Towards an Enduring Peace.^ 



[259] 



MANIFESTO OF THE 
DEUTSCHE FRIEDENSGESELLSCHAFT 

[Professor Ludwig Quidde of Munich, a writer 
on historical subjects, is most widely known for his 
book on Caligula, taken to be intended as a covert 
attack on the Kaiser. He has also written on mili- 
tarism.] 

Notwithstanding the prohibition of the Government, de- 
mands for annexation are being more or less publicly advo- 
cated. Six large agricultural associations go especially far 
in these ideas ; indeed for one petition signatures are collected 
among those who because of " their rank and education con- 
sider themselves the spiritual leaders of public opinion." 
This movement has evidently the support of important circles. 
The worst of this is that those demands are known to the 
neutrals and to hostile countries, who make them the founda- 
tion of their accusations of German desires of conquest. Be- 
sides they kindle ill-feeling against Germany, as the Gov- 
ernment and the whole German nation are held responsible 
for all this. 

There is no doubt that the Imperial Government is un- 
justly accused in this respect, whatever may be her attitude 
towards other questions. Should such tendencies be pub- 
licly criticized, then the world would soon see that the 
greater part of the German nation is strongly opposed to 
them. 

The prohibition to discuss the aims of the war, which is 
strictly maintained with respect to ourselves, prevents us 
from criticizing this question thoroughly; and from organ- 
izing our opposition to such tendencies. 

So far we have gladly obeyed the order not to discuss these 
[260] 



questions. After our experience, however, of the way in 
which this prohibition and the above-mentioned agitation 
are exploited abroad to the detriment of German interests, 
we think it our duty to appeal to the Government to grant 
" free speech to a free nation." 

Until this has been granted, the German Peace Associ- 
ation can do no more than utter a general protest against 
the danger of such annexation ideas. When such ideas are 
considered the aim of war, the war will be prolonged indefi- 
nitely, for months, perhaps for years. Their realization 
would not strengthen, but weaken Germany, abroad as well 
as at home, in peace and in future wars. A new war would 
be inevitable shortly after such a peace. 

The German Peace Association and all friends of the 
people desire that the military supremacy of the Central 
Powers, which we hope will decide the peace, shall be turned 
towards the consolidation of Germany's position in the 
world, towards the development of the economical and na- 
tional forces of the German nation. But they hope also, 
that the coming peace may contain the elements of a durable 
peace and lay the foundation for a lasting community of jus- 
tice and culture between the nations, which must be restored 
after the peace, howsoever bitter their hostility may be at 
present. The association is convinced that a sensible con- 
sideration of the vital interests of the German nation will 
prevail over empty phrases and private interests, when the 
conditions of peace shall be drawn up. 

L. QuiDDE, 
O. Umfrid, 

Stuttgart. 
[Bourne, " Towards an Enduring Peace."] 



[261] 



STATEMENT BY DR. DAVID STARR JORDAN 
ON THE TERMS OF PEACE 

[Dr. David Starr Jordan, Chancellor Emeritus of 
Leland Stanford University, an authority alike in 
natural science and international relations, prepared 
the follovi^ing informal statement in the early sum- 
mer of 191 7 as his view of what would be a desirable 
settlement. His close personal study, in the field, of 
Alsatian and Balkan conditions gives it peculiar 
weight.] 

I approve in principle the statement of the Russian com- 
mittees as to the final terms of peace. These again, in 
principle, accord with the appeal of the Pope, and with the 
resolutions of the British Union for Democratic Control. 
These involve no annexation by force, no punitive indem- 
nities, and, so far as may be, the relief by federation of 
oppressed nationalities. I do not believe that any nation 
or group of nations can attempt to punish a people for 
the past acts of its rulers, nor can any nation or group of 
nations be trusted to act as judge and executioner. And 
no great nation ever yet entered war with absolutely clean 
hands. 

The important result is that no nation should gain by 
war, either in lands or in wealth. This means a return, 
as a basis of discussion, to a Status quo Ante. "Status 
quo Ante" is a phrase involving two conflicting ideas. In 
so far as it relates to national boundaries it must be ac- 
cepted as a basis for discussion, a beginning of give and 
take. In so far as it applies to political conditions as they 
existed before the war, an unstable " Balance of Power " 
[262] 



constantly threatened by armament rivalries and new al- 
liances, it cannot be too severely condemned. But to re- 
ject the political ideals involved does not prevent the tem- 
porary acceptance of its territorial actualities. 

In opposition to the territorial Status quo Ante many 
considerations have been urged. The unrest of repressed 
nationalities has been greatly stimulated by the crude in- 
justices of w^ar time. It is especially desired to restore 
Alsace-Lorraine to France, to form anew the Kingdom of 
Poland, to dismember Austria, to bring order to Turkey, 
and justice to the Balkans. All this may be done, but 
no result can be permanent if not founded on justice and 
on the will of the people concerned. 

The German colonies taken in the war should be re- 
stored, with this reservation, that for German South Africa, 
Samoa and New Guinea, acceptable exchanges should be 
made. It would be a lame conclusion that these districts, 
politically and economically valueless to the possessing na- 
tion, should pass to the over-swollen Imperialism of Great 
Britain. Nor do I see a single legitimate objection to 
German colonization in Mesopotamia. So long as Ger- 
many is shut out by force from a colonial expansion that 
most of her people agree in desiring, the basis for controversy 
and war exists. 

In return it would not violate the theory of no punitive 
indemnities if the German Government should return the 
sums extorted, brigand fashion, from cities of Belgium and 
France. There is no way that I know of for compelling 
this, but it would surely be a matter of justice and good 
morals to aid in future understandings. 

The rehabilitation of Roumania is a matter for future 
agreement. As matters are, the nation has lost the Rou- 
manian district of Bessarabia, has never controlled the 
Roumanian parts of Transylvania and Bukovina, and has 
seized without warrant the rich Danubian meadows of 
Dobruja. 

To me the problem most difficult of solution is that of 
Alsace-Lorraine. The " Tragedy of Pride " prevents the 



return of the provinces to France, and it is the fault of 
Prussia that, after forty-five years, there is still a question 
of Alsace-Lorraine. The harsh rule since w^ar time makes 
a continuance of German rule almost unthinkable. In 
right the provinces should be made a free state, a bond of 
union between Germany and France, its fortifications should 
be dismantled, and under no pretext should its territory be 
divided. The " question of Alsace-Lorraine " is not a prob- 
lem of race or language. The Germanic people of upper 
Alsace " being German, are more obstinately French than 
Frenchmen can be." The key to its solution is found in 
fjeedom, and its ultimate future may be in union with the 
kindred people of Switzerland. 

The future of Poland cannot be settled in a word. Free 
trade, free schools and home rule would mean more then 
absolute political independence. The problem of access to 
the sea looms large, and still larger the relations with 
Lithuania, with Posen and with Galicia. Meanwhile, the 
old aristocracy still potent in Poland form a continuous 
threat to the political welfare of the State. But none of 
these matters can be settled by force or from the outside. 
Freedom, with poverty and ignorance on the one hand and 
an arrogant caste-system on the other, may open the way 
for anarchy, but only in freedom can a race find itself. If 
a people is unfit for self-government, as has been said of 
the Poles, the Irish and the Jews, then so much the more 
reason why they must have it. It is a necessary stage be- 
fore anything higher. 

The appeals of Finland strongly impress the world. It 
would seem, however, that the future of Russia demanded 
for Finland, Ukrainia and other nationalities rather fed- 
eration than separation. This again it is for the people 
concerned, not the armies of Europe, to decide. 

The same thought applies to Austria. The separation of 
Bohemia and Jugoslavia from Austria-Hungary would in- 
crease, not reduce, the discord. If Austria proper is to re- 
join Germany, it is a matter for the people concerned to 
decide. The equal federation of these states would largely 

[264] 



abate the tyrannies of which the various peoples so justly 
complain. 

The Trentino, largely Italian, might be allowed to choose 
for itself. The cession of Trieste, Fiume and Dalmatia to 
Italy, leaving Austria-Hungary without seaports, seems im- 
possible, and it would be a source of greater friction than 
has yet existed. 

The question of Serbia is not simple. An outlet to the 
sea through Herzegovina, Ragusa, Gravosa and Cattaro 
would subject a more or less alien people to an arbitrary 
rule. Cattaro alone would help little, as the mountains 
along Lovcen which separate Montenegro from the sea are 
inaccessible to railroads. The proposed outlet to Salonica 
is impracticable except by reciprocity of trade. Meanwhile 
the districts of Macedonia, annexed by Servia (Ochrida, 
Monastir, etc.), have been most tyrannically abused by the 
Serbian military caste, and their population is chiefly 
Bulgarian. 

The injustices of the robber-treaty of Bucharest should 
be in some way corrected. The Dobruja taken by 
Roumania is a Bulgarian district, as is the greater part of 
Macedonia, divided between Serbia and Greece, from which 
the original Bulgarian population has been largely driven 
out by violence. 

The Concert of Powers at the Treaty of London should 
have let the Balkans absolutely alone, or else they should 
have made an honest attempt to secure the welfare of the 
people This " Concert " has made the problem of Al- 
bania wholly insoluble. For Constantinople it has left only 
the two alternatives — autonomy with international govern- 
ment, or a renewed effort to modernize Turkish rule. 

Can we not ask that Congress should, in substance, de- 
clare that the United States of America has entered on the 
great war in a spirit of altruism, hoping to stay the slaughter, 
and asking no reward, when Belgium, France and Serbia 
are redeemed? When this is guaranteed and the seas made 
free as the World's Open Highway, we shall hope to lay 
down our arms, returning to our normal status of peace. 

[265] 



We shall approve of no forced annexations, of no compul- 
sory indemnities, no attempt to punish any peoples for their 
rulers' sins, and of no exploitation of commercial or economic 
fruits of victory. We ask no guarantees for the future 
save those invoked in the good will of free peoples. We 
appeal to all nations to grant, through federation and 
autonomy, relief to repressed nationalities, believing that in 
cooperation and conciliation rather than through unchecked 
national sovereignty, the future of civilization may be 
conserved. 

Memorandum on Conceivaf}le Terms of Peace 

1. Evacuation of Belgium, without keeping hold of any 

kind, unless it be required to be unfortified, and 
guaranteed in its neutrality. 

2. Evacuation of France without hold of any kind. 

3. The reorganizing of Alsace-Lorraine as an independ- 

ent, unfortified, buffer state, its neutrality guar- 
anteed by the other nations. 

4. The German colonies should be returned, except 

German Southwest Africa and the islands in the 
Pacific. For these proper exchanges should be 
made. Permission might be granted to buy the 
Belgian Congo or Portuguese colonies. 

5. Tsingtau should be returned to China. In return 

the leases of Japan in South Manchuria might be 
extended beyond 1923. 

6. Italy should have the Trentino, not Trieste, not 

Fiume, not Albania. 

7. For Bulgaria, the Treaty of Bucharest should be re- 

vised. The Dobruja (Silistria), should be re- 
turned ; also Kavalla, Monastir and Ochrida — the 
part of Macedonia south of Uskub and east of the 
Struma. 

8. Greece should have Epirus and the Islands of the East, 

except those at the mouth of the Dardanelles. 

9. Montenegro should have Scutari and the whole of 

the Lake of Scutari. 
[266] 



10. Servia offers serious difficulties, having no outlet on 

the sea, and no possibility of using the little rail- 
way of Montenegro, from Virpazar on the lake to 
Antivari on the sea. To reach the sea, Servia 
must include unwilling populations, either Herze- 
govina with Ragusa, Gravosa and Cattaro, or else 
the bulk of Albania, with Durazzo. The Serbian 
army officers have been very brutal towards Bul- 
garian and Albanian subjects. 

11. Constantinople is one of the great problems. To have 

it in control of Germany or of Russia will meet 
great objection. To make of the region east of the 
Enos-Midia Line and across in Asia a similar dis- 
trict, a separate neutralized, unfortified state, would 
have advantages, likewise serious embarrassments. 
On the whole it may be best to leave it in Turkey, 
under some sort of guarantees. In any case the 
Dardanelles and Bosphorus should be open and un- 
fortified. The Berlin-Bagdad scheme is no war 
matter, any more than the British " Cape to Cairo " 
railway, and should not be opposed by Russia. 

12. Palestine (Zion), should have autonomy or independ- 

ence. Syria (Damascus), should be given auton- 
omy. 

13. Arabia is apparently already independent of Turkey. 

14. Armenia must have autonomy and such guarantees as 

may be possible. Russian rule may be acceptable, 
for in the words of an Armenian leader, " there 
are degrees even in Hell! " 

15. The problems of Russia must be settled by the Rus- 

sian people. The demands for autonomy of Fin- 
land, Ukrainia, Caucasus, Armenia, Siberia, seem to 
point towards Federation. 

16. The only hope of Austria seems to be Federation; a 

matter which the incoherent nationalities must settle 
somehow for themselves. 

17. The problem of Poland and Lithuania must be worked 

out by the people. Russian and Austrian Poland 

[267] 



might be united, under a form of government to 
be chosen. But indications point toward stormy 
times, whatever the solution. The German Baltic 
provinces need to be considered. 

1 8. The matter of indemnities is yet to be settled. It 

is not likely to be possible for any nation to en- 
force their payment. There is but one way to 
collect indemnities, unless granted. 

19. The matter of disarmament is of prime importance. 

The poverty of Europe will guarantee its perma- 
nence, unless the United States becomes a militant 
nation. 

20. Outside of the west of Europe no nation pays much 

regard to rights of minorities or of smaller na- 
tionalities within their limits. Othen^ase, geo- 
graphical matters would have less importance. 

21. None of these matters can be settled by war. The 

safety from war demands that no nation gain an} 
good thing from it. 



[268] 



PEACE PROGRAM OF THE UNION FOR 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 

[The Union of Democratic Control was formed 
in England shortly after the outbreak of the war 
with the object of securing a new course of diplomatic 
policy. Its Secretary has been Mr. Morel, author of 
various works on Africa and the Congo abuses and 
" Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy " dealing especially 
with Morocco. Among its spokesmen in Parliament 
are Messrs. Ponsonby, Trevelyan, MacDonald and 
Snowden.] 

" A stage in the war has been reached when the democ- 
racies of all the belligerent countries are beginning to work 
towards a peace based on the same general principles. The 
frankest statement of those ideas is contained in the declara- 
tion of the Russian democratic government in favor of: 

" Peace without annexations and without indemnities on 
the basis of the right of nations to decide their own destiny." 

The Russian Government further declared: 

" The government deems it to be its duty to declare now 
that free Russia does not aim at the domination of other na- 
tions, at depriving them of their national patrimony or at 
occupying by force foreign territories, but that its object is 
to establish a durable peace on the basis of the rights of na- 
tions to decide their own destiny. The Russian nation does 
not lust after the strengthening of its power abroad at the 
expense of other nations." 

On behalf of Great Britain on May 23, Lord Robert 
Cecil, replying in the House of Commons, declared that: 

" Our aims and aspirations were dictated solely by our 
determination to secure a peace founded on national liberty 

[269] 



and international amity, and that all imperialistic aims based 
on force and conquest were completely absent from our 
program." 

President Wilson, in his recent message to Russia, de- 
clared : 

" No people must be forced under a sovereignty under 
which it does not wish to live. No territory must change 
hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit 
it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be 
insisted on except those that constitute payment for mani- 
fest wrong done. No readjustments of power must be made 
except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the 
world and the future welfare and happiness of the peoples." 

The German Chancellor declared in the Reichstag on 
May 17: 

" We did not go to war, and we are not fighting now 
against almost the whole world, in order to make conquests 
but only to secure our existence, and firmly to establish the 
future of the nation." 

We have here the common principles by which all the 
governments now profess to be guided. 

The frame of mind of the various nations is now such that 
no government can afford to lay itself open to the charge 
of prolonging the war for the purpose of annexing new terri- 
tory, either in Europe or outside Europe. 

In consequence of this unanimity of profession the Execu- 
tive Committee of the Union for Democratic Control has 
considered what these declarations mean in terms of prac- 
tical politics, and makes the following suggestions which are 
not final nor incapable of modification, but as a suitable basis 
for further examination and discussion. 

The settlement arrived at when the war concludes will 
necessarily be imperfect. The stability of peace will depend 
quite as much on the methods adopted for dealing with new 
international difficulties as they arise and the existence of 
international machinery for meeting racial, economic and 
other rivalries in the future, as upon the immediate wisdom 
of the settlement. Machinery for making international 

[270] 



changes without war is one of the indispensable conditions 
of permanent peace. 

No Forcible Annexations 

As a preliminary to any rearrangement of territorial 
boundaries, it ought to be made perfectly clear that all claims 
based on conquest, imperialistic ambition or strategic con- 
siderations such as a German demand for a revision of stra- 
tegic frontiers in Belgium and elsewhere, an Italian demand 
for an Italian Dalmatia or a Russian demand for Constan- 
tinople, are ruled out on principle. There must be a com- 
plete acceptance of a policy of "no annexations." 

Our suggestions are as follows: 

(a) Belgium. 

The complete reestablishment of the sovereign independ- 
ence and integrity and the economic restoration of Belgium 
must be absolutely secured. 

(b) France. 

The invaded districts of France must be evacuated. 

(c) Servia, Montenegro and Roumania must be evacuated 
and their independence restored. 

(d) Alsace and Lorraine. 

The disposition of Alsace and Lorraine should be decided 
on the principles of the right of the population to control its 
own destiny. The decision would not necessarily imply the 
allocation of the whole of both provinces to either France 
or Germany. Neither should the policy of autonomy be 
excluded. 

In this, as in other cases where the views of a population 
are subject to dispute, the question ought to be decided, by a 
plebiscite or otherwise, under the supervision of an impar- 
tial international commission and free from the interference 
of accompanying armies. 

(e) Trentino. 

The claims of Italy to Trentino or other *' unredeemed " 
districts ought to be decided by the same process. 

(f) Poland. 

Poland should be free and independent. The population 

[271] 



of Austrian Poland and the Polish districts of Prussia should 
decide whether they -wash to become part of Poland. 

(g) Austro-Hungarian Empire. 

An unfortunate impression was created by the allied note 
to President Wilson of January lo that it is the fixed de- 
termination of the allies to break up the Austro-Hungarian 
empire into independent states. This intention ought to be 
explicitly repudiated by all the allies, as it has been by the 
Russian democracy. But it must be made clear that freedom 
for the component population of that empire can be obtained 
by self-government within that empire, as it can be secured 
for the Finns in Russia and for the Irish within the British 
empire. 

(h) Other Problems. 

There are very complicated problems such as Polish claims 
on Dantzig, Bulgaria's claim on Macedonia, Roumania's 
claim on Transylvania, and the future status of Persia which 
obviously cannot be settled by any military decision, but 
which ought to be referred to an international commission 
appointed with the cooperation and authority of the nations 
of Europe. 

(i) Turkey. 

Russian democracy has repudiated the imperialistic policy 
of the czar to annex Constantinople. The way is, therefore, 
open for a proposal to neutralize or internationalize the city 
and the straits. It is against the interest of the world that 
the great trading waterways of the world should be in the 
hands of single powers. 

The policy of international control over the Ottoman em- 
pire should be maintained and extended so as to provide 
full security for the Christian peoples and freedom of de- 
velopment for other races under the suzerainty of the sul- 
tan. 

But no immediate settlement of the Turkish empire could 
be regarded as final. The arrangements would necessarily 
have to be revised from time to time by the League of Na- 
tions. The maximum of freedom for the various nation- 
alities and freedom of trade between all the parts, and 

[272] 



equality of economic opportunity for the nationals of all 
European powers should be the policy followed. 

(k) German Colonies. 

Great Britain should repudiate definitely any claim to 
annex German colonies by right of conquest. 

As recently as 1885, by the general act of the conference 
of Berlin an assignment of sovereign rights in Africa was 
made by the great powers. A shifting of the political fron- 
tiers in existence before the war has become inevitable. It 
may be that such territorial readjustments will involve po- 
litical changes under which some part of the African terri- 
tory hitherto administered by Germany may be transferred. 

The principle of no annexations, however, requires a 
frank recognition that in the interests of a lasting peace 
Germany is not less entitled than other great powers to 
organize and develop over-sea dependencies. 

The great zone of tropical Africa should be neutralized 
under an international guarantee, and absolute freedom of 
enterprise established there. 

A less exclusive trade policy enforced throughout Africa 
by international arrangement would greatly facilitate the 
adjustment of national territorial claims. 

Under a general rearrangement of territories the Pacific 
islands might be dealt with as well as Africa. 

No Punitive Indemnities 

Belgium is entitled to special relief from Germany owing 
to the circumstances under which she was forced into war. 

No indemnities should be demanded in the sense of pay- 
ments to recover the expenses of the war, but there should 
be a common fund provided by all the belligerent nations to 
assist the recovery of the parts of the world most seriously 
devastated by the war. An international commission should 
decide the allocation of the common funds. 

Guarantees of Permanent Peace 

The foundation of all future hopes of permanent peace 
lies in the establishment of a League of Nations. That will 

[273] 



become a reality only in so far as all the peoples are led to 
see that such a league offers better hope of national security 
than the old system of competitive armament. We cannot 
hope to destroy militarism so long as there is a chance of 
governments being able to persuade their people that the 
only means of national security lies in preponderant military 
power. Our first task is to convince the masses of every 
country that in a League of Nations they may find a meanr 
of defense which renders their old militarism unnecessary. 

Such a League of Nations, with a common undertaking 
to submit disputes to arbitration and to form an international 
council or parliament for dealing with international prob- 
lems as they become critical, has been proposed by President 
Wilson on behalf of the United States, and accepted in prin- 
ciple by the British, French, Russian, Austro-Hungarian and 
German Governments. 

The second condition indispensable to permanent peace 
is to persuade the German and Austrian populations that 
their right to equal opportunity for economic expansion and 
for access to raw materials will be secure without their being 
obliged to fight for them. To secure this, the nations should 
agree to reciprocal equality of commercial opportunity in all 
their dependencies. Upon the breaking down of commercial 
exclusiveness depends the good-will of the future. The pol- 
icy of economic warfare laid down by the Paris conference 
should be repudiated as being opposed to international peace. 

The disappearance of secret diplomacy is essential to per- 
manent peace. Secret treaties should be prohibited by inter' 
national agreement and should be regarded as void. All 
treaties should be sanctioned by the national parliaments and 
subject to periodical revision. 

The largest measure of agreement for the reduction of 
armaments on land and sea should be obtained at the set- 
tlement. 

We suggest that while the removal of the motive for 
arming among nations will prove to be the only real guaran- 
tee for an effective reduction, a method might be adopted by 
means of international inspection of armament establish- 

[274] 



ments for controlling the execution of any agreement for 
immediate reduction which may be reached by the settlement. 

Nations should agree to abolish private enterprise in the 
production of armaments. 

This question should be surveyed in the light of the in- 
fraction of the rights of neutrals in time of war, and of the 
security of economic opportunity for all nations in time of 
peace. 

The Executive Committee of the Union for Democratic 
Control. 

Norman Angell Charles Roden Buxton 

J. A. HoBSON F. W. JowETT, M. p. 

F. W. Pethick Lawrence J. Ramsay MacDonald, 
E. D. Morel M. P. 

Philip Snowden, M. P. Arthur Ponsonby, M. P. 

Charles Trevelyan, Helena M. Swanwick 

M. P. Irene Cooper-Willis 

[This program was reprinted in this country by 
the American Union against Militarism and in the 
N. Y. Co// of July 30, 191 7.] 



[275] 



FABIAN SOCIETY 
PROPOSED ARTICLES OF SETTLEMENT 

July 17, 191 5 

[The Fabian Society, founded in London in 1884 
by a group of brilliant Socialist " intellectuals," main- 
tains a Research Department for which Mr. L, S. 
Woolf prepared the following project — probably 
the most complete draft of an international constitu- 
tion yet elaborated.] 

The signatory States, desirous of preventing any future 
outbreak of war, improving international relations, arriving 
by agreement at an authoritative codification of interna- 
tional law and facilitating the development of such joint 
action as is exemplified by the International Postal Union, 
hereby agree and consent to the following Articles: 

The Establishment of a Supernational Authority 

1. There shall be established as soon as possible within 
the period of one year from the date hereof {a) an Inter- 
national High Court for the decision of justiciable issues be- 
tween independent Sovereign States; {b) an International 
Council with the double function of securing by common 
agreement, such international legislation as may be prac- 
ticable, and of promoting the settlement of non-justiciable 
issues between independent Sovereign States; and (c) an 
International Secretariat. 

The Constituent States 

2. The independent Sovereign States to be admitted as 
Constituent States, and hereinafter so described, shall be: 

[276] 




[Courtesy of Cartoons Magasine'\ 

Willy Sluiter in Dc Nieuzvc Amsterdammer, Amsterdam. 

TO THE PEACE PALACE 
It Will Soon Be Time to Get It Ready for Use. 



(a) The belligerents in the present war; 

(b) The United States of America; 

(c) Such other independent Sovereign States as have 
been represented at either of the Peace Conferences at The 
Hague, and as shall apply for admission vv^ithin six months 
from the date of these Articles; and 

(d) Such other independent Sovereign States as may 
hereafter be admitted by the International Council. 

Covenant Against Aggression 

3. It is a fundamental principle of these Articles that the 
Constituent States severally disclaim all desire or intention 
of aggression on any other independent Sovereign State or 
States, and that they agree and bind themselves, under all 
circumstances, and without any evasion or qualification 
whatever, never to pursue, beyond the stage of courteous 
representation, any claim or complaint that any of them 
may have against any other Constituent State, without first 
submitting such claim or complaint, either to the Interna- 
tional High Court for adjudication and decision, or to the 
International Council for examination and report, with a 
view to arriving at a settlement acceptable to both parties. 

Covenant Against War Except as a Final Resource 

4. The Constituent States expressly bind themselves sev- 
erally under no circumstances to address to any Constituent 
State an ultimatum, or a threat of military or naval oper- 
ations in the nature of w^ar, or of any act of aggression ; and 
under no circumstances to declare war, or begin military 
or naval operations of the nature of war, or violate the terri- 
tory or attack the ships of another State, otherwise than by 
way of repelling and defeating a forcible attack actually 
made by military or naval force, until the matter in dispute 
has been submitted as aforesaid to the International High 
Court or to the International Council, and until after the 
expiration of one year from the date of such submission. 

On the other hand, no Constituent State shall, after sub- 
mission of the matter at issue to the International Council 

[277] 



and after the expiration of the specified time, be precluded 
from taking any action, even to the point of going to war, 
in defense of its own honor or interests, as regards any 
issues which are not justiciable within the definition laid 
down by these Articles, and which affect either its inde- 
pendent sovereignty or its territorial integrity, or require 
any change in its internal laws, and with regard to which no 
settlement acceptable to itself has been arrived at. 

The International Council 

5. The International Council shall be a continuously ex- 
isting deliberative and legislative body composed of repre- 
sentatives of the Constituent States, to be appointed in such 
manner, for such periods and under such conditions as may 
in each case from time to time be determined by the several 
States. 

Each of the eight Great Powers — viz., Austria-Hungary, 
the British Empire, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia 
and the United States of America — may appoint five repre- 
sentatives. Each of the other Constituent States may ap- 
point two representatives. 

Different Sittings of the Council 

6. The International Council shall sit either as a Council 
of all the Constituent States, hereinafter called the Council 
sitting as a whole, or as the Council of the eight Great 
Powers, or as the Council of the States other than the eight 
Great Powers, or as the Council for America, or as the 
Council for Europe, each such sitting being restricted to the 
representatives of the States thus indicated. 

There shall stand referred to the Council of the eight 
Great Powers any question arising between any two or more 
of such Powers, and also any other question in which any 
of such Powers formally claims to be concerned, and re- 
quests to have so referred. 

There shall also stand referred to the Council of the 
eight Great Powers, for consideration and ratification, or 
for reference back in order that they may be reconsidered, 

[278] 



the proceedings of the Council for America, the Council for 
Europe, and the Council of the States other than the eight 
Great Powers. 

There shall stand referred to the Council for Europe any 
question arising between two or more independent Sovereign 
States of Europe, and not directly affecting any independent 
Sovereign States not represented in that Council, provided 
that none of the Independent Sovereign States not so repre- 
sented formally claims to be concerned in such question, and 
provided that none of the eight Great Powers formally 
claims to have it referred to the Council of the eight great 
Powers or to the Council sitting as a whole. 

There shall stand referred to the Council for America 
any question arising between two or more independent 
Sovereign States of America, not directly affecting any inde- 
pendent Sovereign State not represented in that Council, 
provided that none of the independent Sovereign States not 
so represented formally claims to be concerned in such ques- 
tion, and provided that none of the eight Great Powers for- 
mally claims to have it referred to the Council of the eight 
Great Powers or to the Council sitting as a whole. 

There shall stand referred to the Council for the States 
other than the eight Great Powers any question between 
two or more of such States, not directly affecting any of 
the eight Great Powers and which none of the eight Great 
Powers formally claims to have referred to the Council sit- 
ting as a whole. 

The Council shall sit as a whole for — 

(a) General legislation and any question not standing 
referred to the Council of the eight Great Powers, the Coun- 
cil of the States other than the eight Great Powers, the 
Council for Europe or the Council for America respectively ; 

(b) The appointment and all questions relating to the 
conditions of office, functions and powers of the International 
Secretariat, and of the President and other officers of the 
International Council ; 

(c) The settlement of Standing Orders, and all questions 
relating to procedure and verification of powers; 

[279] 



(d) The financial affairs of the International Council 
and International High Court, the allocation of the cost 
among the Constituent States, and the issue of precepts upon 
the several Constituent States for the shares due from them ; 

(e) The admission of independent Sovereign States as 
Constituent States; and 

(/) Any proposal to alter any of these Articles, and the 
making of such an alteration. 

Membership of the Council and Voting 

7. All the Constituent States shall have equal rights tc 
participation in the deliberations of the International Coun- 
cil. Any Constituent State may submit to the International 
Council sitting as a whole any proposal for any alteration 
of International Law, or for making an enactment of new 
law; and also (subject to the provisions of these Articles 
with regard to the submission of justiciable issues to the In- 
ternational High Court) may bring before the Council any 
question, dispute or difference arising between it and any 
other Constituent State. 

When the International Council is sitting as the Council 
of the eight Great Powers or as the Council of the States 
other than the eight Great Powers each of the States repre- 
sented therein shall have one vote only. 

When the International Council is sitting as a whole or 
as the Council for Europe or as the Council for America, 
the number of votes to be given on behalf of each State shall 
be as follows: 

As agreed to by the Hague Conference, the relative posi- 
tion of the States works out into the following scale of votes : 

Austria-Hungary, the British Empire, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United 

States of America 20 votes each 

Spain 12 " 

The Netherlands 9 " 

Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portu- 
gal, Sweden, China, Roumania, Turkey. . . 6 " " 

[280] 



Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico 4 " " 

Switzerland, Bulgaria, Persia 3 " " 

Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Serbia, 

Siam 2 " " 

The other Constituent States i vote " 

Legislation Subject to Ratification 

8. It shall be within the competence of the International 
Council to codify and declare the International Law exist- 
ing between the several independent Sovereign States of the 
world; and any such codifying enactment, when and in so 
far as ratified by the Constituent States, shall be applied and 
enforced by the International High Court. 

It shall also be within the competence of the International 
Council from time to time, by specific enactment, to amend 
International Law, whether or not this has been codified; 
and any such enactment when and in so far as ratified by 
the several Constituent States shall be applied and enforced 
by the International High Court. 

Whenever any Constituent State notifies its refusal to 
ratify as a whole any enactment made by the International 
Council, it shall at the same time notify its ratification of 
such part or parts of such enactment as it will consent to be 
bound by; and the International Council shall thereupon 
reenact the parts so ratified by all the Constituent States, 
and declare such enactment to have been so ratified, and such 
enactment shall thereupon be applied and enforced by the 
International High Court. 

When any enactment of the International Council making 
any new general rule of law has been ratified wholly or in 
part by any two or more Constituent States, but not by all 
the Constituent States, it shall, so far as ratified, be deemed 
to be binding on the ratifying State or States, but only in 
respect of the relations of such State or States with any other 
ratifying State or States; and it shall be applied and en- 
forced accordingly by the International High Court. 



[281] 



Non-Justiciable Issues 

9. When any question, difference or dispute arising be- 
tween two or more Constituent States is not justiciable as 
defined in these Articles, and is not promptly brought to an 
amicable settlement, and is of such a character that it might 
ultimately endanger friendly relations between such States, 
it shall be the duty of each party to the matter at issue, irre- 
spective of any action taken or not taken by any other party, 
to submit the question, difference or dispute to the Inter- 
national Council with a view to a satisfactory settlement 
being arrived at. The Council may itself invite the parties 
to lay any such question, difference or dispute before the 
Council, or the Council may itself take any such matter at 
issue into its own consideration. 

The Constituent States hereby severally agree and bind 
themselves under no circumstances to address to any other 
Constituent State an ultimatum or anything in the nature 
of a threat of forcible reprisals or naval or military oper- 
ations, or actually to commence hostilities against such State, 
or to violate its territory, or to attack its ships, otherwise 
than by way of repelling and defeating a forcible attack 
actually made by naval or military force, before a matter in 
dispute, if not of a justiciable character as defined in these 
Articles, has been submitted to or taken into consideration 
by the International Council as aforesaid for investigation, 
modification and report, and during a period of one year 
from the date of such submission or consideration. 

The International Council may appoint a Permanent 
Board of Conciliators for dealing with all such questions, 
differences or disputes as they arise, and may constitute the 
Board either on the nomination of the several Constituent 
States or othen^ase, in such manner, upon such conditions 
and for such term or terms as the Council may decide. 

When any question, difference or dispute, not of a jus- 
ticiable character as defined in these Articles, is submitted to 
or taken into consideration by the International Council as 
aforesaid, the Council shall, with the least possible delay, 
[282] 



take action, either (i) by referring the matter at issue to 
the Permanent Board of Conciliators, or (2) by appointing 
a Special Committee, whether exclusively of the Council or 
otherwise, to enquire into the matter and report, or (3) by 
appointing a Commission of Enquiry to investigate the mat- 
ter and report, or (4) by itself taking the matter into con- 
sideration. 

The Constituent States hereby agree and bind themselves, 
whether or not they are parties to any such matter at issue, 
to give all possible facilities to the International Council, to 
the Permanent Board of Conciliators, to any Committee or 
Commission of Enquiry appointed by either of them, and tc 
any duly accredited officer of any of these bodies, for the suc- 
cessful discharge of their duties. , 

When any matter at issue is referred to the Board of 
Conciliation, or to a Special Committee, or to a Commission 
of Enquiry, such Board, Committee or Commission shall, if 
at any time during its proceedings it succeeds in bringing 
about an agreement between the parties upon the matter at 
issue, immediately report such agreement to the Interna- 
tional Council; but, if no such agreement be reached, such 
Board, Committee or Commission shall, so soon as it has 
finished its enquiries, and in any case within six months, 
make a report to the International Council, stating the facts 
of the case and making any recommendations for a decision 
that are deemed expedient. 

When a report is made to the International Council by 
any such Board, Committee or Commission that an agree- 
ment has been arrived at between the parties, the Council 
shall embody such agreement, with a recital of its terms, in 
a resolution of the Council. 

When any other report is made to the Council by any 
such Board, Committee or Commission, or when the Council 
itself has taken the matter at issue into consideration, the 
Council shall, after taking all the facts into consideration, 
and within a period of three months, come to a decision on 
the subject, and shall embody such decision in a resolution 
of the Council. Such resolution shall, if necessary, be ar- 

[283] 



rived at by voting, and shall be published, together with any 
report on the subject, in the Official Gazette. 

A resolution of the Council embodying a decision settling 
a matter at issue between Constituent States shall be obliga- 
tory and binding on all the Constituent States, including all 
the parties to the matter at issue, if either it is passed unani- 
mously by all the members of the Council present and vot- 
ing ; or where the proposed enactment does not affect the in- 
dependent sovereignty or the territorial integrity, nor require 
any change in the internal laws of any State, and where such 
enactment shall have been assented to by a three-fourths 
majority of the votes given by the representatives present and 
voting. 

The International Secretariat 

lO. There shall be an International Secretariat, with an 
office permanently open for business, with such a staff as the 
International Council may from time to time determine. 

It shall be the duty of the International Secretariat to 
make all necessary communications on behalf of the Interna- 
tional Council to States or individuals; to place before the 
President to bring before the Council any matter of which it 
should have cognizance; to organize and conduct any en- 
quiries or investigations ordered by the Council; to maintain 
an accurate record of the proceedings of the Council; to 
make authentic translations of the resolutions and enact- 
ments of the Council, the report of the proceedings, and 
other documents, and to communicate them officially to all 
the Constituent States; and to publish for sale an Official 
Gazette and such other works as the Council may from time 
to time direct. 

Subject to any regulations that may be made by the In- 
ternational Council, the International Secretariat shall take 
charge of and be responsible for {a) the funds belonging to 
or in the custody of the International Council and the Inter- 
national High Court; (,^) the collection of all receipts due 
to either of them; and (c) the making of all authorized pay- 
ments. 

[284]' 



The International High Court 

11. The International High Court shall be a permanent 
judicial tribunal, consisting of fifteen Judges, to be ap- 
pointed as hereinafter provided. Subject to these Articles 
it shall, by a majority of Judges sitting and voting, control 
its own proceedings, determine its sessions and place of meet- 
ing, settle its own procedure, and appoint its own officers. 
It may, if thought fit, elect one of its members to be Presi- 
dent of the Court for such term and with such functions as 
it may decide. Its members shall receive an annual stipend 

of , whilst if a President is elected he shall receive an 

additional sum of . The Court shall hear and decide 

with absolute independence the issues brought before it in 
conformity with these Articles; and shall in each case pro- 
nounce, by a majority of votes, a single judgment of the 
Court as a whole, which shall be expressed in separate rea- 
soned statements by each of the Judges sitting and acting in 
the case. The sessions of the Court shall be held, if so 
ordered, notwithstanding the existence of a vacancy or of 
vacancies among the Judges; and the proceedings of the 
Court shall be valid, and the decision of a majority of the 
Judges sitting and acting shall be of full force, notwith- 
standing the existence of any vacancy or vacancies or of the 
absence of any Judge or Judges. 

The Judges of the Court 

12. The Judges of the International High Court shall be 
appointed for a term of five years by the International Coun- 
cil sitting as a whole, in accordance with the following 
scheme: Each of the Constituent States shall be formally 
invited to nominate one candidate, who need not necessarily 
be a citizen or a resident of the State by which he is nomi- 
nated. The eight candidates severally nominated by the 
eight Great Powers shall thereupon be appointed Judges by 
the International Council sitting as the Council of the eight 
Great Powers. The remaining seven Judges shall be ap- 
pointed by the International Council sitting as a whole, 
after selection by exhaustive ballot from among the candi- 

[285] 



dates nominated by the Constituent States other than the 
eight Great Powers. On the occurrence of a vacancy among 
the Judges nominated by the eight Great Powers, the State 
which had nominated the Judge whose seat has become va- 
cant shall be invited to nominate his successor, and the candi- 
date so nominated shall thereupon be appointed by the Inter- 
national Council sitting as the Council of the eight Great 
Powers. On the occurrence of a vacancy among the other 
Judges, each of the Constituent States other than the eight 
Great Powers shall be invited to nominate a candidate to 
fill the vacancy; and the International Council sitting as a 
whole shall, by exhaustive ballot, choose from among the 
candidates so nominated the person to be appointed. 

A Judge of the International High Court shall not be 
liable to any legal proceedings in any tribunal in any State, 
and shall not be subjected to any disciplinary action by any 
Government, in respect of anything said or done by him in 
his capacity as Judge ; and shall not during his term of office 
be deprived of any part of the emoluments or privileges of 
his office. A Judge of the International High Court may be 
removed from office by a resolution of the International 
Council sitting as a whole, carried by a three-fourths ma- 
jority. 

The Court Open Only to State Governments 

13. The International High Court shall deal only with 
justiciable questions, as defined in these Articles, at issue be- 
tween the' national Governments of independent Sovereign 
States, and shall not entertain any application from or on 
behalf of an individual person, or any group or organization 
of persons, or any company, or any subordinate administra- 
tion, or any State not independent and Sovereign. The In- 
ternational High Court may, if it thinks fit, deal with a suit 
brought by a Constituent State against an independent Sov- 
ereign State which is not a Constituent State ; or with a suit 
between two or more such States. 



[286] 



Justiciable Issues 

14. The justiciable questions with which the Interna- 
tional High Court shall be competent to deal shall be ex- 
clusively those falling within one or other of the following 
classes, viz. : 

(a) Any question of fact which, if established, would be 
a cause of action within the competence of the Court; 

(fi) Any question as to the interpretation or application 
of any international treaty or agreement duly registered as 
provided in these Articles, or of International Law, or of 
any enactment of the International Council; together with 
any alleged breach or contravention thereof; 

(c) Any question as to the responsibility or blame attach- 
ing to any independent Sovereign State for any of the acts, 
negligences or defaults of its national or local Government 
officers, agents or representatives, occasioning loss or dam- 
age to a State other than their own, whether to any of the 
citizens, companies or subordinate administrations of such 
State, or to its national Government; and as to the repara- 
tion to be made, and the compensation to be paid, for such 
loss or damage; 

(d) Any question as to the title, by agreement, prescrip- 
tion, or occupation, to the sovereignty of any place or dis- 
trict ; 

(e) Any question as to the demarcation of any part of any 
national boundary; 

(/) Any question as to the reparation to be made, or the 
amount of compensation to be paid, in cases in which the 
principle of indemnity has been recognized or admitted by 
all the parties; 

(g) Any question as to the recovery of contract debts 
claimed from the Government of an independent Sovereign 
State by the Government of another independent Sovereign 
State, as being due to any of its citizens, companies or sub- 
ordinate administrations, or to itself ; 

(h) Any question which may be submitted to the Court 
by express agreement between all the parties to the case. 

The question of whether or not an issue is justiciable 

[287] 



within the meaning of these Articles shall be determined 
solely by the International High Court, which may deter- 
mine such a question whether or not formal objection i; 
taken by any of the litigants. 

If any State, being a party to any action in the Interna- 
tional High Court, objects that any point at issue is not a 
justiciable question as herein defined, the objection shall be 
considered by the Court; and the Court shall, whether or 
not the objecting State enters an appearance, or argues the 
matter, pronounce upon the objection, and either set it aside 
or declare it well founded. 

It shall be within the competence of the International 
High Court, with regard to any justiciable question in re- 
spect of which it may be invoked by one or more of the par- 
ties, summarily to enjoin any State, whether or not a party 
to the case, to refrain from taking any specified positive 
action or to discontinue any specified positive action already 
begun, or to cause to be discontinued any specified positive 
action begun by any person, company or subordinate admin- 
istration within or belonging to such State, which in the 
judgment of the Court is designed or intended, or may 
reasonably be expected to change the status quo with re- 
gard to the question at issue before the Court, or seriously 
to injure any of the parties to the case. Any such injunc- 
tion of the International High Court shall be binding, and 
shall be enforceable, in the same way as a judgment of the 
Court, in the manner hereinafter described. 

Immediate Publicity for All Treaties j Existing and Future 

15. No treaty or agreement between two or more inde- 
pendent Sovereign States shall be deemed to confer any right 
to invoke the International High Court, or shall be treated 
as valid, or be in any way recognized by the International 
Council or the International High Court, or shall be held 
to confer any rights, to impose any obligations, or to change 
the status or legal rights of any person, company, subordinate 
administration, district or State, unless a duly authenticated 
copy of such Treaty or Agreement has been deposited by one 

[288] 



or all of the States that are parties to it, in the Registry of 
the International High Court, within twelve months from 
the date of these Articles, in accordance with any rules that 
may from time to time be made by the Court for this pur- 
pose; or in the case of a Treaty or Agreement hereafter 
made, within three months from the date of such Treaty or 
Agreement. 

It shall be the duty of the officer in charge of the Registry 
immediately after deposit to allow the duly accredited repre- 
sentative of any Constituent State to inspect and copy any 
Treaty or Agreement so deposited; and promptly to com- 
municate a copy to the International Secretariat for publi- 
cation in the Official Gazette. 

JJndei-taking to Submit All Justiciable Questions to the 
International High Court 

1 6. The Constituent States severally undertake and agree 
to submit to the International High Court for trial and 
judgment every question, difference or dispute coming within 
the definition of a justiciable question as laid down by these 
Articles that may arise between themselves and any other 
independent Sovereign State or States; and at all times to 
abstain, in respect of such questions, from anything in the 
nature of an ultimatum ; from any threat to take unfriendly 
or aggressive action of any kind with a view to redressing 
the alleged grievance or punishing the alleged wrongdoing; 
and from any violation of the territory of any other State 
or attack on the ships of such State or other military or naval 
operations, or other action leading or likely to lead to war. 

Enforcement of the Decrees of the Court 

17. When in any case upon which judgment is given by 
the International High Court, the Court finds that any of 
the parties to the case has, biy act, negligence, or default, 
committed any breach of international obligation, whether 
arising by Treaty or Agreement, or by International Law. 
or by enactment of the International Council in accordance 
with these Articles, the Court may simply declare that one 

[289] 



or other litigant States is in default, and leave such State 
voluntarily to make reparation; or the Court may, in the 
alternative, itself direct reparation to be made or compen- 
sation to be paid for such wrong, and may assess damages or 
compensation, and may, either by v^^^ay of addition to damages 
or compensation, or as an alternative, impose a pecuniary fine 
upon the State declared in default, hereinafter called the 
recalcitrant State; and may require compliance w^ith its de- 
cree within a specified time under penalty of a pecuniary 
fine, and may prescribe the application of any such damages, 
compensation, or fine. 

In the event of non-compliance with any decision or decree 
or injunction of the International High Court, or of non- 
payment of the damages, compensation, or fine within the 
time specified for such payment, the Court may decree exe- 
cution, and may call upon the Constituent States, or upon 
some or any of them, to put in operation, after duly pub- 
lished notice, for such period and under such conditions as 
may be arranged, any or all of the following sanctions — 
viz. : 

(a) To lay an embargo on any or all ships within the 
jurisdiction of such Constituent State or States registered as 
belonging to the recalcitrant State; 

(b) To prohibit any lending of capital or other moneys 
to the citizens, companies, or subordinate administrations of 
the recalcitrant State, or to its national Government; 

(c) To prohibit the issue or dealing in or quotation on 
the Stock Exchange or in the press of any new loans, de- 
bentures, shares, notes or securities of any kind by any of 
the citizens, companies or subordinate administrations of the 
recalcitrant State, or of its national Government; 

(d) To prohibit all postal, telegraphic, telephonic and 
wireless communication with the recalcitrant State; 

(e) To prohibit the payment of any debts due to the 
citizens, companies or subordinate administrations of the 
recalcitrant State, or to its national Government; and, if 
thought fit, to direct that payment of such debts shall be 
made only to one or other of the Constituent Governments, 

[290] 



which shall give a good and legally valid discharge for the 
same, and shall account for the net proceeds thereof to the 
International High Court; 

(/) To prohibit all imports, or certain specified imports 
coming from the recalcitrant State, or originating within it ; 

(ff) To prohibit all exports, or certain specified exports 
consigned directly to the recalcitrant State, or destined for it; 

(h) To prohibit all passenger traffic (other than the exit 
of foreigners), whether by ship, railway, canal or road, to or 
from the recalcitrant State; 

(i) To prohibit the entrance into any port of the Con- 
stituent States of any of the ships registered as belonging to 
the recalcitrant State, except so far as may be necessary for 
any of them to seek safety, in which case such ship or ships 
shall be interned; 

(;') To declare and enforce a decree of complete non- 
intercourse with the recalcitrant State, including all the 
above-mentioned measures of partial non-intercourse; 

(k) To levy a special export duty on all goods destined 
for the recalcitrant State, accounting for the net proceeds 
to the International High Court; 

(/) To furnish a contingent of war-ships to maintain a 
combined blockade of one or more of the ports, or of the 
whole coastline of the recalcitrant State. 

The International High Court shall arrange for all the 
expenses incurred in putting in force the above sanctions, 
including any compensation for loss thereby incurred by any 
citizens, companies, subordinate administrations or national 
Governments of any of the Constituent States other than 
the recalcitrant State, to be raised by a levy on all the Con- 
stituent States in such proportions as may be decided by the 
International Council; and for the eventual recovery of the 
total sum by way of additional penalty from the recalcitrant 
State. 

When on any decree or decision or injunction of the In- 
ternational High Court execution is ordered, or when any 
sanction or other measure ordered by the Court is directed 
to be put in operation against any Constituent State, it shall 

[291] 



be an offense against the comity of nations for the State 
against which such decree, decision, injunction or execution 
has been pronounced or ordered, or against which any sanc- 
tion or other measure is directed to be enforced, to declare 
war, or to take any naval or military action, or to violate the 
territory or attack the ships of any other State or to commit 
any other act of aggression against any or all of the States 
so acting under the order of the Court; and all the other 
Constituent States shall be bound, and do hereby pledge 
themselves, to make common cause with the State or States 
so attacked, and to use naval and military force to protect 
such State or States, and to enforce the orders of the Inter- 
national High Court, by any warlike operations that may 
for the purpose be deemed necessary. 

[For further discussion of this, the most com- 
pletely elaborated of the various programs for inter- 
national organization, see " International Govern- 
ment: Two Reports by L. S. Woolf, prepared for 
the Fabian Research Department, with an Introduc- 
tion by Bernard Shaw: Together with a Project by 
a Fabian Committee for a Supernational Authority 
that will Prevent War." Brentano's, 1916.] 



[292] 



PRESIDENT ELIOT'S PROPOSAL FOR A PEACE 
CONFERENCE 

To the Editor of The New York Times: 

The urgent international problem to-day is how to bring 
about a frank and sincere conference of the belligerent na- 
tions without an armistice — since neither group would 
now take the obvious risks of an armistice — a conference 
consultative and not arbitral, and only preliminary to the 
official conference of Governments which must devise and 
propose a real settlement. This problem is difficult, but not 
insoluble. 

After three years of warfare, strenuous and continuous 
beyond all precedent, the military situation to-day is de- 
scribed fairly well by the word stalemate. For each party it 
is inconclusive; and there is no umpire. Either party can 
hold the other in trench warfare. The Entente Allies can 
drive the Germans back for short distances, but neither 
side has as yet won a decisive victory in trench warfare, or 
captured an army in open country. Because of the superi- 
ority of the Entente Allies and the United States in num- 
ber of men, industrial productiveness, and financial strength, 
Germany in all probability can be brought to a condition 
of exhaustion before the Allies will be; but this result can 
be brought about only by prolonged and desperate sacrifices 
of human life and of the savings of the nations, and at 
the cost of infinite human woe. 

Although all the nations involved are longing for peace, 
their Governments are in no condition to discuss terms of 
peace. The political and industrial change brought about 
by the war are tremendous; but they are manifestly in- 
complete. Democracies have been obliged to change many 

[293] 



of their habitual modes of action; autocracies are facing 
internal agitations; one autocracy has just disappeared, but 
no stable government has as yet taken its place ; many in- 
dustries have to be carried on under new^ conditions as 
regards both labor and capital; and v\^ar itself is conducted 
in new w^ays w^hich disregard the ethics heretofore thought to 
be universally accepted. There is a general wondering as 
to what is going to happen next, which indisposes respon- 
sible persons to large committals, or decisions which cannot 
be recalled. The Entente Allies do not state clearly their 
minimum demands or lowest terms for peace, and the 
Central Monarchies state no terms at all. 

Under such circumstances it is wholly natural for com- 
bative and indignant men and women to say, " What is 
the use of talking with the German rulers about terms of 
peace; they will not keep their word if they can obtain any 
military advantage by breaking it?" "We must fight till 
we are plainly victorious." On the other hand, the vari- 
ous official and unofficial statements of the terms on which 
the Allies would be willing to make peace produce on the 
German mind, so far as their opponents can discover, only 
this effect : " We are fighting a war of defense against 
dismemberment or imprisonment; we must fight to the last 
gasp in the hope that some favoring chance or discord among 
our enem.ies may save us from the threatened destruction." 
This is, indeed, a horrible dilemma, and many righteous men 
say that there is no way of escape from it, except by the 
overpowering of one or other of the combatants. Before 
settling down, however, to this long struggle is it not worth 
while to try a limited preliminary experiment on human ca- 
pacity for good feeling and sound reasoning even under the 
most adverse circumstances? 

Even under the actual very discouraging circumstances, 
he would be a bold man who should affirm that it is im- 
possible to bring appointed conferees from all the belligerent 
nations into one room for the oral discussion of subjects 
previously agreed upon, the conferees being selected by the 
several Governments, but receiving no instructions either 

[294] 



before or during the conference from the appointing powers, 
and having no power or commission except to make a brief 
public report of their conclusions. The function of the 
several Governments would be limited to the appointment 
of the conferees and the granting of the necessary safe con- 
ducts. In order to keep the size of the conference moder- 
ate, each small State might be restricted to two conferees 
and each large State to four. 

The two principal subjects of discussion ought to be: 

I. The means of so organizing the civilized world that 
international war can be prevented — by force when peace- 
able means have failed. 

II. The removal or remedying in good measure of the 
public wrongs, injustices, and distrusts which contributed 
to the outbreak of the present war, or have been created 
during its course — wrongdoings and passions which will 
cause future wars unless done away with. 

There follows a list of the subjects which might well be 
discussed under each of these two principal heads-, the 
conference itself making choice among them : 

UNDER I 

(a) Will the nations concerned publicly recognize, as 
a settled principle of international action, that no nation 
shall henceforth attempt to exercise rule or domination over 
any other nation, large or small, occidental or oriental ? 

(b) Can the boundaries of the European States be so 
readjusted that no European population shall be held by 
force to an unnatural allegiance contrary to their wishes? 

(c) Shall the freedom of the seas and of the canals and 
channels connecting great seas be placed under interna- 
tional guarantees for peace times but not for war times? 

(d) Will all the nations agree that enlargements of 
national territory, extensions of national trade, and con- 
certed migrations shall hereafter be brought about only 
by the consent and with the good-will of all parties con- 
cerned, and shall be maintained only by the parties' sense 
of mutual service and advantage? For expansion of trade, 

[295] 



the universal reliance shall hereafter be the policy of the 
" open door " ; and for relief from congestion of popula- 
tion, the policy of " peaceful penetration." Enlargements 
of territory by purchase or other voluntary contract shall 
be subject to the approval of the International Council. 
(See below.) 

(e) Will the present belligerents agree to form an of- 
fensive and defensive alliance for the purpose of instituting 
and maintaining an International Council composed of one 
delegate from each nation, and an Executive Commission 
composed of one Commissioner from each of either three or 
five great powers — such, for example, as Great Britain, 
France, Russia, Germany, and the United States, or the 
United States, France, and Germany, the Chairman of the 
commission to be in either case an American — and an inter- 
national army and international navy — the function of all 
these bodies combined to be to prevent international war, if 
need be by the use of force, and therefore to see that forces 
adequate to that end are maintained on call, these forces to 
be decidedly superior to the existing armies and navies of 
any two nations combined? Other nations might later be 
admitted to that alliance by the joint action of the Interna- 
tional Council and the International Executive Commission, 
provided that their forms of government might properly be 
called constitutional or free and that they were prepared to 
make some substantial contribution to the effective forces of 
the alliance; but no such addition to the first group of na- 
tions should be made until at least five years had elapsed 
from the conclusion of peace. 

(/) Will the nations agree that as soon as the inter- 
national army and international navy have been put into 
working order a gradual systematic reduction of armaments 
shall be made, under the direction of the International Coun- 
cil and Executive Commission, so soon as experience has 
demonstrated the safe limits of reduction? 

(ff) Will all the existing Governments agree, in the in- 
terest of permanent peace, that for the future the power 
to declare war and to maintain war by taxation and borrow- 

[296] 



ings shall reside in an elective assembly under conditions 
which give to the mass of the people, or their elected 
representatives, control over all questions of v^^ar or peace? 

(h) Will all the nations agree to the suppression of se- 
cret diplomacy except as preliminary or tentative intercom- 
munication; so that no treaty, understanding, or interna- 
tional arrangement should take any effect until publicly dis- 
cussed and approved in representative assemblies of the na- 
tions concerned? 

(i) Inasmuch as the present war and many previous 
wars have been promoted and prolonged because of the 
existence in most nations of a permanent military class hav- 
ing no other occupation than war and preparation for 
war, will the belligerent nations now agree to abolish within 
a reasonable time, each by appropriate legislative and execu- 
tive action, its " regular " or professional military class, and 
to substitute for its present military establishment an un- 
paid, democratic army, analogous to the Swiss, based on 
universal training and liability to service? The Swiss Army 
is here taken as an example because the military constitu- 
tion of Switzerland has produced an extraordinarily effective 
army without creating a military class or a militaristic 
spirit in the Swiss people. Those nations in the alliance 
which maintain a navy would be expected to cause the 
navy to be manned on the same principles of universal 
training and liability to service; but the proportion of 
officers permanently employed may be larger in a navy than 
in an army, because a larger proportion of a navy than of an 
army will be constantly in active service. 

(;') Will the belligerent nations now consent to attempt 
to secure for the world, through the measures indicated 
above, complete freedom from military or naval aggression? 

(k) Will the nations represented in the new alliance 
agree that the expenses of the International Council and 
Executive Commission shall be borne by each of the allied 
nations in proportion to its population, and that each nation 
shall pay the expenses of its quota in the international army 
and international navy ? 

[297] 



(/) Will the belligerent nations now agree that another 
conference at The Hague shall be called soon after the close 
of the war to consider and recommend for adoption by the 
several nations a new body of international agreements 
concerning the conduct of war, to include the new arrange- 
ments necessitated by the use, not yet fully developed, of 
the high explosives, the submarine, and the airplane, and 
to include also the establishment of an International Court 
with a suitable code of procedure, and of an International 
Council of Inquiry and Conciliation to take cognizance of 
incipient international contentions? 

UNDER II 

(a) The partition of Poland. 

(b) The cutting off of Alsace-Lorraine from France in 
1870-71. 

(c) The failure to give Italy in 1866, certain territories 
long subject to Austria, but unquestionably belonging to the 
Italian nationality. 

(d) The discords and enmities introduced into the Near 
East, and particularly into the Balkan States, by the unjust 
treaties of 1878 and 1913, made under the oversight of the 
principal European powers. 

(e) The destruction wrought by the German and Aus- 
trian occupation of Belgium and Northern France, Poland, 
and Serbia, and the Russian invasion of East Prussia, and 
the various means of restoring those countries, such as in- 
demnities, repayment of fines and requisitions, and loans from 
any nations that are able and willing to make them at no 
interest for a time and a slowly rising rate up to a maximum 
of 5 per cent. 

(/) The oppression of several distinct nationalities which 
have long been miserable under the control of Turkey. 

The status of the German colonies lost during the present 
war could be another appropriate subject for consideration 
by the conference. The conference rrtight also consider 
whether permanent international peace and a just constitu- 
tion of the International Council could be promoted by the 

[298] 



application of the principle of federation to some groups 
of nationalities to which that principle is not now applied, 
as for instance to the Scandinavian kingdoms as one group 
and the Balkan States as another. 

It would certainly facilitate the proceedings of an inter- 
national conference in the interest of durable international 
peace if it could be understood beforehand that all the 
participating nations had come to the conclusion that war 
on the modern scale and with the new implements of 
destruction is not an available means, in the present state 
of the civilized world, of settling international disputes or 
of extending national influence and power. 

What democracy, by its elected executive, or what auto- 
crat can set this experiment on foot? Switzerland would 
seem an appropriate State to start the experiment and pro- 
vide the meeting-room. 

Asticow, Me. Charles W. Eliot. 

Aug. 21, 1917. 



[299] 



SIX PEACE PROGRAMS: 



A COMPARISON OF THE MAIN PROPOSALS 

From the Manchester Guardian, Monday, August 27, 1917 

THE ALLIES 
Note to President Wilson, January, 1917 



Belgium 

Serbia and Monte- 
negro 



"Restoration with the compensations due." 



Rumania 

France and Russia 

(Invaded 

Territories) 



" Evacuation, with fitting reparation." 



German Colonies 



A ustria-Hungary 



Turkey 



A Isace-Lorraine 



Poland 



Not mentioned. 



Italians, Slavs, Rumanians, Czechs, and 
Slovaks to be " liberated from foreign 
domination." 



The subject peoples of Turkey to be liberated 
and the Ottoman Empire to be expelled 
from Europe. 



Provinces or territories formerly torn from 
the Allies by force or against the wishes of 
their inhabitants to be restored. 



The Allies accept the declaration of the Tsar 
that the war-aims of Russia include " the 
creation of a free Poland from all three of 
her now incomplete tribal districts." 



Indemnities 



No mention. 

See also " compensation 
above. 



and " reparation 



[300] 




[Courtesy of the New York Times Current History Magazine'] 
(From De Nieuwe Amsterdammer, Amsterdam.) 

A DIFFICULT PROBLEM 

Peace Angel : "I don't see where I can ever get hold 
of it." 



" Whole-hearted agreement with the proposal 
to create a League of Nations." 
Other Points No intention to seek " the extermination or the 

political extinction of the Germanic peo- 
ples." 



THE POPE 
August, 1917 



Belgium 

Serbia and Monte- 
negro 
Rumania, France 
and Russia 
(Invaded 
Territories) 
German Colonies 



Austria-Hungary 



" The reciprocal restoration of territories 
which are now occupied " appears to cover 
all these, though specific mention is only 
made of Belgium ("total evacuation, 
with a guarantee of her full political, mili- 
tary, and economic independence against 
no matter what power"), the occupied 
parts of France and the German colonies. 



Territorial questions at issue between (i) 
Austria and Italy and (2) Germany and 
France to be examined " with a concilia- 
tory disposition," taking into consideration 
the aspirations of the inhabitants " in the 
measure of the just and possible." 



Such questions as those of Armenia (and 
also the Balkan States) are to be dealt with 
" in the same spirit of equity and justice," 
as is recommended in the case of Italy's 
claims on Austria and those of France to 
Alsace-Lorraine. 



Turkey 



Alsace-Lorraine 



See under Austria-Hungary. 



" The territories forming part of the ancient 
Poland kingdom of Poland " are to be dealt with 

according to the principles stated above. 



Indemnities 



Generally speaking, no indemnities and no 
compensations. The States will recoup 
themselves by disarmament. If there are 
exceptions, these must be considered " with 
justice and equity." 



[301] 



Other Points 



Restriction ,of armaments; compulsory arbi- 
tration, and a League of Nations ; the " true 
freedom and common use of the seas " to be 
assured. 



BRITISH LABOR PARTY 
August, 1917 



The " foremost condition of peace " is the 
complete restoration of Belgium, with pay- 
ment for all the damages done. 



Belgium 



Restoration. 

The future of the Balkan States to be dealt 
with by a special conference of their repre- 
sentatives or by an international commis- 
sion. These States to be free to settle their 
own destinies, irrespective of Austria, Turk- 
ish, or other Dominion. 



Serbia and Monte- 
negro 



Rumania, France 
and Russia 
(Invaded 
Territories) 
German Colonies 



The general principle laid down in this 

program is " no annexations — leaving to 

each people the freedom to settle its own 
destinies." 



A ustria-Hungary 



Turkey 



Alsace-Lorraine 



The Italians to be united to their mother- 
country. 



Subject peoples freed from Turkey cannot be 
handed back. If the peoples freed cannot be 
left to settle their own destinies, they should 
be placed under commissions acting by the 
authority of the League of Nations. 

Constantinople should be made a free port, 
neutralized and placed, together with both 
shores of the Dardanelles, under a similar 



commission. 
Palestine to be made " by agreement among all 
the nations," a free Jewish State under in- 
ternational guarantee. 



Alsace and Lorraine to be allowed to satisfy 
their " inflexible desire " for restoration to 
France. 



[302] 



Poland 



Indemnities 



Other Points 



The principle of " allowing each people to 
settle its own destiny " is to be applied. 



No indemnities " by way of punishment." 
See also under Belgium, above. Apart 
from Belgium, the restoration of devastated 
area should be undertaken at the expense 
of an international fund. 



A League of Nations, an International High 
Court, and an " International Legislature,"' 
recommended ; economic war-after-war 
condemned ; the " open door " and a Free 
Trade tariff demanded. All the present 
colonies of the European Powers in Trop- 
ical Africa should be transferred to the 
League of Nations, and administered by a 
Commission under that authority as a single 
independent African State, to be perma- 
nently neutralized. 



GERMAN MAJORITY SOCIALISTS 
Stockholm, June, 1917 



Belgium 

Serbia and Monte- 
negro 
Rumania, France 
and Russia 
(Invaded 
Territories) 
German Colonies 



Restoration. 



A ustria-Hungary 



Austrian Socialists' views accepted (see last 
column). 



Turkey 



Alsace-Lorraine 



Not mentioned. 



Not to be restored to France, but to have 
" full equality as an independent member 
of the German State." Cultural autonomy 
for the French inhabitants. 



Russian Poland to be independent, and also 
Poland Finland. The Prussian Poles to have cul- 

tural autonomy. 



[303] 



Indemnities 



No indemnities and no compensation for dam- 
age, except international help if an invaded 
State lacks resources of its own. 



An obligatory international arbitration court; 
restriction of armaments; right of capture 
at sea and use of armed merchantmen to 
be abolished ; commercial " war-after-war " 
to be forbidden ; secret diplomacy to be 
Other Points abandoned; protective duties to be abol- 

ished ; the " open door " to be applied in 
the colonies. The liberation of Ireland, 
Egypt, Tripoli, Morocco, India, Thibet, 
Korea to be demanded by the Socialists of 
the nations which rule these countries. 



GERMAN MINORITY SOCIALISTS 
Stockholm, July, 1917 



Belgium 



Serbia and Monte- 
negro 



Rumania, France 
and Russia 
(Invaded 
Territories) 
German Colonies 
A ustria-Hungary 
Turkey 



Full independence to be restored, with com- 
pensation for damage done, " especially for 
the economic values that have been taken 
away." 

Serbia to be reestablished as a " self-govern- 
ing, independent State." 

All Serbs to be united in a single national 
State, which should be combined with the 
other Balkan States in a Republican Balkan 
Federation. 

The German Minority Socialists do not make 
definite proposals on these points, but lay 
down the general principles of peace with- 
out annexation, based upon national self- 
government. 

" Regulation of frontiers must be conditional 
upon the assent of the populations concerned, 
and not an act of force." 

" We reject a policy of colonial conquest. 
The possession of any colony without its own 
self-administration is nothing else than the 
possession of an unfree people, and, just as 
slavery, is incompatible with our principles." 

The bearing of all this on the future of 
Turkey is not clear. 



[3^4] 



Alsace-Lorraine 



The people of Alsace-Lorraine should have a 
" direct and free vote " as to its future. 



The " national unity " of the Poles ap- 
proved. "To admit the right of Russian 
Poland Poland to national independence, but to 

deny that same right to Prussian and Aus- 
trian Poland is contradictory." 

No indemnities, which " simply mean the 
Indemnities. plundering of the vanquished by the vic- 

tor." See also Belgium, above. 

General disarmament; compulsory inter- 
national arbitration ; national minorities to 
have " the right to develop their national 
Other Points life " ; democratic control of foreign policy 

and abolition of secret treaties ; " any eco- 
nomic barriers " and " any economic strug- 
gle " between States condemned. 



AUSTRIAN SOCIALISTS 
Stockholm, May, 1917 



Belgium 



Annexations condemned. 



Independence of Serbia to be restored; access 
to the sea perhaps to be secured by reunion 
with Montenegro. 

The other Balkan States to come to an under- 
standing among themselves on the princi- 
ple of " The Balkans for the Balkan peo- 
ples." 



Serbia and Monte- 
negro 



Rumania, France 
and Russia 
(Invaded 
Territories) 
German Colonies 



The first article of this program demands 
a " peace without annexations." 



The subject peoples of Austria-Hungary to 
remain an " integral part " of the Empire, 
but to have national autonomy. 



A ustria-Hungary 



[305] 



Turkey 



Alsace-Lorraine 



Poland 



Not mentioned. Uncertain whether " na- 
tional autonomy " is intended to apply to 
any part of Turkey. In general, the pro- 
gram says that " the disintegration of ex- 
isting great States would only serve the 
vicious Imperialistic aims of other great 
States." 

Not mentioned. 



Russian Poland (and Finland) to have inde- 
pendence. The Austrian and German 
Poles to have autonomy within the bound- 
aries of Austria and Germany. 



Indemnities 



Other Points 



No indemnities. 



Diminution of the Protectionist system de- 
manded and the " open door " in colonies ; 
economic " war-after-war " condemned ; 
right of capture at sea to be abolished ; dis- 
armament, with " purely defensive national 
militias " ; nationalization of war indus- 
tries. 



[306] 



REFERENCE LIST OF OTHER SOURCES RE- 
FERRED TO IN THE TEXT 

(The following documents are not included in this book 
because they are easily accessible. Their sources are indi- 
cated. Most of the official documents of December, 1916, 
and January, 19 17, have been reprinted in Pamphlet No. 23, 
published by the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, which is referred to in the bibliography as C.E.I. P. 
The initials T.C.H. refer to the New York Times Current 
History Magazine.) 

Extract from the Speech of Chancellor von Bethmann-Holl- 

weg in the German Reichstag, December 12, 191 6 

(C. E. I. P.). 
Peace Note of Germany and Her Allies, December 12, 1916 

(C. E. I. P.). 
Note of the German Government to the Vatican regarding 

the Peace Proposals, December 12, 1916 (C. E. I. P.). 
Autograph Letter from the German Emperor to Chancellor 

von Bethmann-Hollweg, under date of October 31, 

1 916, in which the Kaiser expressed his wish that peace 

proposals be initiated (T. C. H., February, 191 7). 
Austrian Official Statement regarding the Peace Proposals, 

December 12, 1916 (C. E. I. P.). 
Extracts from the Speech of Premier Briand in the French 

Chamber of Deputies, December 13, 1916 (C. E. I. P.). 
Russian semi-official Statement regarding the German Peace 

Proposals, December 14, 19 16 (C. E. I. P.). 
Statement of M. Trepoff on taking office as Premier for the 

first term, officially announcing the agreement giving the 

[307] 



Dardanelles to Russia ( The N. Y. Times, December 4, 
1916). 
Resolution of the Russian Duma against acceptance of the 
German Peace Proposals, December 15, 191 6 (C. E. 

I. P.). 

The Official Reply made in the Duma by N. N. Pokrovsky, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the German Peace Pro- 
posal of December 12, 1916 (T. C. H., March, 1917: 
Extract, C. E. I. P.). 

Speech of Arthur Henderson, unofficial Member of the 
British Cabinet, London, December 16, 1916 (C. E. 
I. P.). 

President Wilson's Peace Note, December 18, 191 6 (C. E. 
I. P.). 

Extracts from the Speech of Premier Lloyd George in the 
House of Commons, December 19, 1916 (C. E. L P.)- 

Address by Earl Curzon, Lord President of the War Coun- 
cil and Leader of the House of Lords, December 19, 
1916 (T. C. H., February, 1917 : Extracts, C. E. L P.). 

Address by ex-Premier Herbert H. Asquith in the House of 
Commons, December 19, 1916 (T. C. H,, February, 
1 91 7: Extracts, C. E. L P.). 

Statement of Halil Bey, Turkish Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, December 19, 19 16 (The N. Y. Times, Decem- 
ber 20, 1916). 

Speech of Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the 
House of Commons, December 21, 1916 (C. E. L P.). 

Secretary Lansing's Two Statements Regarding Peace Note 
to the Belligerents ( The N. Y. Times, December 22, 
1916). 

Swiss Peace Note in support of President Wilson, Decem- 
ber 23, 1916 (C. E. L P.). 

The Czar's Official Comment on the German Peace Pro- 
posal, December 25, 1916 (T. C. H., February, 1917). 

Extract from the Address of Arthur Henderson, unofficial 
Member of the British Cabinet, before the National 
Congress of the French Socialist Party, December 26, 
1916 (The N. Y. Times, December 27, 191 6). 
[308] 



The German Note of December 26, 19 16, Replying to 
President Wilson's Note of December 18 (C. E. I. 

P.). 
Austro-Hungarian Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note, 

December 26, 1916 (C. E. I. P.). 
Scandinavian Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note, 

December 29, 1916 (C. E. I. P.)- 
Entente Reply to the Peace Note of Germany and Her 

Allies, December 30, 1916 (C. E. I. P.). 
Austro-Hungarian Reply to the Scandinavian Peace Note, 

January 3, 19 17 (C. E. I. P.). 
Dr. Ludwig Stein's Comment on the Entente Reply to Ger- 
many, January 3, 1917 (T. C. H., February, 1917)- 
Statement of Emile Vandervelde, Belgian Minister of State, 

on the Peace Proposals (C. E. I. P.)- 
Chinese Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note, January 

9, 1917 (C. E. LP.). 

Entente Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note, January 

10, 1917 (C. E. I. P.). 

Belgium's Separate Reply to the President, January 10, 

1917 (C. E. I. P.). 
Lloyd George's Guild Hall Address, January 11, 1917 (C. 

E. L P.). 
German Note to Neutral Powers relative to the Entente 

Reply to the Peace Proposals, January 11, 1917 (C. 

E. L P.). 
Extracts from the Austro-Hungarian Note to Neutral 

Powers relative to the Entente Reply to the Peace 

Proposals, January 11, 1917 (C. E. L P.). 
Turkey's Note to Neutrals relative to the Entente Reply 

(T. C. H., March, 1917). 
Statement of Paul Deschanel, President of the French 

Chamber of Deputies, January 11, 191 7 {The N. Y. 

Times, January 12, 1917). 
British Note of January 13, 191 7, amplifying the Entente 

Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note (C. E. L P.). 
Kaiser Wilhelm's Proclamation to the German People, 

January 13, 1917 (C. E. L P.). 

[309] 



Statement of Francesco Ruffini, Italian Minister of Public 
Instruction, Rome, January 14, 191 7 (C. E. I. P.). 

Persian Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note, January 
15, 1917 (C. E. I. P.). 

German Semi-Official Comments on the Entente Reply (T. 
C. H., February, 1917). 

Extract from the Reply of the Greek Government to Presi- 
dent Wilson's Peace Note, January 16, 191 7 (C. E. 

I. P.), 
President Poincare's Comment on President Wilson's Peace 

Note and the Entente Reply to Germany ( The N. Y. 

Times, January 20, 191 7). 
President Wilson's Address to the Senate, January 22, 191 7 

(C.E.I. P.). 
Resolution by Senator Cummins on President Wilson's Sen- 
ate Address, and Debate (The Congressional Record, 

Vol. 54, Nos. 36 and 43). 
Speech of Viscount Motono, Japanese Minister for Foreign 

Affairs, in the Diet, January 23, 19 1 7 (C. E. I. P.). 
Extract from the Speech of Bonar Law, Chancellor of the 

Exchequer, Bristol, England, January 24, 19 17 (C. E. 

I. P.). 

Speech of Premier Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament, re- 
plying to President Wilson's Senate Address, January 
25, 1917 (C. E. I. P.). 

Statement by Francesco Ruffini, Italian Minister of Public 
Instruction, replying to President Wilson's Senate Ad- 
dress, January 28, 1917 (T. C. H., March, 1917). 

Criticism of Plan for " Peace Without Victory " (T. C. H., 
March, 191 7). 

Statement of the Russian Foreign Office on President Wil- 
son's Senate Address (T. C. H., March, 1917). 

Comment of Dr. Wadeff, Bulgarian Minister to Switzer- 
land, on President Wilson's Peace Note {The N. Y. 
Times, January 27, 19 1 7). 

German Note to the United States regarding the Submarine 
Blockade, January 31, 191 7 (C. E. I. P.). 
[310] 



President Wilson's Address to Both Houses of Congress in 

Joint Session, February 3, 1917 (C. E. I. P.). 
Paul Milyukov's Address to the Duma, February 28, 1917 

(T. C. H., May, 1917). 
The Peace Terms of the Party Leaders of the Reichstag 

{The N. Y. Times, February 29, 1917). 
President Wilson's Inaugural Address {The N. Y. Times, 

March 6, 1917). 
Milyukov's War Note, March 18, 191 7 {The N. Y. Times, 

March 19, 1917). 
The Origin of the Russian Peace Terms, by Alexander 

Trachtenberg {The N. Y. Call, August 20, 1917). 
Call of the Petrograd, Council of Workers' and Soldiers' 

Deputies to the People of the Whole World, March 

27, 191 7 (Translated from Bulletin No. 15 of the 

Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies 

for Bulletin No. i of the Organizing Committee of the 

People's Council of America). 
Address of President Wilson calling for a Declaration of a 

State of War. Delivered before a Joint Session of 

Congress on April 2, 19 17 {The Congressional Record, 

April 2, 1917). 
Kaiser Wilhelm's Note of April 7, 191 7 (T. C. H., May, 

1917). 
Proclamation of the Russian Provisional Government, April 

10, 1917 {The N. Y. Times, April 11, 1917). 
Joint Note to the Allied Governments from the Provisional 

Government of Russia, May i, 1917 (T. C. H., June, 

1917). 
Explanation by the Provisional Government of its Note of 

May I to the Allied Governments ( The N. Y. Times, 

May 6, 1917). 
Extract From an Address by Rodzianko, President of the 

Duma, May 10, 1917 (T. C. H., June, 1917). 
Speech of the German Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, 

Before the Reichstag, May 15, 191 7 (T. C. H., July, 

1917). 

[311] 



Statement by Georg Ledebour in the Reichstag suggesting a 
republic in Germany (T, C. H., July, 1917). 

Philip Scheidemann's Speech in the Reichstag, May, 191 7 
{The Philadelphia Bulletin, May 21, 1917). 

The Question of the Russian Peace Formula debated in 
Parliament May 16, 1917 {The Times, London, May 
17, 1917; speech by Lord Robert Cecil in this debate 
inT. C. H., July, 1917). 

Aims of The Russian Coalition Provisional Government 
{The N. Y. Times, May 20, 1917). 

President Wilson's Note to Russia cabled May 26, 19 17 
(T. CH., July, 1917). 

Resolution Voted by the Russian Congress of Delegates from 
the Front, May 30, 1917 (T. C. H., July, 1917). 

Statement by Vandervelde, Belgian Minister of State, re- 
garding Peace Without Annexations or Indemnities, 
May, 1917 {Le Temps, May 28, 1917). 

Resolution adopted by the Russian Congress of Peasants 
Junes, 1917 (T. C. H., July, 1917). 

Ex-President Taft's Commencement Address at Union Col- 
lege, Schenectady, June 13, 191 7, on Why We Entered 
the Great War (T. C. H., August, 1917). 

French Ordre du Jour Resolution, June 5, 191 7 (T. C. H., 
July, 1917)- 

Reply of the British Government to the Russian Note Re- 
garding the Allied War Aims {The Times, London, 
June 12, 1917). 

French Note to Russia Defining War Aims, June ii, 1917 
(T. C. H., August, 191 7). 

President Wilson's Statement to the Belgian Commission, 
June 18, 1917 {The N. Y. Times, June 19, 1917). 

German Demand for Reform of the Prussian Diet, June 
20, 191 7 (T. C. H., August, 191 7). 

Lloyd George's Speech at Glasgow, June 29, 19 17 (Printed 
by Alabaster, Passmore & Sons, London). 

The Kaiser's Manifesto of July 13, 191 7 to the President of 
the Prussian State Ministry (T. C. H., August, 1917). 

Speech of Dr. Michaelis, the New German Chancellor, Be- 
[312] 



fore the Reichstag, July 19, 1917 (T. C. H., August, 

1917)- 

German Comment on Michaelis' Speech of July 19, 19 17 
{The Times, London, July 28, 1917). 

Lord Robert Cecil's Comment on Michaelis' Speech of 
July 19 {The N. Y. Times, July 21, 1917), 

Speech of Sir Edward Carson, Belfast, July 20, 1917 {The 
Times, London, July 21, 1917). 

Lloyd George's Speech on Belgian Independence Day, 
Queen's Hall, July 21, 191 7 {The N. Y. Times, July 
22, 1917)- 

Speech of Lord Robert Cecil in Parliament, July 24, 191 7 
{The Times, London, July 25, 1917). 

House of Commons Debate on the Reichstag Resolution, 
July 26, 1917 {The Times, London, July 27, 1917). 

Official Communique, in Regard to the Decision of the Al- 
lied Balkan Conference, Paris, July 25—27, 1917 {The 
Times, London, July 26, 1917). 

Count Czernin on Peace, July 28, 1917 {The Times, Lon- 
don, July 30, 191 7). 

Mr. Balfour's Speech in Parliament, July 30, 1917 {The 
Times, London, July 31, 1917). 

The Pope's Peace Proposal, August i, 191 7 {The N. Y. 
Times, August 17, 191 7). 

Mr. Balfour in the House of Commons, August 17, 1917 
{The Times, London, August 18, 1917). 

President Wilson's Reply to the Pope, August 27, 191 7 
{The N. y. Times, August 29, 191 7). 

The German Reply to the Pope ( The N. Y. Times, Septem- 
ber 23, 1917)- 

The Austrian Reply to the Pope {The N. Y. Times, Sep- 
tember 22, 191 7). 

Pan-German Program as Stated by von Bissing (T. C. H., 
August, 1917). 

Declaration of Policy by Mr. Walter Long, British Secre- 
tary of State for the Colonies, on the Future of German 
Colonies, January 31, 1917 {The Times, London, 
February i, 191 7). 

[313] 



Further statement by Mr. Long in Parliament, February 20, 

19 1 7 {The Times, London, February 21, 1917). 
Further Statement by Mr. Long in Parliament, August 14, 

1 91 7 (The Times, London, August 15, 1917). 
Statements on the Subject of the German Colonies by Baron 

Motono, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir 

Joseph Ward, Minister of Finance of New Zealand and 

Prime Minister Massey of New Zealand {The N. Y. 

Times, Fehrunry 23, 191 7). 
Lord Robert Cecil on the German Colonies (T. C. H., 

July, 1917). 
Statement of Herr Solf, German Colonial Secretary, on 

German Aims, June 7, 191 7 {The Times, London, 

June 20, 1917). 
Comment on Herr Solf's Speech by Captain von Salzmann, 

formerly German Agent in China ( The Times, London, 

June 29, 1917). 
Dr. Hans Delbrueck on the Colonies {The N. Y. Times, 

August 19, 191 7). 



Many of the official documents may also be found in the 
three pamphlets of " Official Documents Looking Toward 
Peace," published by the American Association for Interna- 
tional Conciliation, 407 W. 117th Street, New York City. 



[314] 



SOME OF THE MORE RECENT BOOKS 

AND ARTICLES DEALING WITH 

THE PROBLEMS OF THE 

SETTLEMENT 

Compiled by Pauline K. Angell 

/. QUESTIONS OF TERRITORY AND 
NATIONALITY 

Books and Pamphlets 
General 

Avant-Projet d'un Traite General Relatif aux Transferts 
de Territoires. By Theodor Adelsward. Stock- 
holm, Oskar Eklund, 19 17. 37 p. 

Le Droit des Nationalites. E. Bate, Ed. Paris, Alcan, 
1915, 112 p. 

The Submerged Nationalities of the German Empire. 
By E. Barker. London, Milford, 19 15. 

Problems of the Peace. William Harbutt Dawson, 
Ed. London, Allen & Unwin, 191 7. 366 p. 

Belgium and the Principle of Nationality. By Jules 
Destree. London, Council for the Study of Interna- 
tional Relations, 19 16. 45 p. 

The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe. 
By Leon Dominian. New York, Holt, 191 7. 375 p. 

The Value of Small States. By H. A. L. Fisher. Ox- 
ford University Press, 191 4. 25 p. 

Human Geography in Western Europe. By H. J. 
Fleure. London, Williams & Norgate, 19 17. 

The New Map of Europe. By Herbert Adams Gib- 
bons. New York, Century, 1914. xi., 412 p. 

[315] 



Deutschlands Grosste Gefahr: Ein Mahnruf. By Ru- 
dolf GoLDSCHEiD. Berlin, Verlag " Neues Vater- 
land," 1915. 64 p. 

Germany's Annexationist Aims. By S. Grumbach. 
(Tr. by J. Ellis Barker.) New York, Button, 

1917- 

Arms and the Map. A Study of Nationalities and Fron- 
tiers. By Ian C. Hannah. London, Unwin, 1915. 
261 p. 

The Dead Lands of Europe. By J, W. Headlam. 
New York, Doran. 3 1 p. 

Political Frontiers and Boundary Making. By Thomas 
H. HoLDiCH. London, Macmillan, 1916. xi., 307 p. 

Nationalism, War and Society, By Edward Kjiehbiel. 
New York, Macmillan, 19 16. 255 p. 

L'Europe Nouvelle. By Paul Louis. Paris, Alcan, 
1915. 131 p. 

Some Frontiers of Tomorrow. By L. W. Lyde. Lon- 
don, Black, 19 1 5. 120 p. 

The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis. 
By Thomas G. Masaryk. London, Council for the 
Study of International Relations, 19 15. 32 p. 

Notes Sur les Moyens de Constater la Nationalite. By 
Rob. Michels. The Hague, Martinus Mijhoff, 1917. 
10 p. 

The Problems of the Coming Peace. By Felix Mly- 
NARSKi. New York, Polish Book Importing Co., 19 16. 
172 p. 

The National Principle and the War. By Ramsay 
MuiR. Oxford University Press, 19 14. 

The War and the Settlement: An Italian View. By 
EuGENio RiGNANO. (Tr. by A. M. S. Furniss, with 
Int. by Ramsay Muir.) London, Council for the 
Study of International Relations, 1916. 100 p. 

Nationality in Modern History. By J. H. Rose. New 
York, Macmillan, 19 16. 202 p. 

II Principio di Nazionalita. By Francesco Ruffini. 
Milan, Treves. 

[316] 



The Problems of Nationality. By Theodore Ruyssen. 
(3 Pamphlets tr. by John Mez.) New York, Ameri- 
can Association for International Conciliation, 19 17. 
72 p. 

Present-Day Europe: Its National States of Mind. By 
Theodore Lothrop Stoddard. New York, Century, 
191 7. 3-322 p. 

Nationalism. By Rabindranath Tagore. London, 
Macmillan, 19 1 7. 

Nationality and the War. By Arnold J. Toynbee. 
London, Dent, 1915. xii,, 522 p. 

The New Europe: Some Essays in Reconstruction. By 
Arnold J. Toynbee. London, Dent, 19 15. 85 p. 

The Principle of Nationalities. By Israel Zangwill. 
New York, Macmillan, 1917. 5-1 16 p. 

Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhine Provinces 

Alsazia e Lorena. Anonymous. (Preface by Jean Car- 
rere.) Milan, Treves, 19 15. xv., 83 p. 

Wohin Gehort Elsass-Lothringen ? Anonymous. Zu- 
rich, Rascher, 191 5. 96 p. 

La Paix et la Frontiere du Rhin. By Franck Chau- 
VEAU. Paris, Perrin, 19 15. 

Alsace-Lorraine et Fra:nce Rhenane: Expose des Droits 
Historiques de la France sur Toute la Rive Gauche du 
Rhin. By Stephen Coube. (Preface by Maurice 
Barres.) Paris, Lethielleux, 1915. 181 p. 

La Question d'Alsace- Lorraine de 1871 a 19 14. By 
Jltles Duhem. Paris, Alcan, 191 7. 116 p. 

La Veritie Territorial et la Rive Gauche du Rhin. By 
F. DE Grailly. Paris-Nancy, Berger-Levrault, 19 16. 

384 P- 

Alsace-Lorraine Under German Rule. By Charles D. 
Hazen. New York, Holt, 1917. 

France-Alsace. (Conferences et articles.) By Paul- 
Albert Helmer. (Preface by Maurice Barres.) 
Paris, L'Edition Frangaise lllustree, 1916. xv., 316 p. 

Alsace-Lorraine, A Study in Conquest. By David Starr 

[317] 



Jordan. Indianapolis, Ind., Bobbs-Merrill, 1916. 

113 p. ^ 

La Guerre Europeenne et la Question d'Alsace-Lorrairie. 
By Henri and Andre Lichtenberger. Paris, Chap- 
elot, 1915. 132 p. 

Le Rhin Frangais: Annexion de la Rive Gauche. By 
Onesime Reclus, pseud. Paris, Attinger, 19 14. 
80 p. 

L' Alsace-Lorraine. By A. Prignet. (Preface by Dan- 
iel Blumenthal.) Paris, Delagrave, 191 6. 188 p. 

Alsace-Lorraine from Caesar to Kaiser. By Ruth Put- 
nam. New York, Putnam, 1915. viii., 208 p. 

La Frontiere du Rhin. By C. M. Savarit. Paris, 
Floury, 19 15. 47 p. 

L'Alsace-Lorraine ; Histoire d'une Annexion. By Ga- 
briel Seailles. Paris, Ligue des droits de I'homme, 
1916. 63 p. 

Notre Frontiere de I'Est: La France et I'empire a tra- 
vers I'histoire et les origines du pangermanisme. By 
Henri Stein. Paris, Alcan, 19 16. 127 p. 

La Rive Gauche du Rhin et I'fiquilibre Europeen. By 
Charles Stienon. Paris, Lib. d. 1. soc. d. Recueil 
Sirey, 191 7. 80 p. 

Elsass-Lothringen und der Krieg. By Bruno Weil. 
Leipzig, Singer, 19 14. 64 p. 

Italia Irredenta and the Adriatic 

L'Avvenire Coloniale d'ltalia e la Guerra. By Saving 
AcQUAViVA. Rome, Athenaeum, 191 7. 127 p. 

L'Adriatico: Studio Geografico, Storico e Politico. 
Anonymous. Milan, Treves, 19 14. 404 p. 
* Italy and the War. By Jacques Bainville. (Tr. by 
Bernard Miall.) New York, Doran, 19 15. 9-267 p. 

Al Parlemento Austriaco e al Popolo Italiano. By Ce- 
sar e Battisti. Milan, Treves, 19 15. 

Why Italy Entered into the Great War. By Luigi 
Carnovale. Chicago, 111., Italian- American Publish- 
ing Co., 1917. 673 p. 

[318] 



Trento e Trieste: L'Irredentismo e il Problema Adri- 
atico. By Gualtiero Castellini. Milan, Treves, 

1915. 

Italy and the Jugoslav Peoples. By Civis Italic us, 
pseud. (Tr. by G. F. Hill.) London, Council for 
the Study of International Relations, 191 6. 

On Great Serbia. (Cover title: Are Italy's Claims on 
Istria, Dalmatia and islands justified? Thou shalt not 
steal. Ne kradi.) By Martin D. Krmpotic. Kan- 
sas City, Kan., Typis the Catholic Register, 19 15. 15 p. 

I Trattati di Lavoro e la Protezione dei Nostri Lavoranti 
all'Estero. By Luciano De Feo. (Preface by Luigi 
Lussatti.) Milan, Treves. 

Dalmazia e Italia. By Illyricus, pseud. Rome, Vog- 
hera, 1915. 52 p. 

Italy and the War. By Sidney Low. London, Long- 
mans, Green, 19 16. xii., 316 p. 

La Dalmazia. By Giuseppe Prezzolini. Firenze: 
Libreria della Voce, 1915. 

The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic. By R. W. Seton- 
Watson. London, Nisbet, 19 15. 79 p. 

L'Adriatico : Golfo d'ltalia. L'ltalianita di Trieste. By 
Attilio Tamaro. Milan, Treves, 1915. 270 p. 

La Guerre Europeenne et la Question de I'Adriatique. 
By C. Vellay. Paris, Chapelot, 191 5. 128 p. 

Illyricus: La Question de Trieste. By Bogumil 
VosNjAK. Geneva, 191 5. 

Greater Italy. By William Kay Wallace. New- 
York, Scribner, 19 17. x., 312 p. 

II Diritto d'ltalia su Trieste e I'lstria. Documenti. 
Milan, Bocca, 1915. xxxix., 616 p. 

Austria-Hungary 

Les Races et les Nationalites en Autriche-Hongrie. By 

Bertrand Auerbach. Paris, Alcan, 1917. (2nd 

enlarged edition.) 
La Question d'Autriche, les Slovaques. By Ernest 

Denis. Paris, Delagrave, 191 7. 283 p. 

[319] 



The Whirlpool of Europe, Austria-Hungary and the 

Hapsburgs. By A. R. and E. M. Colquhoun, New 

York, Dodd, Mead, 1914. xvi., 349 p. 
Modern Austria: Her Racial and Social Problems. 

With a Study of Italia Irredenta. By Virginio 

Gayda. (Tr. by Zoe M. Gibson, and C. A. Miles.) 

London, Unwin, 191 5. 350 p. 
L'Ungueria e i Magiari nella Guerra delli Nazioni. By 

Armando Hodnig. Milan, Treves, 1915. xi., 96 p. 
Is Austria Doomed? By Zanardi Landi. London, 

Hodder & Stoughton, 19 16. 188 p. 
La Liquidation de I'Autriche-Hongrie. By Louis 

Leger. Paris, Alcan, 191 5. 86 p. 
The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary (from 1866 to 

1915). By Ferdinand L. Leipnik. London, Un- 
win, 1915. 
Die Volkswirtschaft Osterreich-Ungarns und die Ver- 

standingung mit Deutschland. By Erich Pistor. 

Berlin, Reimer, 1915. 175 p. 
Austria-Hungary; the Polyglot Empire. By Wolf 

von Schierbrand. New York, Stokes, 191 7. vii., 

352 P- 
The Future of Austria-Hungary and the Attitude of the 

Great Powers. By R. W. Seton-Watson. (Scotus 

Viator, pseud.) London, Constable, 1907. vii., 77 p. 
German, Slav and Magyar; a study in the origins of the 

great war. By R. W. Seton-Watson. London, 

Williams, 19 16. 198 p. 

Central Europe^ the Balkans and the Near East 

General Treatment 

The Pan-German Plot Unmasked. By Andre Ch era- 
dame. (Tr. by Lady Frazer, with an int. by the Earl 
of Cromer.) New York, Scribner, 191 7. xxxi., 

235 p. 
German Road to the East. By Percy Evans Lewin. 
New York, Doran, 191 7. 

[320] 



Central Europe. By Friedrich Naumann. (Tr. by 
Christabel M. Meredith, with an int. by W. J. Ashley.) 
London, King, 19 16. 345 p. 

Die Balkanfrage. M. J. Boun, Ed. Munich, Duncker 

and Humbolt, 19 14. , 
Deutschland, Osterreich-Ungarn und die Balkanstaaten. 

By H. von Bulow. Hamburg, Der Siid-West-Ver- 

lag, 1914. 166 p. 
The Burden of the Balkans. By M. Edith Durham. 

Nelson, 19 15. 
The War and the Balkans. By Noel Buxton and 

Charles Roden Buxton. London, Allen & Unwin, 

1915. 112 p. 
L'Evolution Economique Contemporaine des Pays Bal- 

kaniques — Roumanie, Bulgarie et Serbie. By M. Du- 

desco. Paris, Rousseau, 191 5. 
The Balkans, By N. Forbes, A. J. Toynbee, D', Mit- 

RANY, and D. G. Hogarth. Oxford, Clarendon 

Press, 19 1 5. 407 p. 
The Politics of the Balkan League. By Ivan E. Gue- 

CHOFF. (Tr. by Constantin C. Mincoff.) London, 

Murray, 1915. 162 p. 
England in the Balkans; A Hellenic on British Policy. 

By John Mavrogordato. London, Hellenic League, 

1915- 

Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems in Their Rela- 
tion to the Great European War. By Marion L 
Newbigin. London, Constable, 191 5. ix., 243 p. 

Les Pays Balkaniques. By Gustave L. Niox. Paris, 
Delagrave, 191 5. 188 p. 

Light on the Balkan Darkness. By Crawfurd Price. 
London, Simpkin, 19 15. 124 p. 

The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans. By R. W. 
Seton-Watson. London, Constable, 191 7. 

The Balkans: A Laboratory of History. By William 
M. Sloane. New York, Eaton & Mains, 1914. viii., 
33-2 p. 

[321] 



War and Diplomacy in the Balkans. By H. Charles 
Woods. London, Cox- 1915. vi., 48 p. 

Russlands Balkanpolitik in der Jiingsten Vergangenheit. 
By Johannes Ziekursch. Breslau, Preuss & Jiinger, 
1915- 17 p. 

Our Slavic Fellow Citizens. By Emily G. Balch. 
New York, Charities Publication Committee, 19 10. 
XX., 536 p. 

The Southern Slavs. By N. Forbes. Oxford Univer- 
sity Press. 191 5. 

Les Yougoslaves, Leur Passe: Leur Avenir. By H. 
HiNKOVic. Paris, Alcan, 19 16. 28 p. 

La Yougoslavie ; La France et les Serbes. By Pierre de 
Lanux. Paris, Payot, 191 6. 263 p. 

Le Panslavisme et I'lnteret Frangais. By Louis Leger. 
Paris, Flammarion. 

The Slav Nations. By Srgjan Pl. Tucic. (Tr. by 
Fanny S. Copeland.) New York, Doran, 1915. viii., 
11-192. 

The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy. 
By R. W. Seton-Watson. London, Constable, igii. 
xii., 463 p. 

Jugoslav Nationalism. By Bogumil Vosnjak. Lon- 
don, 19 1 6. 

A Bulwark against Germany. By Bogumil Vosnjak. 
London, Allen & Unwin, 191 7. 270 p. 

L'Unite Yougoslave Manifeste de la Jeunesse Serbe, 
Croate et Slovene Reunie. (Preface by T. G. Mas- 
aryk.) Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1916. 53 p. 

Idea of Southern Slav Unity. (Pub. for Jugoslav Com- 
mittee in London.) London, Nisbet, 191 5. 

Sketch of Southern Slav History. (Pub. for Jugoslav 
Committee in London.) London, Nisbet, 191 5. 32 p. 

Southern Slavs: Land and People. (Pub. for Jugoslav 
Committee in London.) London, Nisbet, 191 5. 64 p. 

Southern Slav Programme. (Pub. for Jugoslav Commit- 
tee in London.) London, Nisbet, 1915. 32 p. 

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Near East from Within. Anonj^mous. London, Cassell, 

1915- 

Nationalism and War in the Near East. By " A Diplo- 
matist." Lord Courtney of Penwith, Ed. Ox- 
ford University Press, 19 15. 428 p. 

La Guerre d'Orient et la Crise Europeenne. By Paul 
Louis. Paris, Alcan, 1916. ii., 122 p. 

Eastern Question. By J. A. R. Marriott. Oxford 
University Press, 191 7. viii., 456 p. 

Germany and Eastern Europe. By Lewis B. Namier, 
(With an int. by H. A. L. Fisher.) London, Duck- 
worth, 191 5. xvi., 128 p. 

I Dardanelli: I'Oriente e la Guerra Europea. By Giu- 
seppe Piazza. Milan, Treves, 1915. 172 p. 

The Reconstruction of South-Eastern Europe. By V. R. 
Savic. London, Chapman, 19 17. 279 p. 

Der Weltkrieg 19 14-16 und sein Zusammenhang mit 
der Orient Krise. By Rudolf Wahn. Wien, Brau- 
miiller, 19 16. 199 p. 

The Near Eastern Problem and the Pan-German Peril. 
By Vladimir Yovanovitch. London, Watts, 19 15. 

Special Treatment 
{Listed alphabetically by countries.) 

The Revolt in Arabia. By E. Snouck Hurgronje. 
London, Putnam, 191 7. 

Der Arabische Orient und der Krieg. By A. Mi-Bas- 
CHAN. Zurich, Fiissli, 191 6. 40 p. 

Die Armenische Frage. By C. A. Bratter. Berlin, 
Concordia Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 19 15. 40 p. 

Armenia Past and Present. By W. Llew. Williams. 
(Int. by T. R. O'Connor.) King, 19 16. 211 p. 

La Question Bosniaque. By Sigismond Gorgas. Paris, 
Giard & Briere, 191 5. 

Bosnie-Herzegovine. By Nikola Stoianovitch. Ge- 
neva, Kundig, 19 1 7. 

The Aspirations of Bulgaria. By Balkanicus, pseud. 

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(Tr. from the Serbian.) London, Simpkin, 1915. 
288 p. 

Bulgaria and Her Neighbors. By Historicus, pseud. 
New York, Mail and Express job printing, inc., 191 7. 
no p. 

The Intervention of Bulgaria and the Central Macedo- 
nian Question. By Crawfurd Price. London. Lec- 
ture Agency, Ltd., 19 15. 

Bulgaria's Role in the Balkans. By R. A. Tsanoff. 
Worcester, Mass., 1915. 20 p. (Reprinted from the 
Journal of Race Development, v. 5.) 

Les Croates sous le Joug Magyar. By H. Hinkovic. 
Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1915. 

Greece in Her True Light: Her position in the World- 
vi'ide war. As expounded by El. K. Venizelos. (Tr. 
and published by S. A. Xanthaky and M. G. Sakella- 
rios.) New York, 1916. 288 p. 

Mesopotamia, the Key to the Future. By Canon J. Y. 
Parfit. New York, 191 7. 41 p. 

Geschichte von Montenegro und Albanien. By S. Gop- 
CEVic. Gotha, Perthes, 1914. 

The Policy of National Instinct,' A Speech Delivered in 
the Rumanian Chamber of Deputies During the Sitting 
of the i6th and 17th December, 1915, by Take 
JoNESCo. London, Constable, 1916. 108 p. 

The Justice of Roumania's Cause. By A. W. A. Leeper. 
New York, 191 7. 24 p. 

Roumania's Cause and Ideals. By Leonard A. Mag- 
nus. London, Paul (Kegan), Trench, 1917. xiii., 
165 p. 

La Roumanie Contemporaine : Son Importance dans le 
Concert Balkanique et pour la Guerre Presente. By 
Constantin D. Mavrodin. (Preface by Georges 
Lacour-Gayet. ) Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 19 15. 

Greater Roumania: A Study in National Ideals. By 
D. MiTRANY. New York, 191 7. 20 p. 

Roumania and the Great War. By R. W. Setoj^-Wat- 
SON. London, Constable, 1915. 102 p. 

[324] 



Serbia and the Serbs. By Sir Valentine Chirol. 
Oxford University Press, 19 14. 18 p. 

The Spirit of the Serb. By R. W. Seton-Watson. 
London, Nisbet, 191 5. 

Serbia's Place in Human History. By Nicholai Vel- 
iMiROVic. London, Council for the Study of Interna- 
tional Relations, 19 16. 20 p. 

Religion and Nationality in Serbia. By Nicholai Vel- 
IMIROVIC. (Preface by R. W. Seton-Watson.) Lon- 
don, Nisbet, 19 15. 

L'Europe et la Resurrection de la Serbie. By Gregoire 
Yakchitch. (Preface by Emile Haumant.) Paris, 
Hachette. 

Les Slovenes. By Ivan Krek. (Tr. by A. U.) Paris, 
Alcan, 191 7. 85 p. 

Political and Social Conditions in Slovene Lands. Lon- 
don, The Near East. 36 p. 

La Syrie et la France. By C. and Paul Roederer. 
(Preface by M. Pierre- Alype. ) Nancy- Paris, Berger- 
Levrault, 191 7. xxviii., 144 p. 

The Passing of the Turkish Empire in Europe. By 
R. Granville Barker. Philadelphia, Lippincott, 
1914. 

La Reprise de Constantinople et I'Alliance Franco-Russe. 
By Edouard Driault, Paris, Alcan, 19 15. 48 p. 

Deutschland, die Turkei und der Islam; ein Beitrag 
zu den Grundlinien der Deutschen Weltpolitik im 
Islamischen Orient. By Hugo Grothe. Leipzig, 
S. Hirzel, 1914. 43 p. 
L'Europe Devant Constantinople. By Max Hoschiller. 
Paris, Riviere, 1916. 147 p. 

Turkey and the War. By Vladimir Jabotinsky. Lon- 
don, Unw^in, 191 7. 264 p. 

The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. By 
Coleman Phillipson and Noel Buxton. London, 
Stevens & Haynes, 19 17. 
Turkey: A Past and a Future. By A. J. Toynbee. 
New York, Doran, 191 7. 85 p. 

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The Disposition of Constantinople. By Talcott Wil- 
liams. Philadelphia, American Academy of Political 
& Social Science, 19 17. 6 p. 

The Future of Constantinople. By L. S. Woolf. New 
York, Macmillan, 191 7. 9-109 p. 

Turkey in Europe and Asia. Oxford University Press, 
1914. 

Poland 

Poland and the League of Nations. By H. N. Brails- 
ford. London, Allen & Unwin, 191 7. 

Deutschland, Polen und die Russische Gefahr. By 
Wilhelm Feldman. (Preface by Alexander Bruck- 
ner.) Berlin, K. Curtius, 191 5. 99 p. 

The Polish Question in Connection with the Lithuanian, 
Ruthenian and Jewish Questions. By J. Gabrys. 
Paris, Lithuanian Information Bureau, 19 15. 15 p. 

Poland: A Study in National Ideahsm. By Monica 
M. Gardiner. London, Burns & O., 1915. 256 p. 

The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East. By 
Herbert Adams Gibbons. New York, Century, 
1917. X., 218 p. 

The Pole and the World War. By A. von Guttry. 
Munich, G. Muller, 19 15. 304 p. 

Voina i Polsha. L. Kozlovsky, Ed. 19 14. 194 p. 

Neu-Polen. By M. Kranz. Munich, Lehmann, 1915. 
100 p. 

Reflexions Sur le Probleme Polonais. By Jan Kuchar- 
GEWSKI. Lausanne, Societe Suisse de Publicite, 

1915. 

Comment les Polonais Comprennent leur Liberte. By 
Michel Lozynsky. (Tr. by G. Brocher.) Lau- 
sanne, Rev. Ukranienne, 19 16. 40 p. 

Poland as a Geographical Entity. By W. Nalkowski. 
(Preface by J. Fairgrieve.) London. Allen & Un- 
win, 1917. 

Was wird aus Polen? By Friedrich Naumann. 
Berlin, Reimer, 191 7. 

[326] 



Poland. By W. Alison Phillips. London, Williams 

& Norgate, 19 15. 256 p. 
La Pologne d'hier et de demain. By Stanislas Posner. 

(Int. by Georges Renard.) Paris, Alcan, 19 16. xii., 

124 p. 
Racial Delimitation of Poland. By J. M. Robertson. 

London, Allen & Unwin, 191 7. 
Russia, Poland and the Ukraine. By G. F. Steffen. 

(Tr. from the Swedish by J. W. Hartman.) Jersey 

City, Ukrainian National Council, 19 15. iv., 36 p. 
Zur Losung der Polnischen Frage; Offener Brief an 

George Cleinow und Maximilian Harden. By " A 

Pole." Berlin, Kohler, 1914. 35 p. 
Poland's Case for Independence. Being a series of Essays 

illustrating the continuance of her national life. New 

York, Dodd, Mead, 1916. 352 p. 
German Economic Policy in Poland: Reprinted from 

The Times, Nov. 25, 26, 27, 1915. London, Polish 

Information Committee, 1916. 24 p. 
The Polish Question as an International Problem. Lon- 
don, Allen & Unwin, 19 16. 
Resurrection of Poland: For a Lasting Peace. Paris, 

Societe Generale d'lmprimerie et d'Edition Leve, 191 5. 
Polish Problem by a Pole. London, Union of Democratic 

Control, 191 5. 

Other Suppressed Nationalities 

(Listed alphabetically by countries.) 

Bohemia's Case for Independence. By Edward Benes. 
(Int. by H. W. Steed.) London, Allen & Unwin, 
1917. 

The Case of Bohemia. By Lewis B. Namier. (Lon- 
don?), Czech National Alliance in Great Britain, 1917. 
10 p. 

The Czecho-Slovaks ; an Oppressed Nationality, By 
Lewis B. Namier. New York, Doran, 191 7. 24 p. 

Bohemia's Claim for Freedom. J. Prochazka, Ed. 

[327] 



(Int. by G. K. Chesterton.) London, Matheus, 191 5. 
The Future of Bohemia. By R. W. Seton-Watson. 

London, Nisbit, 19 15. 
Finland, the Buffer State of Europe. By Johannes W. 

W. HoRiNG. (Tr. by F. C. De Walsh.) N. Y. 

German-American Literary Defence Committee, 1915. 

15 p. 
The Golden Key to World Power and the War. (India.) 

By SuNAMPADU Arumugam. London, Longmans, 

Green, 1915. viii., 127 p. 
The Future of Young India. By Annie Besant. 

Adyar, Madras, Theosophical Pub. House, 1915. 
Towards Liberty: Being a Britisher's View Concerning 

India. By T. L. Crombie. Adyar, Madras, Theo. 

Pub, House, 1915. 
Towards Home Rule. By Ramananda Chatterjee. 

Calcutta, Modern Review Office. 
Indien unter der Englischen Herrschaft. By Sten 

Konow. Tubingen, Mohr, 1915. 142 p. 
Deutschland — Indiens Hoffnung. By A. R. Pillai. 

Gottingen, Spielmeyer, 19 14. 41 p. 
Young India. By Lajpat Rai. New York, Huebsch, 

1917. xix., 254 p. 
Self-Government for India Under the British Flag. By 

V. S. Srinivasa Sastri. Allahabad, Servants of India 

Society. 
The Indian Demands: A Symposium. (Int. by G. A. 

Natesan.) Madras, Nateson & Co. 
British Rule in India Condemned by the British Them- 
selves. London, Indian National Party, 19 15. 68 p. 
The Irish Orators. By Claude Bowers. Indianapolis, 

Ind., Bobbs-Merrill, 1917, 
The Irish Rebellion of 191 6 ; a Brief History of the Revolt 

and its Suppression. By John F. Boyle, London, 

Constable, 19 16. 298 p. 
The Crime Against Ireland : A Possible Outcome of the 

War of 19 14. By Sir Roger Casement. Phila- 
delphia Celtic Press, 191 5. 28 p. 
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The Crimes of England. By G. K. Chesterton. Lon- 
don, Palmer, 191 5. 437 P- 

The Irish Rebellion of 1916 and its Martyrs. By Pa- 
DRIAC CoLUM, et al. Maurice Joy, Ed. New York, 
Devin-Adair Co., 191 6. 427 p. 

Dawn in Ireland. By Marie Harrison. London, A. 
Melrose, 191 7. 222 p. 

The King, the Kaiser and Irish Freedom. By James K. 
McGuiRE. New York, Devin-Adair Co., 1915. 

313 p. 
What Could Germany Do For Ireland. By James K. 

McGuiRE. (Int. by Thomas A. Emmet.) New 

York, Wolfe Tone Co., 191 6. 309 p. 
The Irish Rebellion: What Happened and Why. By 

Frederick A. McKenzie. London, Pearson, 191 6. 

112 p. 
England und Ireland. By Carl Peters. Hamburg, 

Deutsche Buchandlung, 191 5. 31 p. 
Ireland and Poland: A Comparison. By T. W. RoL- 

leston. New York, Doran, 19 17. 22 p. 
The National Being — Some Thoughts on an Irish Polity. 

By A. E. (George Russell). Dublin, Maunsel, 

1917. 176 p. 
A Forgotten Small Nationality: Ireland and the War. 

By F. Sheehy Skeffington. New York, Century. 

9 p. 
The Insurrection in Dublin. By James Stephens. 

Dublin, Maunsel, 19 16. 11 1 p. 
A History of the Irish Rebellion of 1 916. By Warre B. 

Wells and N. Marlowe. Dublin, Maunsel, igi6. 

271 p. 
Trial of Sir Roger Casement. George H. Knott, Ed. 

London, Hodge, 1917. xi., 304 p. 
La Question Luxembourgeoise, la France et le Grand- 

Duche de Luxembourg. By J. Dontenville. Paris, 

Tenin, 1917. 106 p. 
Slesvig du Nord, 1906-19 14. Copenhagen, Associations 

Slesvigoises Reunies du Danemark, 191 5. 166 p. 

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Die Ukrainische Staatsidie und der Krieg gegen Russland, 

By Dmytro Donzow. Berlin, Ukrainische Zentral- 

Organisation, 19 15. 70 p. 
The Historical Evolution of the Ukrainian Problem. 

(Tr. by G. Raffalovich. ) By Michaelo Krushev- 

SKY. Letchworth, Garden City Press, 191 5. 
Die Ukraine und ihre Bedeutung im gegenwartigen 

Kriege mit Russland. By Wladimir Kuschnir. 

Vienna, Verlag der Ukrainischen Rundschau, 19 15. 
Die Ukraine der Lebensnerv Russlands. By Eugen 

Lewicky. Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 19 15. 

32 p. 
L'Ukraine sous le Protectorat Russe. By Boris E. 

NoLDE. (Tr. from the Russian by Maurice Gehri.) 

Paris, Payot, 19 1 5. 
The Ukraine and the Ukrainians. By Stefan Rudint- 

SKY. (Tr. from the German by J. W. Hartman.) 

Jersey City, Ukrainian National Council, 191 5. iv., 

36 p. 
Der Weltkrieg und der Ukrainische Problem. By 

Verax, pseud. Berlin, 19 15. 64 p. 
The Russian Plot to Seize Galicia (Austrian Ruthenia). 

By Vladimir Stepankovsky. Jersey City, Ukrain- 
ian National Council, 19 15. v., 55 p. 

The German Colonies 
La Provocation Allemande aux Colonies. By Pierre 

Alype. (Preface by M. Albert Sarraut.) Paris, 

Berger-Levrault, 19 15. xlii, 244 p. 
The German African Empire. By Albert F. Calvert. 

London, Laurie, 19 16. 371 p. 
The New Map of Africa. By Herbert Adams Gibbons. 

New York, Century, 19 16. xiv., 503 p. 
The German Colonial Empire: Its Beginning and End- 
ing. By Paolo Giordani. (Tr. by Mrs. G. W. 

Hamilton.) New York, Macmillan, 19 17. x., 

156 p. 
Germany's Lost Colonial Empire and the Essentials of 

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Reconstruction. By John H. Harris. London, Simp' 

kin, 1917. vii., 88 p. 
Intervention and Colonization in Africa. By Norman 

D. Harris. (Int. by James T. Shotwell.) Boston, 

Houghton Mifflin, 1914. xviii., 348 p. 
The Political Geography of Africa Before and After the 

War. By H. H. Johnston. London, Royal Geo- 
graphical Society, 191 7. 28 p. 
Nordwestafrika und Deutschland. By Georg Kampff- 

MEYER. Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 19 14. 

30 p. 
Germany's Vanishing Colonies. By Gordon Le Sueur. 

London, Everett & Co., 19 15. 190 p. 
The Germans and Africa: Their Aims on the Dark 

Continent and How They Acquired Their African 

Colonies. By Evans LEVt^iN. (Int. by the Rt. Hon. 

Earl Grey.) London, Cassell, 191 5. 
Africa and the Peace of Europe. By E. D. Morel. 

London, National Labour Press, 19 17. 
Kolonialgeschichte der Neuzeit: Ein Abriss. By Veit 

Valentin. Tubingen, Mohr, 191 5. 226 p. 
Germans Must Go, Being a series of Leaders from " The 

Australian Statesman and Mining Standard." Mel- 
bourne, 19 1 5. 

The Far East and the Pacific 
The Mastery of the Pacific. By A. R. Colquhoun. 

New York, Macmillan, 1902. xvi., 440 p. 
The New Pacific. By C. B. Fletcher. (Preface by 

Viscount Bryce and foreword by the Rt. Hon W. M. 

Hughes.) New York, Macmillan, 1917. xxxiii., 

325 P- 

Japan in World Politics. By K. K. Kawakami. New 
York, Macmillan, 191 7. 

The Great War in the Far East, with Special Considera- 
tion of the Rights and Interests of China and the United 
States of America. By Thomas F, F. Millard. 
Shanghai, Mercantile Ptg. Co., 191 5. xi., 9 p. 

[331] 



European Influence in the Pacific, 1513-1914. By Sir 
EvERARD IM Thurn. London, Royal Geographical 
Society, 1915. 27 p. 

Articles 
General 
The Background of Aggression. By Norman Angell. 

New Republic, 150-2, September 8, 1917. 
German Annexations and Indemnities. By Charles A. 

Beard. New Republic, 309-10, July 14, 1917. 
World Empire and National Ideals. By Barton Blake, 

The Forum, 1-6, January, 1917. 
Russia and the Settlement. By H. N. Brailsford. 

New Republic, 343-5, April 21, 1917. 
Alien Races in Russia. By L. Denton. Canadian 

Magazine, 307-11, August, 1917. 
Annexation and the Principle of Nationality. By 

Stephen P. Duggan. Proceedings of the Academy 

of Political Science, Part I., 112-117, July, 191 7. 
Suppressed Nationalities and the Consent of the Governed. 

By Francis Hackett. Proceedings of the Academy 

of Political Science, Part I., 102-106, July, 1917. 
Peace and Settlement. By Sidney Low. Atlantic 

Monthly, 39-50, July, 1917. 
Aims of Democratic Russia: An Authorized Interview 

with M. I. Tereschenko. By G. Mason. Outlook, 

649-51, August 29, 19 1 7. 
Settlement of the Map of Europe. By Joseph McCabe. 

Bookman, 374-80, June, 19 17. 
Interests and Rights of Nationality. By C. E. McGuiRE. 

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 

Science, 147-53, July, 1917. 
No Annexations and No Indemnities? By Politicus, 

pseud. Fortnightly Review, 20-33, July, 191 7. 
" Peace Without Annexations or Indemnities." A Letter 

from Petrograd in June. By John Pollock. Nine- 
teenth Century, 1022-43, November, 1917. 

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Is Nationalism Moribund? By Bertrand Russbll. 
Seven Arts, 673-87, October, 191 7. 

National Independence and Internationalism. By Bert- 
rand Russell. Atlantic Monthly, 622-8, May, 1917. 

What Free Russia Asks of Her Allies. By Lincoln 
Steepens. Everybody's, 129-41, August, 191 7. 

No Annexations and No Indemnities. By W. E. Wall- 
ing. Independent, 327-8, May 19, 191 7. 

Discussion of Small Nationalities. Proceedings of the 
Academy of Political Science, Part I., 131— 138; 146— 
155, July, 1917- 

Russian Peace Terms. Editorial. Independent, 319—20, 
May 19, 1917. 

On the Basis of Nationality. Editorial. New Republic, 
324-7, January 20, 19 17. 

What the Russian Government Wants. Editorial. New 
Republic, 1 7 1-2, June 16, 191 7. 

Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhine Provinces 

Alsace-Lorraine. By Daniel Blumenthal. Con- 
temporary Review, 509—13, April, 1917. 

Why Alsace-Lorraine Wants to be French. By Jules 
Bois. Bookman, 259-64, May, 191 7. 

Alsace-Lorraine To-day and Yesterday. By S. Dewey. 
Nation, 125-7, February i, 1917. 

What About Alsace-Lorraine. By S. Dewey. Nation, 
145-6, August 9, 1917. 

Return of Alsace-Lorraine. By Ernest Dimnet. 
Nineteenth Century, 504—29, September, 191 7. 

Plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine. By S. Griffith. Out- 
look, 880-1, December 20, 19 16. 

Alsace-Lorraine. By A. L. Guerard. New Republic, 
22-3, May 5, 19 1 7. 

Question of Alsace-Lorraine. By E. Lavisse and C. 
Pfister. Fortnightly Review, 49-61, July, 191 7. 

France and the Rhine Frontier. By J. H. Rose. Nine- 
teenth Century, 289—99, February, 191 7. 

[333] 



Alsace and the Stepfatherland. By C. Wagner. At- 
lantic Monthly, 391—7, September, 1917. 

Coal and Iron in War: The Importance of Alsace and 
Lorraine. By " Y," pseud. Fortnightly Review, 700- 
10, November, 191 7. 

Question of Alsace-Lorraine. Editorial. Independent, 
45-6, July 14, 191 7. 

Alsace-Lorraine. Editorial. Nation, 700-1, June 14, 
191 7. 

Lorraine, Coal and Iron. Editorial. New Republic, 
152-4, September 8, 1917. 

Italia Irredenta and the Adriatic 

Avanti Savoia! What Italy Is Fighting For. By 
A. DE BiASi. Independent, 419, September 15, 1917. 

Italy, Austria and Europe. By E. Corradini. Nine- 
teenth Century, 1193-1203, June, 1917. 

Italy and the Adriatic. By Guglielmo Ferrero. At- 
lantic Monthly, 61-8, July, 1917. 

Italy's War of Emancipation. By H. N. Gay. Nation, 
362-3, March 29, 1917. 

Unredeemed Italy. By the Duke of Litta-Visconti- 
Arese. North American Review, 561-74, October, 

1917. 
Italy's Relation to the War. By W. Lowrie. North 

American Review, 63—76, January, 191 7. 
" Italia Irredenta." Editorial. New Republic, 202-4, 

June 23, 191 7. (See Answer by A. A. Bernardy, 

360-1, July 28, 1917-) 

A ustria-Hu ngary 

Aiding the Enemy's Diplomacy: Austria and the Slavs. 
By Norman Angell. New Republic, 324-7, July 21, 
1917. 
The Hungarian Upheaval. By Eugene S. Bagger. 
New Republic, 211-14, September 22, 1917. (See An- 
swer by Voyslav M. Yovanovitch, 48-9, November 10, 
1917.) 
[334] 



Break Austria. By Very Rev. Canon William 
Barry, D.D. Nineteenth Century, 441-53, Septem- 
ber, 19 1 7. 

New Spirit in Austria. By H. N, Brailsford. Con- 
temporary Review, 130-8, August, 1917. 

Only Hope for Austria. By C. F. M. Z. Landi. Nine- 
teenth Century, 217-23, January, 19 17. 

Austria's Doom. By W. Paget. Nineteenth Century, 
562-9, March, 191 7. 

Austria and Prussia. By W. Paget. Nineteenth Cen- 
tury, 1098-1109, May, 1917. 

The Austrian Problem. By Charles Pergler. Pro- 
ceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Part I, 

139-45, July, 1917- 

Austria's Hour of Destiny. By Politicus, pseud. 
Fortnightly Review, 283-95, August, 1917. 

Fate of Austria-Hungary. By W. von Schierbrand. 
World's Work, 189-99, June, 19 17. 

Austria and Europe. By H. W. Steed. Edinburgh Re- 
view, 1—22, January, 191 7. 

What Is Austria? By H. W. Steed. Edinburgh Re- 
view, 364-85, October, 191 7. 

Austria Faces the Future. By T. L. Stoddard. Review 
of Reviews, 62-7, January, 19 17. 

Central Europe, the Balkans and the Near East 

General Treatment 

Threat of Mittel-Europa. By T. G. Frothingham. 
Current History Magazine, N. Y. Times, 97-9, July, 

1917. 
The Failure of Central Europe. By J. M. Kennedy. 

Fortnightly Review, 990-1002, December, 19 16. 
The Challenge of Mid-Europe. By Henry R. Mussey. 

Political Science Quarterly, 450-459, September, 1917. 
Problem of Central Europe. Unsigned. Educational 

Review, 161-76; 294-311; 397-415, February-April, 

1917. 

[335] 



Middle Europe and Bulgaria. Editorial. Nation, 37-8, 

January i, 1917. 
Breaking up Mid-Europe. Editorial. New Republic, 

121-2, June 2, 1917. 
German Political Strategy. Editorial. New Republic, 

281-2, April 7, 191 7. 

Fixing up the Balkans. By F. L. Allen. Century, 
156-8, May, 1917. 

New Departure in Balkan Diplomacy. By Noel Bux- 
ton. Nineteenth Century, 1215-24, June, I9I7- 

Balkan Diplomacy. By S. P. Duggan. Political Sci- 
ence Quarterly, 36-59; 224-51, March, June, 1917. 

The Fate of the Balkans. By Herbert Adams Gibbons. 
Century, 177-86, June, 19 17. 

The Balkan Situation. By David Starr Jordan. The 
Public, 1078-80, November 9, 19 17. 

Balkan Unity and the New Departure. By A. F. 
Whyte. (An answer to Mr. Buxton.) Nineteenth 
Century, 211-20, July, 191 7. 

A Jugo-Slav Federation. By T. H. Holdich. Fort- 
nightly Review, 185-95, August, 1917. 

Weakness of Slavic Polity. By A. S. Johnson. Un- 
popular Review, 243-50, April, 1917. 

Russia and the Slav Ideal. By Z. N. Peev. Fortnightly 
Review, 606-16, April, 191 7. 

Special Treatment. 
{Listed alphabetically by countries.) 

Kingdom in Arabia. By F. Healey. Outlook, 188-9, 

May 30, 1 91 7. 
The Revival of the Arab Nation. By Sidney Low. 

Fortnightly Review, 82—9, July, 191 7. 
Revolution in Arabia. By A. Rihani. Bookman, 121- 

6; 283-8; 495-501, April-May, July, 1917. 

[336] 



And What of Armenia? By N. Der-Hagopian. 
Forum, 49-56, July, 1917- 

Must Armenia Perish? By F. P. Haggard. Independ- 
ent, 540-2, June 23, 1917- 

Bulgaria and Peace. By Crawfurd Price. Fortnightly 
Review, 418-31, September, 191 7. 

State of Feeling in Old Greece. By R. M. Burrows. 
Contemporary Review, 1-5, July, 1917- 

Mesopotamia. By F. C. Beatson and E. Cotes. Nine- 
teenth Century, 260-82, August, 1917. 

Holy Land: Whose to Have and to Hold? By A. Ri- 
HANI. Bookman, 7-14, September, 191 7. 

The Future of Palestine. Unsigned article from the 
" Spectator." Living Age, 764-7, June 23, 19 1 7. 

Serbia and European Peace. By M. S. Stanoyevich. 
North American Review, 583-5, October, 1917. 

Destiny of the Turkish Straits. By N. Buxton. Con- 
temporary Review, 679-89, June, 191 7« 

Europe at Turkey's Door. By L. Dominian. Scientific 
American Supplement, 229-31, April 4, 191 7. 

Constantinople: Principal or Pawn? By Herbert 
Adams Gibbons. Century, 517-26, February, 1917. 

Dardanelles. By J. GiRAUDOUX. North American Re- 
view, 285-91, August, 19 1 7. 

Future Frontiers of Turkey. By T. H. Holdich. 
Fortnightly Review, 784-94, May, 19 17. 

Constantinople — and Then ? By E. D. Schoonmaker. 
North American Review, 511-22, April, 191 7. 

Conquest of Turkey. Editorial. Independent, 478-9, 
March 19, 1917. 

Disposing of Turkey. Editorial. New Republic, 347-8, 
July 28, 1917- 

Partition of Islam. By P. Catzeflis. Forum, 33-41, 
January, 191 7. 

Poland 

The Kingdom of Poland. By H. N. Brailsford. New 
Republic, 174-6, December 16, 191 6. 

[337] 



The Vicious Circle of Nationality. By H, N. Brails- 
ford. New Republic, 157-9, September 16, igi6. 

The Polish Problem. By E. J. Dillon. Fortnightly 
Review, 373-88, March, 191 7. 

Danzig : Poland's Outlet to the Sea. By L. B. Namier^ 
Nineteenth Century, 300-5, February, 191 7. 

Polish Problem : Past and Present. By J. Rose. Con- 
temporary Review, 715—23, December, 191 6. 

Independence of Poland. By George de Swietochow- 
SKI. Fortnightly Review, 982—9; 21-5; December, 
19 1 6 — January, 19 17. 

The New Poland. By Roland G. Usher. New Re- 
public, 73-6, November 18, 19 16. 

Other Suppressed Nationalities 

{Listed alphabetically by countries.) 

Future of Bohemia. By J. Forman and F. Gribble. 
Nineteenth Century, 570-92, March, 191 7. 

Independent Bohemian-Slovak State. By C. Pergler. 
New Republic, 21-2, May 5, 1917. 

Bohemian Question. By C. Pergler. Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 155— 
60, July, 191 7. 

Finland's Independence: A Letter from Helsingfors. 
By R. C. Long. Fortnightly Review, 646-63, Novem- 
ber, 1917. 

India's Coming of Age. By J. C. R. Ewing. World 
Outlook, II, August, 19 1 7. 

India After the War. By J. Ramsay Macdonald. 
Contemporary Review, 280—6, September, 191 7. 

Our Hopes for India. By C. E. Maurice. Contem- 
porary Review, 87-92, January, 191 7. 

Danger in India. By Sydenham of Combe. Nine- 
teenth Century, 1 1 13-27; 31-50; December, 1916- 
January, 191 7. 

English Home Ruler's View. By L. A. Atherley- 
Jones. Nineteenth Century, 932-44, April, 191 7. 
[338] 



Irish Settlement: A Southern Unionist's View. By 
H. A. Blake. Nineteenth Century, 26-30, July, 1917. 

Political Psychology of Ireland. By A. Briton. Fort- 
nightly Review, 675-82, April, 191 7. 

Irish Grievance: The Case for the Anti-English Party. 
By J. F. Byrne. Century, 465-73, January, 191 7. 

Can the Irish Settle the Irish Question. By F. Dilnot. 
World's Work, 413-24, August, 191 7- 

Struggle for Home Rule. By H. W. Dresser. Home 
Progress, 245-6, February, 191 7. 

Ulster Home Rule. By A. P. Graves. Contemporary 
Review, 588-97, May, 1917. 

The Irish Convention and After. By Mrs. John Rich- 
ard Green. Atlantic Monthly, 644-50, November, 
1917. 

Plus Fait Douceur. By H. A. Law. Contemporary 
Review, 6-13, July, 19 1 7. 

In the Matter of Ireland. By S. MacManus. Inde- 
pendent, 61-2, July 14, 1917. 

Ulster Standpoint. By R. McNeill. Nineteenth Cen- 
tury, 922-31, April, 19 1 7. 

Prussia, Poland and Ireland. By J. A. R. Marriott. 
Edinburgh Review, 158—77, January, 1917. 

What Ireland Wants. By J. R. O'Connell. Fort- 
nightly Review, loi-iio, July, 191 7. 

Nationalist Ireland — The Case for Home Rule. By 
E. R. Turner. Nation, 307-10, March 15, 1917. 

Ulster — An Exposition Based on the Writings of Both 
Sides. By E. R. Turner. Nation, 97-101, January 

25, 1917- 

The Letts. By C. T. H. Wright. Edinburgh Review, 
347-63, October, 191 7. 

Claims of Lithuania. By G. F. Lees. Contemporary 
Review, 178-85, August, 19 17. 

Little Russia. By T. L. Stoddard. Century, 569-76, 
August, 191 7. 

Ruthenian Question in Russia. By S. Rapoport. Con- 
temporary Review, 300-5, September, 1917. 

[339] 



The German Colonies 

Future of the German Colonies. By H. H. Johnston 
(The Case for Retention) and W. H. Dawson (The 
Case for Conditional Return). Contemporary Review, 
250-63, September, 191 7. 

The African Question. By H. H. Johnston. Living 
Age, 625-7, September 8, 1917. 

Germany's Colonial Empire: Seven Reasons Against 
Restoration. By J. H. Harris. 'Nineteenth Century, 
1157-63, May, 1917. 

Germany's Lost Colonial Empire. By J. H. Harris. 
Contemporary Review, 464—71, April, 191 7* 

Germany and Africa. By Mallam. Edinburgh Re- 
view, 153-66, July, 1917. 

England's Place in the Sun. By A. P. Usher. Unpopu- 
lar Review, 311-21, October, 1916. 

Question of the German Colonies. Editorial. Independ- 
ent, 436, March 12, 1917. 

The Far East and the Pacific 
What May Happen in the Pacific. By H. C. Douglas. 

Review of Reviews, 394-8, April, 1917. 
China's Predicament. By G. L. Harding. Nation, 

311-13, September 20, 19 17. 
Diplomacy in the Far East. By G. L. Harding. New 

Republic, 105-6, August 25, 191 7. 
Japan's Acts in China. By J. W. Jenks. World's 

Work, 312-28, January, 19 17. 
Chinese Attitude Toward Japan. By J. W. Jenks. 

Scribner's 149—60, February, 19 17 
Oriental Accord. By J. W. Jenks. Independent, 214, 

February 5, 19 17. 
Far East After the War. By K. K. Kawakami. Re- 
view of Reviews, 176—9, February, 191 7. 
Japan and Germany. By K. K. Kawakami. Forum, 

381-90, April, 1917. 
Japan, China and the Far East. By K. K. Kawakami. 

Review of Reviews, 415—17, October, 1917. 
[340] 



The Question of China. By K. S, Latourette. Yale 
Review, 101-17, October, 191 7- 

Neglected Realities in the Far East. By H. R. MusSEY. 
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Part 
II., 14-23, July, 1917- 

Bull in the China Shop. Editorial. New Republic, 
200-1, June 23, 1917. 

Japanese Mission. Editorial. New Republic, 94-5, Au- 
gust 25, 1917- 



//. QUESTION OF SEAS AND MARKETS 
Books and Pamphlets 

The Freedom of the Seas. By Chandler P. Anderson. 
Philadelphia, American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 19 17. 11 p. 

Can Trade Be Captured. By Norman Angell. Lon- 
don, War & Peace, Ltd., 19 15. 

The World's Highway. By Norman Angell. New 
York, Doran, 191 5. 361 p. 

The Freedom of the Seas. By Arthur James Balfour. 
London, Unwin, 1916. up. 

Theory of International Trade. By C. F. Bastable. 
New York, Macmillan, 19 14. 

La lotta economica del dopo guerra. By L. DeFeo. 
(Preface by Giuseppe Canepa.) Milan, Treves, 191 7. 
xii., 109 p. 

Economic Protectionism. By Josef Grunzel, (Edited 
by Eugen von Philippovich ) . Milford, Carnegie En- 
dowment for International Peace, Division of economics 
and history, 1916. 320 p. 

Germany's Commercial Grip on the World; Her Busi- 
ness Methods Explained. By Henri Hauser. (Tr. 
from the French by Manfred Emanuel.) New York, 
Scribner, 1917. 

The New Protectionism. By J. A. Hobson. New 
York, Putnam, 191 6. 152 p. 

[341] 



Sea Power. By Archibald Hurd. London, Constable. 

94 P- 

The New Empire Partnership: Defence, Commerce, 
Policy. By Archibald and Percy Hurd. London, 
Murray, 19 15. 422 p. 

America's Foreign Relations. By Willis Fletcher 
Johnson. New York, Century, 19 16. 2 v. 

The Ethics of International Trade. By Henri Lam- 
bert. London, Milford, 1915. 

Pax Economica. By Henri Lambert. New York, 
J. C. Rankin Co., 19 17. 99 p. 

European International Relations. By J. A. Murray 
Macdonald. London, Unwin, 19 16. 144 p. 

II Mediterraneo e il suo equilibrio. By Vico Mante- 
GAZZA. (Preface by Giovanni Bettolo.) Milan, 
Treves, 19 14. xv., 298 p. 

The War After the War. By I. F. Marcosson. New 
York, Lane, 19 17. 272 p. 

German Trade-War on England. By Sir Guilford 
Molesworth. London, Odhams, 19 16. 12 p. 

Terms of Industrial Peace. By Alex Ramsay. Lon- 
don, Constable, 191 7. 

Germany's Isolation: An Exposition of the Economic 
Causes of the War. By Paul Rohrbach. (Tr. by 
Paul H. Phillipson.) Chicago, 111., McClurg, 191 5. 
xvii., 186 p. 

Freie Meere! By G, von Schulze-Gaevernitz. 
Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 191 5. 32 p. 

The Real German Rivalry: Yesterday, To-day and To- 
morrow. By Sir Swire Smith. London, Unwin, 
1916. 80 p. 

The Paris Conference and Trade After the War. By 
Harold Storey. London, Unwin, 19 16. 32 p. 

American World Policies. By Walter E. Weyl. New 
York, Macmillan, 1917. 307 p. 

The Freedom of the Seas. By Bernard R. Wise. Lon- 
don, Darling & Son, 19 15. 10 p. 
[342] 



II Dominio del Mare nel Conflftto Anglo-Germanico. 
By Italo Zingarelli. Milan, Treves. 

European Economic Alliances. A compilation of Informa- 
tion on International Commercial Policies after the 
European War and their Effect upon the Foreign Trade 
of the U. S. Also an analysis of European and United 
Commercial Inter-Dependence and Treaty Relations. 
New York, National Foreign Trade Council, igi6. 
119 p. 

Referendum on the Report of the Special Committee on 
Economic Results of the War and American Business. 
Reprinted by permission of the Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States. New York, American Associa- 
tion for International Conciliation, 19 15. 46 p. 

(See also Monthly Bulletins of the Society to Eliminate 
Economic Causes of War, Roger W. Babson, Sec, 
JVellesley Hills, Mass.) 

Articles 
The Gates of the Mediterranean, By Capt. Battine. 

Fortnightly Review, 763—71, November, 1917. 
Report of Lord Balfour of Burleigh's Committee. By 

Beauchamp. Contemporary Review, 545-52, May, 

1917. 
Strategy of Economic Peace. By H. N. Brailsford. 

New Republic, 96-8, August 25, 191 7. 
Reichstag and Economic Peace. By H. N. Brailsford. 

Fortnightly Review, 447—57, September, 19 17. 
Basis for a Durable Peace Between Germany and England. 

By W. C. Bullitt. Annals of the American Academy 

of Political and Social Science, 113— 17, July, 1917. 
Two Paths of Empire. By H. Cox. Edinburgh Re- 
view, 379-408, April, 19 1 7. 
Whose Open Door? By O. K. Davis. Everybody's, 

34-46, January, 191 7. 
Nationality and Freedom of Commerce Prerequisites to a 

Durable Peace. By S. P. Duggan. Annals of the 

[343] 



American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
13 1-6. July, 191 7. 

Empire and the New Protection. By H. W. Fox. Nine- 
teenth Century, 510-27, March, 19 17. 

Economic Imperialism; Germany's Self-Revelation of 
Guilt. By David Jayne Hill. Century, 356-63, 
July, 1917. 

Economic Programmes After the War. By F. W. Hirst. 
Atlantic Monthly, 243—6, February, 1917. 

Great Britain Abandons Free Trade. By J. C. Hopkins. 
Review of Revieius, 178—81, August, 191 7. 

.Trade, Concessions, Investments, Conflict and Policy in 
the Far East. By Stanley K. Hornbeck. Proceed- 
ings of the Academy of Political Science, Part II., 80- 
98, July, 1917- 

Financial Imperialism. By Frederic C. Howe. At- 
lantic Monthly, 477-84, October, 1917. 

The Freedom of the Seas. The Enemy's Trap. By 
Archibald Hurd. Fortnightly Review, 685-99, No- 
vember, 191 7. 

Passing of Economic Nationalism. By A. Johnson. 
Harper s, 221-5, July, 19 17. 

Way to Durable Peace. By B. Lasker. Yale Review, 
24-42, October, 19 17. 

The True Freedom of the Seas. By Sir John Mac- 
DONELL. Nineteenth Century, 1007— 21, November, 

1917- 

A Plea for British Trade. By Sir Charles Mallet. 
Nineteenth Century, 633—46, September, 1917. 

Economic Hymn of Hate. By H. R. Mussey. Un- 
popular Review, 36-55, January, 191 7. 

American Statesmen and Freedom of the Seas. By C. 
O'SuLLivAN. Catholic World, 447-62, January, 
1917. 

Bagdad Corridor. By K. Pool, New Republic, 318-19, 
January 20, 19 17. 

Economic Factors in an Enduring Peace. By E. E. 

[344] 



Pratt. Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 136-9, July, 191 7. 

Two Conceptions of the Freedom of the Seas. By Jesse 
S. Reeves. American Historical Review, 535-43, 
April, 191 7. 

Theory of Trade War. By J. M. Robertson. Con- 
temporary Review, 45-54, February, 1917. 

Economic Access and Neutralization of Water Ways. 
By J. Russell Smith. Proceedings of the Academy 
of Political Science, Part I, 80-86, July, 19 17. 

Neutrals and Permanent Peace. By L. Simons. At- 
lantic Monthly, 190-201, August, 191 7. 

World's Trade After the War. By Sidney Webb. 
North American Review, 575-82, October, 1917. 

Open vs. the Closed Door. By E. Winslow. North 
American Review, 446-54, September, 191 7. 

Bagdad Railway in the War. By H. C. Woods. Fort- 
nightly Review, 233-46, August, 19 17. 

Belgian Manufacturer Traces the War to the Immorality 
of the Protective Tariff. Current Opinion, 409, 
December, 19 16. 

Germany and the Sea. Editorial. Nation, 250-1, 
March i, 1917. 

Trade War After the War. Editorial. Nation, 359-60, 
March 29, 19 17. 

Ruining German Trade. Editorial. Nation, 674-5, 
June 7, 191 7. 

German Tariff Plans. Editorial. New Republic, 259- 
61, March 31, 1917. 

Trade War or Stable Peace. Editorial. New Republic, 
176-7, June 16, 1917. 

Future of German Commerce. Editorial. New Repub- 
lic, 207-9, September 22, 191 7. 

Internationalism on the Seas. Editorial. New Repub- 
lic, 260—1, October 6, 191 7. 

Economic Rights of Way. Editorial. The New States- 
man, 367-9; 392-3, July 21-28, 191 7. 

[345] 



///. QUESTION OF A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
AND DISARMAMENT 

Books and Pamphlets 

America and the New World State. By Norman 

Angell. New York, Putnam, 1915. 295 p. 
The American League to Enforce Peace: An English 

Interpretation. By C. R. Ashbee. London, Allen & 

Unwin, 1917. 92 p. 
The English Speaking Peoples. By George L. Beer. 

New York, Macmillan, 1917. 31 p. 
Why Britain Should Disarm: The Economic Case for 

Non-Resistance. By George Benson. London, Nat'l 

Labour Press, 191 7. 
Towards an Enduring Peace. Randolph S. Bourne, 

Ed. (Int. by Franklin H. Giddings.) New York, 

American Association for International Conciliation, 

1916. 336 p. 
A League of Nations. By H. N. Brailsford. New 

York, Macmillan, 191 7. 338 p. 
The War of Steel and Gold; A Study of the Armed 

Peace. By H. N. Brailsford. London, Bell, 1915. 

340 p. 
Deutschlands Kriegsziele. By Erich Brandenburg. 

Leipzig, Quelle & Meyer, 19 17. 
International Realities. By P. M. Brown. New York, 

Scribner, 19 17. 
Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars. By James 

Bryce^ et al. London, Allen & Unwin, 19 17. 53 p. 
The Morality of Nations. By C. Delisle Burns. 

London University Press, 191 5. 
Towards a Lasting Settlement. By Charles R. Bux- 
ton, et al. New York, Macmillan, 19 16. 216 p. 
War Against War and the Enforcement of Peace. By 

Christen Collin and Christian Dreyer. (Int. by 

William Archer.) New York, Macmillan, 19 17. 

163 p. 
[346] 



Basis of a Durable Peace. By Cosmos, pseud. New 
York, Scribner, 1917. 144 p. 

The European Anarchy. By G. Lowes Dickenson. 
New York, Macmillan, 191 6. 144 p. 

The Choice Before Us. By G. Lowes Dickenson. 
New York, Dodd, Mead, 191 7. 268 p. 

The Restoration of Europe. By Alfred H. Fried. 
New York, Macmillan, 19 16. 157 p. 

A League to Enforce Peace. By Robert Goldsmith. 
(Int. by A. Lawrence Lowell.) New York, Mac- 
millan, 1917. 331 p. 

Bodies Politic and Their Governments. By Basil Ed- 
ward Hammond. Cambridge University Press, 191 5. 

President Wilson. By H. Wilson Harris. New York, 
Stokes, 1 91 7. 278 p. 

Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace. By George 
D. Herron. New York, Kennerly, 19 17. 173 p. 

The Re-building of Europe. By David Jayne Hill. 
New York, Century, 19 17. 282 p. 

Towards International Government. By J. A. Hobson. 
New York, Macmillan, 1915. 216 p. 

The Way to Disarm. By Hamilton Holt. New 
York, American Association for International Concilia- 
tion, 1914. 8 p. 

The World in Alliance: A Plan for Preventing Future 
Wars. By Frank N. Keen. London, Southwood, 
1915. 60 p. 

Our Question of Questions, Arm or Disarm? By Wil- 
liam Wirt Kimball. Washington, D. C, Navy Pub. 
Co., 1917. 131 p. 

Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty. By Harold J. 
Laski. Yale University Press, 191 7. 

Enforced Peace. By A, Lawrence Lowell, et al. 
New York, League to Enforce Peace, 19 16. 204 p. 

The International Crisis : The Theory of the State. By 
J. S. Mackenzie, et al. Oxford University Press, 
1917- 163 P- 

[347] 



League of Nations ; A Chapter in the History of the Move- 
ment. By Theodore MArburg. New York, Mac- 
millan, 191 7. 139 p. 

L'Armee Internationale. By General Percin. The 
Hague, La Paix par le droit, 191 7. 

The Confederation of Europe. By W. Alison Phillips. 
New York, Longmans, Green, 19 14. 229 p. 

Termination of War and Treaties of Peace. By Cole- 
man Phillipson. New York, Dutton, 19 16. 454 p. 

La Guerra dei Populi e la Futura Confederazione Europea, 
Secondo un Metodo Analogic© Storico. By Ettore 
PoNTi. Milan, Hoepli, 1915. 216 p. 

Pace Giusta e Duratura: da un Congresso Giuridico di 
Popoli alia Futura Sovranita Interstatale. By Ar- 
NALDO Ranzi. Rome, Desclee, 1917. 100 p. 

Political Ideals. By Bertrand Russell. New York, 
Century, 1917. 172 p. 

Les Bases d'une Paix Durable. By Auguste Schvan. 
Paris, Alcan, 191 7. 245 p. 

Program and Policies of the League to Enforce Peace. 
By William H, Short. New York, League to En- 
force Peace, 191 7. 48 p. 

America and the New Epoch. By Charles P. Stein- 
METZ. New York, Harper, 1916. 228 p. 

What is Coming? A European Forecast. By H. G. 
Wells. New York, Macmillan, 19 16. 294 p. 

International Government. By L. S. Woolf and the 
Fabian Society. (Int. by G. B. Shaw.) New York, 
Brentano, 1916. 412 p. 

The Framework of a Lasting Peace. By L. S. Woolf. 
London, Allen & Unwin, 191 7. 

Articles 
A Parliament of Parliaments. By Felix Adler. Pro- 
ceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Part I, 
53-8, July, 19 1 7. 
The Background of Aggression. By Norman Angell. 
New Republic, 150-2, September 8, 19 17. 
[348] 



The Paradox of Prussian Peace. By Norman Angell. 

Independent, 15, October 6, 19 17. 
The Sanctions of Peace. By William Barry. Dublin 

Review, 173-97, April, 1917. 
Can Man Abolish War? By Harold Begbie. North 

American Review, 743-53 5 886-94, May-June, 1917. 
Peace by Organization. By H. N. Brailsford. New 

Republic, 187-go, March 17, 19 17. 
The United States and the League of Peace. By H. N. 

Brailsford. Atlantic Monthly, 433-42, April, 1917. 
Plans for World Organization. By James Byrne. 

Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Part 

I., 183-7, July, 191 7. 
Enforcing Peace. By Edwin M. Chapman. Hibbert 

Journal, 189-98, January, 191 7. 
The Structure of Peace. By Herbert Croly. New 

Republic, 287-91, January 13, 1917. 
A League of Nations and Its Critics. By W. H. Dick- 
inson. Contemporary Review, 665—73, June, 1917. 
Problems of a Peace League. By C. W. Dustin. North 

American Review, 475-7, March, 1917. 
A League to Enforce Peace. By Walter L. Fisher. 

Annals of the American Academy of Political and So- 
cial Science, 185-99, July, 1917. 
The Bases of a Just and Enduring Peace. By Franklin 

H. GiDDiNGS. Annals of the American Academy of 

Political and Social Science, 83—8, July, 191 7. 
Tropical Colonies — " International Government." By 

J. H. Harris. Fortnightly Revieiu, 742—7, November, 

1917. 
Why Peace must be Enforced. By Hamilton Holt. 

Independent, 212—3, February 5, 19 1 7. 
The League to Enforce Peace. By Hamilton Holt. 

Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Part 

I., 65-69, July, 1917. 
The Future of International Law. By Charles E. 

Hughes. Proceedings of the Academy of Political 

Science, Part I, 3-15, July, 1917. 

[349] 



International Organization : A New Era. By William 
I. Hull. Bookman, 138-44, April, 1917. 

A World Court. By William I. Hull. Proceedings 
of the Academy of Political Science, Part I., 29—35, 
July, 19 1 7. 

A Synopsis of Plans for International Organization. By 
Charles H. Levermore. World Court Magazine, 
222-5, May, 1 91 7. 

The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democ- 
racy. By Walter Lippmann. Annals of the Ameri- 
can Academy of Political and Social Science, l-io, 
July, 191 7. 

Armed Pacifism. By John Macdonell. Contemporary 
Review, 290-300, March, 1917. 

Sovereignty and Race as Affected by a League of Nations. 
By Theodore Marburg. Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 142—6, July, 

1917- 

International Organization: Constitution of a Legisla- 
tive Body. By Raleigh C. Minor. Virginia Law 
Review, May, 191 7. 

International Arbitration. By John Bassett Moore. 
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Part 
L, 21-8, July, 1917. 

Bases para la Organizacion Internacional de la Solidari- 
dad de los Estados ante el Delincuente. By Fernando 
Ortiz. Rev. Bimestre Cubana, 15-20, January-Feb- 
ruary, 191 7. 

President Wilson's Peace Program and the British' Em- 
pire. By W. Alison Phillips. Edinburgh Review, 
227-48, April, 191 7. 

National Federations and World Federation. By W. 
Alison Phillips. Edinburgh Review, 1-27, July, 

1917- 

The American Plan for Enforcing Peace. By Frederick 
Pollock. Atlantic Monthly, 650-5, May, 19 17. 

National Independence and Internationalism. By Bert- 
rand Russell. Atlantic Monthly, 622-8, May, 1917. 

[350] 



Disarmament and International Courts Prerequisites to a 
Durable Peace. By J. L. Slayden. Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 92— 
100, July, 191 7. 

Future Machinery of Peace. By J. G. Snead-Cox. 
Dublin Review, 1-16, January, 191 7. 

International Legislation and Administration. By 
Alpheus H. Snow. Proceedings of the Academy of 
Political Science, Part I., 36-53, July, 191 7- 

American Dream of Peace. By H. Stephen. Nine- 
teenth Century, 799-810, April, 19 17. 

An Illusion of To-day. By F. G. Stone, Nineteenth 
Century, 700-8, April, 191 7. 

Problems of World Legislation and America's Share 
Therein. By John H. Wigmore. Virginia Law Re- 
view, March, 191 7. 

Disarmament and Democracy. Editorial. New Repub- 
lic, 230-2, September 29, 191 7. 

League of Nations: History of Movement. Editorial. 
New Statesman, 342-4, July 14, 1917. 

NOTE 

The English publication. New Europe (Vol. I., No. I, 
October, 19 16), is a weekly magazine devoted to the 
problems of the settlement. It is edited by a distinguished 
list of collaborators representing the chief allied countries. 
It is an indispensable source of information on current dip- 
lomatic problems. Pertinent articles which have appeared 
in it are too numerous to be listed here. 



[351] 



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